Tag Archives: European New Right

Manifesto of the New Right – Benoist & Champetier

“Manifesto of the French New Right in the Year 2000” by Alain de Benoist and Charles Champetier (PDF – 264 KB):

Manifesto of the French New Right (English)

The following is the original French version of this work:

Manifeste: la Nouvelle Droite de l’an 2000 (PDF – 208 KB):

Manifeste: la Nouvelle Droite de l’an 2000 (Français)

The following is the Spanish translation of this work:

Manifiesto: La Nueva Derecha del año 2000 (PDF – 204 KB):

Manifiesto: la Nueva Derecha del año 2000 (Español)

The following is the Italian translation of this work:

La Nuova Destra del 2000 (PDF – 202 KB):

La Nuova Destra del 2000 (Italiano)

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Notes on publications and translations of the Manifesto:

Alain de Benoist’s and Charles Champetier’s “Manifesto of the French New Right in the Year 2000” (Telos, Vol. 1999, No. 115, [March-May 1999], pp. 117-144) was the first edition of the English version, which was also published in a second edition as Manifesto for a European Renaissance (London: Arktos, 2012). The full text of this manifesto was also included as an appendix within the third edition of Tomislav Sunic’s Against Democracy and Equality: The European New Right (London: Arktos, 2011). The text used to create the file available on this site was retrieved from: <http://www.amerika.org/texts/manifesto-of-the-french-new-right-in-year-2000-alain-de-benoist-and-charles-champetier >. The text in English is alternatively available in HTML format here: <http://home.alphalink.com.au/~radnat/debenoist/alain9.html >.

The “Manifiesto: la Nueva Derecha del ano 2000” (Hespérides, Vol. IV, No. 19 [March-May 1999], pp. 13-47) was the first edition of the Spanish version, which was also published in a second edition as Manifiesto para un renacimiento europeo (Mollet del Vallès, Barcelona: Grup de recerca i estudi de la cultura europea, 2000), which has in turn been recently republished by Arktos (London, 2013). The text of the Spanish translation was retrieved from: <http://www.red-vertice.com/disidencias/textosdisi19.html >.

The “Manifeste: la Nouvelle Droite de l’an 2000” (Eléments, No. 94, [February 1999], pp. 11-23) was the first edition of the original French version, which was also published in a second edition as Manifeste pour une renaissance européenne (Paris: GRECE, 2000). The text of the French retrieved from: <http://www.grece-fr.net/textes/_txtWeb.php?idArt=71 >.

The “La Nuova Destra del 2000” (“La Nuova Destra del 2000” (Diorama letterario, Firenze, 229-230, October-November 1999) was the first Italian translation of the manifesto, which was published in a newer edition as Manifesto per una Rinascita Europea (Rome: Nuove Idee editore, 2005). The file made available on this site was retrieved from: <http://www.alaindebenoist.com/pdf/la_nuova_destra_del_2000.pdf >.

Other translations: The manifesto was also translated into German as “Manifest: Die Nouvelle Droite des Jahres 2000” (published in Aufstand der Kulturen [Berlin: Edition Junge Freiheit, 1999]), into Dutch as “Manifest voor Europees herstel en vernieuwing” (TeKos, Wijnegem, 95, octobre-décembre 1999), into Danish as “Manifest. Det nye højre år 2000” (Nomos, Valby, III, 2005, 1), into Hungarian as “Manifesztum az európai újjászületésért” (A51 [2002], pp. 239-285), into Czech as “Manifest: Nova pravice v roce 2000” (Tradice budoucnosti. Ed. Orientace 1/2008), into Croatian as “Manifest za Europsku Obnovu, Nova Desnica u 21. Stoljeću” (included as an appendix to Tomislav Sunic, Europska Nova Desnica [Zagreb, Croatia: Hasanbegović, 2009]), into Portuguese as Manifesto Para Um Renascimento Europeu (USA & EU: Editora Contra Corrente, 2014), into Polish as Manifest Grupy Badań i Studiόw nad Cywilizacją Europejską (GRECE) (published online: Konserwatyzm.pl, 2013), and into Ukrainian as Маніфест Нових Правих (published online: Національний альянс, 2009, http://nation.org.ua/)

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Further Reading (Major works by Alain de Benoist):

The following works are considered to be the most important books (along with the above Manifesto) by Alain de Benoist which establish the intellectual foundations of the New Right movement:

Vu de Droite: Anthologie critique des idées contemporaines (Paris: Copernic, 1977), which was translated into German as Aus Rechter Sicht: Eine kritische Anthologie zeitgenössischer Ideen (Tübingen: Grabert, 1983-1984), into Italian as Visito da Destra: Antologia critica delle idee contemporanee (Napoli: Akropolis, 1981), into Portugese as Nova Direita, Nova Cultura: Antologia critica das ideias contemporaneas (Lisboa: Afrodite 1981), and in an abridged format into Romanian as O perspectivâ de dreapta: Anthologie criticâ a ideilor contemporane (Bucarest: coll. « Dreapta europeanâ », 2, Anastasia, 1998).

Les Idées à l’Endroit (Paris: Libres-Hallier, 1979), which was translated into Italian as Le Idee a Posto (Napoli: Akropolis, 1983), into Spanish as La Nueva Derecha: Una respuesta clara, profunda e inteligente (Barcelona: Planeta, 1982), into Greek as Oi ιδέες sta ορθο (Αθήνα: Ελεύθερη Σκέψις, 1980), and partially into German as Kulturrevolution von Rechts: Gramsci und die Nouvelle Droite (Krefeld: Sinus-Verlag, 1985).

Démocratie: le problème (Paris: Le Labyrinthe, 1985), which was translated into English as The Problem of Democracy (London: Arktos, 2011), into German as Demokratie: das Problem (Tübingen & Zürich: Hohenrain, 1986), into Italian as Democrazia: il problema (Firenze: Arnaud, 1985), and into Spanish as ¿Es un Problema la Democracia? (Barcelona: Nueva República, 2013).

Au-delà des droits de l’homme: Pour défendre les libertés (Paris: Krisis, 2004), which was translated into English as Beyond Human Rights: Defending Freedoms (London: Arktos Media, 2011), into German translation as Kritik der Menschenrechte: Warum Universalismus und Globalisierung die Freiheit bedrohen (Berlin: Junge Freiheit, 2004), into Italian as Oltre i diritti dell’uomo: Per difendire le libertà (Rome: Il Settimo Sigillo, 2004), and into Spanish as Más allá de los Derechos Humanos: defender las libertades (published online 2008 at Les Amis d’Alain de Benoist: <http://www.alaindebenoist.com/pdf/mas_alla_de_los_derechos_humanos.pdf >).

