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Klages and the Biocentric Worldview – Andersen

Ludwig Klages and the Biocentric Worldview

By Joakim Andersen

 

Ludwig Klages (1872–1956) was one of the most interesting thinkers of the twentieth century. He was also one of the most complex. Klages was a philosopher, a psychologist, and a leading graphologist. Together with Alfred Schuler and Karl Wolfskehl, he formed the ‘Cosmic Circle’ in Munich. The Circle consisted of the milieu around the poet Stefan George, but it did not fully adhere to George’s patriarchal worldview.

Klages was a productive and original thinker. Among other things, he was the father of the term ‘id’ which was later to be picked up by Sigmund Freud. Klages also coined the term logocentrist, which today is a term used in certain types of feminist theories. He gave his psychological school the name characterology, and wrote several classics on graphology.

Klages was a man of paradox. In his writings he was an anti-Semite, yet he spent several years editing the works of his Jewish-Hungarian colleague, the natural philosopher Melchior Palagyi, after he had passed away. Klages was not very popular in the Third Reich, but neither did he renounce his theories about Judaism even after the Second World War, either. Recently, Jürgen Habermas stated that there is much of value in Klages, given that he was such an original and interesting thinker. But his unique perspective is now largely forgotten. It is therefore of great value that Arktos Media has published two books consisting of excerpts from his writings, translated by Joseph D. Pryce (Pryce has also written a valuable introduction to both collections). This present review focuses on the first of them, The Biocentric Worldview.

The Biocentric Worldview

‘Wild boar, ibex, fox, pine marten, weasel, duck and otter — all animals with which the legends dear to our memory are intimately intertwined — are shrinking in numbers, where, that is, they have not already become extinct…’ — Klages, 1913

What I appreciate the most in Klages’ thought is his so-called biocentric worldview. Klages claims that the distinction between ‘idealism’ and ‘materialism’ is rather irrelevant. In its place he describes a deeper, less well-known historical conflict. Klages puts Life in the centre, but he also identifies an anti-Life force that gradually infiltrated the world and took it over. Klages uses the German terms Seele and Geist, usually translated as Spirit and Mind. There is an intimate connection between Life and Spirit, but Mind is connected to abstractions, like ‘sin’, ‘will to power’, and similar concepts. Klages illuminates the difference:

‘Just as the philosopher of spirit considers everything that denies spirit to be a “sin”, the philosopher of life regards that which denies life to be an offense… no one speaks of a sin against a tree, but men have certainly spoken in the past — and even today many still speak — of an offense against a tree.’

Among these expressions of anti-Life he mentions moralism, Judaism, and Christianity, as well as capitalism and militarism. Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ also risks becoming a part of the anti-Life forces and an unhealthy obsession. Klages develops a useful deep ecological perspective, related to and complementing Naess, Abbey, and Linkola. He also describes how ‘progress’ has hurt the world. In the essay ‘Man and Earth’, Klages describes how animals and plants became extinct, but also how folk cultures and authentic human emotions are pushed aside. Klages was an anti-colonialist, and discusses how both species of animals and human cultures are extinguished. In their place everything, is homogenised, and the vampire that is Geist spreads over the world. Thus Klages connects the threat against biological diversity with the threat against cultural.

‘Modern man´s conscious striving for power far surpasses that of any previous epoch… in the service of human needs, the ever-increasing mechanization has brought about the desecration of the natural world.’ — Klages

These essays are also interesting from the perspective of the history and philosophy of science. Klages analyses both psychoanalysis and Socrates, among many other things. He criticises concepts like ‘progress’ and utopianism as being hostile to Life. His perspective places primary value on Spirit and Life, and on the non-conscious and the qualitative. One does well to compare Klages with Guénon’s The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times, along with Heidegger and Alexander Jacob’s De Naturae Natura.

Klages and Romanticism

‘Man should look upon the harvested fruits of the unconscious as an unexpected windfall bestowed by Heaven above.’ — Goethe

Among Klages’ own sources we find Nietzsche and the pre-Socratic philosophers. We also find the German Romantics and Goethe. Among the Romantics, Klages focuses on the now largely forgotten Carl Gustav Carus. He demonstrates that German Romanticism has permanent value.

In one’s own life, Klages is of value in showing that too much Geist leads to a worse and less authentic life. When the process has gone too far, one loses the ability to perceive the beauty of a forest, and instead only sees it as something merely quantifiable: as a bunch of timber. Likewise, the Romantics and Klages are also of use in politics. They show that the tendency towards hyper-politicisation and ideological thinking are among the enemies of Life. Family, nature, emotions, beauty, folk culture — they are all threatened by too much Geist. When Karlheinz Weissmann identifies the living as the leitmotiv of conservatism, or when Heinrich von Leo described his mission as protecting the ‘God-given, real life, in its development following its inner forces’, they are clearly related to Klages. Conservatism, defined as taking care of the living, not only animals and plants but also such ‘organisms’ as cultures, can also be biocentric.

When it comes to the philosophy of science, Carus, Goethe, and Klages are also of great use, given their focus on the whole rather than on the parts of things, on the sub- or non-conscious, and on reality and life above the prevailing focus on the mechanical and quantifiable. Klages quotes Carus: ‘…the key to an understanding of conscious thought resides in the realm of the unconscious.’

The Biocentric Worldview is thus of great value due to its deep ecological qualities as well as Klages’ original conception of history. Klages’ description of the rise and vampire-like spread of Geist has much in common with Nietzsche’s description of how ressentiment and slave morality takes over the world. (However, some aspects of Nietzsche are also dangerously close to the vampire.)

Klages is not a determinist. He does not rule out that Spirit and Life may be defended against Mind. He also reminds us that the goal of a Spirit-oriented science is to understand, rather than to reduce and manipulate. His role models are thus heroes, poets, and gods. The anthology is highly recommended.

 

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Andersen, Joakim. “Ludwig Klages and the Biocentric Worldview.” RightOn, 6 November 2015. < https://www.righton.net/2015/11/06/ludwig-klages-and-the-biocentric-worldview/ >.

 

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Conversation with Alain de Benoist – Versluis

A Conversation with Alain de Benoist by Arthur Versluis (PDF – 303 KB):

A Conversation with Alain de Benoist by Arthur Versluis

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De Benoist, Alain. “A Conversation with Alain de Benoist.” Interview by Arthur Versluis. Journal for the Study of Radicalism, No. 8.2 (Fall 2014), pp. 79-106. Retrieved from <http://files.alaindebenoist.com/alaindebenoist/pdf/jsr-entretien_avec_arthur_versluys.pdf >.

 

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Interview with Fenek Solère – Macek (Editor)

Interview with Fenek Solère by Daniel Macek, Editor of the New European Conservative

 

Introductory Note: The following is an original interview with Fenek Solère, an Anglophone representative of what is known as the ‘Identitarian Movement.’ We have conducted this interview via email and it is published here on our website New European Conservative for the first time. In this discussion, Solère provides his own particular interpretation of Identitarianism, its major concepts and thinkers, and related Right-wing movements. Of course, it should be noted that we don’t agree with all of Solère’s statements; this interview is not an expression of the official position of the New European Conservative, but rather of Fenek Solère’s personal studies and views. – Daniel Macek (Editor of the New European Conservative)

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We are aware that you identify as an ‘Identitarian’ which refers to a Right-Wing movement historically connected with the Nouvelle Droite. It happens that different authors don’t always define this term in the same manner and disagree who exactly falls into this category. How do you define the term Identitarian and which thinkers or political leaders do you think can be included in it?

Identity itself is a complex subject. It is composed of many elements and operates on the individual and group level. Some aspects of individual identity you can choose, like the house where you live or the clothes you wear, which to a certain extent define your taste, project your personality or can be taken as an indication of your material circumstances. Other aspects like ‘genetic markers’ locate individuals within a particular group and are far less transient and require more radical interventions if you desire to alter or overcome them. For example, one’s gender or skin colour are pre-determined. Although weight and hair colour can be modified, your starting point is fixed, has is the shape of your skull, the size of your brain or the structure of your nasal bones and septal cartilage.

So for Identitarians of the Nouvelle Droite (ND), Neue Rechte and Nueva Derecha dispensation Human Bio-Diversity (HBD) is something to celebrate, as well as an essential bio-marker for identity. Thus, true Identitarianism mitigates the fear of the other by embracing the fact that we are different and that each group has distinct general attributes that fit them to the environment from which they originate and are reflected in the cultures they have created. Neue Rechte thinker Pierre Krebs stated: ‘The originality and richness of the human heritages of this world are nourished by their differences and their deviations’.

The ND’s notion of ethnopluralism is therefore set in stark contrast to the egalitarian and universalist view that man is an undifferentiated mass. Identitarians in general sympathizing with Alain de Benoist and Charles Champetier’s opinion, ‘that from the socio-historical viewpoint, man as such does not exist, because his membership of humanity is always mediated by a particular cultural belonging’. Identitarians conceive identity to be based on jus sanguinis, a belonging based on primordial, organic and biological factors linked to the soil and national territory, not the liberal left’s post-Second World War civil welfare-state citizenship of jus soli. The former being a pragmatic approach to our inherent and instinctive family, regional, religious, gender or ancestral predilections and prejudices and our perceived in and out groups. The latter being underpinned by supra-national bodies like the UN and EU, which seek to use liberal leftist national governments to erode and destroy European ethnic homogeneity. Whilst at the same time turning identity into a commodity that can be bought and sold. Thus contriving to make the current influx of migrants into a source of profit for cosmopolitan elite, the real 1%, that in turn helps them to perpetuate the modernist market forces that generate their power-base.

Fallacious egalitarian notions which depend on arguments like race is a social construct, need to be challenged whenever and wherever they are encountered. In avoiding so self-evident a truth and denying the right to difference out of some misplaced fear of breaching the new religion of political correctness, we do an immense disservice not only to decades of scientific research but also to thousands of years of evolution.

And just to state for the record, Identitarianism is not National Socialism or Fascism with another face as some academics like Tamir Bar-On in his works Where Have All The Fascists Gone (2007) and Rethinking the French New Right (2013) try to imply, using that familiar technique of guilt by association. A quick perusal of Michael O’Meara’s book New Culture, New Right: Anti-Liberalism in Postmodern Europe (2nd Ed. 2013) is a perfect antidote to such misinformation. Similarly, one could quote from Dr. Tomislav Sunic’s insightful and erudite essay ‘Liberal Double-Talk and Its Lexical and Legal Consequences’ in his book Post-Mortem Report (2010) to disabuse the gullible.

However, it cannot be denied that there is some overlap between Old Right and New Right thinkers, mainly within the spectrum of the Revolutionary Conservative tradition. But it seems to me that today’s Identitarians essentially take their lead from Alain De Benoist, Dominique Venner, Pierre Krebs, Guillaume Faye, Pierre Vial, Alexander Dugin and more recently the new wave of philosopher activists like Markus Willinger and his Generation Identity: A Declaration of War Against the 68’ers (2013).

Personally, I am a firm believer in ethnocultural identity, agreeing with the Italian Pasquale Stanislao Mancini (1817-1888) that ‘Man is born as a member of a family and the nation being the aggregate of families, he is a citizen of the nation to which his father and his family belong’. Or indeed, Mancini’s fellow countryman Giussepe Mazzini (1805-1872) who defined nationality as biological membership of a common community, sharing cultural characteristics such as language, an affinity with a defined territory, and the spiritual will to be part of such an entity. Which for me, once again, perfectly describes the parameters of an individual’s identity. After-all what Briton’s soul is not touched when he dreams of the face of the princess buried with her chariot in Wetwang in East Yorkshire; what Celt is not moved when he sees the Bronze Age Battersea shield or the burial chamber of the ancient Prince in Lavau; what Saxon when he reflects on the majesty of the Sutton Hoo helmet; what Gaul when he ponders the paintings of Lascaux and the Palaeolithic art in the Chauvet Cave; what Slav when he walks by the archaeological remains of cities like Sintashta and Arkaim on the windswept Steppe or stands inside the Lavra complex in Kiev; what German when he realizes that the 7000 year old Neolithic concentric circles at Goseck form an ancient sun observatory far older than Stonehenge; what Swiss when he thinks of La Tene art; what Estonian when he hears the music of Arvo Part; What Italian when he marvels at the fact his Roman ancestors designed and built the aqueduct at the Pont du Gard; what Greek as he stands in the shadows cast by the pillars of the Acropolis in Athens; what Serb’s pulse does not beat faster when he recites Jovan Sterija Popovich’s The Warriors Lament at Kosovo Field; and what Portuguese heart does not burst with pride when he reads the sublime understated poetry of Fernando Pessoa?

The White European ethnos should not be constrained by national boundaries. I agree with Guillaume Faye, ‘To each European his own fatherland, national and regional, chosen on the basis of intimate emotive affinities – And to all Europeans the Great Fatherland, this land of intimately related peoples’. Borders should be permeable to those who are entitled by hereditary and custom to continue the natural osmosis of centuries, to mingle within the related blood lines and wider gene-pool to which they belong. But that vast territory, those reservoirs of blood and precious strands of mitochondrial DNA should always be protected against the mass contamination of out-groups. Which is why, as per Willinger (2013), ‘We Europeans shouldn’t fight one another over petty disagreements’. For there is a very clear and present danger, the enemy are pounding at the Gates of Vienna once more and we should rally to defend the citadel.

 

The term Identitarianism also seems to imply a movement limited to concerns about ‘identity’ (its root word), yet anyone who looks into it can see that Identitarians are typically concerned with far more issues than just the problem of identity. Do you think the name may pose a problem when presenting Identitarian theory to the public?

Our Identity is formed by a common European heritage. It is therefore axiomatic that we concern ourselves with the full range of issues that might give advantage or pose a threat to the continuation of that identity.

If one takes geography as a starting point it is clear that Europe is blessed with high mountains that form defensible natural barriers, riven with deep river valleys that flow into balmy Mediterranean bays and benefits greatly from an indented northern coastline. All these topographical features are key factors in the development and subsistence of small regional communities that could not only survive but also thrive and develop distinct and recognizable cultures of their own.

European identity is a rich matrix of differentiated communes of varying sizes, taking multifarious forms such as city-states, duchies, republics, nations and empires. Each to a greater or lesser extent benefiting from the ready availability of cultivatable land and navigable rivers that in turn provide trade routes to the world beyond.

Based on the Greek roots of Western liberty, defined by Herodotus as ‘a free people’, meaning a people who enjoy national independence and the Roman concept of libertas meaning all citizens treated equally before the law, by the 15th century there were over 500 self-governing entities operating within the land-mass that now falls under the aegis of the European Union.

It would therefore require a mass inversion of human character or a Great Replacement of the population, to borrow Renaud Camus’ terminology, before a psychology formed by centuries of rugged individualism and self-determination could be overturned.

And who would want to change it in the first place? Europe’s history is already a vibrant example of diversity in people, art, language, ideas and even technologies. These features in and of themselves fuelling the economic and political competition between the various inhabitants and nation states comprising the European homeland, leading to what the economic Historian Eric Jones describes has ‘the European miracle’. A dynamism that was sadly lacking in the heavily centralized models of governance adopted by Ming and Manchu China, the Mughal India and the Ottoman Empire.

We are what we have created. And we have created who we are.

One senses such pride in Pericles’ funeral oration of 431 B.C. where he spoke of the freedom, democracy and equality of his native Athens: ‘Thus, choosing to die resisting, rather than to live submitting, they fled only from dishonour’.

Are we so much less than they?

Europe is perhaps the greatest knowledge creating region in the world. We are the descendants of people that with the Emperor Constantine’s move from Rome to Constantinople in 324 A.D, effectively de-coupled Church and State, making it extremely difficult for an Islamic style Theocracy to become established in Europe; divested the King or Emperor of the claim to Godliness and thus placed limitations on temporal authority; developed the concept of individual liberty and communal responsibility; inherited many of the positive features of the Roman Republic, surviving through the Latin literate elite, which nurtured the notions and values of institutions like the senate, a republic, a constitution, a regulated system of jurisprudence and ultimately democracy.

We have created a civil society replete with private enterprise, state welfare, a free church, universities, guilds and freedoms of association beyond the control of the state apparatus. Therefore, we as Identitarians, concern ourselves with issues wider than the theme of identity. Our ideology needs to be all encompassing. But our approach to those issues, be they concerning personal freedom, means and forms of expression, the right to practice a particular religion, employment, economics, culture, art, the environment, foreign policy and defense should be defined through the lens of identity.

It seems to me a simple matter of political expediency to ensure that Identitarianism is presented has the best way to guarantee personal and group self-interest. And people create a culture. An Algerian may live in Paris but that does not make him Renoir’s nephew; a Trinidadian may sleep in a bedsit in Walthamstow but that does not mean he is a descendant of one of Henry V’s brave bowmen at Agincourt; and a Turk may run a kebab stall in Munich but that does not make him Bavarian. Our identity is our culture. Our culture is our identity. And culture and demographics is destiny.

