Defining Paganism – Faye

Defining Paganism

By Guillaume Faye

 

Paganism: The philosophic and/or religious attitude, generally polytheistic and pantheistic, that is the antipode to the revealed salvation religions, to religious or secular monotheism, or to Western materialism.

For Christopher Gérard, one of the principal contemporary practicing authorities on the subject: ‘Paganism, as a coherent vision of the world … is faithful to an ancestry, considered part of a very long memory, enrooted in multiple terrains, opened to the invisible … an active participant in the world, a sought-after harmony between microcosm and macrocosm. Paganism in essence is a natural religion, the most ancient of a world “born” with its birth – if the world were ever born. Rather than an eccentric fad – or the elegant nostalgia of literary refugees from some mythic Golden age, I think paganism is on the way to becoming the first of the world’s religions.’ He mentions 1.5 billion pagans on five continents, which would make it the world’s largest religious group. Gérard adds, ‘Without being narrowly moralistic … a lived paganism seems to me incompatible with whatever makes man servile. As the exaltation of life – of the eternal élan – paganism refuses everything that debases man: drugs, dependencies, every kind of unhealthy life.’ A lived paganism, in other words, is not destructuring, nor linked to the permissive, anti-vitalist mores of the present West (as certain prelates would have us believe). Gay Pride has nothing in common with the pagan bacchanalia! Paganism, moreover, is neither superstitious nor vacuously ritualistic, in contrast to Islam (this belief system which is most opposed to it), for Islam is all these things to the highest degree.

Pierre Vial has written that paganism is not anti-Christian, but a-Christian and post-Christian. ‘To be pagan is to refuse the inversion of values that Nietzsche denounced in Christianity. It is to take the hero, not the martyr, as the model. Christian suffering has always repulsed me. To celebrate the redemptive value of suffering seems life a form of masochism.’ (Today, modern European Christians practice their ethno-masochism and culpability on the immigrant colonisers; in every domain they practice the ‘duty to repent.’) Vial continues, ‘To exalt wretchedness, suffering, and sickness is unhealthy and I much prefer the Greek ideal of transcendence or the Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius. Paganism ought not, though, to be confused with anti-clericalism or atheism. Another point: a purely intellectual definition of paganism … won’t suffice. It’s perhaps necessary, but it doesn’t go far enough. For paganism to exist, it must be lived. Not simply in gestures, but in life’s most ordinary expressions. Paganism is defined primarily in reference to the sacred … It affirms the immanence of the sacred.’

For both Gérard and Vial, paganism the authentic ‘religion,’ for it ties men of the same community together and ties them to a cosmos in which the divine is everywhere, where the gods are not separated from, but part of, the profane world.

Similarly, Gnosticism, which inspires Freemasonry, has nothing to do with paganism. Paganism’s constituting traits are: the presence of the sacred and the supernatural within nature; a cyclical or spherical conception of time; the refusal to consider nature the ‘property’ of the men who exploit and thus destroy it; the coming-and-going of sensuality and asceticism; the unqualified apology of the life-force (the ‘yes to life’ and ‘the Great Health’ of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra); the idea that the world is ‘uncreated’ and corresponds to a river of becoming, without beginning or end; the tragic sentiment of life refusing all nihilism; the cult of ancestors, of the line, of our people’s biological and cultural identity; the refusal of all revealed and universal Truths and thus the refusal of all fanaticism, dogmatism, and forced proselytism.

We need to beware, though, of certain so-called pagans who hold that paganism stands for ‘absolute tolerance,’ in the name of ‘social polytheism.’ Such pagans, like the post-conciliar Church, support, for instance, immigration and Islam and refuse to struggle against the reigning social decadence. This pseudo-paganism of secular clerics gives the pagan spirit a Leftist slant. It’s a pseudo-paganism, in effect – purely negative and reactive, a hollow Judaeo-Christianity, an anti-Catholic fixation.

It’s not a philosophy of life, but an attitude of resentment. Besides, these pseudo-pagans, who lack true culture, have never been able to define nor positively live their assumed ‘paganism.’ In a totally absurd way, it’s even led them to a pro-Islam position (whose Qur’an considers pagans ‘idolaters’ – and whose lot is that of the Eid al-Adha’s slaughtered sheep) – and to the egalitarianism of absolute toleration for every form of deviance, justified in the name of a purely casuistic ‘social polytheism’ (hemophilia, antiracism, ethno-pluralism, tribalism, etc.) One doesn’t even have to criticise the Church to assume the position of Monsignor Gaillot and the post-conciliar humanitarians.

Against this, we affirm that paganism is in essence a partisan of social order – which it sees as reflecting the cosmic order, it equally opposes the fusion of peoples, random mixing, and thus a massifying individualism. The pagan vision of the world is holistic and organic and views its people as a hierarchical community of destiny. Like ancient Greek paganism, the notion of the City, inseparable from notions of patriotism and ethnic identity, is fundamental the pagan conception of the world. Similarly, Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power perfectly accords with paganism (to the degree it respects the natural, cosmic order).

In Europe, paganism – her ancient religion, far older than Christianity – has taken several forms: first there’s a ‘philosophical’ paganism (or neo-paganism), with Hellenic, Roman, Germanic, Scandinavian, etc., components, all of which hold no belief in anthropocentric gods, but rather in a sacred, polytheistic, and pantheistic vision of the world, in which the divinities are eternal allegories representing the multiplicities of life and cosmos; this paganism knows numerous communal rituals linked to the different stages of human life and to the seasonal cycles; it’s been evident in European art for centuries. There’s also a ‘wild’ paganism that stretches from the (pseudo-pagan) New Age to European Buddhism. Another false paganism is intellectualist paganism, which is often just a form of anti-Catholic hatred; what Gérard calls ‘salon paganism.’ And finally, there’s the latent or implicit paganism of traditional Catholicism and Orthodoxy, especially evident in their polytheistic cults.

There’s no pagan ‘Church.’ Paganism isn’t sociologically unified – one needs to speak of paganisms. The word itself is ambiguous, coined by Christians to designate the religion of peasants (pagani).

It might also be noted that sects belong neither to paganism nor its philosophy, but to derivations of the mystic monotheistic salvation religions.

Pagans today need to have the intelligence and wisdom to not – apriori – reject traditional Christianity, and vice versa, for the struggle against the common enemy is what’s most important. Not sectarianism, but a historic compromise, is needed here. No reconciliation, by contrast, is possible with the Judaeo-Christianity of the post-conciliar Left.

The main pagan reproach of Christianity (as made by Pierre Vial, Giorgio Locchi, and Louis Rougier) is its roots in universalism and egalitarianism and its progressive view of history; totalitarian ideologies of salvation, such as globalist liberalism, with its end to history and its disarming humanitarianism, are simply secularised forms of Christianity. Universalism, for example, has been transformed into a secular cosmopolitanism, and Christian charity into a masochistic humanitarianism. Universal charity, as it comes from Judaeo-Christianity and clashes with the pagan world vision, has been central to Europe’s moral disarmament, to its failure to resist the Third World’s colonising invasion. Similarly, in situating God outside or above the universe and declaring the latter profane, Judaeo-Christianity opened the way to an atheistic materialism. Following Augustine and Aquinas, traditional Christianity claimed that the equality and universality of men before God is destined not for the City, but for the beyond, following the Last Judgment.

We need, henceforth, to recognise that the egalitarian, universalist, and anti-nationalist virus of the early Christians, neutralised by the Medieval Church and by chivalry, has returned in force with the modern post-conciliar Church. Traditional Christianity, whether Catholic or Orthodox, incorporated important pagan elements, notably in the polytheism of the Holy Trinity, the cult of the saints and the Virgin Mary, etc. We might also mention Pelagius, Teilhard de Chardin, Giordano Bruno, or other Churchmen who attempted a synthesis of European Christianity and paganism.

The most important thing today is to confront the common enemy, Islam – the most abstract, the most intolerant, the most dangerous of the monotheistic religions (founding model of totalitarianism, even more so than Communism), with which, unfortunately, the Catholic hierarchy and our pseudo-pagan ‘ethno-pluralist’ intellectuals suicidally collaborate. In the course of the Twenty-first century, it’s not unreasonable to expect that authentic pagans in Europe and India will be the ones manning the front line in the struggle against the desert’s totalitarian religion – not the Catholic clerics or republican ‘secularists.’

It would be vain to instrumentalise paganism as a ‘political religion.’ For paganism is above all an attitude, a philosophical, spiritual positioning, a choice of values, and in no case does it have a vocation to institutionalise itself as a religion – as a ‘new Church.’ European Catholicism – before it was desacralised by Vatican II – included important pagan elements, to such a degree that certain modern theologians accuse it of having been a ‘pagano-Christianity’ – the same reproach Luther and Calvin made of it. Slavic-Greek Orthodoxy still retains many pagan remnants.

The historic alliance of authentic pagan philosophers (inspired by the heritage of Greece, Rome, and India) to traditional European Christianity is a prerequisite to the merciless struggle that is to be waged against the Masonic gnosis, the obscurantism of the Muslim colonisers, and the virus of materialism.

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Excerpt from: Faye, Guillaume. Why We Fight: Manifesto for the European Resistance. London: Arktos Media, 2011, pp. 205-210.

 

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European Son – Interview with Benoist

“European Son: An Interview with Alain de Benoist” (PDF – 191 KB):

European Son: An Interview with Alain de Benoist

Additional document with portions of the original interview containing critical commentaries on Christianity and the Human Sciences which were cut out from the official interview in The Occidental Quarterly (PDF – 314 KB):

Interview with Alain de Benoist on the Human Sciences and Christianity by Bryan Sylvain

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Citation for the official The Occidental Quarterly interview: De Benoist, Alain. “European Son: An Interview with Alain de Benoist.” Interview by Brian Sylvian. The Occidental Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Fall 2005), pp. 7-27. <https://www.toqonline.com/archives/v5n3/53-bs-debenoist.pdf >.

Citations for the original sources of the “Interview with Alain de Benoist on the Human Sciences and Christianity by Bryan Sylvain”: De Benoist, Alain. “Interview on Christianity, Part 1.” Counter-Currents Publishing, 28 January 2011. <http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/01/interview-on-christianity-part-1/ >; “Interview on Christianity, Part 2.” Counter-Currents Publishing, 29 January 2011. <http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/01/interview-on-christianity-part-2/ >; “Interview on the Human Sciences, Part 1.” Counter-Currents Publishing, 9 February 2011. <http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/02/interview-on-the-human-sciences-part-1/ >; “Benoist on Eugenics & Intelligence: Interview on the Human Sciences, Part 2.” Counter-Currents Publishing, 11 February 2011. <http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/02/benoist-on-eugenics-and-intelligence-interview-on-the-human-sciences-part-2/ >; “Benoist on J. Philippe Rushton: Interview on the Human Sciences, Part 3.” Counter-Currents Publishing, 14 February 2011. <http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/02/interview-on-the-human-sciences-part-3/ >; “Benoist on Feminism, IQ, & the Wealth of Nations: Interview on the Human Sciences, Part 4.” Counter-Currents Publishing, 14 February 2011. <http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/02/benoist-on-feminism-iq-the-wealth-of-nations-interview-on-the-human-sciences-part-4/ >.

 

Interview on the Fourth Political Theory – Morgan

The Fourth Political Theory: An Interview with John Morgan by Natella Speranskaya

 

Natella Speranskaya (NS): How did you discover the Fourth Political Theory? And how would you evaluate its chances of becoming a major ideology of the 21st century?

John Morgan (JM): I have been interested in the work of Prof. Dugin since I first discovered English translations of his writings at the Arctogaia website in the late 1990s. So I had already heard of the Fourth Political Theory even before my publishing house, Arktos, agreed to publish his book of the same name. In editing the translation of the book, I became intimately familiar with Prof. Dugin’s concept. According to him, the Fourth Political Theory is more of a question than an ideology at this point. It is easier to identify what it is not, which is opposed to everything represented by liberalism, and which will transcend the failures of Marxism and fascism. In recent decades, many people have been heralding the “death of ideology.” Carl Schmitt predicted this, saying that the last battle would take place between those who wish to reject the role of politics in civilization, and those who understand the need for it. The death of ideology, I believe, is simply the exhaustion of those political systems that are founded on liberalism. This does not mean that politics itself has ended, but only that a new system is required. The Fourth Political Theory offers the best chance to take what is best from the old ideologies and combine them with new ideas, to create the new vision that will carry humanity into the next age. Although we can’t say with certainty what that will look like, as of yet. But it should be obvious to everyone that the current ideology has already run its course.

NS: Leo Strauss when commenting on the fundamental work of Carl Schmitt The Concept of the Political notes that despite all radical critique of liberalism incorporated in it Schmitt does not follow it through since his critique remains within the scope of liberalism”. “His anti-Liberal tendencies, – claims Strauss, – remain constrained by “systematics of liberal thought” that has not been overcome so far, which – as Schmitt himself admits – “despite all failures cannot be substituted by any other system in today’s Europe. What would you identify as a solution to the problem of overcoming the liberal discourse? Could you consider the Fourth Political Theory by Alexander Dugin to be such a solution? The theory that is beyond the three major ideologies of the 20th century – Liberalism, Communism and Fascism, and that is against the Liberal doctrine.

JM: Yes, definitely. The unsustainably and intellectual poverty of liberalism in Europe, and also America, is becoming more apparent with each passing day. Clearly a new solution is needed. Prof. Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory, as he has explained in his book of the same title, is more of a question than an ideology at this point, and it is up to those of us who are attempting to defy unipolar hegemony to determine what it will be. So, yes, we need a new ideology, even if we cannot yet explain exactly what it will be in practice. I think Prof. Dugin’s idea of taking Heidegger’s Dasein as our watchword is a good one, because we are so entrenched in the liberal mindset – even those of us who want to overcome it – that it is only be re-engaging with the pure essence of the reality of the world around us that we will find a way out of it. The representational, virtual reality of postmodernism which surrounds most of us on a daily basis has conditioned us to only think about liberalism on its own terms. Only by renewing our contact with the real, non-representational world, and by disregarding all previous concepts and labels, can we find the seeds for a new way of apprehending it.