In German, an important collection of essays by Alain de Benoist has been published in the book  Schöne Vernetzte Welt: Eine Antwort auf die Globalisierung (Tübingen: Hohenrain-Verlag, 2001). Another German collection had also been published as Aufstand der Kulturen: Europäisches Manifest für das 21. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Edition Junge Freiheit, 1999). In Spanish, see also the following two publications: Benoist’s Más Allá de la Derecha y de la Izquierda: El pensamiento político que rompe esquemas (Barcelona: Ediciones Áltera, 2010), and a collection of essays by Benoist and Guillaume Faye titled Las Ideas de la “Nueva Derecha”: Una respuesta al colonialismo cultural (Barcelona: Nuevo Arte Thor, 1986). In Russian, a notable collection of translated essays by Alain de Benoist (Ален де Бенуа) has been published as Против либерализма: к четвертой политической теории (Санкт-Петербург: Амфора, 2009).

Also worth mentioning is a book by Benoist that is only available in French known as Critiques – Théoriques (Lausanne & Paris: L’Age d’Homme, 2003),  but from which selected essays (two important examples being “A Critique of Liberal Ideology” and “The Idea of Empire”) have been translated into multiple languages – including English, Spanish, Italian, German, Portuguese, Russian, among some others – and published in various magazines or journals. In addition, we would like to make note of a collection of essays on racism and anti-racism, which includes Benoist’s important essay “Racisme: remarques autour d’une définition” (translated into English as “What is Racism?”): the book Racismes, Antiracismes, edited by Andre Béjin and Julien Freund (Paris: Librairie des Méridiens, 1986), translated into Italian as Razzismo e antirazzismo (Firenze: La roccia di Erec, 1992).

Finally, it is worth mentioning the joint work of Alain de Benoist and Alexander Dugin on the theory of Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory, L’appel de L’Eurasie, conversation avec Alain de Benoist (Paris: Avatar Éditions, 2013), translated into Spanish as ¿Qué es el eurasismo? Una conversación de Alain de Benoist con Alexander Dugin (Tarragona: Ediciones Fides, 2014).

Read more about Alain de Benoist’s life and work at his official website: <http://www.alaindebenoist.com/ >, and see also F. Roger Devlin’s review of Alain de Benoist’s Memoire Vive: <https://neweuropeanconservative.wordpress.com/2013/02/02/benoists-vivid-memory-devlin/ >.

 

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New Right Forty Years Later – Benoist

“The European New Right: Forty Years Later” by Alain de Benoist (PDF – 169 KB):

European New Right Forty Years Later

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De Benoist, Alain. “The European New Right: Forty Years Later.” The Occidental Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1, (Spring 2009). <http://www.toqonline.com/archives/v9n1/TOQv9n1Benoist.pdf >.

Note: This essay has also been published as a preface to the third edition of Tomislav Sunic’s Against Democracy and Equality: The European New Right (London: Arktos, 2011). It has also been translated into Spanish as “La Nueva Derecha Europea, 40 años después”, published online at El Manifesto (9 Julio 2014) <http://www.elmanifiesto.com/articulos.asp?idarticulo=4773 >.

 

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Interview with Steuckers

Interview with Robert Steuckers by Troy Southgate

 

Troy Southgate: When and why did you decide to become involved in politics?

Robert Steuckers: I was never actually involved in politics, as I was never a member of a political party. Nevertheless I am a citizen interested in political questions but of course not in the usual plain and trivial way, as I have no intention to become a candidate, council deputy or Member of Parliament.

For me “politics” means to maintain continuities or, if you prefer, traditions. But traditions that are embedded in the actual history of a particular human community. I started to read historical and political books at the tender age of 14. This lead to a rejection of established ideologies or non-values.

From the age of 15 onwards, with the help of a secondary school history teacher, a certain Mr. Kennof, I realized that people should grasp the main trends of history in keys and always make use of historical atlasses (I have collected them ever since) in order to understand in one glimpse the main forces animating the world scene at a precise moment of time. Maps are very important for politics at a high level (diplomacy, for instance).

The principal idea I acquired at this young age was that all ideologies, thoughts or blue prints which wanted to get rid of the past, to sever the links people have with their historical continuities, were fundamentally wrong. As a consequence, all political actions should aim at preserving and strengthening historical and political continuities, even when futurist (pro-active) actions are often necessary to save a community from a sterile repetition of obsolete habits and customs.

The discourses of most ideologies, including the various expressions of the so-called far right, were in my eyes artificial in the Western World just as communism was an abstraction in front of the whole of Russian history in the East or an abstraction obliterating the genuine historical patterns of the East-European peoples submitted to Soviet rule after 1945. The rupture of continuities or the repetition of dead past “forms” leads to the political-ideological confusion we know nowadays, where conservatives aren’t conservative and socialists aren’t socialists anymore, and so on.

Fundamental political ideas are better served in my eyes by “Orders” than by political parties. Orders provide a continuous education of the affiliated and stress the notion of service. They feel reluctant in front of the mere politicians’ petty ambitions. Such Orders are the Chivalric Orders of the Middle Ages or the Renaissance in Europe, the notion of fatwa in the Persian Islamic world as well as later experiments, including in the 20th Century (The Legion of Michael the Archangel Michael in Romania, the Verdinaso in Flanders, etc.).

Troy Southgate: Please explain what you mean by the term “Conservative Revolution” and, if possible, provide us with an outline of some of its chief ideologues.

Robert Steuckers: When the phrase “Conservative Revolution” is used in Europe, it is mostly in the sense given to it by Armin Mohler in his famous book Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932. Mohler listed a long list of authors who rejected the pseudo-values of 1789 (dismissed by Edmund Burke as mere “blue prints”), stressed the role of the Germanic in the evolution of European thought and received the influence of Nietzsche. Mohler avoided, for instance, purely religious “conservatives,” be they Catholics or Protestants.

For Mohler the main brandmark of “Conservative Revolution” is a non-linear vision of history. But he doesn’t simply take over the cyclical vision of traditionalism. After Nietzsche, Mohler believes in a spherical conception of history. What does that mean? It means that history is neither simply a repetition of the same patterns at regular intervals nor a linear path leading to happiness — to the end of history, to a Paradise on Earth, to felicity, etc. — but is a sphere that can run (or be pushed) in every direction according to the impulsion it receives from strong charismatic personalities. Such charismatic personalities bend the course of history towards some very particular ways, ways that were never previously foreseen by any kind of Providence.