Most identitarians advocate democracy of some sort, but there is some disagreement about what form of democracy should be used as a model (republic, direct democracy, mixed democracy) and whether there should be an aristocratic or elitist element in the government. What political structure do you yourself think Identitarians should aim for?

It is for individual peoples operating on the regional and national level to decide what form of democracy best serves their particular needs and circumstances. This will be greatly influenced by history, geography and socio-economic factors. The ability of a citizen to exercise their right to vote has been hard won and should be defended. It is a privilege that was denied to the majority of our forebears. For example before the 1832 Reform Act in Britain, only 1.8% of the adult population was eligible to vote. The Reform Act itself only increased that to 2.7%. By 1867 the franchise was extended to 6.7% and after 1884 to 12.1%. It was only in 1930 that women became fully enfranchised in the United Kingdom. America was little different, with only white land-owning males allowed to vote in the decades immediately after the American War of Independence and still only 5% able to vote in the years between 1824-1848. It therefore concerns me that with the increasing democratization we see today, little thought has been given to how someone qualifies to vote in the first place and the duties and responsibilities that come with such a right.

There are now for example vast numbers of politically illiterate people living in Europe, originating from continents and countries with either no tradition of democracy, or one rife with corruption, nepotism and Potemkin-style show elections. These people are more often than not accompanied by numerous dependents, who despite living off Western welfare, still do not speak the language of their host countries after generations of co-habitation. These willfully non-assimilating communities also currently qualify to vote in our elections.

And this is exactly why unsavoury individuals like Green Party MEP Daniel Cohn-Bendit openly advocates for more immigrants to enter Germany : ‘We, the Greens have to make sure to get as many immigrants as possible into Germany. If they are in Germany, we must fight for their right to vote, we need to change this Republic’. Sentiments which on reflection give a whole new meaning to French political scientist Alexis de Tocqueville’s thesis, espoused in his seminal text Democracy in America (1835/1840), about how modern democracy could lead to tyranny by the majority.

But what majority?

It is relatively simple to organize support along racial, ethnic or religious lines. And once a particular ethnic group or coalition holds the balance of power, it tends to ensure its own interests take priority. Barak Obama’s second term of office was greatly assisted by garnering 93% of the ‘black vote’ and 71% of the ‘Latino vote’ and 73% of the ‘Asian vote’. I predict we will see similar voting patterns emerging in the French Presidential elections of 2017. In this regard Western liberal democracy is being used both consciously and subconsciously as a Trojan Horse. Michael Doyle in his book Ways of War and Peace (1997) says of Immanuel Kant, the Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Konigsberg University and author of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781): ‘Kant distrusted unfettered, democratic majoritarianism, and his argument offers no support for a claim that all participatory polities – democracies – should be peaceful, either in general or between fellow democracies. Many participatory polities have been non-liberal. For two thousand years before the modern age, popular rule was widely associated with aggressiveness (by Thucydides) or imperial success (by Machiavelli)… The decisive preference of the median voter might well include ethnic cleansing against other democratic polities’.

Britain, the so-called Mother of Democracy, is a case in point. Recognising the tendency for people to vote for those who share their own ethnicity, are sympathetic to their in-group interest, or sometimes just plainly anti-white, led to the steep rise in both black and Muslim political representation in both the Conservative and Labour Parties over the last two decades. Such cynical attempts to pander to these hordes of new voters in order to win elections will however prove pyrrhic. With such notorious characters as Diane Abbott and Bernie Grant barely able to disguise their racial animus with comments like ‘white people love playing divide and rule, we should not play their game’ in the former case, and celebrating the murderous Broadwater Farm riots of October 1985 in the latter instance, by claiming ‘the police got a bloody good hiding’. And these are not isolated incidents. Grant, who was of Ghanaian extraction passing on the mantle of his black dominated constituency to David Lammy, who up until recently was a potential Labour mayoral candidate for London, whose platform included giving a mass amnesty for all illegal immigrants. Some media pundits are already touting with James Bond like certainty that Chuka Umunna, current Labour Shadow Secretary for Business, Innovation and Skills, will be Britain’s Obama of the 2020’s. And this is perfectly credible following Labour’s inevitable meltdown in the wake of ultra-Left Jeremy Corbyn’s election to the leadership, a replay of the shambolic steerage of the party under Michael Foot from 1980 to 1983.

But these cases, although rightfully shocking, are a lot less insidious than that epitomized by the Muslim community. Such as with Dr. Mohammad Naseem, who holds a senior position in the Islamic Party of Britain funding the Respect Party, that so flagrantly exploited The Anti-War Coalition to advance Muslim interests in Britain. The machinations of such people giving us an insight into our democratic dilemma. For they very clearly mobilized the fast growing Muslim block vote to defeat the Labour incumbent Oona King (herself a black ethnic) in Bow & Bethnal Green in 2005 and then overturned a substantial Labour majority in Bradford West in the 2012 General Election, returning George Galloway, with a 10, 140 majority. A success that was nearly replicated in Birmingham constituencies like Sparkbrook and Small Heath and the East End of London, in West Ham and East Ham. Locations where similar voting blocks are already beginning to distort the UK’s cherished democracy.

It is noticeable that Galloway publicly congratulated the Muslim Public Affairs Committee for his success in Bradford West. But that should not surprise us because the co-founder of Respect is Salma Yaqoob, an associate of Abjul Miah, an activist in the Islamic Forum of Europe, which calls for the imposition of Sharia in Europe. Yaqoob, along with elected fellow councilor for Birmingham Mohammad Ishtiaq, revealed their political sympathies when they remained seated with arms folded, showing utter contempt, during the award of the George Cross medal to L/Cpl Matt Croucher who had so valiantly thrown himself on top of a Taliban hand-grenade in order to protect his comrades. Such acts of support for terrorism inspiring others, resulting in the Respect Party taking 5 further seats on Bradford Council between 2012-2015.

Then there is the widespread investigations of electoral fraud perpetrated by Muslims in Scotland and Birmingham. The corruption of the first directly elected Muslim Mayor of Tower Hamlets, Bangladeshi born Lutfur Rahman and the expense abuses of the first ever Muslim woman elected to the British Parliament, the so-called Baroness Pola Uddin to consider. Given that Labour have now nominated Sadiq Khan for their candidate for London Mayor and the fact that London is fast becoming a majority non-white city, things do not bode well for democracy in the United Kingdom. Especially when the politically slick Khan presents himself as a moderate by criticizing the Labour leader for failing to sing the National anthem at formal state events and insists that he will fight anti-Semitism and support gay marriage as part of his global appeal to the rainbow coalition of minorities, which is set to eclipse the white heterosexual community in the capital within a decade.

So my response to what form of democracy Identitarians should advance is very simple and should be applied to the whole of Europe, North America, Canada, Australia etc. For it seems to me, to turn Alexis de Tocqueville slightly on his head, we are actually ruled by a pernicious minority, rather than majority, who do seek to keep us, as de Tocqueville rightly asserts as perpetual children, overseeing us like a shepherd might a flock of animals. Where de Tocqueville’s prescience is undeniable is in his identification of how the majority can be swayed, stating: ‘The majority has enclosed thought within a formidable fence. A writer is free inside that area, but woe to the man who goes beyond it, not that he stands in fear of an inquisition, but he must face all kinds of unpleasantness in every day persecution. A career in politics is closed to him for he has offended the only power that holds the keys’.

In order to overcome this position and to reclaim the majority position within the existing democratic process radical steps are required:

 

  • The immediate withdrawal of the franchise from all personages who cannot prove descent from citizens of the state where they currently reside prior to 1950, or at least three full generations;
  • Exemption to the above to be granted only in the case of migrant persons of full European heritage who have migrated legally and have themselves been previously resident in nations where there is a tradition of democracy;
  • The above caveat to be suspended in the case of Slavic peoples who have been subject to Communist Dictatorship;
  • The end of the right of prisoners with serious criminal convictions such as terrorists or those who have been sentenced for electoral misdemeanors or abuse of public office from exercising the right to vote;
  • All members of proscribed religio-terrorist organizations to be prevented from participating in the franchise or proselytizing in the public realm;
  • The cessation of all funding for organizations that promulgate multiculturalism, foreign community cohesion, etc. and the initiation of actions to reclaim all monies spent or unspent from the budget holders of such organizations;
  • The suspension from office of all elected officials who do not meet the familial descent criteria identified above;
  • The seizure of all assets obtained by said elected officials and full and thorough investigations conducted of their personal and business interests and their voting records by an independent panel;
  • The removal from the statute books of the legal notion of civil citizenship;
  • The term ethnic citizenship to be enshrined in all codified laws pertaining to the states in question;
  • The repatriation of all criminal, long term unemployed and economically inactive personages who fail to meet the first criteria stated above;
  • The funded repatriation, using international or foreign aid budgets, of all people failing the familial descent criteria, as per above, to their original ethnic homelands. Following the purchase of the ticket, the remainder of the balance per individual or family unit to go to the receiving countries;
  • The above policy to be in force for a period of five years only, after which, there will be no budget allocated either in regard to foreign aid or repatriation, unless in instances of natural disaster, humanitarian assistance or expended in the national or Western interest;
  • A tiered structure of residency to be introduced providing certain privileges based on factors like longetivity of residence, tax contributions and recognition of public service;
  • The deportation of all Asylum Seekers and refugees who fail to meet the UN’s own criteria of the ‘passage to the nearest safe country’;
  • The removal from public office, university chairs and the welfare infrastructure of all officials who have supported by word or deed the political, economic and cultural ethnocide of people of European identity in their own homelands;
  • The return of the death penalty for all serious crimes including treason;
  • The establishment of a Pan-Atlantic Court to preside over tribunals relating to the above.

 

What are your personal religious views, and how do you think religious revival will occur in conjunction with Right-Wing revolutions?

I was born into a High Anglican family but greatly sympathize with Julius Evola’s description of himself as a Catholic Pagan. I think it was the English Philosopher Thomas Hobbes who called Catholicism ‘the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire sitting crowned upon its grave’. I am drawn to the ceremonial, the beauty of the music and the mystery of the liturgy but cannot abide the current trend in Christianity towards the promulgation of pacifism and the worship of the stranger. First and foremost I sense there is a deep and unacknowledged smugness and condescension underlying this faux charity. Secondly, our Christian values are being misused by a fifth column to undermine Western Civilization, in what I think is a war of moral position, to thwart attempts by Europeans to defend their homeland from a tsunami style invasion from the Global South. Ironically, these new arrivals are mostly non-Christians (Muslims) who have come from failing states and societies where Christians are killed for their religious beliefs, their priests and nuns butchered, places of worship desecrated and their church spires burnt to cinders. So I do not think we need a latter day Nostradamus to predict what is coming.

My personal belief system can never incorporate conversion by the sword as per Charlemagne’s massacre at Verden of 4,500 Saxons, or his enforcement in 785 AD of the Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae which reads: ‘If any one of the race of the Saxons or hereafter any concealed among them shall have wished himself unbaptized, and shall have scorned to come to baptism and shall have wished to remain a pagan, let them be punished by death’. Such stern sentiments captured also in lines from a contemporary poet who wrote the Paderborn Epic: ‘What the contrary mind and perverse soul refuse to do with persuasion/ Let them leap to accomplish when compelled by fear’.

Neither can I easily tolerate the venal sectarian aspects of events like the English Reformation that led to the martyrdom of Catholic men like Thomas More (1478-1535), author of Utopia (1516) and Edmund Campion (1540-1581); or the long list of Protestants whose deaths are recorded in Foxe’s Book of Martyrs (1563), Scholars like William Tynedale, who translated the Bible into English and wrote The Obedience of Christen Men (1528); the St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in Paris in 1572, which set the tone for the French Wars of Religion between the Calvinist Protestants and their Catholic rivals; and the Thirty Years War in Central Europe which by conservative estimates reduced the civilian population of Germany by up to 40% and allowed Sultan Osman the Second to extend Ottoman influence, which was only stopped by a military confederation of Lithuanian and Polish forces at the battle of Chocim in 1621.

For me, such introspection and divisive religious self-indulgence should never be repeated. Christianity after all has never been as uniform as many think and there were numerous primitive forms prior to the transformation of the church under Emperor Constantine the Great. Many people will be familiar with the Gnostic alternative that competed with Orthodox Christianity. Also, there are the Coptic, Armenian, Greek and Russian Orthodox Churches. Then there are the heretical variations such as Arianism, Donatism, the Albigensians and the Bogomils. One of the earliest translations of the Gospels into the Northern European languages was done by a Goth named Ulfilas, an adherent of Arianism. Then in 835 AD an anonymous poet synthesized the four gospels into an alliterative Beowulf style poem and this is analysed in G. Ronald Murphy’s The Heliand (1992) and The Saxon Saviour: The Germanic Transformation of the Gospel in 9th Century Heliand (1995), where the Gospels are removed from the dry climes of Judea to the dark forests and stormy seas of the European Northlands.

Which leads me to theological and cultural figures like Jakob Wilhelm Hauer (1881-1962), Mathilde Ludendorff (1877-1966) and Sigrid Hunke (1913-1999). The latter, the winner of the Schiller prize for German Cultural Works in the European Spirit and author of From the Decline of the West to the Rise of Europe (1989), herself being influenced by such heretics as Pelagius, Johannes Scotus, and Meister Eckhart, and in her turn influencing ND thinkers like Pierre Krebs and his work Undying Heritage (1981) as well as Alain de Benoist and his On Being a Pagan (1982).

My own brand of faith is heavily influenced by writers like G.K Chesterton, C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien. Myth-makers who introduced me to Christian ideals by using stories within landscapes I recognized and with characters whose thoughts and actions resonated with the pagan past that loomed behind the Christian veneer. Churches being built on the sacred groves of the druids; Christian festivals using fertility symbols like fir trees and eggs; and the Green Man, tongue lolling, eyes leering out from the carved oak that furnishes our great cathedrals from Reims to Canterbury.

With regards to the simultaneous resurgence of Right Wing Revolutions and religious revival, I think you have only to look at the ripe tradition of committed Christians who have led or participated in movements we define today as Right-Wing to find the answer. In the Slavic world you have Conservative and Orthodox intellects like Gogol, Dostoevsky, Ivan Ilyin and Solzhenitsyn. From Romania there was Corneliu Z. Codreanu, who was a member of the Brotherhood of the Cross before forming The Legion of the Archangel Michael. Clerical reactionary movements have a history of success in both Slovakia and Croatia. Italy was 99% Catholic when the classic form of Fascism came to power. Franco’s Spain shared a similar religious majority and Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera’s Falange was almost messianic in character.

Then there are French Catholic Counter-Revolutionary and Counter-Enlightenment thinkers like Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) and Louis Gabriel Ambroise de Bonald (1754-1840). These were rapidly followed by Catholic priest and political theorist Hughes-Felicite Robert de Lamennais (1782-1854); Francois-Rene de Chateaubriand (1768-1848), author of The Genius of Christianity (1802); and Pierre-Simon Ballanche (1776-1847) who developed a theology of progress. Then there was the Action Francais, National Catholicism and integral traditionalism of Charles Maurras (1868-1952); Maurice Barres (1862-1923) author of the Faith of France (1918); General George Ernest Boulanger (1837-1891); George Bernanos (1888-1948), author of Under Satan’s Sun (1926) and The Diary of a Country Priest (1936); Paul Deroulede (1846-1914), Founder of National League of Patriots; and Edward Drumont, Founder of the Nationalist League of Patriots. All wonderfully complemented by the Christian modernist philosopher Maurice Blondel (1861-1949) and Jean Ousset, a political idealist of Catholic sentiment.

And these Christian men do not stand alone. I was touched by the young women of Renouveau Francais in their firm stance against the toxic FEMEN coven outside Notre-Dame de Paris and likewise the humour and talent of the young girl band Les Brigandes with their tongue in cheek but poignant songs such as Cannabisation Nationale, Chevaucher le Dragon and The Great Replacement. Therefore, like the resurgent interest in Orthodoxy following the fall of the Soviet Union, I foresee a central role for religion in fomenting change in a post-liberal World.

 

What are your views on the connection between ecological theory and present Right-Wing Movements such as Identitarians? What steps do you think we should take to deal with environmental problems?

I believe the ideological tenets of the Radical Right are ecology based. In both ethos and action we should regard ourselves as stewards, not materialist defilers of the natural environment. It was Moritz Arndt, a nineteenth century German nationalist who wrote The Care and Conservation of Forests in 1815. His student, Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, went on to author Field and Forest in 1853, a landmark text in which he declared: ‘We must save the forest, not only so that the ovens do not become cold in winter, but also that the pulse of life of the German people continues to beat joyfully, so that Germany remains German’.

Indeed, I understand it was Ernst Haekel, founder of the German Monist League who first coined the word ecology in 1867. This influencing Walther Darre, an agronomist by profession, who led the National Socialist Blood & Soil programme. Darre himself emerged from the Artaman League, founded by Willibald Hentschel. The word Artaman itself being a hybrid expression meaning agriculture-man and the League being a central pillar of the Nackt-Kultur movement which found expression in the Wandervogel youth groups of the period.