NS: Do you agree that today there are “two Europes”: the one – the liberal one (incorporating the idea of “open society”, human rights, registration of same-sex marriages, etc.) and the other Europe (“a different Europe”) – politically engaged, thinker, intellectual, spiritual, the one that considers the status quo and domination of liberal discourse as a real disaster and the betrayal of the European tradition. How would you evaluate chances of victory of a “different Europe” over the ”first” one?

JM: Speaking as an American outsider, I absolutely see two Europes. The surface Europe is one that has turned itself into a facsimile of America – the free market, democracy, multiculturalism, secularism, pop culture, sacrificing genuine identity for fashions, and so on. The other Europe is much more difficult to see, but I have the good fortune of having many friends who dwell within it. This is the undercurrent that has refused to accept the Americanization of Europe, and which also rejects the liberal hegemony in all its forms. They remain true to the ancient spirit of Europe’s various peoples and cultures, while also dreaming of a new Europe that will be strong, independent and creative once again. We see this in the New Right, in the identitarian movement, and in the many nationalist groups across Europe that have sprung up in recent years. As of now, their influence is small, but as the global situation gets worse, I believe they will gain the upper hand, as more Europeans will become open to the idea of finding new solutions and new ways of living, disassociated from the collapsing hegemonic order. So I estimate their chances as being very good. Although they must begin acting now, even before the “collapse,” if they are to rescue their identities from oblivion, since the “real” Europe is fast being driven out of existence by the forces of liberalism.

NS: “There is nothing more tragic than a failure to understand the historical moment we are currently going through” – notes Alain de Benoist – “this is the moment of postmodern globalization”. The French philosopher emphasizes the significance of the issue of a new Nomos of the Earth or a way of establishing international relations. What do you think the fourth Nomos will be like? Would you agree that the new Nomos is going to be Eurasian and multipolar (transition from universum to pluriversum)?

JM: Yes, I do agree. In terms of what it will look like, see my answer to question 4 in the first set of questions.

NS: Do you agree that the era of the white European human race has ended, and the future will be predetermined by Asian cultures and societies?

JM: If you mean the era of the domination of White Europeans (although of course that comprises many diverse and unique identities in itself), and those of European descent such as in America, over the entire world, then yes, that era is coming to an end, and has been, gradually, since the First World War. As for the fate of White Europeans in our own homelands, that is also an open question, given the lack of genuine culture and diminishing reproductive rates of Whites around the world, coupled with large-scale non-White immigration into our homelands. While I welcome the end of White hegemony, which overall hasn’t been good for anyone, most especially for Whites themselves, as an American of European descent I do fear the changes that are taking place in our lands. As the thinkers of the “New Right” such as Alain de Benoist have said, if we stand for the preservation of the distinct identities of all peoples and cultures, then we must also defend the identities of the various European peoples and their offshoots. I would like to see European peoples, including in America, develop the will to resist this onslaught and re-establish our lands as the true cradles of our cultures and identities. Of course, in order to do this, White peoples must first get their souls back and return to their true cultures, rejecting multiculturalism and the corporate consumer culture that has grown up in tandem with neo-colonialism, both of which victimize Whites just as much as non-Whites. Unfortunately, few White Europeans around the world have come to this understanding thus far, but I hope that will change.

As for whether the future belongs to Asians, that I cannot say. Certainly India and China are among the most prominent rising powers. But at the same time, they face huge domestic challenges, demographically and otherwise. Whether they will be able to sustain the momentum they have now is uncertain. Having lived in India for the last four years, while it is a land I have come to love, I have difficulty seeing India emerging as a superpower anytime soon. The foundations just aren’t there yet. Likewise, I find it troubling that India and China continue to understand “progress” in terms of how closely they mimic the American lifestyle and its values. Until Asian (and other) nations can find a way to develop a sustainable and stable social order, and until they forge a new and unique identity for themselves in keeping with their traditions that is disconnected from the Western model, I don’t see them overtaking the so-called “First World.”

NS: Do you consider Russia to be a part of Europe or do you accept the view that Russia and Europe represent two different civilizations?

JM: As a longtime student of Dostoevsky, I have always believed that Russia is a unique civilization in its own right. Although clearly Russia shares cultural affinities and linkages with Europe that cannot be denied, and which bring it closer to Europe than to Asia, it retains a character that is purely its own. I have always admired this aspect of Russia. Whereas Western Europe sold its soul in the name of material prosperity in its rush to embrace the supposed benefits of the Industrial Revolution and modernity as quickly as possible, Russia developed its own unique path to modernity, and has always fought hard to maintain its independence. It seems to me, as a foreigner, that as a result, Russia retains a much stronger connection to the spiritual and the intangible aspects of life than in the West, as well as a more diverse, as opposed to purely utilitarian, outlook. The German Conservative Revolutionaries understood this, which is why they sought to tilt Germany more towards Russia politically and culturally, and away from England and the United States (such as Arthur Moeller van den Bruck advocated). Similarly, in today’s world, New Rightists, traditionalists and so forth would do well to look toward Russia and its traditions for inspiration.

NS: Contemporary ideologies are based on the principle of secularity. Would you predict the return of religion, the return of sacrality? If so, in what form? Do you consider it to be Islam, Christianity, Paganism or any other forms of religion?

JM: I think we already see this happening to an extent. In the nineteenth and for most of the twentieth century, the prevailing view was skepticism and scientism, with religion primarily relegated to its moralistic aspects. But beginning in the 1960s in North America and Western Europe, we have seen a renewal of interest in religion and the transcendental view of life on a large scale. This development was, of course, presaged by the traditionalist philosophers, such as René Guénon and Julius Evola, who understood modernity perhaps better than any other Europeans of their time. But unfortunately, this revival in practice has tended toward New Age modes of thought, or else mere identity politics and exotericism as we see with the rise of fundamentalist Christianity in America, rather than in genuinely traditional spirituality. As such, most spirituality in the Western nations today is an outgrowth of modernity, rather than something that can be used to oppose and transcend it. But the fact that more traditionalist books are being made available, and that we see more groups dedicated to traditional spirituality and esotericism than ever before, is a promising trend.

As for the form that this revival will ultimately take, that depends on the location. For much of the world, of course, people are likely to return to and revitalize the traditions that grew out of their own civilizations, which is as it should be. We already see efforts in this direction at work in some parts of the so-called “Third World.” But in Western Europe, and especially America, it is a more difficult question. The Catholic Church today doesn’t hold much promise for those of a traditional mindset. Guénon himself abandoned his native Catholicism and began to practice Islam because he had come to believe that Catholicism was no longer a useful vehicle for Tradition. And of course today, things are much worse than they were in Guénon’s time. Protestantism, besides being counter-traditional, is in even poorer shape these days. And while I am very sympathetic to those who are seeking to revive the pre-Christian traditions of Europe, or adopt traditions from other cultures, this ultimately isn’t a good strategy for those who are engaged in sociopolitical activity alongside spiritual activities. The vast majority of Europeans and Americans still identify with Christianity in some form, and this will need to be taken into account by any new political or metapolitical movement that emerges there.

In America, unlike Europe, we have no real tradition of our own. This is both a blessing and a curse. It’s a blessing because our culture has always been tolerant of allowing and even embracing the presence of alternative forms of spirituality. (Interest in Hinduism, for example, began in America already in the Nineteenth century with such figures as Thoreau and Emerson, and with the arrival of Hindu teachers from India such as Protap Chunder Mozoomdar and Swami Vivekananda.) But it is also a curse because there is no particular, universal spiritual tradition that underlies American civilization which can be revived. Christianity remains dominant, but certainly the popular forms of it that exist in America today are unacceptable from a traditional standpoint. At the same time, most Americans are unlikely to accept any form of spirituality which they perceive to be different from or in opposition to Christianity. So it is a difficult question.

The best solution may be to exclude advocating any specific religion from our efforts in the West for the time being, and leave such decisions to the individual. Of course, we should encourage everyone who supports us to integrate the traditional worldview into their own lives, in whatever form that may take, and to oppose secularism on the grounds of the resacralization of culture. Perhaps once the process of the collapse of the current global and cultural order is further along, and as the peoples’ faith in the illusions of progress, materialism and nationalism inculcated by modernity are shattered, the new form or forms of religion that must take root in the West will become more readily apparent.

 

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Morgan, John. “The Fourth Political Theory: An interview with John Morgan.” Interview by Natella Speranskaya. Euro-Synergies, 3 June 2013. <http://euro-synergies.hautetfort.com/archive/2013/05/29/john-morg.html >. (See this article in PDF format here: The Fourth Political Theory – An Interview with John Morgan by Natella Speranskaya).

Note: See also the closely related interview with John Morgan on the Theory of the Multipolar World: <https://neweuropeanconservative.wordpress.com/2015/01/20/theory-of-multipolar-world-morgan/ >.

 

4th Political Theory & the “Other Europe” – Speranskaya

The Fourth Political Theory and “Other Europe”

By Natella Speranskaya

 

“The Fourth Political Theory is a volitional construction of the tradition based on deconstruction of modernity” – Alexander Dugin

Critique of (Neo)liberalism from “above”

In his book Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss and The Concept of the Political Heinrich Meier states that the world that is trying to refrain from identifying the difference between a friend and an enemy Schmitt clearly shows the world the inevitability of “either or” in order to intensify the “awareness of an emergency situation” and re-awaken the ability that is manifested when “the enemy reveals itself with particular clarity”[1]. Indeed, today we can unmistakably identify our enemy. The ideological (as well as ontological) enemy is a liberal – a supporter of the political theory that defeated the two ideologies of the twentieth century – Communism and Fascism (National Socialism). Today we are dealing with the result of the victory. By saying “we” I do not mean some abstract political entity, rather I mean the representatives of the Eurasian geopolitical tradition or the approaches of tellurocratic geopolitics (therefore, the enemies are determined by their involvement in thalassocratic geopolitics). By commenting on the fundamental work The Concept of the Political Leo Strauss notes that despite all radical critique of liberalism incorporated in it Schmitt does not follow it through since his critique develops and remains within the scope of liberalism.

“His anti-Liberal tendency, – claims Strauss, – remains constrained by “systematics of liberal thought” that has not been overcome so far, which – as Schmitt himself admits – “despite all failures is not substituted by any other system in today’s Europe”[2]. Critique of liberalism is impossible within the scope of liberalism; without definite overcoming (or better to say, “collapsing”) the liberal discourse no substitution is possible.

We are well aware of the fact that all three major political ideologies of the past century – Liberalism, Communism and Fascism (the first, second and third political theories, respectively) – are the products of modernity. A paradigmatic shift to postmodernity necessarily implies the birth of a political theory that is beyond the scope of the preceding three theories (besides, given the political metamorphoses of Liberalism that can be reduced to a single definition – “Neoliberalism” – the need for a well-grounded alternative becomes essential). Only after getting liberated from the bondage of Liberal doctrine it is possible to proceed with its total critique. Moving a step beyond modernity does not mean: a) the attempts aimed at formation of another communist doctrine, b) a possibility of establishing a Neo-Fascist ideology capable of substituting an alternative political theory of counter-liberal essence. We are to make a political choice that will determine the future of the world order being already on the verge of transition to multipolarity, constituted by four poles, where the presence of the Eurasian pole is essential. Besides, the very political choice implies the conscious acceptance of the concept of The Fourth Political Theory enabling the critique of (Neo)liberalism from “above”.

“Other Europe”

“Only few people can actually argue against the fact that today, amid the frightening feeling of crisis and unease that has taken over the keenest minds, the whole European community appeals to the supreme ideal of world culture, culture, within which a new principle is expected to unite the powers and bearers of scattered European traditions”, – claims Italian philosopher Julius Evola in an introductory part of his essay United Europe: The Spiritual Prerequisite[3].

We, the representatives of the Eurasian political philosophy are building strategic relations with the last resistant rebels of Europe, those who even among the ruins maintain the courage to defend supreme, heroic and traditional values. When reflecting on preconditions of the new European unity, Evola highlights an imminent threat both from Russia and the USA. This essay deals with the historical period that has been characterized by a bipolar system of world order; the very model incorporated two poles, the two hegemons – the USSR and the USA. Nowadays, we are dealing with a unipolar model and a single hegemon, the United State of America and, therefore, find ourselves within a victorious Liberal discourse that is going through barely noticeable metamorphoses. Despite all the differences between the two historical periods, the European crisis not only remained an unresolved problem but rather increased significantly. However, what kind of Europe do we discuss? In one of his interviews Alexander Dugin noted that today we encounter “two Europes: “ liberal Europe” (or “Europe-1”) incorporating the idea of “open society”, human rights, registration of same-sex marriages, legalization of the Swedish family, and “other Europe” (“Europe-2”) – politically engaged, thinker, intellectual, spiritual, the one that considers the status quo and domination of liberal discourse as a real disaster and a betrayal of the European tradition. “Many years have passed since when the West became aware what the “tradition” stand for, in its highest sense; anti-traditional spirit has become synonymous with the western one as early as in the Renaissance era. “Tradition” in its full sense is a succession of periods called as “The heroic ages” by Vico – where there was the only creative force with metaphysical roots expressed in customs and religion, law, mythology, artistic creations – in all private areas of existence[4],– states Julius Evola. The last resistant rebels of Europe are the representatives of “Other Europe”.

In his work Europe and Globalization Alain de Benoist pays attention to the fact that “Europe possesses all trump cards that would enable it to overthrow the American hegemony and to become a major world power without any hesitation.” However, Europe restrains itself from making a strategic decision and allows to be thrown into an abyss of helplessness and total extinction by the USA; most of the Europeans have lost their identity, and only a few representatives of “Other Europe” are still faithful to the heritage of the European tradition. The fourth Nomos of the Earth that we have closely approached is characterized as “multipolar” or, more precisely, as potentially multipolar since “the only civilization – the United States of America is hegemonic in six major spheres of power – technologies, economics, finances, warfare, media and culture. De Benoist highlights that the US aims to delay inevitable transformation of Western universum into planetary pluriversum. A radical split from the US would lead Europe to become sovereign, to return its true identity (national, cultural, etc.) and, as a result, would contribute to the decline of the USA status of a world leader.