Mohler in this sense never believes in universalistic political receipts or doctrines but always in particular and personal trends. Like Jünger, he wants to struggle against everything that is “general” and to support everything that is “particular”. Further, Mohler expressed his vision of the dynamic particularities by using the some awkward terminology of “nominalism.” For him “nominalism” was indeed the word that expressed at best the will of strong personalities to cut for themselves and their followers an original and never used path through the jungle of existence.

The main figures of the movement were Spengler, Moeller van den Bruck, and Ernst Jünger (and his brother Friedrich-Georg). We can add to these triumviri Ludwig Klages and Ernst Niekisch. Carl Schmitt, as a Catholic lawyer and constitutionalist, represents another important aspect of the so-called “Conservative Revolution”.

Spengler remains the author of a brilliant fresco of the world civilizations that inspired the British philosopher Arnold Toynbee. Spengler spoke of Europe as a Faustian civilization, at best expressed by the Gothic cathedrals, the interaction of light and colors in the glass-works, the stormy skies with white and gray clouds in most of the Dutch, English, and German paintings. This civilization is an aspiration of the human soul towards light and towards self-commitment.

Another important idea of Spengler is the idea of “pseudo-morphosis”: a civilization never disappears completely after a decay or a violent conquest. Its elements pass into the new civilization that takes its succession and bends it towards original paths.

Moeller van den Bruck was the first German translator of Dostoevsky. He was deeply influenced by Dostoevsky’s diary, containing some severe judgments on the West. In the German context after 1918, Moeller van den Bruck advocated, on the basis of Dostoevsky’s arguments, a German-Russian alliance against the West.

How could the respectable German gentleman, with an immense artist’s culture, plea in favor of an alliance with the Bolsheviks? His arguments were the following: in the whole diplomatic tradition of the 19th century, Russia was considered as the shield of reaction against all the repercussions of the French Revolution and of the revolutionist mind and moods. Dostoevsky, as a former Russian revolutionist who admitted later that his revolutionist options were wrong and mere blue prints, considered more or less that Russia’s mission in the world was to wipe out of Europe the tracks of the ideas of 1789.

For Moeller van den Bruck, the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia was only a changing of ideological clothe Russia remained, despite the Bolshevik discourse, the antidote to the Western liberal mind. So defeated Germany should ally to this fortress of anti-revolutionism to oppose the West, which in the eyes of Moeller van den Bruck is the incarnation of liberalism. Liberalism, stated Moeller van den Bruck, is always the final disease of a people. After some decades of liberalism, a people will ineluctably enter into a terminal phase of decay.

The path followed by Ernst Jünger is known enough to everyone. He started as an ardent and gallant young soldier in the First World War, leaving the trenches with no gun, simply with a hand grenade under his arm, worn with elegance like the stick of a typical British officer. For Jünger the First World War was the end of the petty bourgeois world of the 19th Century and the “Belle Epoque,” where everyone had to be “as it should be,” i.e. behave according to said patterns pre-cut by borrowing teachers or priests, exactly as we all today have to behave according to the self-proclaimed rules of “political correctness.”

Under the “storms of steel,” the soldier could state his nothingness, his mere fragile biological being, but this statement couldn’t in his eyes lead to an inept pessimism, to fear and desperation. Having experimented the most cruel destiny in the trenches and under the shelling of thousands of artillery guns, shaking the earth thoroughly, reducing everything to the “elemental,” the infantrymen knew better of cruel human destiny on the surface of this planet. All artificiality of civilised urban life appeared to them as mere fake.

After the first World War Ernst Jünger and his brother Friedrich-Georg turned out to be the best national-revolutionist journalists and writers.

Ernst evolved to a kind of cynical, soft, ironical, and serene observer of humanity and the facts of life. During a carpet bombing raid on a Parisian suburb, where factories were producing war material for the German army during WWII, Jünger was terrified by the unnatural straight air path taken by the American flying fortresses. The linearity of the planes’ path in the air above Paris was the negation of all the curves and sinuosities of organic life. Modern war implied the crushing of those winding and serpentine organicities. Ernst Jünger started his career as a writer by being an apologist of war. After having observed the irresistible lines thrust forward by the American B-17s, he became totally disgusted by the unchivalrousness of the pure technical way of running a war.

After WWII, his brother Friedrich-Georg wrote a first theoretical work leading to the development of the new German critical and ecological thinking, Die Perfektion der Technik (The Perfection of Technics). The main idea of this book, in my eyes, is the critique of “connection.” The modern world is a process trying to connect human communities and individuals to big structures. This process of connection ruins the principle of liberty. You are a poor chained prole if you are “connected” to a big structure, even if you earn £3000 or more in one month. You are a free man if you are totally disconnected from those big iron heels. In a certain way, Friedrich-Georg developed the theory that Kerouac experimented untheoretically by choosing to drop out and travel, becoming a singing tramp.

Ludwig Klages was another philosopher of organic life against abstract thinking. For him the main dichotomy was between Life and Spirit (Leben und Geist). Life is crushed by abstract spirit. Klages was born in Northern Germany but migrated as a student to Munich, where he spent his free time in the pubs of Schwabing, the district in which artists and poets met (and still meet today). He became a friend of the poet Stefan Georg and a student of the most original figure of Schwabing, the philosopher Alfred Schuler, who believed himself to be the reincarnation of an ancient Roman settler in the German Rhineland.

Schuler had a genuine sense of theater. He disguised himself in the toga of a Roman Emperor, admired Nero, and set up plays remembering the audience of the ancient Greek or Roman world. But beyond his lively fantasy, Schuler acquired a cardinal importance in philosophy by stressing for instance the idea of “Entlichtung,” i.e. the gradual disappearance of Light since the time of the Ancient City-State of Greece and Roman Italy. There is no progress in history: On the contrary, Light is vanishing as well as the freedom of the free citizen to shape his own destiny.

Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin, on the left or conservative-liberal side, were inspired by this idea and adapted it for different audiences. The modern world is the world of complete darkness, with little hope of finding “be-lighted” periods again, unless charismatic personalities, like Nero, dedicated to art and Dionysian lifestyle, wedge in a new era of splendor which would only last for the blessed time of one spring.