My thinking echoes that of sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936), whose classic work Community and Society (2013 ed.) introduced the concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft into the philosophical and sociological lexicon, and Hans Freyer (1887-1969), who in parallel with Tönnies, debated the notions of people (or Volk to borrow the German term) and the place they inhabit (heimat/home) and their interactions to form an organic entity in and of itself. There is in my opinion a positive co-dependency between the two; A Gemeinschaft (Community) which exists not only the interconnectedness and interdependence between the people themselves but also in the interaction of the community and the natural world. This is intrinsically linked with the Bio-centrism or Lebensphilosophie (Philosophy of Life) of Ludwig Klages. In other words, Gaia nurturing the character and temperament of the people, inspiring what the Germans term the Volksgeist (Folk-Spirit). And this sits alongside and works in harmony with the biological influence that guides the disparate genetic trajectories of the various races that make up mankind as a whole.

And the German Right was not alone in this regard. In St. Petersburg Ivan Parfenevich Borodin’s culture-aesthetic conservationism was heavily influenced by the German Romantics. Also, in England there was a long tradition of concern with population control, epitomized by Thomas Malthus’s An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798). During the first half of the twentieth century there were a myriad of groups like the English Mistery, the English Array, John Hargrave’s Kibbo Kift and H.J. Massingham’s Council for the Church and Countryside that included various intellectuals such as Nietzschean philosopher Anthony Ludovici, Rolf Gardiner, Lord Lymington, historian Arthur Bryant, poet laureate Sir John Betjeman, British Union of Fascists activist and gentleman farmer Bob Saunders and Major-General J.C.F. Fuller. Gardiner himself went on to found the Soil Association and was intimately involved with Montague Fordham’s Rural Reconstruction Movement which focused on organic farming and Kinship in Husbandry. The latter met in Merton College Oxford in 1941.

Then there were the numerous noted writers in this field. Some examples being Henry Williamson, author of the children’s classic Tarka the Otter (1927), Lady Eve Balfour who wrote The Living Soil (1943) and Jorian Jenks, Editor of the Soil Association’s Journal Mother Earth and his own books, Spring Comes Again (2012 ed.), From the Ground Up (1950), The Stuff Man’s Made Of (1959) and The Land and the People (2003 ed.).

So there is a depth and richness to the Right’s engagement with ecological matters that the faddist (and more often than not socialist) orientated Green Parties across Europe wish to obscure. Janet Biehl and Peter Staudenmaier’s book, Eco Fascism: Lessons from the German Experience (2011) traces this lineage in very precise terms. Another perfect example being Patrick Wright’s book The Village that Died for England (1995) about Tyneham in Dorset, which captures the originality and seriousness with which the British Right approached the preservation and conservation of the environment decades before the Greens came to prominence in the United Kingdom.

Indeed, looking to current thinking in this sphere one is inevitably drawn to advocates like Pentti Linkola in Finland and his work Can Life Prevail (2009); John Seymour (1914-2004) a leading figure in the Self-Sufficiency movement; the radical antiquarian John Michell; Edward Abbey, famous for his groundbreaking Desert Solitaire (1968); Carey McWilliams’ Ill Fares the Land: migrants and migratory labour in the United States (1945); David Foreman, the Founder of Earth First and author of Confessions of an Eco-Warrior (1991) who has spoken on numerous anti-immigration platforms; and Richard Hunt, who established Alternative Green, author of To End Poverty, the Starvation of the Periphery by the Core (1998), whose memory has been defamed with the sobriquet eco-fascist.

For in order to smear the philosophy of Deep Ecology it has now become necessary to besmirch the reputations of some of its leading proponents. Green anarchist Murray Bookchin, who wrote Post Scarcity Anarchism (1971) and the Ecology of Freedom (1987) argued that these people are ‘barely disguised racists, survivalists and macho Daniel Boones’. Harvard educated Theodore J. Kaczynski, better known as the Unabomber and his 1995 Manifesto entitled Industrial Society and Its Future, perfectly fitting this narrative.

Regardless of such slanders and the Left’s attempts to hijack some of the Right’s core agenda it is immensely reassuring to see this tradition continue with political parties like Golden Dawn in Greece, dedicating time and resources to green issues and animal welfare. Ultimately, I see identitarian and nationalist militants operating in the tradition of the Wehrbauer, peasant soldiers, defending the land that has fed and nourished our communities for millennia.

 

What is your position on the classic sociological problem of individualism versus communitarianism? Some philosophers see individualism as the fundamental cause of socio-cultural decay. Do you agree with this?

Individualism is to a large extent a fundamental characteristic of Western society. The conundrum of individualism versus communitarianism being so deeply embedded in Western Tradition, that we can trace collectivist themes emerging in Plato’s Republic and a more individualist approach being adopted in the stance of the Greek Sophists.

This divergence grew even wider with the development of a private property owning class in places like England around 1200, so that by the 17th century a yawning chasm existed, allowing political philosophers like Thomas Hobbes to speak openly in terms of the new homo-economicus. Which in due course led to Adam Smith’s laissez-faire economics, personified by his text The Wealth of Nations (1776) and Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarianism arguing that ‘the free expression of individual wills and interests provide natural harmony and maximal efficiency’. While the origins of Epistomelogical individualism can be traced back to the thinking of British Empiricists like David Hume who wrote A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) and John Locke, who developed his Theory of the Mind, which to an extent formed the modern concept of identity, both rejecting priori truths, instead giving precedence to individual experience in the accumulation of knowledge.

And the British were not alone in such thinking. The French intellectual Rene Descartes, author of Meditation on First Philosophy (1641) and Principles of Philosophy (1644) also endorsed epistemological individualism from a rationalist perspective. This tendency reached a climax with influential thinkers like Kierkergaard, Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre.

Whereas those of the more collectivist orientation include Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his Social Contract (1762), in the early nineteenth century Hegel, who considered the nation-state as the highest embodiment of social morality and of course Karl Marx who, along with Freidrich Engels, himself author of The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884) put forth his own collective treatise in the form of The Communist Manifesto (1848). Since World War Two Germany, France and Holland are examples of countries that have attempted to bridge the divide between the individual and socialist collectivism, paving the way for the welfare state.

Like Hegel, Marx and de Tocqueville I see civil society as an ecosystem that facilitates individuals to use their talents for private entrepreneurship but also to come together in groups to achieve shared objectives.

In both cases sensitive and unambiguous regulation is required to ensure that excesses are constrained. As a critic of unfettered individualism, I do see the value in freedom of association, yet, I tend to agree with de Tocqueville that individualism is best served when ‘self-interest is properly understood’.

Communities function at the optimal level when there are common bonds, in the form of recognizable identity and an acknowledged purpose, in the shape of a culture, to promulgate. Individuals operating within such parameters know that their activities may advance their own agenda but there will be interventions should self-interest begin to harm the public good. The challenge is to define that point and apply it sensitively. If we do not, we will end up with tyranny or worse the atomized and dysfunctional society epitomized by Michel Houellebecq, the dissipated and disgruntled misanthrope who wrote Soumission (2015). As per Fareed Zakaria in his book The Future of Freedom, Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (2003): ‘Supporters of free markets often make the mistake of thinking of capitalism as something that exists in opposition to the state. When it is time to pay taxes, this view can seem self-evident. But the reality is more complex. Although in the twentieth century many states grew so strong as to choke their economies, in a broader historical perspective, only a legitimate, well-functioning state can create the rules and laws that make capitalism work. At the very least, without a government capable of protecting property rights and human rights, press freedoms and business contracts, anti-trust laws and consumer demands, a society gets not the rule of law but the rule of the strong. If one wanted to see what the absence of government produces, one need only look at Africa – it is not a free-market paradise’.

So let us take a moment and consider the question from a psychological perspective. Can we really say collectivists are closely linked individuals who view themselves primarily as parts of a whole, be it a family, a network of workers, a tribe, or a nation? And if so, are such people motivated by the norms and duties imposed by the collective entity they identify with? The reverse being that Individualists are motivated by their own preferences, needs and rights, giving priority to personal rather than group goals?

Are people so easily categorized? Or can their conduct vary according to different stimuli, like threat or opportunity, in turn causing their behavior and attitudes to fluctuate between these polar opposites?

It seems to me that psychology may not be universal. There is potential for culture specific predispositions. And if so, what effect does this have on thought and actions? Does it explain the Muslim residents of the Belgian suburb of Molenbeek beeping their horns in support of the killing of 200 innocent Parisians on Friday 13th 2015? And if collectivism and individualism is viewed through the diffusing prisms of culture and race, does that not reveal itself in the crime rates, family abandonment, levels of self-esteem, feelings of entitlement, and overall behavioral patterns from one group to another?

I would hazard a guess that it does. And if my assumption is correct, it is yet another example where multiculturalist diversity is self-evidently proven not to be a source of strength but in fact a terrible weakness.

 

There are a lot of differing positions among Right Wingers about the philosophy of gender and what the differences between the social roles of men and women should be. What are your thoughts on this matter?

It is true that the Right is a broad church in most matters but it seems to me that our Achilles’ heel is the way our opponents present us as misogynistic. This gender divisive meme has been successfully reinforced with highly selective media coverage, mostly focusing on the shaved heads and swastika tattoos of those understandably angry and disenfranchised white males who cling to what they perceive has a defiant and revolutionary identity. Their views and attitudes treated with contempt and disdain, their social status as losers projected in a way that makes them unattractive to the fairer sex.

And of course this is both deliberate and not without a grain of truth, which is why it is credible and so successful. It is further exploited by television pundits who are very careful about who they select to represent identitarian sentiments in interviews on the street or in the studio. How often have we seen the intellectual mismatch between Right and Left through the distorting camera lens? Well-meaning people, male and female alike, speaking nothing but rational common sense being belittled by some guru orating smugly about the benefits of multiculturalism from the safety of a tree-lined university campus miles from the inner-city?

But this is all changing with the rise of erudite and media savvy women like Marie Le Pen and Marion Marechal Le Pen of the French National Front, Krisztina Morvai and Dora Duro of Hungary’s Jobbik Party, Beata Szydlo of the Polish Law & Justice Party, Kristiina Ojuland, founder of the Estonian People’s Unity Party and Italians like Vittoria Brambilla, Daniela Santanche and Giorgia Meloni of the People’s Freedom Party, La Destra and Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy) respectively. The glass ceiling has been shattered so to speak and the long history of socially conservative women contributing to traditionalist or nationalist movements which I wrote about in my ‘Matriarchs in the Mannerbund’ article is gaining momentum once again. Just take a look at the young women in Renouveau Francais, the girl band Les Brigandes and the female militants of Generation Identitaire. There is also a sizable demographic of youthful, middle aged and senior ladies amongst the crowds in Katowice, Tallinn and Dresden. Women standing alongside their men protesting against the immigration invasion. And there we have our answer to the mainstream media promulgating the image of pretty blonde German girls holding up banners at Munich Railway Station reading ‘We Welcome Refugees’. A proper analysis of the rape and sexual abuse statistics highlighting the role played by non-Europeans particularly in the UK, France, Sweden and Norway may enlighten some of our ‘sisters’ who cling to the naïve notion of universal brotherhood.

As for myself, I believe in the full engagement of women within all social and professional spheres based on their capability and inclination. I have said many times, I am not threatened by independent and talented women. Rather the opposite, I find them attractive and interesting. Here I am thinking of role models and archetypes with a philosophical inclination, but they could be from any field of human endeavor, people like Perictione, mother of Plato; Myia, the Pythagorean philosopher who lived around 500 BC; Tullia d’Aragon (1510-1556), who wrote Dialogues on the Infinity of Love (1552); Lady Anne Conway, whose thinking influenced Leibniz and who authored Principles of the most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (1690); Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle-upon-Tyne (1623-1673) and her book The Blazing World (1666); Lady Damaris Cudworth Masham (1659-1708) who wrote A Discourse Concerning the Love of God: Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or Christian Life (1696); G.E. Anscombe (1919-2001) a committed advocate for Roman Catholicism who debated C.S. Lewis and introduced the term ‘consequentialism’ into the language of analytic philosophy; Marilyn McCord Adams, American philosopher of the Episcopal Church and philosopher of religion, who published What sort of Human Nature (1999) and Wrestling for Blessing (2005); Patricia Smith Churchland, who specializes in Neuro-philosophy and medical and environmental ethics; and Professor Rae Langton, a Fellow of Newnham College Cambridge, who was recently ranked the fourth most influential woman thinker of modern times.

However, unlike the admirable talents already mentioned I freely admit I resent those who use the scorpion sting of anti-male hate to influence others. This form of politicized feminism is particularly unctuous and I recognize in that strain of thought an agenda to demean motherhood and to undermine those women who wish to be the guardians of the hearth and nurturers of the next generation. Here I am thinking of Feminist theorists like Judith Butler who wrote Gender Trouble (2006); Nancy J. Hirschmann, author of Gender, Class and Freedom in Modern Political Theory (2007); Sandra Harding, who tried to introduce the gender war into science with her work Is There a Feminist Method?; Nancy Tuana, Editor of Feminism and Science (1989); Sara Kiesler’s Gender and Democracy in Computer Mediated Communications; Amy Sheilds Dobson’s Post- Feminist Digital Cultures: Femininity, Social Media and Self-Reconstruction (2015); and Jos/Xe9 Medina, who was responsible for the truly awful The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epimestic Injustice and Resistant Imaginations (2012).

Personally, I would certainly favour a natalist approach by European governments to their own indigenous populations and the opposite approach taken to so-called refugees and economic migrants who are currently siphoning off monies to promulgate their own genes, that would be better spent on our own people.

In my opinion, we have for far too long undervalued the role of women in society and seen the family and children has a costly burden when in reality they are our salvation. After all, do we really expect the average Somalian, Syrian or Roma refugee to have sufficient intelligence and diligence to hold down a regular job, generate added value for our society and pay taxes to keep us in our old age? At present the vast majority of such people are welfare dependent or in low wage jobs, suppressing the salary levels across Europe and America and sending what they can home to buy houses in the Balkans or support their families until they can get visas to join their menfolk and then themselves jump on to the European gravy-train.

Are we not better off producing our own children and paying women of European heritage, who so desire, a living wage, to become mothers? So yielding a harvest of high IQ offspring that is far more likely to underpin our future economic growth and have sufficient empathy for their genetic forebears to shoulder the burden their grandparents represent in the twilight of their lives? The traditional family unit may not be ideal for all and relationships blossom and decline but the seed of our future hope must be white and planted deep in the fertile wombs of European women.

 

How do you see the connection between the Traditional School (represented by authors such as Guenon, Evola ,etc.) and Identitarianism? What theory of Tradition do you follow?

I am a great admirer of Rene Guenon (1886-1951) and Julius Evola (1898-1974). Both these traditionalist thinkers have greatly influenced my own views on metapolitics and provide rich repositories of knowledge to nourish the Identitarian ideology which is currently taking shape in Europe and beyond.

Guenon’s The Crisis of the Modern World (1927) is almost his manifesto, or call to arms, for Traditionalists and is only bettered in my humble opinion by his Reign of Quantity and Signs of the Times (1945). What both works offer the reader is an antidote to the vacuous relativism of modernity, something other intellects like Frithjof Schuon, Mircea Eliade, Martin Lings, Titus Burckhardt and Ananda K. Coomaraswamy have recognized in their own works, acknowledging Guenon as the re-founder of Western Esotericism using Eastern ideas. His critique originating from the perspective of ancient wisdom and tradition.

As for Baron Giulio Cesare Andrea Evola, the core of his theories circulate around the fact that mankind is presently living in the Kali Yuga or Dark Age and the underlying tension in his writing is the attempt to find a method to effect a primordial rebirth. I avidly devoured his Revolt Against the Modern World (1934), Men Amongst the Ruins (1953) and his Metaphysics of War (2011, Ed. Arktos), the latter being a collection of essays he wrote during the 1930’s and 1940’s rejecting pacifism and an attempt to re-awaken heroic ideals through the act of war. His argument that the Warrior is someone who is more than a paid mercenary of the current oligarchy and should transcend the political and economic towards a higher spiritual calling certainly appeals to my sense of honour. Within his corpus of writings Evola strives to give examples in the form of Sigismund, King of Hungary and his wife Barbara of Celeje’s Order of the Dragon, a militant Christian force that faced the Ottoman Turks and who counted amongst their ranks such notable characters as Vlad Dracul and members of Elizabeth Bathory’s family.

Evola himself generated many disciples and followers for his Heathen Imperialism (2007, Ed.) and what he called the spiritual element of race rather than pure biological reductionism. Some examples being the Italian Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari and CasaPound; the Spanish Falange Espanola; the Swiss militant Armand Amaudruz’s Nouvel Ordre; and the French Troisieme Voie (Third Way). Perhaps the clearest statement of intent coming from a spokesman of the Ordine Nuovo when he stated: ‘Our work since 1953 has been to transpose Evola’s teachings into direct political action’.