We would like to point out a need for identifying a principle capable of ensuring unity, mentioned by Evola, that we define as a political doctrine that represents a major alternative to the liberal ideology. The very political doctrine, founded by Alexander Dugin, has been titled as The Fourth Political Theory. Today we must reconsider the historical fate of Russia and Europe. Russia, not as a part of Europe, but rather Russia and Europe as two “big spaces” (Grossraum), two civilizations: on the one hand, given the multipolar model of the world order that incorporates the above-mentioned civilizations as actors, and on the other hand, considering comprehensive analysis of the relations between Russia and Europe that is overcoming the liberal paradigm and provides us with a completely different picture. Alain de Benoist also highlights that Russia, located in the center of Heartland, is not Europe, while Europe belongs to the Eurasian entity. It is noteworthy that the Italian philosopher Massimo Cacciari, ex-governor of Venice and a former Member of the European Parliament (mostly popular in Russia for his work entitled The Geophilosophy of Europe) had a presentiment about the Fourth theory; this is described in Foreword of his geophilosophical work as follows: “…instead of a simplified classical scheme with two poles – left (Marxists) and right (anti-Marxists, conservatives), and the center in the middle, Cacciari discusses approproateness of the political scheme that involves, ar least, four distinctions”.

«Imitation of History»

The Fourth Political Theory is Liberalism’s enemy. However, what the current Liberalism stands for? Our strategic plan aimed at destruction of the hostile ideology depends on the answer to this question. Today we are dealing with “Neo-Liberalism” or “Post-Liberalism”, a non-authentic Liberalism. In his book The Fourth Political Theory A. Dugin establishes the change of status of the Liberal ideology within the transition from modernity to post-modernity, and describes the “scenery (панораму) of post-liberal grotesque”: the “individuum” of classical Liberalism, the former measure of all things, becomes a post- individuum; a man as a possessor of private property – that practically acquired a sacral status –becomes possessed by the latter; the Society of the Spectacle (La Société du spectacle (Guy Debord) occurs; the boundary between real and virtual is blurred – the world becomes a technical supermarket; all forms of supra-individual authority are eliminated; the state is substituted by the “civil society”; the principle – “the economy is our destiny” is replaced by another principle – “the digital code is our destiny”, in other words, everything comes to total virtuality.

“There is nothing more tragic than a failure to understand the historical moment we are currently going through; – notes Alain de Benoist – this is the moment of postmodern globalization”. The French philosopher emphasizes the significance of the issue of a new Nomos of the Earth that is a way of establishing international relations. So, what do you think the fourth Nomos will be like? De Benoist discusses two possibilities: transition to universe (or a unipolar world) which means the USA domination, and transition to pluriversum (a multi-polar world) where cultural diversity will face no threat of total absorption and “melting”. Indeed, the fourth Nomos of the Earth is related to the Fourth Political Theory. Alain de Benoist states that “similar to the three large Nomoi of the Earth within the modernity, there have been three major political theories”. In the era of modernity we have encountered the succession of Liberalism, Socialism and Fascism in the 18^th, 19^th and 20^th centuries, respectively. And these three ideologies disappeared in the reverse order. So, the latest of the ideologies was the one that disappeared first. (…) The fourth Nomos of the Earth requires the emergence of the Fourth Political Theory. The Fourth Theory cannot yet be defined in detail, – adds de Benoist. – Indeed, it will be critical of the preceding theories. However, it will incorporate valuable ideas from the preceding ideologies. This will be a synthesis as well as Aufhebung in its Hegelian sense.

While elaborating an ideological basis for the Fourth Theory it is possible to analyze positive as well as negative aspects of the other three well-known political theories and adopt those aspects that we find acceptable. This is one of the ways. However, it does not mean that there are no other approaches. We can also propose the issue of “political mimesis” having considered it from another angle.

For instance, contemporary French philosophers Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy offer a new concept of “imitation of history”. They focus on the idea that Europe has tended to be imitation-oriented for a long time, “which, first of all, means imitating the ancients. The role of the antique model (Sparta, Athens, Rome) in the establishment of contemporary nation states and in the construction of their culture is well known»[5].

“Imitation of history” played a fundamental role in the concept of German Nazism (as well as Italian Fascism). It is important to reflect whether political mimesis of classical era is feasible today, and whether or not the need for a new shift towards antiquity has to be discussed. Was not it a mistake of the followers of the third political theory in the form of German National-Socialism (resulting in a defeat) that the imitation of the ancients ignored an important feature: existence of «two Greeces» – Apollonian and Dionysian, Greece of the light day and Greece of the mysteries, Greece of the Law and heroic severity and Greece of ecstatic rituals and sacrifices? And the last is the Russian rather than only European soil feasible for the revival of the spirit of antiquity? In other words, should not we borrow “political mimesis” or “Imitation of history” of more ancient ideologemes rather than those ideological aspects that exist within the political theories generated by modernity? This would be a radical solution for the development of political theory beyond the modernity.

As for Russia, establishment of the Russian school of Neoplatonism clearly indicates the seriousness of our intention and our understanding of Plato’s significant role. “The project of New Russia is to be commenced by Plato’s announcement”, – claims A. Dugin. The fact that Platonopolis, Plato’s Republic has never been founded may indicate that any attempt to establish it involved an initial intention of reducing a distance between modernity and antiquity by approximation of the Greek heritage to «us/them». However, the main point is that we/they are to be elevated to the Greeks. The city of the world must become the city of God and not the other way around.

“Nazism (and in many respects, the Italian Fascism) is characterized by defining its own movement, ideology and the state as a manifestation of some myth or as a living myth. This is what Rosenberg claims: “Odin is dead, but in another way, as essence of the German soul, Odin is resuscitating before our very eyes,” claim P. Lacoue-Labarthe, and J.-L.Nancy. National-Socialism was a synthesis of various myths (rather not quite successful): Apollonian and Dionysian Greece clashed rather than had anything in common within the new political doctrine; even at the early stage, this featured a further defeat in a historical collision. However, besides Greek element (Hitler used to say of himself: “I am Greek”), National-Socialism also incorporated the elements of the ancient Germanic paganism, Medieval and Indo-Aryan tradition. Mussolini’s Fascism, in its turn, represented an idealistic myth of Italy as the heiress of Rome. Julius Evola notes that with the doctrine of the state, Fascism “returned to the tradition underlying the great European states. Besides, it has revived or, at least, attempted to revive the Roman idea as the highest and special integration of “myth” about a new political organism that is “strong and organic”. For Mussolini the Roman tradition was not just a figure of speech, it was rather the “idea of power”, the ideal for upbringing of a new type of a human being who had to take power into his hands. “Rome is our myth” (1922). These words witnessed a proper choice and great courage; they incorporate a desire to bridge the gap over the abyss of centuries, to revive continuity of the only valuable heritage of Italian history”[6]. Nevertheless, Mussolini was never able to truly appreciate a spiritual dimension of Roman symbol and ancient Rome.

Racial Doctrine

A fatal mistake of the German National-Socialism was a distorted understanding of the racial doctrine that recognized only “racism of the first degree” (biological racism).

The first step in this succession was the confusion of concepts of “nation” and “race” that, in Evola’s words, equaled to democratization and degradation of the concept of race. Opinions of a small number of followers of different understanding of the racial theory were not taken into account. As for the Italian Fascism, from the very beginning this ideology was free from vulgar interpretation of the racial theory. In 1941 Evola was summoned to appear in the Venetian Palace where his meeting with Mussolini was planned. Mussolini expressed great interest in Evola’s work titled “The Synthesis of Racial Doctrine”, having discovered “a basis for establishing an independent fascist and anti-materialist racism” in it. Mussolini unconditionally accepted the theory of three races such as spiritual, mental and physical (biological). The very theory has had a direct correlation with Plato’s ideas: the race of body in the state corresponded to demos, the mass, while the mental race and the race of spirit correlated with guards/warriors and philosophers, respectively. However, subsequently Mussolini had come under pressure from the representatives of the Catholic Church who realized a major threat in racial issue being discussed on the level of spirit, and the theory of three races did not get an appropriate support.

Julius Evola used to emphasize that the concept of race (that is beyond its usual understanding as being both an anthropological and ethnic entity) confronts an individual (which is indeed a positive feature of racism). According to the Italian philosopher, one of the practical meaning of racial theory is “the need for overcoming liberal, individualistic and rationalistic conceptions according to which an individual is like an atom, the subject in itself, that lives, making sense only for himself”. Thus, the Italian Fascism with its roots was initially focused on the theory of three races that strongly distinguishes it from National-Socialist doctrine which fanatically professed biological racism.

Nowadays, the word “race” and its derivatives are only perceived in a negative sense; therefore, applying them as the elements of foundation for any ideological structure would be extremely incautious. The Fourth Political Theory categorically rejects racism including its latest, postmodern forms such as a dictatorship of glamour, following the trends of modern information, the idea of unipolar globalization (superiority of Western values). Alexander Dugin claims that the Fourth Political Theory rejects “all forms of normative hierarchization of societies on the basis of ethnic, religious, social, technological, economic and cultural origin. A comparison of societies is possible; however, one should not claim superiority of one society over the others”.

Returning to the issue of «Imitation of history» several questions might be posed: which path to follow when forming the Fourth Political Theory? Should we select “robust elements” from the three political ideologies or should we refer to Plato’s Politeia and pre-modern, traditional society (or combine both approaches)?

What could be a hypothetic transition from logos to mythos within the political ideology? And what is the relationship between the Fourth Political Theory and a myth?

What are the myth of Russia and the myth (or myths) of “other Europe” being incorporated in the Fourth Political Theory as a foundation for a multipolar world?

These questions await answers.

Alexander Dugin believes that Plato sacrificed the truth of the myth to the truth of philosophy. Therefore, Plato’s Republic, from the very beginning, was based on Apollonian principle (strictly rejecting the Dionysian one). Is not it appropriate to sacrifice the truth of philosophy for to Philosophy of the other Beginning that will eliminate the problematics of separation of logos and Mythos? Politeia is only possible when there are two of its constituent principles. The Fourth Political Theory is in need of a Myth, a Myth as a universal Myth, a Myth as paradeigma, within the scope of which the dialogue between Russia and “Other Europe” will mark (mean, become) the transition to a new political reality.

According to its founder, The Fourth Political Theory is a volitional construction of tradition based on deconstruction of modernity. It primarily deals with total rejection of subjects of three theories of the 20^th century: rejection of individual, class and race/nation-state in Liberalism, Communism and National-Socialism as well as Fascism, respectively. [Heidegger’s] Dasein (Germ. “being-there/there-being”) becomes the subject of the Fourth Political Theory making it a «fundamental-ontological structure developed in the field of existential anthropology». Besides, The Fourth Political Theory, focused on multi-polarity, goes even further than Heidegger and claims the plurality of Dasein. The Dasein-culture-civilization-big space-a pole of the multi-polar world presents an absolutely different context of political thought. There is no individual as it is abolished by Dasein; instead of individual there is an issue of authentic or non-authentic existence, that is a choice – das Mann or Selbst; that is the foundation of the Fourth Political Theory. A class and a race, as well as a state (at least, a contemporary national bourgeois state) all constitute anthropological and ontological constructs of modernity, versions of Techne, Ge-stell; and we are designing an existential political structure, – says Alexander Dugin.

Thus, all attempts of our liberal opponents aimed at discrediting the Fourth Political Theory as “a new version of National-Socialism” are groundless, and represent just a hostile reaction due to the occurrence of an equal (or a superior) rival and strategic actions aimed at eliminating the risk of the imminent collision with the enemy. Again, we would like to emphasize that the Fourth Political Theory is beyond the scope of the three political ideologies, and a rigid resistance to liberalism can be considered to be the only feature bringing it closer to the second and the third theories.

Notes

[1] Heinrich Meier. “Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss and The Concept of the Political.” The Hidden Dialogue. Moscow: SKIMEN, 2012.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Julius Evola. United Europe: The Spiritual Prerequisite. Tradition and Europe. Ex Nord Lux, 2009.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Julius Evola. Men Among the Ruins. Critic of the Fascist Regime: Right-Wing Views. Moscow, ACT, 2007.

 

——————

Speranskaya, Natella. “The Fourth Political Theory ‘Other Europe’.” Global Revolutionary Alliance News (GRANews), 9 February 2013. <http://www.granews.info/content/natella-speranskaya-fourth-political-theory-and-other-europe >.

Note: See also Natella Speranskaya’s interview with Alexander Dugin: <https://neweuropeanconservative.wordpress.com/2014/06/27/civilization-as-political-concept-dugin/ >.

 

Nationalism – Benoist

Nationalism: Phenomenology & Critique

By Alain de Benoist

Translated by Greg Johnson

 

There are probably as many theories of nationalism as there are nationalist theories. It is obviously impossible to give an account of them here. We will not take part in the false quarrel over whether nationalism is a pathological exacerbation of patriotism, or if it represents, on the contrary, its conscious and rigorous doctrinal elaboration. Let us note only that, beyond the often extremely complex typologies suggested today,[1] nationalism can be defined in two basic ways.

First, nationalism is the more or less voluntary aspiration, founded on objective facts or not, of a people to be constituted (or restored) as a nation, generally in a context perceived as hostile to its collective identity. Thus it presents itself as a movement of historical construction. In the second definition, nationalism is the political doctrine that affirms that a government must be concerned above all with the national interest, even based upon it exclusively.

These two definitions show from the start the ambivalence of nationalism, an ambivalence directly related to its eminently reactive character. Nationalism generally appears in circumstances that are “exceptional,” in Carl Schmitt’s sense of the term. Nationalism aims at reacting against a threat, real or supposed, that would weigh upon the collective identity and prevent it from founding itself as or persisting as a nation. Nationalism, for example, appears just as much in reaction to a foreign occupation as in a situation of colonization, in the framework of an exacerbated regionalism, etc. Its essence, therefore, is related to conflict. It needs an enemy. But this enemy can take the most diverse forms. Hence the plasticity of nationalism which, in history, can just as well be modern or antimodern, intellectual or popular, of the Right or Left. (During the whole nineteenth century, let us recall, nationalism was primarily liberal and republican.)