Klages developed the ideas of Schuler, who never wrote a complete book, after he died in 1923 due to an ill-prepared operation. Klages, just before WW1, pronounced a famous speech on the Horer Meissner Hill in Central Germany, in front of the assembled youth movements (Wandervogel). This speech bore the title of “Man and Earth” and can be seen as the first organic manifesto of ecology, with a clear and understandable but nevertheless solid philosophical background.

Carl Schmitt started his career as a law teacher in 1912 but lived till the respectable age of 97. He wrote his last essay at 91. I cannot enumerate all the important points of Carl Schmitt’s work in the frame of this modest interview. Let us summarize by saying that Schmitt developed two main idea the idea of decision in political life and the idea of “Great Space.”

The art of shaping politics or a good policy lays in decision, not in discussion. The leader has to decide in order to lead, protect, and develop the political community he is in charge of. Decision is not dictatorship as many liberals would say nowadays in our era of “political correctness.” On the contrary: a personalisation of power is more democratic, in the sense that a king, an emperor, or a charismatic leader is always a mortal person. The system he eventually imposes is not eternal, as he is doomed to die like any human being. A nomocratic system, on the contrary, aims at remaining eternal, even if current events and innovations contradict the norms or principles.

Second big topic in Schmitt’s work the idea of a European Grand Space (Grossraum). “Out-of-Space” powers should be prevented to intervene within the frame of this Great Space. Schmitt wanted to apply to Europe the same simple principle that animated US President Monroe. America for the Americans. OK, said Schmitt, but let us apply “Europe to the Europeans.” Schmitt can be compared to the North-American “continentalists,” who criticised Roosevelt’s interventions in Europe and Asia. Latin Americans also developed similar continentalist ideas as well as Japanese imperialists. Schmitt gave to this idea of “Greater Space” a strong juridical base.

Ernst Niekisch is a fascinating figure in the sense that he started his career as a Communist leader of the “Councils’ Republic of Bavaria” of 1918-19, that was crushed down by the Free Corps of von Epp, von Lettow-Vorbeck, etc. Obviously, Niekisch was disappointed by the absence of a historical vision among the Bolshevik trio in revolutionist Munich (Lewin, Leviné, Axelrod).

Niekisch developed a Eurasian vision, based on an alliance between the Soviet Union, Germany, India, and China. The ideal figure who was supposed to be the human motor of this alliance was the peasant, the adversary of the Western bourgeoisie. A certain parallel with Mao Tse-Tung is obvious here. In the journals that Niekisch edited, we discover all the German tentatives to support anti-British or anti-French movements in the colonial empires or in Europe (Ireland against England, Flanders against a Frenchified Belgium, Indian nationalists against Britain, etc.).

I hope I have explained in a nutshell the main trends of the so-called conservative revolution in Germany between 1918 and 1933. May those who know this pluri-stratified movement of ideas forgive my schematic introduction.

Troy Southgate: Do you have a “spiritual angle”?

Robert Steuckers: By answering this question, I risk being too succinct. Among the group of friends who exchanged political and cultural ideas at the end of the Seventies, we concentrated of course on Evola’s Revolt Against the Modern World. Some of us rejected totally the spiritual bias, because it lead to sterile speculation: they preferred to read Popper, Lorenz, etc. I accepted many of their criticisms, and I still dislike the uttermost Evolian speculations, alleging a spiritual world of Tradition beyond all reality. The real world being disregarded as mere triviality. But this is of course a cult of Tradition mainly supported by young people “feeling ill in their own skin,” as we say. The dream to live like beings in fairy tales is a form of refusing to accept reality.

In Chapter 7 of Revolt Against the Modern World, Evola, on the contrary, stresses the importance of the “numena“, the forces acting within things, natural phenomena or powers. The initial Roman mythology laid the accent more on the numena than on the personalised divinities. This bias is mine. Beyond the people and the gods of the usual religions (be they Pagan or Christian), there are acting forces and man should be in concordance with them in order to be successful in his earthly actions.

My religious/spiritual orientation is more mystical than dogmatic, in the sense that the mystical tradition of Flanders and Rhineland (Ruusbroec, Meister Eckhart), as well as the mystical tradition of Ibn Arabî in the Muslim area or of Sohrawardî in the Persian realm, admire and worship the total splendor of Life and the World. In these traditions, there is no clear-cut dichotomy between the godly, the sacred, and the holy on the one side and the worldly, the profane, and the simple on the other. Mystical tradition means omni-compenetration and synergy of all the forces yeasting in the world.

Troy Southgate: Please explain to our readers why you place such importance on concepts like geopolitics and Eurasianism.

Robert Steuckers: Geopolitics is a mixture of history and geography. In other words of time and space. Geopolitics is a set of disciplines (not a single discipline) leading to a good governance of time and space. Geopolitics is a mixture of history and geography. No serious power can survive without continuity, be it an institutional or historical continuity. No serious power can survive without a domination and a yielding of land and space.

All traditional empires first organized the land by building roads (Rome) or by mastering the big rivers (Egypt, Mesopotamia, China), then lead on to the emergence of a long history, to the sense of a continuity, to the birth of the first practical sciences (astronomy, meteorology, geography, mathematics) under the protection of well structured armies with a code of honor, especially codified in Persia, the womb of Chivalry.

The Roman Empire, the first empire on European soil, was focussed on the Mediterranean Sea. The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation couldn’t find a proper core as well coordinated as the Mediterranean. The waterways of Central Europe lead to the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, or the Black Sea, but without any link between them. This was the true tragedy of German and European history. The country was torn between centrifugal forces. The Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen tried to restore the Mediterranean realm, with Sicily as the central geographical piece.

His attempt was a tragic failure. It is only now that the emergence of a renewed imperial form (even under a modern ideology) is possible in Europe: after the opening of the canal between the Rhine-Main system and the Danube river system. There is a single waterway now between the North Sea, including the Thames system in Britain, and the Black Sea, allowing the economical and cultural forces of Central Europe to reach all the shores of the Black Sea and the Caucasian countries.

Those who have a good historical memory, not blinded by the usual ideological blue-prints of modernism, will remember the role of the Black Sea shores in the spiritual history of Europe: in Crimea, many old traditions, be they Pagan or Byzantine, were preserved in caves by monks. The influences of Persia, especially the values of the oldest (Zoroastrian) Chivalry in world history, could influence the development of similar spiritual forces in Central and Western Europe. Without those influences, Europe is spiritually mutilated.

Therefore the Mediterranean area, the Rhine (also coupled to the Rhone) and the Danube, the Russian rivers, the Black Sea and the Caucasus should constitute a single civilization area, defended by a unified military force, based on a spirituality inherited from Ancient Persia. This, in my eyes, means Eurasia. My position is slightly different than that of Dughin but both positions are not incompatible.