For readers who favour a more Esoteric approach to their engagement with tradition, Evola’s The Yoga of Power (1992, Ed.) and The Heremetic Tradition (1995, Ed.) offer a separate access point to his thought which is equally satisfying depending upon your personal preferences. Here, his antecedents or sympathisers are the German Psycho-therapist Karlfried Graf Durkheim who taught gestalt psychology at the Bauhaus in Dessau; occultists like the Swedish founder of the Dragon Rouge, Thomas Karlsson and fellow Italian Massimo Scaligero, author of The Logos and the New Mysteries; and Miguel Serrano, to whom Evola once confessed that Metternich, the State Chancellor of the Austrian Empire (1773-1859), was his conservative ideal.

 

You have once mentioned Alexander Dugin as an influence. What do you think the relationship between Identitarianism and Dugin’s theories of Neo-Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory is, or what should it be like?

Well, actually I am a Slavophile in the tradition of Gogol, Dostoevsky and Ilyin rather than a Neo-Eurasianist, but I first came across Alexander Dugin while I was living on Naberezhnaya, in a 19th century apartment overlooking the Moika Canal, in St Petersburg. I remember my girlfriend at the time would read excerpts from Elementy and Milyi Angel to me as we sat in the pale White Nights sunlight on a wrought iron balcony just meters away from where Pushkin died in 1837.

She had just finished writing her dissertation on the mystical Yuzhinskii Circle founded by Yuri Mamleyev in the 1960’s, and into which Dugin was inducted around 1980. Through her I was introduced to the thinking of Yevgeny Golovin and socialized with students who had attended Dugin’s classes when he was the Professor of Sociology at the prestigious Lermontov Moscow University department of Sociology and International Relations. Mamleyev himself having gone on to teach at Cornell and the Sorbonne. It was while he was associated with the Yuzhinskii Circle that Dugin’s thought became grounded in traditionalism, translating both Evola’s Pagan Imperialism (1928) and Rene Guenon’s The Crisis of the Modern World (1942) into Russian.

As a consequence it seems to me that Dugin’s brand of neo-Eurasianism, like Identitarianism, is intrinsically linked to the Traditionalist School which has its origins in characters like the Catholic scholar Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), one of the leaders of the Philosophia Perennis (Perennial Philosophy) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), whose short but eventful life was to leave an indelible mark on the history of Europe. At the tender age of 23 Mirandola proposed to defend his 900 Theses on religion, philosophy and magic against all those who wished to debate him. His Oration on the Dignity of Man became the unofficial Manifesto of the Renaissance.

Dugin referencing the debt in his own Manifesto of the Eurasianist Movement: ‘Eurasianism implies a positive re-evaluation of the archaic, the ancient. It fervently refers to the past, to the world of Tradition. The development of cultural process is seen by Eurasism in a new reference to the archaic, to the insertion of ancient cultural motives in the fabric of modern forms. The priority in this area is given back to the national creativity, to the sources of national creativity, to the continuation and revival of traditions’. This certainly resonates with my thinking on European Identitarianism.

Eurasianism also shares with Identitarianism the notion that identity itself is bound up with specific geography and sacred space: ‘In principle, Eurasia and our space, the heartland Russia, remain the staging area of a new anti-bourgeois revolution’. Dugin in unison with the thinkers of the European New Right standing in stark opposition to the nihilism of modernity and what the French philosophers like Alain de Benoist have termed Mondialism.

Therefore Dugin shares the Identitarian concern with the current monopoly of liberalism in all its guises and its imposition of stifling conformity. His attack on the negative aspects of the Atlanticist West and its consumer led values is just as valid as that of Alain Soral, author of Understanding Empire: Global Government Tomorrow or the Revolt of the Nations (2011). Soral’s book takes the starting point of Tradition to bolster the survival of cultures and peoples from Viscount Melville Sound in Canada’s Arctic North to Madagascar in the Indian Ocean and from San Diego in the Pacific West to Jakarta in the East.

In this regard I recognise strains consistent with Identitarianism in the Eurasianist attempt to debate beyond the frameworks of recent history and discard the clichés of failed ideologies in pursuit of a new one. Like Identitarianism, Dugin’s Eurasianism is an attempt to find an antidote to the crisis of postmodernity, trying to shake up the status quo and offer a fresh political model that avoids the lethargy and gridlock that Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007) so deftly describes in his own works, particularly The Illusion of the End (1994).

Likewise, Eurasianism greatly benefits from the activism of the Eurasian Youth Union which had at one point nearly 50 offices across the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and operates like Generation Identitaire in many respects.

So for me Dugin is in the right camp when it comes to recognizing that integration into Global Society means to lose one’s own identity. In effect we risk becoming identikit humans, a new proletariat in the service of the New World Order.

There are however a number of points where I take specific issue with Dugin. And in that regard I am in interesting company, namely, Dmitri Vasiliev of Pamyat (Memory) and Eduard Limonov of the National Bolshevik Party. The first concern being that he believes ‘Civilizations are cultural and religious communities – not ethnic national ones’ (The Fourth Political Theory, p. 165, Arktos Books, 2012). For me the attributes of an ethnicity and its physical environment are key factors in the gestation of civilization and culture. Also, his proposal for an alliance between the Orthodox and Islamic worlds in opposition to The West seems to me both naïve and misplaced. The two faiths in the first place are inimical to each other and already delineate to a great extent the competition for the same sacred space between racial phenotypes.

It also reflects what some describe has his paranoia about The West’s motives and intentions which, coupled with the overstated Prophet-like ‘end of the world’ Joachimite hermeticism of his expressions, erodes his credibility: ‘The meaning of Russia is that through the Russian people will be realized the last thought of God, the thought of the end of the world… Death is the way to immortality. Love will begin when the world ends. We must long for it, like true Christians…We are uprooting the accursed tree of knowledge. With it will perish the Universe…’ (Dugin quoted in Stephen Shenfield’s Russian Fascism – Traditions, Tendencies, Movements, p. 193, 2000).

And his aggressive response to a question posed by Megan Stack in September 2008 on the ever closer relationship of the West to Ukraine, effectively seeing it ‘as a declaration of war. As a declaration of psychological, geopolitical, economic and open war’, strike me as short-sighted. I much prefer Guillaume Faye’s vision of a Europe extending all the way to Trans-Siberia.

Then there is also the very real danger that Dugin’s ideas can be over-simplified. When he states ‘that ideocratic Russia’, meaning the Slavic World and Eurasia, is irretrievably antagonistic to the plutocratic ‘island’ of the Anglo-Saxon West, he correctly describes, from his perspective, the fundamental clash between mammon and traditionalism. What he fails to appreciate is the rapid resuscitation of the longing for identity in the West and the long term corrosive effects that Mammon, in the form of hydrocarbon wealth, is having on the Orthodox soul and the Central Asian mindset. I lived in Astana for two years, skating with Kazakhs on the frozen Ishim and saw at first hand the Gulag complex in Karaganda, visiting the L.N. Gumliyov University named after the great Eurasianist historian, ethnologist and anthropologist who wrote Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere of the Earth (1978) and Ancient Rus and The Great Steppe (1989). Ask the fair skinned Russians how they are now treated by their Kazakh neighbours, recently filled with a resurgent pride in their Turkic origins, building mosques on an unprecedented scale. Dugin may, might I suggest, just be turning a blind eye to the underlying instincts that drive mankind?

And speaking of Gumilyov, he, like Konstantin Leontyev and Nikolay Danilevsky believed in a Russian-Super-ethnos opposed to Catholic Europe, which in effect lay the groundwork for Dugin’s later Eurasian worldview. Gumilyov’s fame relying largely on the thesis of passionarity which in essence is the theory of the life-cycle of civilization through its initial development, leading to its climatic, inert and convolution phases. Fundamentally, he diagnosed Europe as entering a phase of deep inertia while the passionarity of the Arabic world is high. To passionarity, in my view, one could also add fecundity.

So although there are many synergies between the Identitarian and Eurasian philosophies and there is of course merit in dialogue and pragmatic alliance it is also a plain and self-evident truism that there are fundamental differences that it may be impossible to overcome. Our challenge is to try.

 

The theory of Multipolarism and harmony between autonomous cultures has been identified as an important aspect of New Rightism/Identitarianism. However, there are a few Identitarian authors who deviate from the multipolar line and seek to advocate hostility and conflict with foreign ethnic groups and civilizations, similar to old fashioned nationalists. How do you think this problem should be dealt with?

To return to Dugin for a moment, I have sympathy for his assertion that ‘When there is only one power which decides who is right and who is wrong and who should be punished and who not, we have a form of dictatorship. This is not acceptable. Therefore we should fight against it. If someone deprives us of our freedom, we have to react and we will react’. He continues, ‘The American Empire should be destroyed’, and like him I have no doubt that ‘at one point, it will be!’

But what America is he talking about?

I would hazard a guess that his ire is not directed at farmers in Wisconsin. In fact, I doubt if he is talking about Americans per se but in fact the plastic America of Wall Street and Hollywood, those parasitic elements that have so distorted what Dugin terms the Atlanticist sphere, corporate cosmopolitans like the Brookings Institute for example feeding like vampires under a cloak of hegemonic liberalism. And is that not what politicians and commentators like Paul Wolfowitz and Norman Podhoretz represent? Their star-spangled masks slipping occasionally because they do not represent American interests but that of another select group. Because for them money has no homeland and the liberal democracy they wish to force upon the world is illusory. Dugin actually implies as much, ‘Spiritually, globalization is the creation of a grand parody, the Kingdom of the Anti-Christ. And the US is the centre of its expansion’.

And remember Michael O’ Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at the afore mentioned Brookings Institute, an organisation funded by JP Morgan, Chase & Amp, Goldman Sachs, Google, Facebook, Pepsi and Coca Cola, wrote Which Path to Persia? Options for a New American Strategy towards Iran (2009) and more recently Deconstructing Syria: A New Strategy for America’s Most Hopeless War.

And why? Could it be that President Assad was fast developing his 4 Seas Strategy to turn Syria into a trade hub between the Black, Mediterranean, Arabian and Caspian Seas? Could it be that Syria is a sovereign state with a national bank that is not owned by the Rothschilds? And what of Ukraine? Has no one noticed the land grab being perpetrated for the rich black earth west of the Dnieper whilst attention is being focused on Russian aggression in Donetsk? Here again, George Soros plays with his democratic marionettes while bullets fly and cash registers bulge.

So let’s take a closer look at this rivalry between Globalism and Multipolarism. Was the world really divided between the Free West and the Communist East after the death of Stalin? Some argue that both sides were being run by the same people, our globalist masters, and that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the consequence of those same self-serving masters deciding that the eastern experiment had run its course and was no longer worth sustaining. In fact, ironically, the free market of the West served as a better method of destroying pluricultural and organic communities than all the forced collectivisations and centralized bureaucracies in the East. Hence the Ceausescu regime had to fall in Romania, Gorbachev needed to give way to Yeltsin and the German Democratic Republic merge with the Federal Republic so that twenty five years later Angela Merkel could welcome Syrian refugees with open arms into the very heart of Europe. Like Solzhenitsyn said: ‘Nations are the wealth of mankind, its collective personalities; the very least of them wears its own special colours and bears within itself a special facet of divine intention’.

And this essence of distinctiveness is what the Globalists despise. Except when it applies to them. For in their eyes there should only be one form of imperialism – that of the internationalist and mercantilist class. The same class that acts with arrogant impunity, uses its immense wealth and nearly unlimited influence against our racial, national and individual interests, simply because we, the drones they employ, need a paycheck every month to pay our mortgages, clear our credit card bills, purchase petrol at the pump and buy a coffee at Starbucks when we shop at the Mall. A Mall full of shops they own, brimming with merchandise that they tell us we must consume.

What we need is a multi-polar world to re-distribute power, global responsibility and wealth. Multipolarism emphasizes national sovereignty and the differentiation of races and cultures. And this decentralization should extend not just to nations but to regions, local communities and individuals.

It seems to me that Globalism encourages servile dependency, whereas Multipolarism strikes right at the heart of the multiculturalist hegemony. We must first slay the dragon that threatens us all, regardless of where we are from or what prejudices or grievances we may harbor between races, religions and nations. Once the fog of globalism has lifted we will be in a better position to judge the real rather than manufactured opportunities and threats we pose to each other. For the Globalist agenda is fundamentally anti-human. They have thrown up a smokescreen of lies and half-truths to effect a divide and rule strategy. It is for identitarians to see beyond this and guide our communities to a better understanding of the true value of a diverse world, especially when peoples are anchored in their own clearly defined natural environments.

 

Guillaume Faye is a popular reference among Identitarian activists, but some of the theories he has expressed in his later works seem to deviate from typical Identitarian positions (his support for authoritarian government, capitalism, the two-tier economic theory, etc.) How do you feel about the direction of Faye’s thought?

Despite what people may think or say about his recent and more idiosyncratic positions, such as his endorsement of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis, a term the American borrowed from Albert Camus (1946) and Bernard Lewis writing in The Atlantic Monthly (1990), but which actually stretches back to the French Colonial Experience of the Belle epoch; and the historical debacle in 1986 with Alain de Benoist, where Faye sided with the Yann-Ber Tillenon, Tristan Mordelle and Goulven Pennaod faction, there can be no question of the significance of Guillaume Faye to the New Right and the broader Identitarian movement. He is however clearly more of an Ethno-nationalist than a Communitarian. And whether we follow P.A. Taguieff’s approach regarding the right to difference which he defined as differentialist racism, using the notion of cultural incompatibility rather than skin colour as the criterion for expulsion, or we stick to the hardline racial origins argument, matters little in the end. What does matter, is the fact that ethnic communitarianism has led to ghettos or rather immigrant strongholds from which whites have been ethnically cleansed and from out of which they launch raids against us. Molenbeek in Belgium is just one example. The situation is replicated in the UK, France, Germany, Holland and Sweden.

In Faye’s books, Archeofuturism (2010), Why We Fight: A Manifesto of the European Resistance (2011), Convergence of Catastrophes (2012) and Sex and Deviance (2014) we have, regardless of their quirks and foibles, essential reading materials for all New Right militants, sponsors and sympathisers. These texts provide an interesting and holistic doctrine, which can act as an ideological synthesis, lifting the Right above its current sectarianism to form a common European front against those Faye identifies as the enemies assailing us and attitudes infecting us. An example being: ‘The present dominant values (xenophilia, cosmopolitanism, narcissism, homophilia, permissiveness, etc.) are actually anti-values of de-virilising weakness, since they deplete a civilization’s vital energies and weakens its defensive or affirmative capacities’.

There is of course a debate to be had whether or not he has identified all the culprits and whether he has exonerated some that deserve special attention? But one cannot dispute his stance on mass immigration and the Islamic antagonism to the Western world. What is however questionable are his criticisms of Alain Soral and Christian Bouchet, who he thinks too sympathetic to Islam, while his own detractors in the National Revolutionary Movement in France accuse him of being too pro-Jewish and a National-Zionist. In response he wrote The New Jewish Question (2007). And I am sure Faye will take the opportunity to further review his thinking in this regard when he takes a closer look at the funding mechanisms for Islamic State, the reasons for the destabilization of Syria and the ISRAAID Foundation’s blatant encouragement of economic migrants to penetrate European borders through Greece, Serbia and Croatia.

Certainly de Benoist, when interviewed in 2000 seemed to indicate that he thought Faye was too extreme. But Faye does attract admirers through his work with the Rivarol Journal and his continued association with the national pagan community via Terre et Peuple. With his PhD from Science Po, his journalistic experience gained from his time with Figaro Magazine, Paris-Match and VSD and his sustained contribution to the Nouvelle Droite throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s he clearly deserves his place in the pantheon of Pro-European thinkers alongside Alain de Benoist, Robert Steuckers, Pierre Vial and Dominique Venner.

Personally, I think he has a lot to say to us in this coming decade of internecine racial conflict. It is highly likely that we will be referring to his books and recognizing the fulfillment of his predictions in much the same way as we look today upon Jean Raspail’s seminal work Camp of the Saints (1973).

 

So far you have written one book, the novel titled The Partisan, which portrays Identitarian revolutionaries in a future scenario rising against the threat of an Islamic state in France. Describe for our audience the structure and nature of The Partisan, and how will this compare to future books you plan to write?

The Partisan is a love story. The love between two people, the love of those two people for the militants they call comrades and the love of those patriots for their Motherland. It is an antidote to the cynicism that is injected into our youth from birth. The self-loathing that is facilitated through the teaching of so-called progressive and post-colonial history. It is a recognition that our streets are filled with violent non-assimilating aliens that hate the fact they are not us. Intemperate Gambians, trickster Nigerians, smiling Cameroonians joining with the clandestine columns of Muslims from North Africa that have been marching towards France ever since Charles De Gaulle betrayed the pied-noirs in Algeria and executed Organisation Armee Secrete (O.A.S.) heroes like Roger Degueldre; A man who had earned the Croix de Guerre for his bravery in Indo-China, fought at Dien Bien Phu, before transferring to the elite 1st Foreign Parachute Regiment and was made a Knight of the Legion d’Honneur. The same man who on the day of his execution at Fort d’Ivry on the 7th July 1962 witnessed three of the officers appointed to lead the firing squad refuse to give the order to fire. With only one of the eleven men actually shooting upon the target. For as Delguerde’s O.A.S. comrade rightfully said of the Algerian conflict: ‘It was a war fought in terms of religion and race. We were attacked because we were European – not French but European’.