The definition of nationalism as a political doctrine raises other problems. Once an identity is recovered or the nation emerges, what in nationalism can truly be used as a principle of government? The concept of “national interest” is fuzzy. Maurras writes that a nationalist “subordinates his feelings, his interests, and his systems to the good of the fatherland.” But what faction would not lay claim to this expression? The “good of the fatherland” is a concept for which almost anything can be claimed, the more so as one can have extremely different ideas about it. Given that conflict is of the essence of nationalism, the risk is then great that a nationalist government can exist only while engaging in new arenas of conflict. Any foreigner, for example, will be potentially seen as an enemy. As for the concept of an “inner enemy,” it will lead to civil war, which nationalism seems to prohibit on principle.

The contents of nationalism thus remain rather obscure. One sees nationalist movements appearing in the world, but in general they have few things in common. They are opposed to one another. They claim contradictory values. It all seems as if nationalism were more a form than a substance, a container than a content.

One can understand it better, however, if one relates it to the idea of the nation, from which it cannot be dissociated. Indeed, nationalism initially represents a political instrumentality of the collective identity that gives rise to the nation. However, the nation is only one form of polity among others. And it is a specifically modern form.

Neither the Gallic resistance against Caesar nor that of Arminius against the legions of Varus is relevant to our sense of “nationalism.” The application of the word “nation” to Antiquity or the Old Regime is for the most part an anachronism. In the Middle Ages, the “nation” (from natio, “birth”) had a cultural or ethnic sense, but by no means a political one. At the time of the Hundred Years War, patriotism refers to the “country” (pays), i.e., to both a familiar region and an ensemble of intermediate bodies concretely defining a shared identity. In the political sense, the nation appears only in the eighteenth century, and it is defined in opposition to the king. The “patriots” then were those who thought the nation, not the king, incarnates the unity of the country, i.e., the nation exists independently of the kingdom. The nation joins together those who share the same political and philosophical ideas. It is in this sense that Barrère[2] was able to say to the Convention that “the aristocrats have no fatherland.” The nation is thus initially perceived as the sovereign people, then as the population of a given territory recognizing the authority of the same state and themselves as members of the same political unity, and finally as this political unity itself. One reads, in Article 3 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man: “The principle of any sovereignty lies primarily in the nation.”

The Old Regime in France had already largely started the process of centralization. The Revolution continued this process in a new form. It aimed at “producing the nation,” creating a new social bond, generating social behaviors giving rise to the nation as a body politic formed of equal individuals. The state, consequently, became the producer of the social. And this production was built on the ruins of the intermediate bodies. Beginning with the Revolution, the nation became for any individual an immediate presence. It is a collective abstraction to which one belongs directly, without the mediation of intermediate bodies or the state. There is thus, paradoxically, an individualistic root of the nation and nationalism. Louis Dumont has written on this subject:

Historically, the nation in the precise, modern sense of the term, and nationalism—distinguished from simple patriotism—have depended upon individualism as a value. The nation is precisely the type of overall society corresponding to the reign of individualism as a value. Not only does the nation accompany individualism historically, but the interdependence of the two is essential, so that one can say that the nation is a society composed of people who regard themselves as individuals.[3]

The “modernity” of the nation and nationalism remained unseen for a long time, initially because nationalism was at times also a reaction (or an answer) to the social and political dysfunctions born of modernity, then, starting in the late nineteenth century, because the political Right took up the national idea in opposition to the “internationalist” socialist movements.

This individualistic and modern sense of the national idea allows us to understand how nationalism falls within the horizon of the metaphysics of subjectivity. Heidegger, who sees subjectivity as the modern form (Gestalt) of being oneself (Selbstsein), writes in this connection:

Any nationalism is, on the metaphysical plane, an anthropologism and as such a subjectivism. Nationalism is not overcome by pure internationalism, but only enlarged and established as a system. Nationalism is as little brought and raised to humanitas by internationalism as individualism is by ahistorical collectivism. Collectivism is the subjectivity of man on the plane of totality.[4]

At the same time this also clarifies the relationship between nationalism and liberal individualism: the “we” that forms the base of the former is only an enlargement of the “I” characteristic of the latter. In liberalism, it is legitimate for the individual always to seek his own best interest; in nationalism, the national interest precedes all. In both cases, justice and truth merge with what is good for me or for us. In both cases, the ultimate decision lies in subjective interest, that is, in utility.

In the quotation above, Heidegger shows just as well that political universalism (“pure internationalism”) does not fundamentally contradict nationalism. Exacerbated ethnocentrism, moreover, is defined quite classically as the private individual enlarged to universal dimensions, and universalism, conversely, as a masked ethnocentrism. The private individual attests only to his truth, but he tends to present it as the truth in itself. Such is the base of the pretense of certain peoples or certain nations to be regarded as “chosen,” i.e., called to fulfill a “universal mission.” France has not escaped this temptation, and even succumbed more often than others. Guizot declared: “France is the heart of civilization.” Lavisse added: “Our fatherland is most human of the fatherlands,” thus giving to understand that there exist degrees of “humanity.” In fact, it is often said that French nationalism cannot be fundamentally intolerant because in France the idea of the nation goes along with that of humanity. But this assertion makes one wonder. Indeed, if the idea of the nation goes with that of humanity, then the idea of humanity also goes with that of the nation. Whoever does not belong to the nation consequently finds himself excluded from humanity.

Any claim of collective identity need not necessarily be formulated in terms of the ideology of nationalism. Such a confusion, given the historical excesses of nationalism, could only call into question the value of the very concept of collective identity. Yet such a concept, regardless of methods and foundations, is essential to any true sociality. In communist societies, it is what made it possible for the people to survive by opposing their own identity to the one the regime tried to impose upon them. In Western society, it is what continues to nourish the symbolic imagination and give meaning to the desire to live together. Nationalism, in what is most tumultuous and questionable in it, is no more the inevitable consequence of the assertion of collective identities than is the nation the only way of politically organizing the citizenry. Indeed, it is the negation of collective identities, such as we encounter throughout the twentieth century in liberalism as well as in Communism, that causes these identities to assume irredentist, convulsive, and destructive forms.

To be more precise, let us say that there are two different ways to pose the affirmation of a collective identity. The first, which could be that of nationalism, restricts the individual to defending his people, while the second, concerned above all with diversity, sees the necessity of defending all peoples against the ideologies that threaten to eradicate them.

Consider the English saying “My country, right or wrong.” This saying is generally misunderstood. It does not state that membership is a mere fact from which one cannot draw an abstraction. It also says that my country can be right or wrong—and not that it is always right.

Yet, in all rigor, a nationalist could not recognize his country is wrong, simply because to judge it wrong, he must have a criterion of justice that goes beyond mere belonging, i.e., ultimately, a clear awareness of the objective truth. A nationalist is spontaneously carried from thinking his country is never wrong to thinking that it is always right. From such a point of view, in the event of conflict, only force can decide. Force then becomes the supreme value. It is identified with truth, which means that history is basically right: the winners are always right, for the sole reason that they won. One paradoxically lapses into social Darwinism, which is only another form of the ideology of progress.

If, on the contrary, I can judge my country wrong, without forgetting it is mine, that is because I know that my membership is not a criterion of objective truth. Then I leave behind the metaphysics of subjectivity, the point where nationalism and liberal individualism converge. The identity of others is no longer in principle a threat to mine. I am ready to defend my identity because this defense is a general principle, whose legitimacy I also recognize for others. In other words, if I defend my “tribe,” it is also because I am ready to defend those of others.

Notes

Alain de Benoist, “Nationalisme : phénoménologie et critique,” in his Critiques—Théoriques (Lausanne, Switzerland: L’Age d’Homme, 2002), 85–88. The translator wishes to thank Alain de Benoist for his permission to translate and publish this essay, Michael O’Meara for checking the translation, and Arjuna for his help with French idioms.

1. Cf. in particular Gil Delannoi et Pierre-André Taguieff, eds., Théories du nationalisme. Nation, nationalité, ethnicité (Paris: Kimé, 1991).

2. Bertrand Barrère de Vieuzac (1755–1841)—TOQ.

3. Louis Dumont, Essais sur l’individualisme (Paris: Seuil, 1983), 20–21. English translation: Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

4. Martin Heidegger, Über den Humanismus (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1946), 107. English translation by Frank A. Capuzzi, with J. Glenn Gray and David Farrell Krell: “Letter on Humanism,” in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell, revised and expanded edition (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 244.

 

——————

De Benoist, Alain. “Nationalism: Phenomenology & Critique.” Counter-Currents Publishing, 16 May 2012. <http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/05/nationalism-phenomenology-and-critique/ >.

Note: On the problem of nationalism, see also Kosaku Yoshino’s “From Ethnie to Nation: Theoretical Reflections on Nationalism”.

 

Territory & Ethno-Cultural Stability – Krebs

Territory and Ethno-Cultural Stability

(Excerpt from Fighting for the Essence)

By Pierre Krebs

 

The Key Idea of Territory

Any talk about people and culture boils down to dealing with the fundamental question of territory. It is a cardinal question that is impossible to avoid, since it opens and closes every debate on identity. In effect, territory is to a people what air is to our lungs. If it happens to disappear, the cultural and biological life of an ethnic group is threatened with asphyxiation (in a very real sense) in a short span. All the discussions that relate to identity cannot ignore the notion of territory if they do not wish to sink into the ridiculous. [29] ‘The human being is a territorial being,’ reminds Professor Otto Koenig. [30] The preservation of territorial integrity is the condition sine qua non [31] of ethnic existence, as Eibl-Eibesfeldt has persistently explained. The cohabitation of different communities within a state is possible only when the territorial integrity of each community is clearly defined and its sovereignty strongly guaranteed, as in the case of Switzerland, a model of ethnic cooperation which evidently has nothing to do with the multiracial society ‘that Heiner Geissler imagines.’ [32]

The Maintenance of Peace is Closely Dependent upon the Maintenance of Territorial Integrity

In his most recent work, the ethologist Eibl-Eibesfeldt returns to this major point: ‘The best way to maintain peaceful cooperation between peoples consists in guaranteeing to each of them a territory that each people has the right to administer in its own way, and in which it is permitted to develop itself culturally as it sees fit.’ [33] The multicultural society, de facto, creates the conditions of a permanent state of conflict as soon as the different ethno-cultural groups engage in the (legitimate) defence of their interests, needs, and aspirations, as soon as they are naturally led to affirm their identity in order to escape the cultural or ethnic suicide of assimilation. Any state of peace in society is inevitably overturned in a state of crisis provoked by ethnic rivalries: ‘To the degree that a people accept the implantation of minorities in their territories, they open the door to inter-ethnic competition in their own house.’ [34]

It clearly emerges from the empirical observations of modern ethology that the demarcation of a territorial border does not come about through chance, but purely and simply from genetically programmed dispositions: ‘It is imperative to know that human beings are hereditarily endowed with programmes of behaviour that determine their perceptions, reflections and actions in a decisive manner.’ [35] Territorial demarcation equally responds to a need dictated by evolution: ‘In the case of competitions with other individuals, the entrance en bloc of a closed group is as important as its number… Another advantage consists in the fact that the formation of well-defined groups that are mutually demarcated in relation to other foreign groups favours evolution, insofar as mutation emerge only in small groups and develop only through the competitive struggles that oppose on group to another.’ [36] Erlung Kohl refers to Konrad Lorenz to demonstrate that the cultural life of an ethnic group is tightly bound to the territorial demarcation of a space that guarantees it a separate development that it imperatively needs to know and affirm itself: ‘Relatively compact barriers… that are erected between two cultural cores which are divergent in development are characteristic of all cultures, and are clearly indispensable to their evolution.’ [37] Respect for territorial integrity quite simply demands the maintenance of peace: ‘Peaceful collaboration between different peoples is possible on the condition that each ethnic group possesses its own territory and can regulate its own affairs without exposing itself to any repressive domination or to territorial amputations.’ [38]

All these observations allow one to measure to what degree of stupidity and blindness the militants of multiracialism have sunk, as their model of society leads inevitably to war! Immigrants ‘who settle permanently take possession of the most precious resource that a people possess – namely, their territory. It is for this reason that they are perceived as invaders, and this situation then automatically triggers a desire for territorial defence among the natives… Taking into account our hereditary reflexes, the multicultural model that Geissler wants to introduce in Central Europe would automatically lead to conflicts.’ [39] Heiner Geissler himself warns of the danger of a civil war (even if he places the responsibility for it on the shoulders of his compatriots!), which he believes can be defused through social measures. This reduction of the human paradigm to the economic paradigm reveals to what extent the current political discourse is linked to the models of liberal thought and to its archetype, the Homo occidentalis: ‘I predict civil wars in Germany if we do not grant immigrants who lives among us full citizenship – even if they have a different skin colour and are not of Germanic origin.’ This famous ‘equality of rights’ naturally supposes strict conformity to the principles defined by human rights. These foreigners will become ‘German citizens… who recognise our Constitution.’ [40] Apart from the fact that the appellation ‘German’ is absurd insofar as multiracial discourse empties it of its real ethno-cultural significance, human nature does not allow itself to be locked within techno-commercial thought. The humanity of a human being does not allow itself to be reduced to its basest needs – unfortunately for Geissler (but what was true here of a Geissler is also exactly true of the present, completely brainless President, Christian Wulff)[41] – and fortunately for men – human nature does not allow itself to be locked within techno-commercial thought, the humanity of the human being does not allow itself to be reduced to its needs. The aesthetic sense, the historical sense and the religious sense are other paradigms of human infinitely richer and more complex than the liberal theoreticians wish to admit.