When the Ottomans gained complete control over the Balkan Peninsula in the 15th Century, the land routes were cut for all Europeans. Moreover, with the help of the North African sea rovers assembled by the Turkish-born Barbarossa based in Algiers, the Mediterranean was closed to peaceful European commercial expansion towards India and China. The Muslim world worked as a bolt to contain Europe and Moscovy, core of the future Russian Empire.

All together, Europeans and Russians joined their efforts to destroy the Ottoman bolt. The Portuguese, Spaniards, English and Dutch tried the sea routes and circumvented the African and Asian land mass, ruining first the Moroccan kingdom, which drew gold from subtropical Western African mines and claims in order to build an army to conquer again the Iberian Peninsula. By landing in Western Africa, the Portuguese got the gold more easily for themselves and the Moroccan kingdom was reduced to a mere residual superpower. The Portuguese passed around the African continent and entered the Indian Ocean, circumventing definitively the Ottoman bolt, and giving for the first time a real Eurasian dimension to European history.

At the same time, Russia repelled the Tartars, took the City of Kazan, and destroyed the Tartar shackle of the Muslim bolt. This was the starting point of the continental Russian Eurasian geopolitical perspective.

The aim of American global strategy, developed by a man like Zbigniew Bzrzezinski, is to recreate artificially the Muslim bolt by supporting Turkish militarism and Panturanism. In this perspective, they support tacitly and still secretly the Moroccan claims on the Canary Isles and use Pakistan to prevent any land link between India and Russia. Hence the double necessity today for Europe and Russia to remember the counter-strategy elaborated by ALL European people in the 15th and 16th Century.

European history has always been conceived as petty nationalist visions. It is time to reconsider European history by stressing the common alliances and convergencies. The Portuguese seaborne and the Russian landborne actions are such convergencies and are naturally Eurasian. The Battle of Lepanto, where the Venetian, Genoan, and Spanish fleets joined their efforts to master the East Mediterranean area under the command of Don Juan of Austria, is also a historical model to meditate upon and to remember.

But the most important Eurasian alliance was without any doubt the Holy Alliance lead by Eugene of Savoy at the end of the 17th Century, which compelled the Ottomans to retrocede 400,000 sq. km of land in the Balkans and Southern Russia. This victory allowed the Russian Tsars of the 18th Century, especially Catherine II, to win decisive battles once more.

My Eurasianism (and of course my whole geopolitical thought) is a clear answer to Bzrzezinski’s strategy and is deeply rooted in European history. It is absolutely not to be compared with the silly postures of some pseudo-national-revolutionist crackpots or with the poor aesthetic blueprints of new rightist would-be philosophers. Besides, one last remark concerning geopolitics and Eurasianism: my main sources of inspiration are English. I mean the historical atlas of Colin McEvedy, the books of Peter Hopkirk about the secret service in the Caucasus, in Central Asia, along the Silk Road and in Tibet, the reflections of Sir Arnold Toynbee in the twelve volumes of A Study of History.

Troy Southgate: What is your view of the State? Is it really essential to have systems or infrastructure as a means of socio-political organization, or do you think a decentralized form of tribalism and ethnic identity would be a better solution?

Robert Steuckers: Your question needs a whole book to be properly and completely answered. Firstly, I would say that it is impossible to have A view of THE State, as there are many forms of States throughout the world. I make of course the distinction between a State, which is still a genuine and efficient instrument to promote the will of a people and also to protect its citizens against all evils be they machinated by external, internal or natural foes (calamities, floods, starvation, etc.).

The State should also be carved for one population living on a specific land. I am critical, of course, of all artificial States like those that were imposed as so-called universal patterns. Such States are pure machines to crush or to exploit a population for an oligarchy or foreign masters. An organization of the peoples, according to ethnic criteria, could be an ideal solution, but unfortunately as the events in the Balkans show us the ebbs and flows of populations in European, African, or Asian history have very often spread ethnical groups beyond natural boarders or settled them within territories which were formerly controlled by others. Homogeneous States cannot be built in such situations. This is the source of many tragedies, especially in Middle and Eastern Europe. Therefore the only perspective today is to think in terms of Civilizations as Samuel Huntington taught us in his famous article and book, The Clash of Civilizations, first written in 1993.

Troy Southgate: In 1986, you said “the Third Way exists in Europe at the level of theory. What it needs is militants.” [“Europe: A New Perspective” in The Scorpion, Issue #9, p.6] Is this is still the case, or have things developed since then?

Robert Steuckers: Indeed, the situation is still the same. Or even worse because, growing older, I state that the level of classical education is vanishing. Our way of thinking is in a certain way Spenglerian, as it encompasses the complete history of the human kind.

Guy Debord, leader of the French Situationnists from the end of the Fifties until the Eighties, could observe and deplore that the “society of the spectacle” or the “show society” has as its main purpose to destroy all thinking and thought in terms of history and replace them by artificial and constructed blueprints or simple lies. The eradication of historical perspectives in the heads of pupils, students, and citizens, through the diluting work of the mass-media, is the big manipulation, leading us to an Orwellian world without any memory. In such a situation, we all risk becoming isolated. No fresh troops of volunteers are ready to take over the struggle.

Finally, tell us about your involvement with Synergies and your long-term plans for the future.

“Synergies” was created in order to bring people together, especially those who publish magazines, in order to spread more quickly the messages our authors had to deliver. But the knowledge of languages is also undergoing a set-back. Being plurilingual, as you certainly know, I have always been puzzled by the repetition of the same arguments at each national level. Marc Lüdders from Synergon-Germany agrees with me. It’s a pity for instance that the tremendous amount of work performed in Italy is not known in France or in Germany. And vice-versa. In order to keep this short: my main wish is to see such an exchange of texts realized in a swift manner within the next twenty years.

 

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Steuckers, Robert. “Interview with Robert Steuckers.” Interview by Troy Southgate. Synthesis, 2001. <http://www.rosenoire.org/interviews/steuckers.php>.

Note: See also Robert Steucker’s website Euro-Synergies: <http://euro-synergies.hautetfort.com >.

Notes on further reading: Armin Mohler’s book Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1933 (Graz & Stuttgart: Ares-Verlag, 2005), mentioned in this interview, is one of the most important works concerning the Conservative Revolution. It has been translated into French as La Révolution conservatrice en Allemagne: 1918-1932 (Puiseaux, Loiret: Pardès, 1993).  Also worth noting is Mohler’s Von Rechts Gesehen (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1974).

On Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, one of the founding intellectuals of the Conservative Revolution, an excellent overview of his thought in English is Lucian Tudor’s “Arthur Moeller van den Bruck: The Man & His Thought” (originally published online: Counter-Currents.com, 17 August 2012), available on our website here: <https://neweuropeanconservative.wordpress.com/2014/03/21/arthur-moeller-van-den-bruck-tudor/ >.

For a good overview of Carl Schmitt’s works and philosophy in English, see Paul Gottfried, Carl Schmitt: Politics and Theory (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990).

For an overview of Ludwig Klages’s works and philosophy, see Joe Pryce, “On The Biocentric Metaphysics of Ludwig Klages,” Revilo-Oliver.com, 2001, <http://www.revilo-oliver.com/Writers/Klages/Ludwig_Klages.html > (this essay was republished in print as an introduction to Klages anthology, The Biocentric Worldview [London: Arktos, 2013]). (See this essay in PDF format here: On the Biocentric Metaphysics of Ludwig Klages).

 

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Review of Faye’s ‘Why We Fight’ – Stevens

Review of Guillaume Faye’s Why We Fight: Manifesto of the European Resistance

By Brett Stevens

Why We Fight: Manifesto of the European Resistance
by Guillaume Faye
274 pages, Arktos
.

 

This book combines two excellent concepts: a brief summary of the European New Right and its goals, and more importantly, a glossary of terms which re-captures many concepts from their definitions as seized and contorted by liberal academia.

For most people in the United States, “nationalism” means “patriotism,” because that is how the big media talking heads (and hence, their friends, who repeat things they’ve heard in order to seem smarter) use the term. However, professional sources still note that nationalism is the concept of ethnic self-rule for all ethnic groups, while patriotism is loyalty to the nation-state and its political dogma and economic system. (p. 200)

Faye renews terms that have been forgotten by all but historians and philosophers, as well as a few recent hilarious additions (see “Mental AIDS” on p. 190). Through this vehicle, he is able to construct an argument from the terms already in use, making it drop into place as part of arguments already made. This is the power of his Metapolitical Dictionary, which comprises the bulk of this book.

In addition, the glossary helps keep focus on terms that signify important parts of a worldview that otherwise would be forgotten, in the rush to accomplish big things (limit democracy, instill nationalism, ameliorate consumerism). This is a careful ground-up work that constructs the delicate balance of terms that allow us to understand the underlying concepts of an order beyond the one we have been taught in popular notions and state-filtered education.

NATION, nationalism, new nationalism

Etymologically, a ‘nation’ is a popular and political community made up of those of the same ethnic origins, of the same ‘birth.’

The nation ought not to be confused with the nation-state. ‘Nation’ and ‘ethnos’ are the same word, designating a community whose members are of the same origin. To oppose the nation to the Empire is, semantically, to misunderstand it. An empire, in the positive sense, is a federation, an ensemble of similar, closely-related nations — a ‘federal nation.’

The shorter first part of the book is a more triumphant, less academic summation of Faye’s beliefs expressed in other works such as Archeofuturism: European visions of the post-catastrophic age. It is a more exuberant, more contemporary and less abstract version of what he expresses in that book and other writings.

In it, Faye outlines the situation: the West is dying because it has lost a sense of biocultural identity and with it, the ability to make decisions based on values on not simply reactions. At the same time, the results of 400 years of insane liberal policies have come home to roost, which Faye sees as resulting in a “convergence of catastrophes”: failing water and food supplies, climate change, warfare, racial strife and economic collapse.

In addition, he writes about the process of coming to political power and the necessity of unity without corruption by ideologically-confused people; also, he clarifies in simple language how to define the political viewpoint and how to answer its critics. Throughout the summary, he hints at the necessity of an absolute struggle, which is a popular vision among those who have taken the difficult step of rejecting their society and its ideals “as it stands now.”

While the New Right as a movement birthed by thinkers and academics was initially vague in nature, Faye corrects that tendency with a book that uses lists, bullet points, and clear and accurate language to express itself:

Good relations with the Arab-Islamic world cannot but take the form of an armed peace that never lowers its guard. The sine qua non (“necessary prerequisite” – Editor) of such a condition will entail the end of its colonisation of Europe. As the Qur’an says, Islam needs to ‘put down its hand to avoid having it cut off.’ It won’t do this if there is a sword in its hand. The idea of a ‘European-Arab Mediterranean alliance’ based on allegedly common interests is a fool’s errand without any historical or economic basis. Europe has no need of Africa or the Middle East, which are a drag on her, a financial, economic, and human burden, and increasingly a menace. (71)

Faye makes compelling arguments but in this work, he strives not to argue his point so much as to make it plainly distinct from all around it, and thus to capture space in the intellectual free-for-all-zone that is occurring as a future power vacuum becomes obvious to observers of Western collapse. What makes this book a winner is that instead of blindly bloviating, or retreating into abstruse theory, Faye gives us a groundwork for a new movement.

 

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Stevens, Brett. “Why We Fight: Manifesto of the European Resistance, by Guillaume Faye.” Amerika.org, 2 July 2011. <http://www.amerika.org/books/why-we-fight-manifesto-of-the-european-resistance-by-guillaume-faye/ >.

Note: Guillaume Faye’s Why We Fight was originally published in French as Pourquoi nous combattons: Manifeste de la résistance européenne (Paris: Editions de L’Aencre, 2001), and was translated into German as Wofür wir kämpfen: Das Manifest des europäischen Widerstandes (Kassel: Ahnenrad der Moderne, 2006) and into Russian as За что мы сражаемся? Идеологический словарь (Москва: СЛАВА!, 2006). The older version of the dictionary portion of this work was also translated into Spanish as Pequeño Léxico del Partisano Europeo (Molins de Rei, Barcelona: Nueva República, 2012). Some parts of the book under review have also been published in the Spanish-language collection: Escritos por Europa (Barcelona: Titania, 2008).

 

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Struggle to Save the West – Jackson

The Struggle to Save the West: The New Right in Europe has struck the opening blows.

by Thomas Jackson

 

Against Democracy and Equality, Tomislav Sunic, Peter Lang, 1990, 196 pp.

(See Book Image)

In America today, those who see the fundamental problems the nation faces live almost in an intellectual vacuum. This is because the United States does not even recognize its most dangerous enemies: racial and cultural dispossession, growing hatred of our European heritage, and the fatal loss of nerve that has permitted this to happen.