Does that sound familiar?

And if so, what about the ominous description given by another O.A.S. leader Jean-Jacques Susini speaking of Algiers after the so called liberation by the F.L.N.: ‘I saw a city die, not in its stones but in its humanity. I was walking along a street one day. I was going to buy some Assimil records in Italian, because I intended to seek exile in Italy. All of a sudden, I recalled a time in the distant past when I was a child and I would walk along the same street with my grandfather. Then the street had been alive, teeming with people, both European and Moslem. Stores were open, and there was a certain feeling of happiness, of intensity of life. However, now I was walking on the same street in July 1962. Stores were closed. The Europeans had left, and the Moslem crowds were very dense, because the F.L.N. had scheduled its independence day celebrations. Suddenly I had the feeling that even if the monuments and buildings hadn’t changed, even if Algiers hadn’t been bombarded, the city was dead somehow in human terms. The population was no longer the same. Thus, there was something which had died. It wasn’t the presence of Moslems which bothered me. What bothered me was that there were only Moslems. There wasn’t one European. And these Moslem crowds were not the same ones that I had been used to seeing when I was a child. In those days the crowds were peaceful and went about their daily errands. These crowds were excited, mobilized. The F.L.N. had brought tens of thousands of them into the city in trucks that day for the independence celebrations. Yes, these were crowds that were excited’.

And this description, which could now so easily be applied to Paris, is the backdrop to my novel The Partisan. Gone are the days when we can turn the other cheek. Ethnic war is on the horizon and the book I have written is a fast paced violent and sexy fiction, which is meant to entertain and stimulate our people to respond to the struggle that is coming. The reader follows Sabine, the central character, through a futuristic French landscape that is being subject to the will of Allah and the slash of the sharia scimitar.

The intention is that the reader identifies with her experiences, recognizes and sympathises with her ideological development, moving ever closer to The New Resistance that is formed to oppose this 21st Century Occupation and the oppression of the descendants of Vercingetorix, Count Roland, Charles Martel, Godfrey of Bouillon, Charles of Anjou, Joan of Arc, Maurice de Saxe, Lafayette, Napoleon and Philip Petain.

My desire is for The Partisan to be in the vanguard of a new generation of Identitarian literature. It is the first of a series of books I have planned that will cover scenarios from Paris to St. Petersburg and Valletta to Vilnius. I am hoping my writing will be one of the many sparks that helps light a blaze across this continent. For as Ernest Hemingway said: ‘Once we have a war there is only one thing to do. It must be won. For defeat brings worse things than any that can happen in war’.

Thank you for the interview.

 

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From the German Conservative Revolution to the New Right – Tudor

“From the German Conservative Revolution to the New Right” by Lucian Tudor (PDF – 261 KB):

From the German Conservative Revolution to the New Right – Tudor

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Tudor, Lucian. “From the German Conservative Revolution to the New Right.” In: Lucian Tudor, From the German Conservative Revolution to the New Right: A Collection of Essays on Identitarian Philosophy, pp. 136-165. Santiago, Chile: Círculo de Investigaciones PanCriollistas, 2015.

Note: This essay has the same title as the book in which it was published and should not be confused with the book itself. It is, however, the most defining and comprehensive essay in Tudor’s book.

 

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Tradition, Modernity, & Confucian Revival in China – Worsman

“Tradition, Modernity, and the Confucian Revival: An Introduction and Literature Review of New Confucian Activism” by Richard Worsman (PDF – 611 KB):

Tradition, Modernity, and the Confucian Revival – Richard Worsman

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Worsman, Richard. “Tradition, Modernity, and the Confucian Revival: An Introduction and Literature Review of New Confucian Activism.” History Honors Papers, Paper 14. Connecticut College. 2012. <http://digitalcommons.conncoll.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=histhp >.

 

Notes: For further reading on the issue of tradition and modernity in China and various ideas of “modernisation without Westernisation,” see Between Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the Modernization of Chinese Culture by Li Zonggui (Oxford: Chartridge Books Oxford, 2015). Also, a collection of studies and perspectives on this process in various Asian countries can be found in Cultural Identity and Modernization in Asian Countries: Proceedings of Kokugakuin University Centennial Symposium (Tokyo: Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics, Kokugakuin University, 1983. <http://www2.kokugakuin.ac.jp/ijcc/wp/cimac/index.html >.)

An academic study over-viewing the theory and development of the process called “modernization without westernization” in Asia can be found in “Modernization without Westernization: Comparative Observations on the Cases of Japan and China and their Relevance to the Development of the Pacific Rim” by Stuart D.B. Picken (NUCB Journal of Economics and Information Science, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2004), pp. 171-179, <http://www.nucba.ac.jp/themes/s_cic@cic@nucba/pdf/njeis482/14PICKEN.pdf > [Alt.]). On the general idea of “modernisation without Westernisation” from a Neo-Eurasianist perspective, see the article “Modernization without westernization is the first step to reject imperialism” by Antonio Grego.

 

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Foundations of Eurasianism – Dugin

Foundations of Eurasianism

By Alexander Dugin

 

Introductory Note: This page presents the combined republication of two separate articles by Alexander Dugin, titled “Milestones of Eurasianism” and “The Eurasian Idea.” They have been published together because we believe that these two together give a more complete view of Eurasianist theories and their philosophical roots. However, our audience should be aware that these two texts by themselves are not entirely satisfactory for understanding Eurasianism, and may lead to misunderstandings if read without reference to other key texts. We urge our audience to read the other articles by or about Alexander Dugin and also articles about the subject Eurasianism on this site for a more complete view of Eurasianist theory.  – Daniel Macek (Editor of the “New European Conservative”)

 

Milestones of Eurasism

 

Eurasism is an ideological and social-political current born within the environment of the first wave of Russian emigration, united by the concept of Russian culture as a non-European phenomenon, presenting–among the varied world cultures–an original combination of western and eastern features; as a consequence, the Russian culture belongs to both East and West, and at the same time cannot be reduced either to the former or to the latter.

The founders of Eurasism:

  • S. Trubetskoy(1890–1938)–philologist and linguist.
  • N. Savitsky (1895–1965)–geographer, economist.
  • V. Florovsky(1893–1979)–historian of culture, theologian and patriot.
  • V. Vernadsky(1877–1973)–historian and geopolitician.
  • N. Alekseev– jurist and politologist.
  • N. Ilin– historian of culture, literary scholar and theologian.

Eurasism’s main value consisted in ideas born out of the depth of the tradition of Russian history and statehood. Eurasism looked at the Russian culture not as to a simple component of the European civilization, as to an original civilization, summarizing the experience not only of the West as also–to the same extent–of the East. The Russian people, in this perspective, must not be placed neither among the European nor among the Asian peoples; it belongs to a fully original Eurasian ethnic community. Such originality of the Russian culture and statehood (showing at the same time European and Asian features) also defines the peculiar historical path of Russia, her national-state program, not coinciding with the Western-European tradition. 

Foundations

Civilization concept

The Roman-German civilization has worked out its own system of principles and values, and promoted it to the rank of universal system. This Roman-German system has been imposed on the other peoples and cultures by force and ruse. The Western spiritual and material colonization of the rest of mankind is a negative phenomenon. Each people and culture has its own intrinsic right to evolve according to its own logic. Russia is an original civilization. She is called not only to counter the West, fully safeguarding its own road, but also to stand at the vanguard of the other peoples and countries on Earth defending their own freedom as civilizations. 

Criticism of the Roman-German civilization

The Western civilization built its own system on the basis of the secularisation of Western Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism), bringing to the fore such values like individualism, egoism, competition, technical progress, consumption, economic exploitation. The Roman-German civilization founds its right to globality not upon spiritual greatness, as upon rough material force. Even the spirituality and strength of the other peoples are evaluated only on the basis of its own image of the supremacy of rationalism and technical progress.

The space factor

There are no universal patterns of development. The plurality of landscapes on Earth produces a plurality of cultures, each one having its own cycles, internal criteria and logics. Geographical space has a huge (sometimes decisive) influence on peoples’ culture and national history. Every people, as long as it develops within some given geographical environment, elaborates its own national, ethical, juridical, linguistic, ritual, economic and political forms. The “place” where any people or state “development” happens predetermines to a great extent the path and sense of this “development”–up to the point when the two elements became one. It is impossible to separate history from spatial conditions, and the analysis of civilizations must proceed not only along the temporal axis (“before,” “after,” “development” or “non-development,” and so on) as also along the spatial axis (“east,” “west,” “steppe,” “mountains,” and so on). No single state or region has the right to pretend to be the standard for all the rest. Every people has its own pattern of development, its own “times,” its own “rationality,” and deserves to be understood and evaluated according to its own internal criteria.

The climate of Europe, the small extension of its spaces, the influence of its landscapes generated the peculiarity of the European civilization, where the influences of the wood (northern Europe) and of the coast (Mediterraneum) prevail. Different landscapes generated different kinds of civilizations: the boundless steppes generated the nomad empires (from the Scythians to the Turks), the loess lands the Chinese one, the mountain islands the Japanese one, the union of steppe and woods the Russian-Eurasian one. The mark of landscape lives in the whole history of each one of these civilizations, and cannot be either separated form them or suppressed.

State and nation

The first Russian slavophiles in the 19th century (Khomyakov, Aksakov, Kirevsky) insisted upon the uniqueness and originality of the Russian (Slav, Orthodox) civilization. This must be defended, preserved and strengthened against the West, on the one hand, and against liberal modernism (which also proceeds from the West), on the other. The slavophiles proclaimed the value of tradition, the greatness of the ancient times, the love for the Russian past, and warned against the inevitable dangers of progress and about the extraneousness of Russia to many aspects of the Western pattern.

From this school the eurasists inherited the positions of the latest slavophiles and further developed their theses in the sense of a positive evaluation of the Eastern influences.

The Muscovite Empire represents the highest development of the Russian statehood. The national idea achieves a new status; after Moscow’s refusal to recognize the Florentine Unia (arrest and proscription of the metropolitan Isidore) and the rapid decay, the Tsargrad Rus’ inherits the flag of the Orthodox empire. 

Political platform

Wealth and prosperity, a strong state and an efficient economy, a powerful army and the development of production must be the instruments for the achievement of high ideals. The sense of the state and of the nation can be conferred only through the existence of a “leading idea.” That political regime, which supposes the establishment of a “leading idea” as a supreme value, was called by the Eurasists as “ideocracy”–from the Greek “idea” and “kratos,” power. Russia is always thought of as the Sacred Rus’, as a power [derzhava] fulfilling its own peculiar historical mission. The Eurasist world-view must also be the national idea of the forthcoming Russia, its “leading idea.”

The Eurasist choice

Russia-Eurasia, being the expression of a steppe and woods empire of continental dimensions, requires her own pattern of leadership. This means, first of all, the ethics of collective responsibility, disinterest, reciprocal help, ascetism, will and tenaciousness. Only such qualities can allow keeping under control the wide and scarcely populated lands of the steppe-woodland Eurasian zone. The ruling class of Eurasia was formed on the basis of collectivism, asceticism, warlike virtue and rigid hierarchy.

Western democracy was formed in the particular conditions of ancient Athens and through the centuries-old history of insular England. Such democracy mirrors the peculiar features of the “local European development.” Such democracy does not represent a universal standard. Imitating the rules of the European “liberal-democracy” is senseless, impossible and dangerous for Russia-Eurasia. The participation of the Russian people to the political rule must be defined by a different term: “demotia,” from the Greek “demos,” people. Such participation does not reject hierarchy and must not be formalized into party-parliamentary structures. “Demotia” supposes a system of land council, district governments or national governments (in the case of peoples of small dimensions). It is developed on the basis of social self-government, of the “peasant” world. An example of “demotia” is the elective nature of church hierarchies on behalf of the parishioners in the Muscovite Rus’. 

The work of L. N. Gumilev as a development of the Eurasist thinking

Lev Nikolaevic Gumilev (1912–1992), son of the Russian poet N. Gumilev and of the poetess A. Akhmatova, was an ethnographer, historian and philosopher. He was profoundly influenced by the book of the Kalmuck Eurasist E. Khara-Vadan “Gengis-Khan as an army leader” and by the works of Savitsky. In its own works Gumilev developed the fundamental Eurasist theses. Towards the end of his life he used to call himself “the last of the Eurasists.” 

Basic elements of Gumilev’s theory

  • The theory of passionarity [passionarnost’] as a development of the Eurasist idealism;
  • The essence of which, in his own view, lays in the fact that every ethnos, as a natural formation, is subject to the influence of some “energetic drives,” born out of the cosmos and causing the “passionarity effect,” that is an extreme activity and intensity of life. In such conditions the ethnos undergoes a “genetic mutation,” which leads to the birth of the “passionaries”–individuals of a special temper and talent. And those become the creators of new ethnoi, cultures, and states;
  • Drawing the scientific attention upon the proto-history of the “nomad empires” of the East and the discovery of the colossal ethnic and cultural heritage of the autochthone ancient Asian peoples, which was wholly passed to the great culture of the ancient epoch, but afterwards fell into oblivion (Huns, Turks, Mongols, and so on);
  • The development of a turkophile attitude in the theory of “ethnic complementarity.”

An ethnos is in general any set of individuals, any “collective”: people, population, nation, tribe, family clan, based on a common historical destiny. “Our Great-Russian ancestors–wrote Gumilev–in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries easily and rather quickly mixed with the Volga, Don and Obi Tatars and with the Buriates, who assimilated the Russian culture. The same Great-Russian easily mixed with the Yakuts, absorbing their identity and gradually coming into friendly contact with Kazakhs and Kalmucks. Through marriage links they pacifically coexisted with the Mongols in Central Asia, as the Mongols themselves and the Turks between the 14th and 16th centuries were fused with the Russians in Central Russia.” Therefore the history of the Muscovite Rus’ cannot be understood without the framework of the ethnic contacts between Russians and Tatars and the history of the Eurasian continent.

The advent of Neo-Eurasism: historical and social context

The crisis of the Soviet paradigm

In the mid-1980s the Soviet society began to lose its connection and ability to adequately reflect upon the external environment and itself. The Soviet models of self-understanding were showing their cracks. The society had lost its sense of orientation. Everybody felt the need for change, yet this was but a confused feeling, as no-one could tell the way the change would come from. In that time a rather unconvincing divide began to form: “forces of progress” and “forces of reaction,” “reformers” and “conservators of the past,” “partisans of reforms” and “enemies of reforms.” 

Infatuation for the western models

In that situation the term “reform” became in itself a synonym of “liberal-democracy.” A hasty conclusion was inferred, from the objective fact of the crisis of the Soviet system, about the superiority of the western model and the necessity to copy it. At the theoretical level this was all but self-evident, since the “ideological map” offers a sharply more diversified system of choices than the primitive dualism: socialism vs. capitalism, Warsaw Pact vs. NATO. Yet it was just that primitive logic that prevailed: the “partisans of reform” became the unconditional apologists of the West, whose structure and logic they were ready to assimilate, while the “enemies of reform” proved to be the inertial preservers of the late Soviet system, whose structure and logic they grasped less and less. In such condition of lack of balance, the reformers/pro-westerners had on their side a potential of energy, novelty, expectations of change, creative drive, perspectives, while the “reactionaries” had nothing left but inertness, immobilism, the appeal to the customary and already-known. In just this psychological and aesthetic garb, liberal-democratic policy prevailed in the Russia of the 1990s, although nobody had been allowed to make a clear and conscious choice.

The collapse of the state unity

The result of “reforms” was the collapse of the Soviet state unity and the beginning of the fall of Russia as the heir of the USSR. The destruction of the Soviet system and “rationality” was not accompanied by the creation of a new system and a new rationality in conformity to national and historical conditions. There gradually prevailed a peculiar attitude toward Russia and her national history: the past, present and future of Russia began to be seen from the point of view of the West, to be evaluated as something stranger, transcending, alien (“this country” was the “reformers’” typical expression). That was not the Russian view of the West, as the Western view of Russia. No wonder that in such condition the adoption of the western schemes even in the “reformers’” theory was invoked not in order to create and strengthen the structure of the national state unity, but in order to destroy its remains. The destruction of the state was not a casual outcome of the “reforms”; as a matter of fact, it was among their strategic aims.

The birth of an anti-western (anti-liberal) opposition in the post-Soviet environment

In the course of the “reforms” and their “deepening,” the inadequacy of the simple reaction began to be clear to everyone. In that period (1989–90) began the formation of a “national-patriotic opposition,” in which there was the confluence of part of the “Soviet conservatives” (ready to a minimal level of reflection), groups of “reformers” disappointed with “reforms” or “having become conscious of their anti-state direction,” and groups of representatives of the patriotic movements, which had already formed during the perestroika and tried to shape the sentiment of “state power” [derzhava] in a non-communist (orthodox-monarchic, nationalist, etc.) context. With a severe delay, and despite the complete absence of external strategic, intellectual and material support, the conceptual model of post-Soviet patriotism began to vaguely take shape.