Fighting for the Essence

The originality and the richness of the human heritages of this world are nourished by their differences and their deviations, which surprise and fascinate as soon as one passes from the culture of one people to another. These originalities can find protection, in turn, only in the homogeneous ethno-cultural space that is proper to them. The defenders of multiracialism are the primary destroyers, consciously or unconsciously, of this elementary right. To resist the aggressive ideology of human rights, the doctrinal alibi of the totalitarian Western society, it is urgent to draw up a new Declaration of the Rights of Peoples in concert with all the movements that fight on this Earth for the respect of their ethno-cultural identities. The sensibly will of the identitarian being should be able to thwart the senseless will of its eulogists and the will of a blind egalitarianism which is the source of the totalitarian levelling of things and persons: ‘The unconditional uniformity of all kinds of humanity of the Earth,’ further observes Heidegger, ‘under the rule of the will to will makes clear the meaninglessness of human action which has been posited absolutely.’ [42]

It is certain that the actions of the politicians today – whether they are absurd or criminal – are not at all reflective of any responsibility by those who decide on them! Their political responsibility last (if at all) only for the period of the parliamentary mandate. It is therefore useless to hope to see them one day before tribunals – to make them answer for their acts – politicians who are today planning of the chaos and wars of tomorrow through their decisions. As Professor Koening bitterly affirmed, ‘no political man bears the responsibility of his when there are no immediate consequences. He has nothing to fear and is responsible for nothing.’ [43]

To pose the question of identity again is to appeal to the wisdom of Knowledge. It is to take into consideration once again the benefits of the life-sciences (which have fallen into discredit, and for a reason) if one wishes to put an end to the ideological blindness of egalitarianism. ‘The biological sciences have revealed to us the most previous of secrets – the laws of the development of our body and of our consciousness. This knowledge has brought to humanity the means of renovating itself.’ [44] What is at stake are peoples and the life of their cultures, of a life of which the living peoples are still the conscience and locus, of a life of which the people are also shepherd. Europe will be reborn from itself, ‘from the re-appropriation of its own origins,’ [45] or it will not be reborn. Julien Freund shares the same opinion: ‘It is not from others that the Europeans can expect their civilisation, but from themselves, on the condition that they wish it, and put into effect the necessary means to ensure it.’ [46] For Sigrid Hunke, too, there is no doubt ‘Europe will unveil its truth when it becomes itself once again, when it determines itself once again, when it is able to reaffirm itself as itself, and to protect itself from foreign pretensions, and when it has found again the strength to realise itself in its own renewed history.’ [47] The spirit that inhabits the being of our people still comes from the same source, from the same blood. [48] So, everything can be born again, everything can begin again for the Europeans ‘as long as the hereditary qualities of the race remain present, the strength and the audicity of his forefathers can be resurrected in modern man by his own will.’ [49]

Let us make sure that the peoples remain the protectors of their values and their truth, in order to continue to gift to the world their singular genius, each in the mysterious expression of their style, their manner, their pride – we who, like Nietzsche, know today much than yesterday, that the writing that springs from a mind always bears the signature of its blood, which is unalterable for all eternity.

Notes

[29] We shall take as a characteristic sample of certain approaches that glimpse an awakener of identities in the multiracial in Stefan Ulbrich (ed.), Multikultopia (Vilbiburg: Arun, 1991). Alongside excellent texts (Rolf Kosiek, ‘Die Wirklichkeit des Volkes in der modernen Welt,’ Robert Steuckers, ‘Verortung in Raum und Zeit,’ etc.), those of the editor of the publication, sprinkled with contradictions, attest to a regrettable dilettantism. One will also notice the lowbrow character that the editor demonstrates in the interview that Mrs. Martiny gave him, or lese this declared adept of the New Right has not understood of the New Culture (to begin with, the label ‘New Right,’ which was invented by the System), or lese he has, perhaps, deliberately chosen to bury himself in an ideological dead-end to please the censors of the System. At best, if we can forgive a certain childishness, we still cannot easily excuse a cheap opportunism. Moreover, the reception of the book seems to have proven the old truth: one who wishes to get into his enemy’s good graces mostly reaps nothing but his contempt.

[30] ‘Wir stehen am Beginn einer Völkerwanderung,’ ‘Gespräch mit Prof. Otto Koenig,’ in R. Eder and A. Mölzer (eds.), Enwanderungsland Europa?, p. 82.

[31] Latin: ‘essential element.’ -Ed.

[32] Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, ‘Zukunft multikultureller Gesellschaft,’ in ibid., pp. 136-137.

[33] Wider die Mißtrauensgesellschaft, p. 157.

[34] Ibid., p. 158.

[35] Eder and Mölzer (eds.), Einwanderungsland Europa?, p. 130.

[36] Ibid., p. 134.

[37] Erlung Kohl, ‘Vom Wert der Mannifaltigkeit: Ethnologische Grundlagen jeder Bevölkerungspolitik,’ p. 16.

[38] Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Wider die Mißtrauensgesellschaft, p. 157.

[39] Ibid., p. 130.

[40] Heiner Geissler, ‘Kein Grund zur Angst,’ in Der Spiegel 41, 1991, p. 23. This former student of the Jesuits is a past-master in the art of distorting responsibilities. If a conflict should break out in the multiracial society that is in progress, the responsibility does not fall upon the politicians who initiated this process. It falls upon the victims, who are incapable of understanding quickly enough the advantages of rejuvenation through miscegenation: ‘It is not the influx of foreigners but is, on the contrary, the incapacity for rejuvenation and adaptation of the Germans, combined with their aversion to immigration, that represents the real danger for our future’ (in Der Spiegel, art. cit.). But instead of fulfilling the role for which he has been elected – to prevent and remove the danger that threaten his community – it is for the exacerbation of these dangers that Heiner Geissler quietly works when he quite calmly announces an escalation of the immigration process: ‘In the future, the Germans will not have to live with just five million foreigners – as today – but with seven, perhaps ten million’ (ibid.). These words will at least have the advantage of reinforcing the plans of the former leader of the Turkish state, Süleyman Demirel. In fact, during a reception given at the Zentrum für Türkeistudien (TAM), Demirel made no secret of the strategic aims of Turkish immigration into Germany. Calling on his emigrant compatriots to demand double nationality, he added: ‘I have been responsible for immigration into Europe, in the 1960s and ’70s, of around 60 to 70 percent of three million Turks, for I have always been a supporter of the establishment of a lobby in Europe’ (in Junge Freiheit, 29 Apirl 1994).

[41] Christian Wulff (b. 1959) was elected President of Germany in 2010 and is a member of the Christian Democratic Union party. Wulff famously charactertised Islam as a ‘part of Germany’ and has called for greater tolerance for Muslim immigrants. -Ed.

[42] Martin Heidegger, ‘Overcoming Metaphysics,’ p. 110.

[43] Otto Koenig, ‘Wir stehen am Beginn ekiner Völkerwanderung,’ in Einwanderungsland Europa?, p. 98. Eibl-Eibesfeldt also issues a serious warning to the politicians forgetful of their duties and their commitments: ‘….I think that the politicians and journalists – whose actions and speeches influence opinion – give evidence of irresponsibility when they attempt to persuade their people that the important thing is not to perpetuate oneself through one’s own descendants. I think that these attempts at persuasion are similar to those that suggest an ethnic suicide… The politicians who act in this way, at least in Germany, violate the oath that they have made to defend the interests of their people. On the other hand, it would be really superfluous to enter into long debates to understand that the suppression of an ethnic group by another is always done at the expense of the first, even when this so-called peaceful process is considered to have taken place through immigration,’ in Wider die Mißtrauensgesellschaft, p. 136.

[44] Carrel, Man, the Unknown, p. 273.

[45] Jean Parvulesco, Le soleil rouge de Raymond Abellio, p. 79.

[46] Julien Freund, La décadence, p. 384.

[47] Sigrid Hunke, Vom Untergang des Abendlandes zum Aufgang Europas, p. 321.

[48] ‘Observed from a biological and anthropological angle, there is no doubt that the Europeans of today constitute a very homogenous population… The common cultural history of the Europeans also links peoples who are genetically very close,’ again affirms Eibl-Eibesfeldt unequivocally, in ‘Zukunft multikultureller Gesellschaft?’, in Eder and Mölzer (eds.), Einwanderungsland Europa?, p. 138. And besides: ‘The European nations are characterised by a language and customs, in short, by a common culture and history, and, to conclude, the Europeans belong to a biological and anthropological type which is also uniquely characteristic,’ in Wider die Mißtrauensgesellschaft, p. 162.

[49] Carrel, Man, the Unknown, p. 273.

 

———————

From: Krebs, Pierre. Fighting for the Essence: Western Ethnosuicide or European Renaissance? London: Arktos Media, 2012, pp. 85-91.

Note: Read more about Pierre Krebs’s work at F. Roger Devlin’s review of Fighting for the Essence: <https://neweuropeanconservative.wordpress.com/2012/11/16/europe-vs-the-west-devlin/ >.

 

Definition of People – Faye

The Definition of a People

By Guillaume Faye

 

People: An ethnic ensemble — biological, historical, cultural — with a territory, its fatherland, in which it is rooted.

‘The people’ — the very term is suspect to the cosmopolitan Left, which sees it as bordering on the politically incorrect — is not any statistical ‘population’; it’s an organic community embracing a transcendent body made up of ancestors, the living, and their heirs. Though marked with a certain spirituality, a people is diachronically rooted in the past and projects itself into the future — it’s submerged in biological and genetic matter, but at the same time it’s a historical, and spiritual, reality.

It’s belonging to a specific people that distinguishes a man and makes him human. Though modern Western egalitarian doctrines reduce peoples to indifferent socioeconomic aggregates, peoples actually constitute the organic bases of the human race; similarly, such doctrines conceive of the ideal man as an individual ‘emancipated’ from his organic attachments — like an undifferentiated cell in a human magma.

It’s necessary to recall, especially for certain Christians, that a people’s attachment is incompatible with Christianity’s present cosmopolitanism. The claim, for example, that ‘I am closer to an African Catholic than I am to a non-Christian European’ is a universalistic claim that relegates a people’s nation to something of secondary significance. This is, indeed, the great drama of European Christianity, marked as it is by Pauline universalism. A Catholic attached to his people and conscious of the biological and cultural dangers threatening them might instead say, ‘I respect all the Christians of the world, but hic et nunc I fight for my people above all, whatever their religion’.

The Jesuit spirit might resolve the contradiction in reference to the Old Testament’s Hebraic tradition: ‘Babel — the mélange of disparate peoples — is a punishment from God, Who wants His peoples to be separate and diverse — humanity is one in Heaven, but multiple on Earth’. *

Arab Islam has no difficulty reconciling the notion of people (the ‘Arab nation’) with that of its universalism. The Jews, on their side, have similarly reconciled a ferocious defence of their ethnicity — their singularity — with their religion, however theoretically monotheistic and universalist it may be. At no moment have Judaism and Islam, unlike the Christian Churches today, engaged in doubting, guiltstroking diatribes against ‘xenophobia’ and ethnocentrism. They are not masochistic . . .

* * *

Like every anthropological notion, ‘people’ lacks mathematical rigour. A people doesn’t define itself as a homogeneous biocultural totality, but as a relationship. It’s the product of an organic alchemy that brings various ‘sub-peoples’ together. The Bretons, Catalans, Scots, etc., can be seen thus as the sub-peoples of a larger people — the Europeans.

* * *

We ought to highlight the ambiguity that touches the notion of the people. The universalist ideology of the French Revolution confused the idea of the people with that of an ‘ensemble of inhabitants who jurisdictionally possess nationality’, whatever their origin. Given the facts of mass immigration and naturalisation, the notion of the French people has been greatly diluted (as have the British or German peoples, for the same reason). This is why (without broaching the unresolvable issue of what constitutes a ‘regional people’ or a ‘national people’), it’s advisable to dialectically transcend semantic problems — and affirm the historic legitimacy of a single, European people, historically bound, whose different national families resemble one another in having, for thousands of years, the same ethnocultural and historical origins. Despite national, linguistic, or tribal differences, haven’t African Blacks, even in Europe, been called on by Nelson Mandela or the Senegalese Mamadou Diop to ‘think like one people’? From Nasser to al-Qadhafi, by way of Arafat, haven’t Arabs been urged to see themselves as an Arab people? Why don’t Europeans have the same right to see themselves as a people?

As for ‘regional peoples’, it’s necessary to oppose Left-wing regionalists, self-professed anti-Jacobins and anti-globalists, who unhesitatingly accept the concept of French or American jus soli — who confuse citizens and residents, and who recognise as Bretons, Alsatians, Corsicans, etc., anyone (even of non-European origin) who lives in these regions and chooses to accept such an identity.

* * *

In belonging to a people, its members are emotionally inclined to define themselves as such, which implies political affiliation. For this reason, we say that a people exists at that point where biological, territorial, cultural, and political imperatives come together. But in no case does mere cultural or linguistic attachment suffice in making a people, if they have no common biological roots. Alien immigrants from people X who are installed on the territory of people Y — even if they adopt cultural elements of their host people — are not a part of Y. As De Gaulle thought, there might be minor exceptions for small numbers of compatible (White) minorities, capable of being assimilated, but this could never be the case for, say, French West Indians.

Similarly, in defining the notion of a people, territorial or geopolitical considerations must also be taken into account. A people is not a diaspora: the Jews felt obliged to reconquer Palestine as their ‘promised land’ because, as Theodor Herzl argued, ‘without a promised land, the Jews are just a religious diaspora, a culture, a union, but not a people’.

There’s a good deal of talk today, on the Left and the Right, about people being ‘deterritorialised’. In reality, there’s nothing of the kind. Every healthy people, even if they possess an important diaspora (Chinese, Arabs, Indians, etc.), maintains close relations with its fatherland.

* * *

Modernist gurus have long claimed that the future belongs not to peoples, but to humanity conceived as a single people. Again, there’ll be nothing of the kind. Despite globalisation and in reaction to it, the Twenty-first century will more than ever be a century of distinct peoples…

——————

Note (for the New European Conservative):

* This is not necessarily the only way for a Christian to reconcile the concept of distinction between peoples with the Christian religion, since throughout history Christianity has been interpreted in numerous different ways. Many Christian conservatives and nationalists in the past have in fact argued that humanity is divided into distinct and separate peoples, and in some manner continues to be so in Heaven (similarly to many Pagans who believed that peoples continue to exist in the Afterlife [excluding those Pagans who believed exclusively in reincarnation]).