When public discourse touches on these subjects at all, it is to celebrate them as signs of a new, better America. Thus, for those who see the road to the new America as the road to oblivion, it is easy to think that they are alone, and that their country faces a unique horror that no one else ever imagined or thought about.

Of course, this is not true. Against Democracy and Equality by Tomislav Sunic not only traces the distinguished history of “revolutionary conservatism” but introduces a contemporary school of European writers who are struggling to find answers to the questions that, in America, are not yet being asked. As Professor Paul Gottfried writes in the preface to this little volume, Dr. Sunic has given us the first book-length introduction in English to the European New Right.

The very title suggests how boldly the New Right is prepared to defy the most cherished liberal assumptions. If this group of thinkers can be said to have one central tenet, it is that the essential nature of man lies not in equality but in inequality. Individuals, races, cultures, and nations are different and unequal; any attempt to treat them as equals is a form of tyranny.

The essential nature of man lies not in equality but in inequality.

Thus, the thinkers of the New Right are adamantly opposed to anything that imposes a universalistic equality. For them, Communism has been the most ruthless form of egalitarian totalitarianism but, in one of their most provocative insights, they see modern Western liberalism as a form of “soft” totalitarianism that is achieving its goals without the violence of concentration camps and secret police. In its ultimate form — which we can see developing in the United States — there is no need for violent repression because each man becomes his own censor and his own jail keeper.

The most prominent leaders of the European New Right are Frenchmen. Alain de Benoist is the best known figure, along with such men as Guillaume Faye, and Julien Freund. They have been prominent since the 1970s, and have played a central role in dislodging Marxism as the unacknowledged religion of European intellectuals. In America, where their ideas are even more of an anathema than in Europe, they are studiously ignored.

Antecedents

As Dr. Sunic explains, the New Right finds inspiration in thinkers who were influential before the Second World War, but who have since been repudiated because the Nazis endorsed some of their views. As part of his introduction to the New Right, Dr. Sunic briefly outlines the thinking of Carl Schmitt (1888-1982), Oswald Spengler (1880-1936), and Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923). These men clearly saw the rush towards universal brotherhood and saw that the consequences would be that Europe would voluntarily give up its prominence and even its distinctiveness.

“Whoever becomes a lamb will find a wolf to eat him.”

According to Pareto, for example, it is folly for those who rule to renounce power in the name of universal brotherhood. As Dr. Sunic paraphrases his views, “The downtrodden and the weak will always appeal to the sense of justice of those who rule, but the moment they grab the reins of power they will become as oppressive as their former rulers. Moreover, if by chance some nation happens to display signs of excessive humanity, philanthropy, or equality, it is a certain symptom of its terminal illness.” In Pareto’s own words, “Whoever becomes a lamb will find a wolf to eat him.”

For liberals, this does not matter. Let Europe be eaten by North Africa or the United States by Mexico. Since all peoples and cultures are equally valid, nothing will have been lost and resistance would be immoral.

Equality

One of the New Right’s goals has been to understand the origins of the militant, universalist egalitarianism that underlies liberalism. Though its point of view offends many traditional conservatives, it finds the source in Christianity. Unlike polytheistic religions, monotheism emphasized the equality of all men before God. By the 16th and 17th centuries, this equality was broadened to include the temporal concepts of legal and political equality.

Thomas Jefferson is a villain to the New Right because of his assertion that all men are created equal. Though Jefferson did not mean these words literally, the New Right sees Karl Marx and his insistence on economic equality as a direct heir to Jefferson.

As Dr. Sunic explains, it is because of their veneration of equality that liberals are unable to withstand the arguments of socialists and communists. Liberals cannot reconcile themselves to the fact that even though men may be politically equal, free competition will always result in inequality. Liberals can therefore raise no principled objection to the forced economic equality of Communism.

The New Right therefore sees both Communism and Nazism as reactions to the half-way equality of liberalism. Communists think it has not gone far enough, whereas National Socialists think it has gone too far.

The New Right rejects equality and takes for granted the genetic basis of inequality. So far, according to Dr. Sunic, the New Right has not made formal political proposals but it would agree with the great British geneticist J.B.S. Haldane that “Any satisfactory political and economic system must be based on the recognition of human inequality.”

Universalism

The other trait common to Christianity, liberalism, and Communism is their insistence on their own universal validity. In the Gospels of both Matthew and Mark, Jesus makes the staggering claim that anyone not for him is against him. Communism’s goal of world-wide revolution was always explicit, but liberalism’s projects for uplift are just as universalist. Muslims must be made into feminists; Japanese must become anti-racists; Africans must be taught democracy; Chinese must eat hamburgers.

Despite its constant preachments about “tolerance,” liberalism is therefore as harshly intolerant as any religious inquisition and would gladly remake the entire world in the image of a leftist American university.

Alain de Benoist has a completely different view of society: “A people is not a transitory sum of individuals. It is not a chance aggregate. It is a reunion of inheritors of a specific fraction of human history, who, on the basis of the sense of common adherence, develop the will to pursue their own history and give themselves a common destiny.”

As Dr. Sunic paraphrases him: “Real “organic’ democracy can only exist in a society in which people have developed a firm sense of historical and spiritual commitment to their community. In such an organic polity … the law must not derive from some abstract preconceived principles, but rather from the genius of the people and its unique historical character. In such a democracy, the sense of community must invariably preside over individualistic and economic self-interests.”

Economism and Individualism

This leads to the two other great flaws of liberalism: its emphasis on economics and its tendency to strip away a man’s traditional, organic ties, and leave him a solitary individual. Once all people are seen as equal and equivalent, parochial loyalties are pure prejudice.

Common markets, currency unions, and supra-national organizations like the European Parliament are symptoms of both the attack on particularism and the victory of pure economics. If local loyalties no longer matter, only economic efficiency is left. The Deutsche Mark, the Pound Sterling, and the traditions and sovereignties they represent can all be brushed aside if a single European currency would be more efficient.

The primacy of economics also explains the relentless ugliness of modern life — stores like warehouses, office buildings like boxes, middle class people who dress like tramps, the obliteration of good manners — because the esthetic and the cultural have no economic value.

In such societies politics is no longer a battle of competing world views but a form of commerce. As Dr. Sunic paraphrases Carl Schmitt: “Different opinions are no longer debated; instead, social, financial, and economic pressure groups calculate their interests, and on the basis of these interests they make compromises and coalitions.” Politicians become rug merchants. An assertion of genuine philosophical differences is a nuisance that hampers trade.