Neo-Eurasism

Neo-Eurasism arose in this framework as an ideological and political phenomenon, gradually turning into one of the main directions of the post-Soviet Russian patriotic self-consciousness. 

Stages of development of the Neo-Eurasist ideology

1st stage (1985–90)

  • Dugin’s seminars and lectures to various groups of the new-born conservative-patriotic movement. Criticism of the Soviet paradigm as lacking the spiritual and national qualitative element.
  • In 1989 first publications on the review Sovetskaya literatura[Soviet Literature]. Dugin’s books are issued in Italy (Continente Russia [Continent Russia], 1989) and in Spain (Rusia Misterio de Eurasia [Russia, Mystery of Eurasia], 1990).
  • In 1990 issue of René Guénon’s Crisis of the Modern Worldwith comments by Dugin, and of Dugin’s Puti Absoljuta [The Paths of the Absolute], with the exposition of the foundations of the traditionalist philosophy.

In these years Eurasism shows “right-wing conservative” features, close to historical traditionalism, with orthodox-monarchic, “ethnic-pochevennik” [i.e., linked to the ideas of soil and land] elements, sharply critical of “Left-wing” ideologies.

2nd stage (1991–93)

  • Begins the revision of anti-communism, typical of the first stage of Neo-Eurasism. Revaluation of the Soviet period in the spirit of “national-bolshevism” and “Left-wing Eurasism.”
  • Journey to Moscow of the main representatives of the “New Right” (Alain de Benoist, Robert Steuckers, Carlo Terracciano, Marco Battarra, Claudio Mutti and others).
  • Eurasism becomes popular among the patriotic opposition and the intellectuals. On the basis of terminological affinity, A. Sakharov already speaks about Eurasia, though only in a strictly geographic–instead of political and geopolitical–sense (and without ever making use of Eurasism in itself, like he was before a convinced atlantist); a group of “democrats” tries to start a project of “democratic Eurasism” (G. Popov, S. Stankevic, L. Ponomarev).
  • Lobov, O. Soskovets, S. Baburin also speak about their own Eurasism.
  • In 1992–93 is issued the first number of Elements: Eurasist Review. Lectures on geopolitics and the foundations of Eurasism in high schools and universities. Many translations, articles, seminars.

3rd stage (1994–98): theoretical development of the Neo-Eurasist orthodoxy

  • Issue of Dugin’s main works Misterii Evrazii[Mysteries of Eurasia] (1996),Konspirologija [Conspirology] (1994), Osnovy Geopolitiki [Foundations of geopolitics] (1996), Konservativnaja revoljutsija [The conservative revolution] (1994), Tampliery proletariata [Knight Templars of the Proletariat] (1997). Works of Trubetskoy, Vernadsky, Alekseev and Savitsky are issued by “Agraf” editions (1995–98).
  • Creation of the “Arctogaia” web-site (1996) – arctogaia.com.
  • Direct and indirect references to Eurasism appear in the programs of the KPFR (Communist Party], LDPR [Liberal-Democratic Party], NDR [New Democratic Russia] (that is left, right, and centre). Growing number of publications on Eurasist themes. Issue of many Eurasist digests.
  • Criticism of Eurasism from Russian nationalists, religious fundamentalists and orthodox communists, and also from the liberals.
  • Manifestations of an academic “weak” version of Eurasism (Prof. A. S. Panarin, V. Ya. Paschenko, F.Girenok and others) – with elements of the illuminist paradigm, denied by the Eurasist orthodoxy – then evolving towards more radically anti-western, anti-liberal and anti-gobalist positions.
  • Inauguration of a university dedicated to L. Gumilev in Astan [Kazakhstan].

4th stage (1998–2001)

  • Gradual de-identification of Neo-Eurasism vis-à-visthe collateral political-cultural and party manifestations; turning to the autonomous direction (“Arctogaia,” “New University,” “Irruption” [Vtorzhenie]) outside the opposition and the extreme Left and Right-wing movements.
  • Apology of staroobrjadchestvo[Old Rite].
  • Shift to centrist political positions, supporting Primakov as the new premier. Dugin becomes the adviser to the Duma speaker G. N. Seleznev.
  • Issue of the Eurasist booklet Nash put’[Our Path] (1998).
  • Issue of Evraziikoe Vtorzhenie[Eurasist Irruption] as a supplement to Zavtra. Growing distance from the opposition and shift closer to the government’s positions.
  • Theoretical researches, elaborations, issue of “The Russian Thing” [Russkaja vesch’] (2001), publications in Nezavisimaja GazetaMoskovskij Novosti, radio broadcasts about “Finis Mundi” on Radio 101, radio broadcasts on geopolitical subjects and Neo-Eurasism on Radio “Svobodnaja Rossija” (1998–2000).

5th stage (2001–2002)

  • Foundation of the Pan-Russian Political Social Movement EURASIA on “radical centre” positions; declaration of full support to the President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin (April 21, 2001).
  • The leader of the Centre of Spiritual Management of the Russian Muslims, sheik-ul-islam Talgat Tadjuddin, adheres to EURASIA.
  • Issue of the periodical Evraziizkoe obozrenie[Eurasist Review].
  • Appearance of Jewish Neo-Eurasism (A. Eskin, A. Shmulevic, V. Bukarsky).
  • Creation of the web-site of the Movement EURASIA: eurasia.com.ru
  • Conference on “Islamic Threat or Threat to Islam?.” Intervention by H. A. Noukhaev, Chechen theorist of “Islamic eurasism” (“Vedeno or Washington?,” Moscow, 2001].
  • Issue of books by E. Khara-Davan and Ya. Bromberg (2002).
  • Process of transformation of the Movement EURASIA into a party (2002).

Basic philosophical positions of Neo-Eurasism

At the theoretical level Neo-Eurasism consists of the revival of the classic principles of the movement in a qualitatively new historical phase, and of the transformation of such principles into the foundations of an ideological and political program and a world-view. The heritage of the classic eurasists was accepted as the fundamental world-view for the ideal (political) struggle in the post-Soviet period, as the spiritual-political platform of “total patriotism.”

The Neo-Eurasists took over the basic positions of classical Eurasism, chose them as a platform, as starting points, as the main theoretical bases and foundations for the future development and practical use. In the theoretical field, Neo-Eurasists consciously developed the main principles of classical Eurasism taking into account the wide philosophical, cultural and political framework of the ideas of the 20th century.

Each one of the main positions of the classical Eurasists (see the chapter on the “Foundations of classical Eurasism”) revived its own conceptual development.

Civilization concept

Criticism of the western bourgeois society from “Left-wing” (social) positions was superimposed to the criticism of the same society from “Right-wing” (civilizational) positions. The Eurasist idea about “rejecting the West” is reinforced by the rich weaponry of the “criticism of the West” by the same representatives of the West who disagree with the logic of its development (at least in the last centuries). The Eurasist came only gradually, since the end of the 1980s to the mid-1990s, to this idea of the fusion of the most different (and often politically contradictory) concepts denying the “normative” character of the Western civilization.

The “criticism of the Roman-German civilization” was thoroughly stressed, being based on the prioritary analysis of the Anglo-Saxon world, of the US. According to the spirit of the German Conservative Revolution and of the European “New Right,” the “Western world” was differentiated into an Atlantic component (the US and England) and into a continental European component (properly speaking, a Roman-German component). Continental Europe is seen here as a neutral phenomenon, liable to be integrated–on some given conditions–in the Eurasist project.

The spatial factor

Neo-Eurasism is moved by the idea of the complete revision of the history of philosophy according to spatial positions. Here we find its trait-d’union in the most varied models of the cyclical vision of history, from Danilevsky to Spengler, from Toynbee to Gumilev.

Such a principle finds its most pregnant expression in traditionalist philosophy, which denies the ideas of evolution and progress and founds this denial upon detailed metaphysical calculations. Hence the traditional theory of “cosmic cycles,” of the “multiple states of Being,” of “sacred geography,” and so on. The basic principles of the theory of cycles are illustrated in detail by the works of Guénon (and his followers G. Georgel, T. Burckhardt, M. Eliade, H. Corbin). A full rehabilitation has been given to the concept of “traditional society,” either knowing no history at all, or realizing it according to the rites and myths of the “eternal return.” The history of Russia is seen not simply as one of the many local developments, but as the vanguard of the spatial system (East) opposed to the “temporal” one (West). 

State and nation

Dialectics of national history

It is led up to its final, “dogmatical” formulation, including the historiosophic paradigm of “national-bolshevism” (N. Ustryalov) and its interpretation (M. Agursky). The pattern is as follows:

  • The Kiev period as the announcement of the forthcoming national mission (IX-XIII centuries);
  • Mongolian-Tatar invasion as a scud against the levelling European trends, the geopolitical and administrative push of the Horde is handed over to the Russians, division of the Russians between western and eastern Russians, differentiation among cultural kinds, formation of the Great-Russians on the basis of the “eastern Russians” under the Horde’s control (13th–15th centuries);
  • The Muscovite Empire as the climax of the national-religious mission of Rus’ (Third Rome) (15th–end of the 17th century);
  • Roman-German yoke (Romanov), collapse of national unity, separation between a pro-western elite and the national mass (end of the 17th-beginning of the 20th century);
  • Soviet period, revenge of the national mass, period of the “Soviet messianism,” re-establishment of the basic parameters of the main muscovite line (20th century);
  • Phase of troubles, that must end with a new Eurasist push (beginning of the 21st century).

Political platform

Neo-Eurasism owns the methodology of Vilfrido Pareto’s school, moves within the logic of the rehabilitation of “organic hierarchy,” gathers some Nietzschean motives, develops the doctrine of the “ontology of power,” of the Christian Orthodox concept of power as “kat’echon.” The idea of “elite” completes the constructions of the European traditionalists, authors of researches about the system of castes in the ancient society and of their ontology and sociology (R. Guénon, J. Evola, G. Dumézil, L. Dumont). Gumilev’s theory of “passionarity” lies at the roots of the concept of “new Eurasist elite.”

The thesis of “demotia is the continuation of the political theories of the “organic democracy” from J.-J. Rousseau to C. Schmitt, J. Freund, A. de Benoist and A. Mueller van der Bruck. Definition of the Eurasist concept of “democracy” (“demotia”) as the “participation of the people to its own destiny.”

The thesis of “ideocracy” gives a foundation to the call to the ideas of “conservative revolution” and “third way,” in the light of the experience of Soviet, Israeli and Islamic ideocracies, analyses the reason of their historical failure. The critical reflection upon the qualitative content of the 20th century ideocracy brings to the consequent criticism of the Soviet period (supremacy of quantitative concepts and secular theories, disproportionate weight of the classist conception).

The following elements contribute to the development of the ideas of the classical Eurasists:

The philosophy of traditionalism (Guénon, Evola, Burckhardt, Corbin), the idea of the radical decay of the “modern world,” profound teaching of the Tradition. The global concept of “modern world” (negative category) as the antithesis of the “world of Tradition” (positive category) gives the criticism of the Western civilization a basic metaphysic character, defining the eschatological, critical, fatal content of the fundamental (intellectual, technological, political and economic) processes having their origin in the West. The intuitions of the Russian conservatives, from the slavophiles to the classical Eurasists, are completed by a fundamental theoretical base. (see A. Dugin, Absoljutnaja Rodina [The Absolute Homeland], Moscow 1999; Konets Sveta[The End of the World], Moscow 1997; Julius Evola et le conservatisme russe, Rome 1997).

The investigation on the origins of sacredness (M. Eliade, C. G. Jung, C. Levi-Strauss), the representations of the archaic consciousness as the paradigmatic complex manifestation laying at the roots of culture. The reduction of the many-sided human thinking, of culture, to ancient psychic layers, where fragments of archaic initiatic rites, myths, originary sacral complexes are concentrated. Interpretation of the content of rational culture through the system of the ancient, pre-rational beliefs (A. Dugin, “The evolution of the paradigmatic foundations of science” [Evoljutsija paradigmal’nyh osnovanij nauki], Moscow 2002).

The search for the symbolic paradigms of the space-time matrix, which lays at the roots of rites, languages and symbols (H. Wirth, paleo-epigraphic investigations). This attempt to give a foundation to the linguistic (Svityc-Illic), epigraphic (runology), mythological, folkloric, ritual and different monuments allows to rebuild an original map of the “sacred concept of the world” common to all the ancient Eurasian peoples, the existence of common roots (see A. Dugin Giperborejskaja Teorija [Hyperborean Theory], Moscow 1993.

A reassessment of the development of geopolitical ideas in the West (Mackinder, Haushofer, Lohhausen, Spykman, Brzeszinski, Thiriart and others). Since Mackinder’s epoch, geopolitical science has sharply evolved. The role of geopolitical constants in 20th century history appeared so clear as to make geopolitics an autonomous discipline. Within the geopolitical framework, the concept itself of “Eurasism” and “Eurasia” acquired a new, wider meaning.

From some time onwards, Eurasism, in a geopolitical sense, began to indicate the continental configuration of a strategic (existing or potential) bloc, created around Russia or its enlarged base, and as an antagonist (either actively or passively) to the strategic initiatives of the opposed geopolitical pole–“Atlantism,” at the head of which at the mid-20th century the US came to replace England.

The philosophy and the political idea of the Russian classics of Eurasism in this situation have been considered as the most consequent and powerful expression (fulfilment) of Eurasism in its strategic and geopolitical meaning. Thanks to the development of geopolitical investigations (A. Dugin, Osnovye geopolitiki [Foundations of geopolitics], Moscow 1997) Neo-Eurasism becomes a methodologically evolved phenomenon. Especially remarkable is the meaning of the Land – Sea pair (according to Carl Schmitt), the projection of this pair upon a plurality of phenomena – from the history of religions to economics.

The search for a global alternative to globalism, as an ultra-modern phenomenon, summarizing everything that is evaluated by Eurasism (and Neo-Eurasism) as negative. Eurasism in a wider meaning becomes the conceptual platform of anti-globalism, or of the alternative globalism. “Eurasism” gathers all contemporary trends denying globalism any objective (let alone positive) content; it offers the anti-globalist intuition a new character of doctrinal generalization.

The assimilation of the social criticism of the “New Left” into a “conservative right-wing interpretation” (reflection upon the heritage of M. Foucault, G. Deleuze, A. Artaud, G. Debord). Assimilation of the critical thinking of the opponents of the bourgeois western system from the positions of anarchism, neo-marxism and so on. This conceptual pole represents a new stage of development of the “Left-wing” (national-bolshevik) tendencies existing also among the first Eurasists (Suvchinskij, Karsavin, Efron), and also a method for the mutual understanding with the “left” wing of anti-globalism.

“Third way” economics, “autarchy of the great spaces.” Application of heterodox economic models to the post-Soviet Russian reality. Application of F. List’s theory of the “custom unions.” Actualization of the theories of S. Gesell. F. Schumpeter, F. Leroux, new Eurasist reading of Keynes.

 

The Eurasian Idea

 

Changes in the Original Meaning of Eurasianism

Different terms lose their original meaning through their daily use over the course of many years. Such fundamental notions as socialism, capitalism, democracy, fascism, have changed profoundly. In fact, they have turned banal.

The terms “Eurasianism” and “Eurasia” also have some uncertainties because they are new, they belong to a new political language and intellectual context that is only being created today. The Eurasian Idea mirrors a very active dynamic process. Its meaning has become clearer throughout history but needs to be further developed.

Eurasianism as a Philosophical Struggle

The Eurasian Idea represents a fundamental revision of the political, ideological, ethnic, and religious history of mankind, and it offers a new system of classification and categories that will overcome standard clichés. The Eurasian theory went through two stages—a formative period of classical Eurasianism at the beginning of the 20th century by Russian emigrant intellectuals (Trubeckoy, Savickiy, Alekseev, Suvchinckiy, Iljin, Bromberg, Hara-Davan, et al.) followed by the historical works of Lev Gumilev and, finally, the constitution of neo-Eurasianism (second half of the 1980s to the present).

Towards Neo-Eurasianism

Classical Eurasian theory undoubtedly belongs to the past and can be correctly classified within the framework of the ideologies of the 20th century. Classical Eurasianism might have passed, but neo-Eurasianism has given it a second birth, a new sense, scale, and meaning. When the Eurasian Idea arose from its ashes, it became less obvious, but has since revealed its hidden potential. Through neo-Eurasianism, the entire Eurasian theory has received a new dimension. Today we cannot ignore the large historical period of neo-Eurasianism and must try to comprehend it in it modern context. Furthermore, we will describe the various aspects of this notion.