————–

From: Faye, Guillaume. Why We Fight: Manifesto for the European Resistance. London: Arktos Media, 2011, pp. 211-213.

 

Civilization as Political Concept – Dugin

Civilization as Political Concept

Interview with the leader of the International “Eurasian Movement”, a philosopher, and a professor at Moscow State University Alexander Dugin.

Interviewed by the Global Revolutionary Alliance’s own Natella Speranskaja (Natella Speranskaya).

 

Natella Speranskaja: The crisis of identity, with which we faced after the Cold War and the collapse of the communist world, is still relevant. What do you think is capable of lifting us out of this crisis – a religious revival or creation of a new political ideology? Which of the options are you inclined to yourself?

Alexander Dugin: After the collapse of communism came the phase of the “unipolar moment” (as Charles Krauthammer called it). In geopolitics, this meant the victory of unilateralism and Atlanticism, and because the pole was left alone, the West has become a global phenomenon. Accordingly, the ideology of liberalism (or more accurately, neo-liberalism) is firmly in place crushing the two alternative political theories that existed in the twentieth century – communism and fascism. The Global liberal West has now defined culture, economics, information and technology, and politics. The West’s claims to the universalism of its values, the values of Western modernity and the Postmodern era, has reached its climax.

Problems stemming from the West during the “unipolar moment” has led many to say that this “moment” is over, that he could not yet be a “destiny” of humanity. That is, a “unipolar moment” should be interpreted very broadly – not only geopolitical, but also ideologically, economically, axiologically, civilization wide. The crisis of identity, about which you ask, has scrapped all previous identities – civilizational, historical, national, political, ethnic, religious, cultural, in favor of a universal planetary Western-style identity – with its concept of individualism, secularism, representative democracy, economic and political liberalism, cosmopolitanism and the ideology of human rights. Instead of a hierarchy of identities, which have traditionally played a large role in sets of collective identities, the “unipolar moment” affirmed a flat one-dimensional identity, with the absolutization of the individual singularity. One individual = one identity, and any forms of the collective identity (for example, individual as the part of the religious community, nation, ethnic group, race, or even sex) underwent dismantling and overthrowing. Hence the hatred of globalists for different kind of “majorities” and protection of minorities, up to the individual.

The Uni-polar Democracy of our moment – this is a democracy, which unambiguously protects the minority before the face of the majority and the individual before face of the group. This is the crisis of identity for those of non-Western or non-modern (or even not “postmodern”) societies, since this is where customary models are scrapped and liquidated. The postmodern West with optimism, on the contrary, asserts individualism and hyper-liberalism in its space and zealously exports it on the planetary scale.

However, it’s not painless, and has caused at all levels its own growing rejection. The problems, which have appeared in the West in the course of this “uni-polar moment”, forced many to speak, that this “moment’s” conclusion, has not succeeded in becoming “the fate” of humanity. This, therefore, was the cost of the possibility of passage to some other paradigm…

So, we can think about an alternative to the “unipolar moment” and, therefore, an alternative to liberalism, Americanism, Atlanticism, Western Postmodernism, globalization, individualism, etc. That is, we can, and I think should, work out plans and strategies for a “post-uni polar world”, at all levels – the ideological and political, the economic, and religious, and the philosophical and geo-political, the cultural and civilizational, and technology, and value.

In fact, this is what I call multi-polarity. As in the case of uni-polarity it is not only about the political and strategic map of the world, but also the paradigmatic philosophical foundations of the future world order. We cannot exactly say that the “uni-polar moment” has finally been completed. No, it is still continuing, but it faces a growing number of problems. We must put an end to it – eradicate it. This is a global revolution, since the existing domination of the West, liberalism and globalism completely controls the world oligarchy, financial and political elites.

So they just will not simply give up their positions. We must prepare for a serious and intense battle. Multi-polarity will be recaptured by the conquered peoples of the world in combat and it will be able to arise only on the smoking ruins of the global West. While the West is still dictating his will to the rest, to talk about early multipolarity – you must first destroy the Western domination on the ground. Crisis – this is much, but far from all.

Natella Speranskaja: If we accept the thesis of the paradigmatic transition from the current unipolar world order model to a new multi-polar model, where the actors are not nation-states, but entire civilizations, can it be said that this move would entail a radical change in the very human identity?

Alexander Dugin: Yes, of course. With the end of the unipolar moment, we are entering a whole new world. And it is not simply a reverse or a step back, but it is a step forward to some unprecedented future, however, different from the digital project of “lonely crowds”, which is reserved for humanity by globalism. Multi-polar identity will be the complex nonlinear collection of different identities – both individual and collective, that is varied for each civilization (or even inside each civilization).

This is something completely new that will be created.

And the changes will be radical. We cannot exclude that, along with known identities, civilizations, and offering of new ways … It is possible that one of these new identities will become the identity of “Superman” – in the Nietzschean sense or otherwise (for example, traditionalist) … In the “open society” of globalism the individual is, on the contrary, closed and strictly self-identical.

The multi-polar world’s anthropological map will be, however, extremely open, although the boundaries of civilizations will be defined clearly. Man will again re-open the measurement of inner freedom – “freedom for”, in spite of the flat and purely external liberal freedom – “freedom from” (as in John Mill), which is actually, not freedom, but its simulacrum, imposed for a more efficient operation of the planetary masses by a small group of global oligarchs.

Natella Speranskaja: Alexander Gelevich Dugin, you are the creator of the theory of a multi-polar world, which laid the foundation from which we can begin a new historical stage. Your book The Theory of a Multi-polar World (Теория многополярного мира) has been and is being translated into other languages. The transition to a new model of world order means a radical change in the foreign policy of nation-states, and in today’s global economy, in fact, you have created all the prerequisites for the emergence of a new diplomatic language. Of course, this is a challenge of the global hegemony of the West. What do you think will be the reaction of your political opponents when they realize the seriousness of the threat posed?

Alexander Dugin: As always in the vanguard of philosophical and ideological ideas, we first have the effect of bewilderment, the desire to silence or marginalize them. Then comes the phase of severe criticism and rejection. Then they begin to consider. Then they become commonplace and a truism. So it was with many of my ideas and concepts in the past 30 years. Traditionalism, geopolitics, Sociology of imagination , Ethnosociology, Conservative Revolution , National Bolshevism, Eurasianism, the Fourth Political Theory, National-structuralism, Russian Schmittianism, the concept of the three paradigms, the eschatological gnosis, New Metaphysics and Radical Theory of the Subject, Conspiracy theories, Russian Heideggerianism, a post-modern alternative, and so on – perceived first with hostility, then partially assimilated, and finally became part of mainstream discourse in academia and politics of Russia, and in part, beyond.

Each of these directions has their fate, but the diagram of their mastering is approximately identical. So it will be also with the theory of a multipolar world It will be hushed up, and then demonized and fiercely criticized, and then they will begin to look at it closely, and then accepted. But for all this it is necessary to pay for it and to defend it in the fight. Arthur Rimbaud said that “the spiritual battle as fierce and hard, as the battle of armies.” For this we will have to struggle violently and desperately. As for everything else.

Natella Speranskaja: In the “Theory of a multipolar world,” you write that in the dialogue between civilizations the responsibility is born by the elite of civilization. Do I understand correctly, it should be a “trained” elite, that is, the elite, which has a broad knowledge and capabilities, rather than the present “elite”? Tell me, what is the main difference between these elites?

Alexander Dugin: Civilizational elite – is a new concept. Thus far it does not exist. It is a combination of two qualities – deep assimilation of the particular civilizational culture (in the philosophical, religious, value levels) and the presence of a high degree of “drive,” persistently pushing people to the heights of power, prestige, and influence. Modern liberalism channels passion exclusively in the area of economics and business, creating a preference for a particular social elevator and it is a particular type of personality (which is an American sociologist Yuri Slezkine called the “mercurial type”).

The Mercurial elite of globalism, “aviakochevniki” mondialist nomadism, sung by Jacques Attali, should be overthrown in favor of radically different types of elites. Each civilization can dominate, and other “worlds”, not only thievish, mercurial shopkeepers and cosmopolitans. Islamic elite is clearly another – an example of this we see in today’s Iran, where the policy (Mars) and economics (Mercury) are subject to spiritual authority, of the Ayatollah (Saturn).

But the “world” is only a metaphor. Different civilizations are based on different codes. The main thing is that the elite must be reflected in the codes themselves, whatever they may be. This is the most important condition. The will to power inherent in any elite, shall be interfaced with the will to knowledge; that is, intellectualism and activism in such a multipolar elite should be wedded. Technological efficiency and value (often religious) content should be combined in such an elite. Only such an elite will be able to fully and responsibly participate in the dialogue of civilizations, embodying the principles of their traditions and engaging in interaction with other civilizations of the worlds.

Natella Speranskaja: How can you comment on the hypothesis that the return to a bipolar model is still possible?

Alexander Dugin: I think not, practically or theoretically. In practice, because today there is no country that is comparable to the basic parameters of the U.S. and the West in general. The U.S. broke away from the rest of the world so that no one on their own can compete with them. Theoretically, only the West now has a claim to universality of its values, whereas previously Marxism was regarded as an alternative. After the collapse of the Soviet Union it became clear that universalism is only liberal, capitalist. To resist Western imperialism there can only be a coalition of large spaces – not the second pole, but immediately multiple poles, each of them with its own strategic infrastructure and with a particular civilizational, cultural and ideological content.

Natella Speranskaja: How real is the sudden transition to a non-polar model? What are the main disadvantages of this model?

Alexander Dugin: Passage to a non-polar model, about which leaders are increasingly talking of in the Council on Foreign Relations (Richard Haass, George Soros, etc.), means the replacement of the facade of a uni-polar hegemony, the transition from the domination based on military and strategic power of the United States and NATO (hardware) to dispersed domination of the West as a whole (software). These are two versions – hard-hegemony and soft-hegemony. But in both cases the West, its civilization, its culture, its philosophy, its technologies, its political and economic institutes and procedures come out as the standard universal model. Over the long term, this will indicate the transfer of power to a “world government”, which will be dominated by all the same Western elites, the global oligarchy. It will then discard its mask and will act directly on behalf of the transnational forces. In some sense, non-polarity is worse than uni-polarity, though it would seem hard to believe.

Non-polarity itself, and even more sharply and rapidly, will not yet begin. For this, the world must go through the turmoil and trials until a desperate humanity itself cries for the world elite with a prayer for salvation. Prior to that, to weaken the power of the United States, world disasters occur, and war. Non-polar world under the control of a world government, consisting of direct representatives of the global oligarchy, is expected by many religious circles as the coming “of the kingdom of the Antichrist.”

As for the “shortcomings” of such a model, I believe that it is just “a great parody of” the sacred world empire, which Rene Guenon warned of in his work The Reign of Quantity and The Signs of the Times. This will be a global simulacrum. To recognize these “deficiencies” will not be so easy, otherwise opposition to “the Antichrist” would be too simple a matter, and the depth of his temptation would be insignificant.

The true alternative is a multi-polar world. Everything else – evil in the truest sense of the word.

Natella Speranskaja: The “counter-hegemony” by Robert Cox, who you mention in your book aims to expose the existing order in international relations and raise the rebellion against it. To do this, Cox called for the creation of counter-hegemonic bloc, which will include political actors who reject the existing hegemony. Have you developed the Fourth Political Theory as a kind of counter-hegemonic doctrine that could unite the rebels against the hegemony of the West?

Alexander Dugin: I am convinced that the Fourth Political Theory fits into the logic of building counter-hegemony, which Cox spoke of. By the way, also in the proximity of critical theory in the MO theory, and multi-polar world is a wonderful text by Alexandra Bovdunova, voiced at the Conference on the Theory of a Multipolar World in Moscow, Moscow State University on 25-26 April 2012.

4PT is not a complete doctrine, this is still the first steps toward the exit from the conceptual impasse in which we find ourselves in the face of liberalism, today rejected by more and more people around the world, in the collapse of the old anti-liberal political theories – Communism and Fascism. In a sense, the need for 4PT – is a sign of the times, and really cannot be disputed by anyone. Another matter, what will be 4PT in its final form. The temptation appears to build it as a syncretic combination of elements of previous anti-liberal doctrines and ideologies …

I am convinced that we should go another way. It is necessary to understand the root of the current hegemony. This coincides with the root of modernity as such, and it grows from the roots of modernity in all three pillars of political theories – liberalism, communism and fascism. To manipulate them to find an alternative to modernity and liberalism, respectively, and of the liberal hegemony of the West, is in my view, pointless. We must move beyond modernity in general, beyond the range of its political actors – individual, class, nation, state, etc.

Therefore 4PT as the basis of a counter-hegemonic planetary front should be constructed quite differently. Like the theory of a multipolar world 4PT operates with a new concept – “civilization”, but 4PT puts special emphasis on the existential aspect of it. Hence the most important, the central thesis of 4PT that its subject is the actor – Dasein. Every civilization, its Dasein, which means that it describes a specific set of existentials. On their basis, should be raised a new political theory generalized at the following level into a “multipolar federation of Dasein” as the concrete structure of counter-hegemony. In other words, the very counter-hegemony must be conceived existentially, as a field of war between the inauthentic globalization (global alienation) and the horizon of authentic peoples and societies in a multipolar world (the possibility of overcoming the alienation of civilizations).

Natella Speranskaja: When we talk about cognitive uprising, however, first of all, should our actions be aimed at the overthrow of the dictatorship of the West?

Alexander Dugin: The most important step is the beginning of the systematic preparation of a global revolutionary elite-oriented to multi-polarity 4PT. This elite must perform a critical function – to be a link between the local and global. At the local level we are talking about the masses and the clearest exponents of their local culture (religious leaders, philosophers, etc.). Often, these communities do not have a planetary perspective and simply defend their conservative identity before the onset of toxic globalization and Western imperialism.

Raising the masses and the traditionalist-conservatives to a realized uprising in the context of a complex union of a counter-hegemonistic block is extremely difficult. Simple conservatives and their supportive mass, for example, of the Islamic or Orthodox persuasion are unlikely to realize the necessity of alliances with the Hindus or the Chinese. This will be the play (and they are already actively playing it) of the globalists and their principle of “divide and conquer!” But the revolutionary elite, which is the elite, even within a particular traditionalist elite of society, should take the heartfelt deep and deliberate feelings of local identity and correlate it within a total horizon of multi-polarity, and the 4PT.

Without the formation of such an elite, the revolt against the post-modern world and the overthrow of the dictatorship of the West will not take place. Every time and everywhere the West has a problem, he will come to the aid of anti-Western forces, which, however, will be motivated by narrow bills to specific civilizational neighbors – most often, just as anti-Western as they are. So it will be and already is the instrumentalization of globalists of various conservative fundamentalist and nationalist movements. Islamic fundamentalists to help the West is one. European nationalists – is another. So a “unipolar moment” extends not only to exist in itself, but also playing the antagonistic forces against him. The overthrow of the dictatorship of the West will become possible only if this strategy will be sufficient enough to create or make appear a new counter-hegemonic elite. An initiative like Global Revolutionary Alliance – the unique example of really revolutionary and effective opposition to hegemony.

Natella Speranskaja: You have repeatedly said that Eurasianism is a strategic, philosophical, cultural and civilizational choice. Can we hope that the political course chosen by Vladimir Putin (establishment of a Eurasian Union) Is the first step towards a multipolar model?

Alexander Dugin: This is a difficult question. By himself, Putin and, especially, his environment, they act more out of inertia, without calling into question the legitimacy of the existing planetary status quo. Their goal – to win his and Russia’s rather appropriate place within the existing world order. But that is the problem: a truly acceptable place for Russia is not and cannot exist, because the “uni-polar moment”, as well as the globalists, stand for the de-sovereignization of Russia, eliminating it as an independent civilization and strategic pole.

This self-destruction seems to suit Dmitry Medvedev and his entourage (INSOR), for he was ready to reboot and go for almost all of it. Putin clearly understands the situation somewhat differently, and his criteria of “acceptability” is also different. He would most of all psychologically arrange a priority partnership with the West while maintaining the sovereignty of Russia. But this is something unacceptable under any circumstances to the unipolar globalists – practically or theoretically.

So Putin is torn between multipolarity – where he leads the orientation of sovereignty – and Atlanticism – where he leads the inertia and the tireless work of a huge network of influence that permeates all of the structure of Russian society. Here is the dilemma. Putin makes moves in both directions – he proclaims multi-polarity, the Eurasian Union, to protect the sovereignty of Russia, even spoke of the peculiarities of Russian civilization, strengthening vertical power, shows respect (if not more) to Orthodoxy, but on the other hand, surrounds himself with pro-American experts (eg, “Valdai Club”), rebuilds education and culture under the globalistic Western models, has a liberal economic policy and suffers comprador oligarchs, etc.

The field for maneuver Putin is constantly shrinking. The logic of the circumstances pushes him to a more unambiguous choice. Inside the country this uncertainty of course causes growing hostility, and his legitimacy falls.

Outside the country, the West only increases the pressure on Putin to persuade him towards globalism and the recognition of “unilateralism”, specifically – to cede his post to the Westerner Medvedev. So Putin, while continuing to fluctuate between multipolarity and Westernism, loses ground and support here and there.

The new period of his presidency will be very difficult. We will do everything we can to move it to a multipolar world, the Eurasian Union and 4PT. But we are not alone in Russian politics – against us for influence in Putin’s circles we have an army of liberals, agents of Western influence and the staff of the global oligarchy. For us, though, we have the People and the Truth. But behind them – a global oligarchy, money, lies, and, apparently, the father of lies. Nevertheless, vincit omnia veritas. That I have no doubt.

 

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Dugin, Alexander. “Civilization as Political Concept.” Interview by Natella Speranskaja. Euro-Synergies, 13 June 2012. <http://euro-synergies.hautetfort.com/archive/2012/06/09/civilization-as-political-concept.html >. The text of this interview was also found at the official Fourth Political Theory website: <http://www.4pt.su/en/content/civilization-political-concept >. (See this article in PDF format here: Civilization as Political Concept).

Notes on further reading: On the topics discussed in the above interview, one of Aleksandr Dugin’s most  well-known books is Четвёртая политическая теория (Санкт-Петербург & Москва: Амфора, 2009), which is available in English translation as The Fourth Political Theory (London: Arktos, 2012), in Spanish translation as La Cuarta Teoría Política (Molins de Rei, Barcelona: Nueva República, 2013), in German translation as Die Vierte Politische Theorie (London: Arktos, 2013), in French translation as La Quatrième Théorie Politique (Nantes: Éditions Ars Magna, 2012), in Portuguese translation as A Quarta Teoria Política (Curitiba: Editora Austral, 2012), in Romanian translation as A Patra Teorie Politică (Chișinău: Editura Universitatea Populară, 2014), in Greek translation as Η τέταρτη πολιτική θεωρία (Αθήνα: Έσοπτρον, 2013), and in Serbian translation as Четврта политичка теорија (Београд: MIR Publishing, 2013).

Also of note in English is Dugin’s book Eurasian Mission: Program Materials (Moscow: International Eurasian Movement, 2005 [2nd edition: London: Arktos, 2015]). For those who know French, an important book by Alexander Dugin has been published as  Pour une théorie du monde multipolaire (Nantes: Éditions Ars Magna, 2013), the French translation of the Russian original: теория многополярного мира (Москва: Евразийское движение, 2012). There is also a Portuguese translation of this work known as Teoria do Mundo Multipolar (Iaeg, 2012). On the theory of the multi-polar world in German, see Dugin’s Konflikte der Zukunft: Die Rückkehr der Geopolitik (Kiel: Arndt-Verlag, 2014). Also worth noting in French is Dugin’s books Le prophète de l’eurasisme (Paris: Avatar Éditions, 2006) and L’appel de L’Eurasie (Paris: Avatar Éditions, 2013). A Spanish version of the latter has been published as ¿Qué es el eurasismo? Una conversación de Alain de Benoist con Alexander Dugin (Tarragona: Ediciones Fides, 2014). It should also be noted that a deeper clarification of the Fourth Political Theory has also been published by Dugin (in Russian), titled Четвертый Путь (Москва: Академический проект, 2014).

A good introduction to Dugin and his ideas in the Spanish language can be found in Sebastian J. Lorenz’s Elementos, N° 70, “Alexander Dugin y la Cuarta Teoría Política: La Nueva Derecha Rusa Eurasiática” (Mayo 2014), <http://urkultur-imperium-europa.blogspot.com/2014/05/elementos-n-70-alexander-dugin-y-la.html >. (We have made Elementos Nº 70 available for download from our site here: Elementos Nº 70 – Dugin). For Spanish readers, the book ¿Qué es el eurasismo? (previously cited) also serves as a good introduction to Dugin’s thought, which augments the Elementos publication.

For more information, see the official Fourth Political Theory website: <http://www.4pt.su/ >.

 

Interview with Tulaev – Devenir

Interview with Pavel Tulaev for «Devenir»

 

1. Pavel Tulaev, first a general question: the world of Russian nationalists seems totally obscure for a majority of us. It’s the same thing for the publications you are editing. What is the present situation for the nationalist forces and what is the place occupied by Athenaeum?

First of all I would like to thank you, Jean Francois, for this good opportunity to express my views on the pages of “DEVENIR”, the magazine I knew after your visit to Russia. In the latest issue of the ATHENAEUM I published an info on our meeting in Moscow and a translation of your article “Ce que nous ne voulons plus”. I hope it will help our readers to know more about situation in your region.

Russian nationalist movement has a very rich and long history. It was growing with the Russian Empire and came to the critical point in the civil war after the Bolshevick Revolution. Modern Russian nationalists are the followers of the White Army which opposed the Communist International. Of course today our movement has new ideas and contemporary strategy, but the fundament is the same. We fight for White ideals, aristocratic and traditional values. There are many nationalist parties, editions and institutions in today’s Russia including the President Putin’s circle, but I cannot describe them in this shirt interview.

Our ATHENAEUM is not a nationalist magazine. It is a white, panaryan, paneuropean and panslavic review in Russian language. We do our best to rise our mentality and publications to the world level.

2. « To touch the persons worried for our culture and to contribute to the formation of the elites of the future »…This definition, given by the association Synergies Européennes, reflects a very ambitious program for Athenaeum. Could you describe your editorial project and what has been achieved since the beginning of the parutions ?

Yes, we are maximalists. We want to be the leaders in our deal. And we are leaders. ATHENAEM is the best racial new right magazine in Russia. We have readers and friends in more then 20 countries, from Europe to South Africa and Chile. Our team that published before the review “NASLEDIJE PREDKOV’ (HERITAGE OF ANCESTORS) is not big but strong enough. Anatoly Ivanov, the head of Moscow Synergie deparment, is a very experience and well educated man, he works in 8 European languages. Vladimir Avdeyev is a talented writer who takes care of raciology and genetics. Serguey Yashin is a genius of Nordic poetry. I am a professional linguist and historian, author of more than 100 publications on Russia, Europe and Americas. Besides we invite specialists from the field we need. Our circle is growing and becoming more powerful.

In the ideology our “ATHENAEUM” does not imitate any of the anterior schools. We are conscious that returning to old religions and myths in their archaic forms is impossible in our age. However, it is desirable to continue this classical heritage. Tackling the problems of the contemporary world, we touch upon a wide range of topics dealing with science and technology, history and racial studies, religion and aesthetics, economics and politics, international relations, and the art of war. In our journal, one can find materials of the most divers genres: analytical forecasts, strategic researches, academic articles, literary essays, book and CD reviews.

I give you the content of #1 and #2 in French so you could have the idea what do we publish in concrete.

3. Beyond the fact that Athenaeum wants to cover all aspects of the knowledge necessary to apprehend the contemporary problems, it is obvious that the notion of race as well as the essential place of Russia in an authentic Europa are central themas of the publication…

Yes, racial problems are one of the very important in our programme. And please take to your consideration that race is not only the colour. We are not the party of blondies. Race means quality first of all. Good genetics, healthy way of life, family, strength and leadership – that is our aim.

Our geopolitical strategy is based on the obvious fact that Russia was, is and always will be the biggest European country. By our race, language, roots and civilization we are Europeans in spite of the communist dictatorship in the XX century.

4. The latest figures about Russian demography are catastrophic. In the coming decades, Russia is at risk of losing tens of millions of people by the simple and terrifying mechanism of a negative natural balance. Do you think that your articles about the importance of preserving the Russian ethno-cultural substract have a chance to be read and convert in political action ? And what are the causes of the decline in births combined with a rising number of deaths ?

The statistics of the demographical catastrophe in Russia is well known by specialists and politics. Every year our nationality is becoming 1,5 millions less. What are the main reasons of it?

The first is so called ‘communist heritage”. Bolshevik Revolution destroyed the institutes of family, property and country life. Millions of people died in wars and ‘labour camps’. Social hierarchy was eliminated and genetics was damaged.

Another one is modern standard of leaving, known as ‘consuming society’. Young men are working for money, comfort and empty life. Women don’t want to be isolated in the family. They want to be independent, to have their our business and personal interests. Many of families want to have only one or two babies and some don’t want children at all.

A big problem for Russia is new pauperization. Before Eltzin’s liberal reforms we were not rich, but there were no such contrasts as we have now. How can you hold a family if your salary is about two o even one hundred dollars?

The demographical situation can be changed only by revolutionary methods. This time we need genetic and eugenic revolution.

ATHENAEUM pays very much attention to this matter. The result is that we have some political support in nationalist parties and skinhead movement.

5. It’s become an habitude in rightist circles to speak about geopolitics on each line of every article. But for Russia, which is imperial by nature and history, it’s not a « fashion » word. Geopolitics is essential. What kind of status would you like to see for your country : the single C.I.S. ? A new Soviet Union ? A part of a mythical Eurosiberia ? Or simply a Russia in accordance to his precommunist imperial past ?

Geopolitics is very popular in today’s Russia. I should say that it’s kind of fashion. Every alternative you have mentioned has it’s own supporters in our country. To my opinion Russia must be a strong national state inside the frontiers of Slavic part of ex-impire. Russians compose more than 80% of the hole population of our state now, so we don’t need any “multi-culty’ version. Other Europeans and White people are our allies in the world struggle against liberal degradation.

6. An islamic party, which has 600,000 members has been founded at the beginning of 2001 in Russia. It’s the first time that muslims want to, deeply and so openly, influence the future of Russia since the great Tatar invasions. It happens at a time where you are confronting the Chechen fighters and the Ben Laden’s volunteers.

Islamic expansion has always been dangerous not only to Russia, but to the hole Europe. In the Middle Ages Muslim world surrounded white nations. The specific point of today’s situation is that NATO and other globalists provoke Islamic attacks for distabilization of European life. I am sure that Chechen war and new Afghanistan crisis were planed and calculated overseas.

7. When this interview will be published, the war between Anglo-saxon forces and Islamic fighters will certainly be a reality in Afghanistan and perhaps the neighbouring countries. What is your feeling about first the menace of radical Islam and secondly the intrusion of America on the Central Asian scene?

I feel that this war will take long time. It’s not easy to convert Muslims into Christians and to make Europeans from Asians. That is why we raise our Aryan heritage. It should help us to oppose Islamic invasion in the South East. American activity in the central Asia can provoke a big war in the heart of Eurasia. It is very dangerous. In this situation the role of Russian army is becoming super important. Nowadays European security depends on our White Warriors as in was in the period of anti-Turkish alliance.

8. Russia enjoys an unbelievable level of freedom of speech compared with the West European countries. The « ethnic » reference in Belgium for instance is considered almost as an abomination. Our politicians have only one political vision: multiculturalism. Where does come this specific freedom from? A compensation for 70-year of bolchevism ?