Eurasianism as a Global Trend; Globalization as the Main Body of Modern History

In the broad sense the Eurasian Idea and even the Eurasian concept do not strictly correspond to the geographical boundaries of the Eurasian continent. The Eurasian Idea is a global-scale strategy that acknowledges the objectivity of globalization and the termination of nation-states (Etats-Nations), but at the same time offers a different scenario of globalization, which entails no unipolar world or united global government. Instead, it offers several global zones (poles). The Eurasian Idea is an alternative or multipolar version of globalization, but globalization is the currently major fundamental world process that is deciding the main vector of modern history.

Paradigm of Globalization—Paradigm of Atlantism

Today’s nation-state is being transformed into a global state; we are facing the constitution of planetary governmental system within a single administrative-economic system. To believe that all nations, social classes, and economic models might suddenly begin to cooperate on the basis of this new planet-wide logic is wrong. Globalization is a one-dimensional, one victor phenomenon that tries to universalize the Western (Anglo-Saxon, American) point of view of how to best manage human history. It is (very often connected with suppression and violence) the unification of different social-political, ethnic religious, and national structures into one system. It is a Western European historical trend that has reached its peak through its domination of the USA.

Globalization is the imposing of the Atlantic paradigm. Globalization as Atlantism absolutely tries to avoid this definition. Proponents of globalization argue that when there will be no alternative to Atlantism that it will stop being Atlantism. The American political philosopher Francis Fukuyama writes about the “end of History,” which actually mean the end of geopolitical history and of the conflict between Atlantism and Eurasianism. This means a new architecture of a world system with no opposition and with only one pole—the pole of Atlantism. We may also refer to this as the New World Order. The model of opposition between the two poles (East-West, North-South) transforms to the center-outskirt model (center—West, “rich North”; outskirt—South). This variant of world architecture is completely at odds with the concept of Eurasianism.

Unipolar Globalization Has an Alternative

Today the New World Order is nothing more than a project, plan or trend. It is very serious, but it is not fatal. Adherents of globalization deny any alternative plan of the future, but today we are experiencing a large-scale phenomenon—contra-globalism, and the Eurasian Idea coordinates all opponents of unipolar globalization in a constructive way. Moreover, it offers the competing idea of multipolar globalization (or alter-globalization).

Eurasianism as Pluriversum

Eurasianism rejects the center-outskirt model of the world. Instead, the Eurasian Idea suggests that the planet consists of a constellation of autonomous living spaces partially open to each other. These areas are not nation-states but a coalition of states, reorganized into continental federations or “democratic empires” with a large degree of inner self-government. Each of these areas is multipolar, including a complicated system of ethnic, cultural, religious and administrative factors.

In this global sense, Eurasianism is open to everyone, regardless of one’s place of birth, residence, nationality and citizenship. Eurasianism provides an opportunity to choose a future different from the cliché of Atlantism and one value system for all mankind. Eurasianism does not merely seek the past or to preserve the current status quo, but strives for the future, acknowledging that the world’s current structure needs radical change, that nation-states and industrial society have exhausted all their resources. The Eurasian Idea does not see the creation of a world government on the basis of the liberal-democratic values as the one and only path for mankind. In its most basic sense, Eurasianism in the 21st century is defined as the adherence to alter-globalization, synonymous with a multipolar world.

Atlantism is not Universal

Eurasianism absolutely rejects the universalism of Atlantism and Americanism. The pattern of Western-Europe and America has many attractive features that can be adopted and praised, but as whole it is merely a cultural system that has the right to exist in its own historical context along with other civilizations and cultural systems.

The Eurasian Idea protects not only anti-Atlantic value systems, but the diversity of value structures. It is a kind of “poliversum” that provides living space for everyone, including the USA and Atlantism, along with other civilizations, because Eurasianism also defends the civilizations of Africa, both American continents, and the Pacific area parallel to the Eurasian Motherland.

The Eurasian Idea Promotes a Global Revolutionary Idea

The Eurasian Idea on a global scale is a global revolutionary concept, called upon to be a new platform for mutual understanding and cooperation for a large conglomerate of different powers: states, nations, cultures, and religions that reject the Atlantic version of globalization.

If we analyze the declaration and statements of various politicians, philosophers, and intellectuals we will see that the majority of them are adherents (sometimes unaware) of the Eurasian Idea.

If we think about all of those who disagree with the “end of history” our spirits will be raised and the failure of the American concept of strategic security for the 21st century connected with constituting the unipolar world, will be much more realistic.

Eurasianism is the sum of the natural, artificial, objective, and subjective obstacles on the path of unipolar globalization; it offers a constructive, positive opposition to globalism instead of a simple negation.

These obstacles, however, remain uncoordinated in the meantime, and proponents of Atlantism are able to manage them easily. Yet, if these obstacles can somehow be integrated into a united force, they will be integrated into something united and the likelihood of victory will become much more serious.

Eurasianism as the Old World (Continent)

The New World is part of the Second Old World or a more specific and narrow sense of the word Eurasianism applicable to what we call the Old World. The Notion of the Old World (traditionally regarding Europe) can be considered in a much wider context. It is multi-civilizational super space, inhabited by nations, states, cultures, ethnicities, and religions connected to each other historically and geographically by dialectic destiny. The Old World is an organic product of human history.

The Old World is often opposed to the New World, the American continent, discovered by Europeans and transformed into a platform for an artificial civilization, where European projects of modernism were created. It was built upon human-produced ideologies as a purified civilization of modernism.

The United States was the successful creation of the “perfect society,” formed by intellectuals from England, Ireland, and France, while the countries of South and Central America remained colonies of the Old World, and Germany and Eastern Europe were less influenced by this idea of a “perfect society.”

In the terms of Oswald Spengler, dualism between Old and New world can be brought to opposites: culture-civilization, organic-artificial, historical-clinical. 

The New World as Messiah

As a historical product of Western Europe during its evolution, the New World very early on realized its “messiah” destiny, where the liberal-democratic ideals of the Enlightenment were combined with the eschatological ideas of radical protestant sects. This was called the theory of Manifest Destiny, which became the new symbol of belief for generations of Americans. According to this theory, American civilization overtook all cultures and civilizations of the Old World and in its current universal form, it is obligatory for all nations of the planet.

With time, this theory directly confronted not only the cultures of the East and Asia, but came into conflict with Europe, which seemed to the Americans to be archaic and full of prejudice and antiquated traditions.

In turn, the New World turned away from the heritage of the Old World. Directly following World War II the New World became the indisputable leader in Europe itself with the “criteria of verity” of others. This inspired a corresponding wave of American dominance and at a parallel time the beginning of a movement that seeks geopolitical liberation from the brutal, transoceanic, strategic, economic and political control of the “elder Brother.”

Integration of the Eurasian Continent

In the 20th century, Europe became aware of its common identity, and step-by-step started to move towards the integration of all its nations into a common union, able to guarantee full sovereignty, security, and freedom to itself and all members.

The creation of the European Union became the most important event that helped Europe restore its status as a world power alongside the USA. This was the response of the Old World to the excessive challenge of the New World.

If we consider the alliance of the USA and Western Europe as the Atlantic vector of European development, European integration under the aegis of the continental countries (Germany, France) may be called European Eurasianism. This becomes more and more obvious if we take into consideration the theory of Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals (de Gaulle) or even to Vladivostok. In other words the integration of the Old World includes the vast territory of the Russian Federation.

Thus, Eurasianism in this context may be defined as a project of the strategic, geopolitical, and economic integration of the north of the Eurasian continent, considered the cradle of European history and the matrix of European nations.

Parallel with Turkey, Russia (both ancestors of the Europeans) is historically connected with the Turkic, Mongolian, and Caucasus nations. Russia gives the integration of Europe a Eurasian dimension in both the symbolic and geographic senses (identification of Eurasianism with continentalism).

During the last few centuries, the idea of European integration has been proposed by the revolutionary faction of European elites. In ancient times, similar attempts were made by Alexander the Great (integration of the Eurasian continent) and Genghis Khan (founder of history’s largest empire).

Eurasia as Three Great Living-Spaces, Integrated across the Meridian; Three Eurasian Belts (Meridian Zones)

The horizontal vector of integration is followed by a vertical, vector.

Eurasian plans for the future presume the division of the planet into four vertical geographical belts (meridian zones) from North to South.

Both American continents will form one common space oriented on and controlled by the USA within the framework of the Monroe Doctrine. This is the Atlantic meridian zone.

In addition to the above zone, three others are planned. They are the following:

  • Euro-Africa, with the European Union as its center.
  • Russian-Central Asian zone.
  • Pacific zone.

Within these zones, the regional division of labor and the creation of developmental areas and corridors of growth will take place.

Each of these belts (meridian zones) counterbalance each other and all of them together counterbalance the Atlantic meridian zone. In the future, these belts might be the foundation upon which to build a multipolar world: the number of poles will be more than two; however, the number will be much less than the number of current nation-states. The Eurasian model proposes that the number of poles must be four.

The Meridian zones of the Eurasian project consist of several “Great Spaces” or “democratic empires.” Each possesses relative freedom and independence but are strategically integrated into a corresponding meridian zone.

The Great Spaces correspond to the boundaries of civilizations and include several nation-states or unions of states.

The European Union and the Arab Great Space, which integrates North, Trans-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, for Euro-Africa.

The Russian-Central Asian zone is formed by three Great Spaces that sometimes overlap each other. The first is the Russian Federation along with several countries of the CIS—members of the Eurasian Union. Second is the Great Space of continental Islam (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan). The Asian countries of the CIS intersect this zone.

The third Great Space is Hindustan, which is a self-dependent civilization sector.

The Pacific meridian zone is determined by a condominium of two great spaces (China and Japan) and also includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Australia (some researchers connect Australia with the American Meridian zone). The geopolitical region is very mosaic and can be differentiated by many criteria.

The American meridian zone consists of the American-Canadian, Central and North American Great Spaces.

Importance of the Fourth Zone

The structure of the world based upon meridian zones is accepted by most American geopoliticians who seek the creation of a New World Order and unipolar globalization. However, a stumbling block is the existence of the Russian-Central Asian meridian space: the presence or absence of this belt radically changes the geopolitical picture of the world.

Atlantic futurologists divide the world into the three following zones:

  • American pole, with the European Union as its close-range periphery (Euro-Africa as an exemption) and
  • The Asian and Pacific regions as its long-range periphery.
  • Russia and Central Asia as fractional, but without it as an independent meridian zone, our world is unipolar.

This last meridian zone counterbalances American pressure and provides the European and Pacific zones ability to act like self-dependent civilization poles.

Real multipolar balance, freedom and the independence of meridian belts, Great Spaces, and nation-states depend upon the successful creation of a fourth zone. Moreover, it’s not enough to be one pole in a two-pole model of the world: the rapid progress of the USA can be counterbalanced only by the synergy of all three meridian zones. The Eurasian project proposes this four-zone project on a geopolitical strategic level.

Eurasianism as Russian-Central Asian Integration; Moscow-Tehran Axis; Fourth Meridian Zone – Russian-Asian Meridian Integration

The central issue of this process is the implementation of a Moscow-Tehran axis. The whole process of integration depends on the successful establishment of a strategic middle and long-term partnership with Iran. Iranian and Russian economic, military, and political potential together will increase the process of zone integration, making the zone irreversible and autonomous. The Moscow-Tehran axis will be the basis for further integration. Both Moscow and Iran are self-sufficient powers, able to create their own organizational strategic model of the region.

Eurasian plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan

The integration vector with Iran is vitally important for Russia to gain access to warm-water ports as well as for the political-religious reorganization of Central Asia (Asian countries of CIS, Afghanistan and Pakistan). Close cooperation with Iran presumes the transformation of the Afghani-Pakistani area into a free Islamic confederation, loyal both to Moscow and to Iran. The reason this is necessary is that the independent states of Afghanistan and Pakistan will be the continuing source of destabilization, that being neighboring countries. The geopolitical struggle will provide the ability to implement a new Central-Asian federation and transform this complicated region into one of cooperation and a prosperity area.

Moscow-Delhi Axis

Russian-Indian cooperation is the second most important meridian axis in integration on the Eurasian continent and the Eurasian collective security systems. Moscow will play an important role, decreasing the tensions between Delhi and Islamabad (Kashmir). The Eurasian plan for India, sponsored by Moscow, is the creation of a federation that will mirror the diversity of Indian security with its numerous ethnic and religious minorities, including Sikhs and Muslims.

Moscow-Ankara

The main regional partner in the integration process of Central Asia is Turkey. The Eurasian Idea is already becoming rather popular there today because of western trends interlaced with Eastern. Turkey acknowledges its civilization differences with the European Union, its regional goals and interests, the threat of globalization, and further loss of sovereignty.

It is strategically imperative for Turkey to establish a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation and Iran. Turkey will be able to maintain its traditions only within the framework of a multipolar world. Certain factions of Turkish society understand this situation—from politicians and socialists to religious and military elites. Thus, the Moscow-Ankara axis can become geopolitical reality despite a long-term period of mutual estrangement.

Caucasus

The Caucasus is the most problematic region to Eurasian integration because its mosaic of cultures and ethnicities easily leads to tensions between nations. This is one of the main weapons used by those who seek to stop integration processes across the Eurasian continent. The Caucasus is inhabited by nations belonging to different states and civilization areas. This region must be a polygon for testing different methods of cooperation between peoples, because what can succeed there can succeed across the Eurasian continent. The Eurasian solution to this problem lies not in the creation of ethnic-based states or assigning one nation strictly to one state, but in the development of a flexible federation on the basis of ethnic and cultural differences within the common strategic context of the meridian zone.

The result of this plan is a system of a half-axis between Moscow and the Caucasian centers (Moscow-Baku, Moscow-Yerevan, Moscow-Mahachkala, Moscow-Grozny, etc.) and between the Caucasian centers and Russia’s allies within the Eurasian project (Baku-Ankara, Erevan-Teheran, etc.).

Eurasian Plan for Central Asia

Central Asia must move toward integration into a united, strategic, and economic bloc with the Russian Federation within the framework of the Eurasian Union, the successor of the CIS. The main function of this specific area is the rapprochement of Russia with the countries of continental Islam (Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan). From the very beginning, the Central-Asia sector must have various vectors of integration. One plan will make the Russian federation the main partner (similarities of culture, economic and energy interests, a common security system). The alternate plan is to place the accent on ethnic and religious resemblance: Turkic, Iranian, and Islamic worlds.

Eurasian Integration of Post-Soviet Territories; Eurasian Union

A more specific meaning of Eurasianism, partially similar to the definitions of the Eurasian intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s is connected with the process of the local integration of post-Soviet territories. Different forms of similar integration can be seen in history: from the Huns and other (Mongol Turkic, Indo-European) nomad empires to the empire of Genghis Khan and his successors. More recent integration was led by the Russian Romanov Empire and, later, by the USSR. Today, the Eurasian Union is continuing these traditions of integration through an unquiet ideological model that takes into consideration democratic procedures; respects the rights of nations; and pays attention to the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic features of all union members.             Eurasianism is the philosophy of integration of the post-Soviet territory on democratic, non-violent, and voluntary basis without the domination of any one religious or ethnic group.

Astana, Dushanbe, and Bishkek as the Main Force of Integration

Different Asian republics of the CIS treat the process of post-Soviet integration unequally. The most active adherent to integration is Kazakhstan. The President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, is a staunch supporter of the Eurasian Idea. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan similarly support the process of integration, though their support is less tangible in comparison with Kazakhstan.

Tashkent and Ashabad

Uzbekistan and especially Turkmenistan oppose the integration process, trying again to gain the maximum positive results from their recently achieved national sovereignty. However, very soon, due to the increasing rate of globalization, both states will face a dilemma: to lose sovereignty and melt into a unified global world with its domination by American liberal values or to preserve cultural and religious identity in the context of the Eurasian Union. In our opinion, an unbiased comparison of these two options will lead to the second one, naturally sequential for both countries and their history.

Trans-Caucasian States

Armenia continues to gravitate towards the Eurasian Union and considers the Russian Federation an important supporter and conciliator that helps it to manage relations with its Muslim neighbors. It is notable that Tehran prefers to establish a partnership with ethnically close Armenia. This fact allows us to consider two half-axis—Moscow-Yerevan and Yerevan-Tehran—as positive prerequisites for integration.

Baku remains neutral, but its situation will drastically change with the continued movement of Ankara towards Eurasianism (it will immediately affect Azerbaijan). Analysis of the Azerbaijani cultural system shows that this state is closer to the Russian Federation and post-Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia than to religious Iran and even moderate Turkey.

Georgia is the key problem of the region. The mosaic character of the Georgian state is the cause of serious problems during the construction of a new national state that is strongly rejected by its ethnic minorities: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Adjaria, etc. Furthermore, the Georgian state does not have any strong partners is the region and is forced to seek a partnership with the USA and NATO to counterbalance Russian influence. Georgia is a major threat, able to sabotage the very process of Eurasian integration. The solution to this problem is found in the Orthodox culture of Georgia, with its Eurasian features and traditions.