Today’s Russia enjoys much more freedom than modern western countries do. My correspondents from “occupied territories” prove that many items we discuss in our ATHENAEUM are “tabu’ for them. Freedom of speech is one of the achievements of the post-communist era. I agree that it’s a kind compensation for 70-year of dictature. The problem is that this freedom came too late. What kind of liberty can realize a person who was ignorant yesterday and is a semi-informed poor man today? The majority of modern people don’t want to analyze the tragedy of the Bolshevik Revolution, the real reasons of World War II and so called “perestroika’. They don’t want to read and to think at all. But there are always some strong, brave and educated leaders who live and fight for the truth. We work for them.

Pavel Tulaev, a great thank for your answers.

Ferg

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Tulaev, Pavel. “Interview for ‘Devenir’.” Официальный сайт: Тулаев Павел Владимирович [Official Website of Pavel Vladimirovich Tulaev], <http://tulaev.ru/html.php?150 >.

 

Interview with Tulaev – Delian Diver

Interview with Pavel Tulaev by “Delian Diver”

 

Pavel Vladimirovich Toulaev is a scholar and a writer, the editor-in-chief of the Russian international magazine “ATHENAEUM”. He is also the vice-president of Moscow department of “Synergy European ” and a member of the Slavic Committee. Toulaev was born in Krasnodar (1959) and is living in Moscow since 1970. By education he is an interpreter from Spanish, English and French (1981), Ph.D. in History (1985). In 1982-1992 he passed his postgraduate studies and worked as a researcher in the Institute of Latin America of the USSR. Then he worked in Spain (1992) and in the USA (1993/1994).

Toulaev is the author of more than 100 publications in different genres about Russia, Europe, Latin and North America. The separate editions published in Moscow are: “The Cross over the Crimean” (1992), “Seven Rays” (1993), “Understanding Russian” (1994), “Franco: the leader of Spain” (1998), “Veneti: ancestors of Slavs” (2000), “Poletajev’s Russian Concert” (2005).

He is the editor of collections: “Russia and Europe: the Experience of Sobor Analysis” (1992), “Russian Perspective” (1996), “Barbarians” (1999), “The White World Futures” (2006) and authors’ works – “Philosophy of the Post-History” by Vitaly Kovaljov (1992), “Sermons” by Dmitry Dudko (1993), “How the Order Creates Wars and Revolutions” by Antony Sutton (1995), “The Priest of the North” by Sergey Yashin (2000); “Veneti: our ancestors” by Jozko Savli (2003); “The Federal Reserve Conspiracy (Russian version as Vlast dollara)” and “The Order of Skull & Bones” by Antony Sutton (2004); “Mother-Land” by Dobroslav; “Rhetra Treasures” by Andreas Gottliebe Masch (2006), “What are we fighting for” by Guillaume Faye (2007).

Some of Toulaev’s works have been published in English, Spanish, German, French, Polish, Slovenian, Serbian, Ukranian.

Interview by Delian diver with Pavel Tulaev,

Moscow, March 18, 2008

Delian diver: There is a lack of information about Russian identitarian movement in Czech republic. Can you briefly describe its history since 1991? Or were there any active organizations (or persons) even in times of USSR?

Pavel Tulaev: First of all, I would like to thank you for the interest in the Russian ATHENAEUM Magazine and my personal works. We are glad to collaborate with a representative of the New Right movement in Czech Republic, because we consider your country one of the key forces in Central Europe.

Czechia traditionally played the leading role in pan-Slavic movement. In my library I have works of prominent Czech scientists and thinkers that influenced modern European thought, such as P. Safarik, F. Dvornik and L. Niederle, translated into Russian, and a wonderful album of Alphonse Mucha.

As for the history of the Russian identitarian movement, it began not in 1991, because the event that took place back then was only a political coup d’etat. Even in the Soviet era several prominent nationalist movements existed in Russia: Orthodox Church, national-patriotic societies, rusofilian art groups etc. The pagan (heathen) movement, which I represent, began with the works or Russian folklore scientists and slavists of XIX-XX centuries, such as A. Afanasiev, A. Fomintsyn, B.Rybakov and many others. Nowadays this Russian heathen line has been extended by the Aryan (Vedic) knowledge, represented in sacred texts and living tradition.

Nowadays there are a lot of political groups of Nationalist and Patriotic direction, of various ideological spectrum. The peak of political activity was in the mid 1990s, but with Putin coming to power, the state has taken some of our key ideas and slogans, and the activity of the nationalists declined. As a result, such organizations as “Pamyat” (radical Orthodox), RNE (National-Socialist), NNP (Russian Nationalist radicals), NBP (National-Bolshevik Party) and many others are now history.

As for the organizations that are active now, I would name NDPR (National-Democratic party of Rusia, led by A. Sevastianov), DPNI (Movement against illegal immigrants, led by Alexander Belov), “Great Russia”(led by Dmitry Rogosin and Andrey Saveliev)

The so-called “Russian March” held every year on Nov, 4 that gathers more than ten thousands supporters in different cities and towns of Russia – can be drawn as an example of our actions.

Delian diver: Your wife (Galyna Lozko) is one of the leading figures of heathenism in Ukraine. Is there any kind of heathen renaissance under way in Slavonic countries? Which Slavonic heathen movements are the most significant ones?

Pavel Tulaev: Yes, Galyna Lozko (Zoreslava) is really the most prominent leading figure of heathenism in Ukraine. She is an outstanding ethnographer with a PhD degree, an author of many important works, including “Europe Awaken” – a book devoted to the European pagan Renaissance. Besides, she has founded and registered at official level the Pagan’s Union of Ukraine (rodnovery), that is publishing “Svarog” Magazine in Kiev.

Together with my wife we have founded a pan-Slavic organization called “Rodovoje Slavyanskoje Vetche”, in which leaders of heathen movement and pagan priests from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Byelorussia, Serbia, Bulgaria and other Slavonic countries take part. I recommend you to read about it at our multilingual portal http://ateney.ru or in our newspaper “SLAVA!”.

Delian diver: Are you in touch with organisations dedicated to preserving German/Nordic, Celtic or ancient Greek and Roman heritage?

Pavel Tulaev: Yes, of course we are. First of all, I would name the World Congress of Ethnic Religions (WCER), headed by Jonas Trinkunas, an outstanding explorer of the folk traditions in Lithuania.

Also we have direct connections with such organizations and magazines as “Message” (The Druids of France), “Nordische Zeitung” (Germany), “Toporzel” (Poland), “Svevlad” (Serbia), “ARMA” (Greece), “Tierra y Pueblo” (Spain), “Dulo Society” (Bulgaria), “Mesogaia Sarmatia” (Ukraine) and many others.

Delian diver: You suggest the replacement of Faye’s Eurosiberian vision by the idea of Euro-Russia where the Siberian area is to be swapped with White Russia and Ukraine. Who is supposed to be the strategic partner of Euro-Russia in future pan-Europe, and what role will the countries of central Europe play in this new continental block?

Pavel Tulaev: Above all, Guillaume Faye is talking about a futuristic project. It has become more concrete when he visited Russia after our invitation. As a result, I have managed to convince him that the notion of Euro-Russia would be more accurate in ethnopolitical sphere, because Russia is a historical subject, and Siberia is merely a geographical territory.

Naturally, for us, Russia is the heart of the continent. But, all in all, the project of EuroRussia presupposes a polycentric system , when every country, including Czechia, will be an equal partner within the new pan-European geopolitical structure. I mean EuroRussia, not just “United Europe”, because Russia has its own destiny and mission in the World.

As for the possible partnership, it will depend on the hierarchy of values, such as nation (ethnos), super-ethnos (family of the nations), race (ethnically similar nations) and White Civilization (that can be European or post-European in its essence).

Delian diver: What is your opinion on the USA and their white nationalist movement? Do you think the contemporary hysterical anti-Americanism (fed especially by far left) can be an obstacle on the way of Euro-American nationalist cooperation?

Pavel Tulaev: I always distinguished between modern predatory policy of the US (as an ally of Israel) and the American people, within which we have comrades-in-arms from White Nationalist movement. When I taught in one of the universities of the US in early 1990s, this statement was justified by my personal experience.

Not all of the Russian Nationalists, especially, the radical far-right ones, share the anti-Yankee hysteria, provoked by the lefts and the so-called “Eurasians”. Russia has traditionally good relations with America, and it will develop this geopolitical line, especially in the Far East and the Pacific, where China is the primary rival of both USA and Russia. But this does not diminish our pro-European strategy, because we are tied with Europe by historical and genetic connections.

Delian diver: How do you view the effort USA put into Turkey to join the EU? Is this effort the part of broader strategy of USA- their aspiration for Islam to penetrate Europe? How do you think this islamisation of Europe will be developing?

Pavel Tulaev: We do agree that the USA-NATO uses Turkey as a battering ram against the European community. The US counts on the radical Islamic organizations with the same purpose. They are the so-called counter-agents who are to create the local artificial and controlled conflicts. The islamization of Europe is a reality and a very serious threat.

As an answer to this, Russia proposes its own strategy against Islamic extremism, which is aimed at neutralizing the allies of Turkey, such as the Wahhabites and Albanian extremists. But simultaneously we are strengthening our relations with such partners as Serbia, Bulgaria, Armenia and Greece, despite of NATO’s attempts to destabilize the atmosphere in South-Eastern Europe.

Delian diver: Is the adjustment of Kosovo part of USA’s effort for further weakening of Russia, his allies and “disobedient” European states by the support of ethnic separatism?

Pavel Tulaev: The separation of Kosovo is one more step of the NATO’s strategy, aimed at dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Slavic World as a whole. After the reunification of Germany, Czechoslovakia and the USSR, whose heart was the union of Great Russia, Minor Russia (Ukraine) and Byelorussia, have been also divided in parts.

But this policy of supporting the separatism and autonomous states has another aspect: today Abkhazia (in Caucasus), Crimea (in the Ukraine), Basque Country (in Spain), Kurdistan (in Turkey), Breizh (in France) also stand for their independence. This process might lead to the dissolution of Maastricht’s Europe and will undermine the bases of NATO. This process may be continued in the USA and Canada, where Alaska, California, Texas and Quebec claim their rights for independence.

The history is a constant changing in types and forms of State. In a hundred years, the political map of the world will look far from the way it looks today.

Delian diver: Please, try to introduce us the pan-European movement Synergies Europeennes. Is Athenaeum regarded as its independent branch? Are there any differences between it and other European branches?

Pavel Tulaev: Synergies Européennes is a pan-European intellectual movement, led by our friend and constant correspondent Robert Steuckers from Belgium. The Russian ATHENAEUM is an independent review, that I am publishing with my colleges: Anatoly Ivanov, a polyglot translator and a veteran of Russian Nationalist movement, and Vladimir Avdeev, a famous writer and racial scientist.

Of course, there are many differences between us and other European branches, since every country has its own history and traditions. Moreover, each of the members of the Russian team has his own preferences and priorities. I am a Russian Nationalist and a pan-Slavist, Anatoly Ivanov sympathizes with Franco-Roman countries and Vladimir Avdeev is famous for his pro-Germanic sympathies. But we all work on the basis of principle of multiformity and harmonic unity of ideas.

Delian diver: Introduce us, please, the Slavic Committee as well. When did it spring into existence and who has been participating in its running?

Pavel Tulaev: The history of the Slavic Committee dates back to the mid. XIX century, when, as a result of growth of national-liberating movements in Europe (the so-called “Spring of the Nations”), the first historical congress took place in 1848 and gathered in Prague more than 300 delegates from fraternal countries. It stimulated the growth of Slavophilian sympathies all over the world. After that, some similar congress in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Belgrade took place.

In the Soviet times this ideological and cultural movement was banned, its leaders were repressed. But during the war with Hitler’s Germany, the ideas of Pan-Slavism were revealed. In the end of the war, even Stalin, mostly due to diplomatic reasons, had to call himself a Slavophile. In history, this ideology was partially realized by Joseph Broz Tito.

The New wave of Pan-Slavism began in the 1990-s, when the Soviet war veterans, who were disappointed by the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty states, tried to organize new international organizations. These are: “Slavyansky Sobor” (The Slavic Council) led by a combat correspondent Nikolai Kikeshev (Russia) and the International Slavic Committee, led by Jan Minar (Czech Republic). I am an active member of the Russian affiliation of this organization.

Since then several prominent international congresses and conferences were held: in Prague, Moscow, Kiev, Minsk. We had a lot of support in Byelorussia, since president Lukashenko is leading a pro-Slavic policy.

After the initiative of many activists from Slavic countries, festivals of art and music take place.

The forms, acquired by the pan-Slavic movement are various and in this respect the “Rodovoye Slavyanskoye Vetche”, that we have organized with Galyna Lozko, is one of the forms this movement has acquired.

Delian diver: At the end please sum up your plans for the future.

Pavel Tulaev: This month I am publishing a very important album “The Native Gods painted by modern slavic artists” that included 230 colored illustrations, a special vocabulary and my introduction devoted to the history of heathen art in Russia. In spring I will publish a volume of reports after the conference “Europe and Russia: New Perspectives” (2007), as I did after the “White World’s Future” conference (2006). I am also preparing a special issue of “Slava!” newspaper, dedicated to the conference in Belgrad (2007), as well as the new issue of our “Athenaeum” Magazine. These materials will be partially posted at our multilingual website http://ateney.ru.

All in all we will continue the line of strengthening the brotherhood of the Slavic peoples and our cooperation within the White World. We are preparing a new conference in Bulgaria, in which the representatives of Czech Republic are also welcome to take place.

We are always ready for a positive and constructive collaboration within the framework of today’s laws and political correctness that does not abolish bravery of thought and reality of action.

In the name of our Native Gods!

Slava!

 

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Tulaev, Pavel. “Interview by Delian diver with Pavel Tulaev.” Délský Potápěč, 22 March 2008. <http://deliandiver.org/2008/03/interview-with-pavel-tulaev-the-editor-of-russian-magazine-the-athenaeum.html >.

This article is also available on Tulaev’s personal website: <http://tulaev.ru/html.php?151 >.