Ukraine and Belarus—Slavic Countries of the CIS

It is enough to gain the support of Kazakhstan and Ukraine to succeed in the creation of the Eurasian Union. The Moscow-Astana-Kiev triangle is a frame able to guarantee the stability of the Eurasian Union, which is why negotiations with Kiev are urgent like never before. Russia and Ukraine have very much in common: culture, language, religious, and ethnic similarities. These aspects need to be highlighted because from the beginning of Ukraine’s recent sovereignty Russophobia and disintegration have been promoted. Many countries of the EU can positively influence the Ukrainian government, because they are interested in political harmony in Eastern Europe. The cooperation of Moscow and Kiev will demonstrate the pan-European attitudes of both Slavic countries.

The above-mentioned factors pertain to Belarus, where integration intentions are much more evident. However, the strategic and economic status of Belarus is less important to Moscow that those of Kiev and Astana. Moreover, the domination of a Moscow-Minsk axis will harm integration with Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which is why integration with Belarus must proceed fluently and without any sudden incidents—along with other vectors of the Eurasian integration process.

Eurasianism as Weltanschauung

The last definition of Eurasianism characterizes a specific Weltanschauung: a political philosophy combing tradition, modernity, and even elements of postmodernism. This philosophy has as its priority traditional society, acknowledges the imperative of technical and social modernization (without separating from traditional culture); and strives for the adaptation of its ideological program to post-industrial, informational society, which is called postmodernism. Postmodernism formally removes the counter positions of tradition and modernism, disenfranchising and making them equal. Eurasian postmodernism, on the contrary, promotes an alliance of tradition and modernism as a constructive, optimistic, energetic impulse towards creation and growth. Eurasian philosophy does not deny the realities discovered by the Enlightenment: religion, nation, empire, culture, etc. At the same time, the best achievements of modernism are used widely: technological and economic advances, social guarantees, freedom of labor. Extremes meet each other, melting into a unifying harmonic and original theory, inspiring fresh thinking and new solutions for the eternal problems people have faced throughout history.

Eurasianism is an Open Philosophy

Eurasianism is an open, non-dogmatic philosophy that can be enriched with new content: religion, sociological and ethnological discoveries, geopolitics, economics, national geography, culture, strategic and political research etc. Moreover, Eurasian philosophy offers original solutions in specific cultural and lingual contexts: Russian Eurasianism will not be the same as French, German, or Iranian versions. However, the main framework of the philosophy will remain invariable.

Principles of Eurasianism

The basic principles of Eurasianism are the following:

  • Differentialism, the pluralism of values systems versus the conventional obligatory domination of one ideology (American liberal-democracy first and foremost);
  • Tradition versus suppression of cultures, dogmas, and discoveries of traditional society;
  • Rights of nations versus the “gold billions” and neo-colonial hegemony of the “rich North”;
  • Ethnicities as values and subjects of history versus the depersonalisation of nations, imprisoned into artificial social constructions;
  • Social fairness and human solidarity versus exploitation and humiliation of man by man.

 

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Dugin, Alexander. “Milestones of Eurasianism.” Ab Aeterno, No. 3, (June 2010). Retrieved from: < http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/12/milestones-of-eurasism/ >.

Dugin, Alexander. “The Eurasian Idea.” Ab Aeterno, No. 1, (November 2009). Retrieved from: < http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/11/the-eurasian-idea/ >.

 

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Ethical Theories of Nishitani, Watsuji, & Berdyaev – Sevilla

“Ethics of Emptiness East and West: Examining Nishitani, Watsuji, and Berdyaev” by Anton Luis Sevilla (PDF – 604 KB):

Ethics of Nishitani, Watsuji, and Berdyaev – Sevilla

“The Communality of Creativity and the Creativity of Communality: A Comparison of the Ethics of Nikolai Berdyaev and Watsuji Tetsuro” by Anton Luis Sevilla (PDF – 308 KB):

Comparison of Berdyaev’s and Watsuji’s Ethics – Sevilla

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Sevilla, Anton Luis. “Ethics of Emptiness East and West: Examining Nishitani, Watsuji, and Berdyaev.” In Questioning Oriental Aesthetics and Thinking: Conflicting Visions of “Asia” Under the Colonial Empires, edited by Shigemi Inaga. Kyoto: International Research Center for Japanese Studies, 2010. Retrieved from: <http://publications.nichibun.ac.jp/region/d/NSH/series/kosh/2011-03-31/s001/s026/pdf/article.pdf >.

Sevilla, Anton Luis. “The Communality of Creativity and the Creativity of Communality: A Comparison of the Ethics of Nikolai Berdyaev and Watsuji Tetsuro.” Kritika Kultura, No. 15 (2010), pp. 226-253. Retrieved from: <http://philpapers.org/archive/SEVTCO-2.pdf >.

 

Notes on other resources: See also the article about the debate on Kitaro Nishida’s philosophical positions, a Japanese philosopher who was a significant influence on Tetsuro Watsuji and Keiji Nishitani: “The Nishida Enigma: ‘The Principle of the New World Order’” by Yoko Arisaka. However, we should note to our audience that Arisaka’s article deals mostly with Nishida’s political and cultural philosophy, and only briefly mentions his philosophy in the fields of religion, ontology, science, and ethics. Likewise, Sevilla’s articles above mostly deal with the ethical philosophies and (to a lesser extent) religious philosophies of Watsuji and Nishitani, but neglect the philosophy of culture and climate which Watsuji is well-known for.

More information on all of these thinkers can be found in various books and journals, including for example at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (see Kyoto School, Nishida, Watsuji). Another good reference for external resources on Japanese philosophers is the Japanese Philosophy Blog (see categories of Kyoto School, Nishida, Watsuji) and Nichibunken (see publications search). However, we should warn our readers that the majority of academic resources on these philosophers in English contain anti-Right-wing or anti-Conservative bias and commentaries (especially the Stanford Encyclopedia), and thus must be compared and balanced with alternative explanations for a better understanding. A more neutral, although somewhat limited, discussion of Watsuji’s political (and ethical-social) philosophy can be found in “Watsuji Tetsuro’s Contributions to Political Philosophy” by Kazuhiko Okuda (Paper delivered to the XVIIth World Congress of International Political Science Association (IPSA), Seoul, Korea, August 17·21, 1997. Originally published online at: <http://nirr.lib.niigata-u.ac.jp/bitstream/10623/31224/1/2011_2_iuj1_019.pdf >. ).

 

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Discussion of Kitaro Nishida’s Philosophy – Arisaka

“The Nishida Enigma: ‘The Principle of the New World Order’” by Yoko Arisaka (PDF – 189 KB):

The Nishida Enigma – Yoko Arisaka

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Arisaka, Yoko. “The Nishida Enigma: ‘The Principle of the New World Order’.” Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Spring 1996): pp. 81-99. Retrieved from: <http://www.arisaka.org/mnipponica.pdf >.

 

Notes on further reading: Studies of Japanese philosophy can be found by researching the website known as The Japanese Philosophy Blog and also the official website of Nichibunken (see publications search), The International Research Center for Japanese Studies, which can be used for research to find numerous resources in Japanese history, culture, religion, society, etc.

In particular, we should mention that Arisaka’s article above deals primarily with Nishida’s cultural and political philosophy, and only briefly mentions his philosophy in the fields of religion, ontology, science, and ethics. For more complete information on Kitaro Nishida’s philosophy, see for example the resources listed at the Japanese Philosophy Blog: Category Nishida Kitaro.

Other posts on the New European Conservative related to Japan and Japanese thought include the following: Alexander Dugin’s “In the Country of the Rising ‘Do’,” Riki Rei’s Review of Naoki Inose’s Persona: A Biography of Yukio Mishima, Justin Raimondo’s biographical sketch “Mishima: Paleocon as Samurai”, Hoang Nguyen’s review of Natsume Soseki’s Kokoro, Kosaku Yoshino’s “Theoretical Reflections on Nationalism”, Anton L. Sevilla’s discussions of Tetsuro Watsuji’s and Nikolai Berdyaev’s ethical theories, and Alexander Dugin’s speech at Tokyo University titled “New Paradigm of Science.”

 

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Interview with Alexander Dugin – Tremblay

Against Universalism: An Interview with Alexander Dugin by Rémi Tremblay

 

Editor’s Introductory Note: The following interview conducted with Alexander Dugin is useful because it helps to clarify some of the positions of the Neo-Eurasianists towards the current political structures and towards Western nations. However, as with the majority of Dugin’s interviews, it is rather limited in scope and provides very incomplete or inadequate explanations of certain important topics, which can lead to misunderstandings. For example, the commentaries on “Manifest Destinies” as well as the roots of empires can be misleading for many readers. Furthermore, it is particularly important to note that Dugin’s explanation of the Eurasian political structure in this interview can seem to imply an authoritarian, undemocratic, and rigidly elitist form of government. However, it is important to recall that in many of his works, Dugin has advocated a form of democracy for Eurasian regions based off of the concept of “organic democracy” (also advocated by Alain de Benoist), and has referred to the envisioned Eurasian empire as a “democratic empire.” For that reason, it is more likely that Dugin prefers a mixed political system which combines true democracy with meritocratic aristocratism. In order to fully comprehend Alexander Dugin’s vision, it is necessary to read his other key texts. – Daniel Macek (Editor of the “New European Conservative”)

Interviewer’s Note: My recent articles have been critical of Eurasianism, and have raised a few questions. Alexander Dugin, the author of the two books referred to in my articles, has kindly offered to answer them.

Rémi Tremblay: In the West, Eurasianism seems to seek to ally itself with nationalists. However, in Russia nationalist groups like the ones that support Russia in the West were crushed and repressed. What can Western nationalists learn from that repression?

Alexander Dugin: Eurasianism works with different groups who are against liberalism, North American hegemony and Modernity as a whole. These groups can be right or left. It is most important to be against liberalism and Atlanticism. But Eurasianism is not nationalistic—it is a Fourth Political Theory, ideologically similar to the European New Right of Alain de Benoist.

In the West there are two kinds of nationalists: (1) that characterized as anti-liberal, continental, anti-USA, and traditionalist; and (2) that characterized as pro-liberal, anticommunist, Atlanticist, pro-American and racist (xenophobe). The Eurasianists are willing to work closely with the former, but have little or nothing in common with the latter.

The same situation exists within Russia. There are Eurasian, imperial, traditionalist patriots who mostly support Putin and are loyal to the state, and the pro-liberal, racist, neo-Nazi extremists manipulated by the USA (like the Right Sector in Ukraine). If the latter are repressed, we enjoy it as much as when repression touches the pro-American liberal. They are a fifth column.

But at the same time Eurasianism is not the Third Path, it is the Fourth one. That means we are beyond right and left, as we refuse the materialism of communists (accepting and supporting their anti-capitalist struggle), while at the same time refusing “Nation,” in the spirit of Julius Evola, as a bourgeois concept based on Imperial-style traditionalism. Nations are now destroyed by the same forces that constructed them on the eve of Modernity. They have served their end [undermining] traditional Stände (elites), ethnic culture, and Medieval forms of society, and now are of no further use to the same Masonic, global, anti-traditional elite that created them. So, everybody from left or right is free to transcend their views and pass from the Second Political Theory or from the Third one to the Fourth.

Tremblay: You call for a multipolar world. However, one gets the impression that a bipolar or even a unipolar world would emerge with Eurasianism. Wouldn’t it be logical for Europeans to support an independent Europe, independent from Moscow and Washington?

Dugin: If we say we want to construct a multipolar world and not a unipolar or bipolar one, we are going to do exactly what we declare. The theory of a multipolar world formulated in my books and in the different documents of Eurasian movements shows clearly that we support exactly a Europe totally independent from Washington and from Moscow. We need to have some fully independent Great Spaces (Grossraum)—North American, South American, European, Islamic, African, Russian-Eurasian, Indian, Chinese and Oceanic—that could be allies or foes, depending on the concrete situation. We are totally against unipolarity and North American hegemony, as well as a bipolar system.

Tremblay: The multicultural super-state that you propose as the model for future states has precedents like Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. Can this model survive without an authoritarian leader? And likewise can multicultural Russia survive in the post-Putin era?

Dugin: The strategically centralized poly-cultural hyper-state is called Empire. Empire should be strong first of all in its ideology, and that ideology cannot be loose or liberal. It should be strong and based on the new aristocracy or ideocracy (as Eurasianists used to say). So, not only an Emperor but also an imperial ideology of a strong idealistic type is needed to grant cohesion to the whole system. I presume that Orthodox Christianity, Hinduism, Confucianism, and Islam are of such types. But they need the spiritual revival. The tri-functional Indo-European model studied by G. Dumezil should be the main platform for the societies of Indo-European origin. The society should be created not from below but from above. The meaning of the State is its spiritual mission. The aristocracy should consist of “Platonic Guards,” philosopher-warriors, that grant unity to the different ethnic groups representing the supra-ethnic elites, as was always the case in historic Empires.

But instead of one liberal, decadent North American financial Empire, there should be different Empires with different imperial visions. The Russian vision is obvious—it has its roots in our organic Orthodox tradition and Russian Eurasian Empire. I presume that the future of Europe lies in the restoration of the Charlemagne heritage and of the eschatological anticipation of the return of King Arthur. Possibly some would hope for the new Roman Empire professed by Virgil, who thought that Apollo would return and this time for eternity.

Tremblay: You claim that non-interventionist politicians like Ron Paul should be supported in the United States. However, you support interventionist politicians in Russia. If non-interventionists take control in the USA and interventionist politicians control the Kremlin, wouldn’t it become a unipolar world directed by Moscow?

Dugin: We have no possibility of exercising unipolarity, nor do we want to. Now there is unipolarity. It should be stopped. Non-interventionists are the only salvation of the USA, which is currently a tool in the hands of an anti-American elite that uses the American people in order to create global government. Without concentrating on inner political problems there will be no USA. The present masters will sacrifice the American people to their globalist agenda.

Russia is on the defense. Globalists attack us on our ground. Where is Ukraine? Is it close to the American borders? No, it is far, far away. But Washington supports Ukrainian liberals and neo-Nazis, pushing them to attack Russia. If some longsighted American politicians see that this is not correct and that it does not serve American interests, they are quite right and are real patriots.

Tremblay: You oppose American Manifest Destiny, but how does Orthodox Messianism differ?

Dugin: We oppose any kind of universalism. USA has its own mission. It is American—North American. Not universal. Manifest Destiny exists, not in the singular but in the plural. We need to use the expression in the plural, Manifest Destinies: American, European (that is quite different), Russian, Islamic, Chinese, and so on. No American dream—liberal and Calvinist—in its secular and materialist version must try to be the only Destiny for all humanity. The American people will pay a terrible price for this titanic presumption. Every great people has its own destiny. The American people are great, but not so great as to be able to deny the greatness of others. The globalist elite that has usurped the power in the USA must repent and surrender this ill-gained dominance.

Tremblay: In Putin Vs Putin, you talk about Putin being moderately Eurasianist based on his first two terms. In light of his third mandate, do you still have this opinion of a half-Western, half-Eurasianist politician?

Dugin: Yes, absolutely. He is half-Eurasianist. He is obliged to be more and more Eurasiniast but that is against his will. He is a liberal-capitalist, but a realist at the same time. Kissinger is much closer to him than we are, but still we support Putin because he will follow the Eurasianist course instead of his own. This is the hard geopolitical logic that binds him, so he will act exactly as we predict, including by the different logic of simply following circumstances and opportunities. He is a realist of pure type. We are not.

Tremblay: In the Great Spaces you propose, Quebec would be part of a bloc otherwise entirely Anglo-Saxon. Wouldn’t that mean the end of our culture and existence as an ethnos in the long term?

Dugin: The Empire conceived in the Eurasianist multipolar vision is never unidimensional, unlike modern nations. They should respect pluralism—ethnic and cultural. There are no fully homogeneous spaces. In Russia we have Muslims, Caucasians, Tartars, Siberians, Finno-Ugrians and so on. North America was built by Anglo-Saxons, Irish, French and Spanish with certain participation from other European nations, notably German, so I suggest the return to the ethnic organization: French Quebec should be French and so on. However, this should not be achieved in the process of creating a new national state, but cultural rights should be granted in the geopolitical context by the Imperial Constitution.

 

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Dugin, Alexander. An Interview with Alexander Dugin: Against Universalism.” Interview by Rémi Tremblay. Alternative Right, 21 May 2015. <http://alternative-right.blogspot.com/2015/05/an-interview-with-alexander-dugin.html >.

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Critical Analysis of Evola’s Thought – Benoist

“Julius Evola, Radical Reactionary and Committed Metaphysician” by Alain de Benoist (PDF – 366 KB):

Julius Evola, Radical Reactionary and Committed Metaphysician

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De Benoist, Alain. “Julius Evola, Radical Reactionary and Committed Metaphysician: A Critical Analysis of the Political Thought of Julius Evola.” The Occidental Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 2015), pp. 17-62. Document retrieved from: <http://files.alaindebenoist.com/alaindebenoist/pdf/julius_evola_radical_reactionary.pdf >.

 

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