A man with no particularist culture is extremely vulnerable. In a society of pure individualism only wealth gives identity, so the poor have nothing and the middle classes face the threat of nothing.

In a healthy society the individual, whatever his economic status, can be concerned with the greater good because it is his society and unlike any other. He may even regret, as Nathan Hale did, that he has but one life to give for his country. The healthy culture thrives on what may appear to be the sacrifices of individuals, but it gives them meaning, history, confidence, and identity, be they rich or poor.

‘Soft’ Totalitarianism

The individualism of liberalism is therefore fragmentation rather than strength. In the view of the New Right, it leaves men open to the “soft” totalitarianism that has made such headway in the United States. Even without police-state techniques, liberalism has so successfully enforced its orthodoxies that men fear to say what they believe about race, immigration, welfare, eugenics, mass democracy, culture, or even foreign aid. The New Right is correct in fearing this form of totalitarianism as the most dangerous and insidious.

Now that Marxism is dead there should be a free-wheeling debate about the validity of its assumptions about equality, universalism, and the primacy of economics. In America there is no such debate. As Alain de Benoist says, “It is always easy [for liberals] to avoid the debate. It suffices to disqualify the adversary … One attacks the persons rather than what they write.” Here, too, the New Right finds the legacy of Christianity: Disagreement with liberalism is wicked, and the non-believer is condemned to eternal damnation.

The spokesmen of the New Right are not generally optimistic about being able to overthrow soft totalitarianism, but they are willing to fight it to the end. As Dr. Sunic puts it: “No matter how dismal and decadent the modern polity appears to be, no matter what the outcome of the struggle is, or how threatened Europe appears, the New Right insists that it is still worth dying for Europe as an honorable warrior.”

Of course, no one will lay down his life for a currency union. The New Right fears that a denatured Europe could eventually be overthrown by vigorous non-whites who still have cultural and racial memories they are willing to die for. Sadly, the non-white nations will also have suffered heavy losses because of the contamination of their own cultures by the missionaries of liberalism.

The Battlefield of Ideas

The New Right has chosen to fight on the battlefield of ideas because it believes that the course of Europe is ultimately governed by the prevailing intellectual climate.

As Dr. Sunic explains, “The real force that sustains liberalism and socialism is the cultural consensus which reigns more or less undisturbed in the higher echelons of education and legal systems.” The left has always understood the importance of capturing the culture. Thus every movie, school book, art show, television program, and court decision promotes the doctrine of universal equality.

Marx believed that the economic structure determines the culture but the New Right argues that it is the other way around: Liberty can be achieved only by creating a counter-culture that is vigorous enough to break liberalism’s monopoly on the mind. This is a process that has hardly begun in the United States, where the more education a man has the more unthinkingly he has absorbed liberal dogmas.

Dr. Sunic has given us an important book. This review can only begin to summarize the richness of thought that he has found in scores of books and journals that are not even available in English. Dr. Sunic has opened the door to a great but little-known body of learning that directly addresses our current crises.

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Jackson, Thomas. “The Struggle to Save the West.” American Renaissance, Vol. 3, No. 12 (December, 1992). <http://www.amren.com/ar/1992/12/index.html >.

Note: A third edition of Sunic’s Against Democracy and Equality was published in 2011 by Arktos (London). The book was also published in a Croatian translation as Europska Nova Desnica (Zagreb, Croatia: Hasanbegović, 2009) and in a Spanish translation as Contra la Democracia y la Igualdad: La Nueva Derecha Europea (Tarragona: Ediciones Fides, 2014).

 

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Review of Faye’s ‘Archeofuturism’ – Whale

Archeofuturism: Guillaume Faye’s Vision for Europe

By George Whale

 

Archeofuturism: European Visions of the Post-Catastrophic Age, Guillaume Faye. Published by Arktos Media Ltd., 2010 (translation by Sergio Knipe, editing and footnotes by John B. Morgan), 250 pages.

“The egalitarian civilisation sprung from modernity is now witnessing its last good days. We must now think about the aftermath of the catastrophe: we must already start developing the vision of an Archeofuturist world for the aftermath of the chaos.”

Guillaume’s Faye’s book Archeofuturism offers radical analyses and solutions to the problems of modernity, and seems as pertinent today as when it was first published in French more than a decade ago.

Guillaume Faye is one of the most radical and influential theorists of the French Nouvelle Droite (New Right). He represents a strand of European nationalism that is fiercely critical of modern egalitarianism, favouring instead older, hierarchical forms of society and government with which to respond to the catastrophes which (Faye believes) are about to befall Western Europe.

The “convergence of catastrophes”

The book is built around three connected ideas: first, that Western civilization is presently threatened by a cataclysm from a set of catastrophes that will converge some time in the early Twenty-First Century; second, that the individualism and egalitarianism of the modern world are inadequate to meet the challenges facing us; and third, that we should start to think about the aftermath of the impending cataclysm in terms of a new synthesis of ancestral values, science and technology – Archeofuturism.

The “converging lines of catastrophe”, according to Faye, “concern the environment, demography, economy, religion, epidemics and geopolitics”. With regard to the environment, he believes that the extension of Western-style industrial progress and development to untold billions of people in the Third World would be devastating, even if it were possible, and he puts forward an alternative order where most of humanity lives in traditional, pastoral societies with low levels of energy use, pollution and consumption, arguing that such communities are not only sustainable, but socially more stable and happy than the urban hells in which much of humanity is presently compelled to exist.

Faye is worried about the changing demographics of Europe. The ageing of the indigenous population coupled with uncontrolled immigration from Africa, Asia and elsewhere places severe strains on the economy and disrupts cultural and social continuity. Growing tribalism and conflict are exacerbated by an increasingly fanatical Islamism:

“Despite reassuring denials on the part of the Western media, radical Islam is spreading like wildfire … The consequences of this phenomenon will be … violent clashes in Europe – particularly France and Great Britain.”

Islam, fuelled by “veiled, repressed and dissimulated resentment of the countries of the South towards their former colonisers” will, Faye believes, lead an intensifying confrontation between North and South, displacing the East-West axis of geopolitical competition that dominated so much of the Twentieth Century.

Archeofuturism: a philosophy for the post-catastrophic age

“Archeofuturism … enables us to make a break with the obsolete philosophy of progress and the egalitarian, humanitarian and individualist dogmas of modernity, which are unsuited to our need to think about the future and survive the century of iron and fire that is looming near.”

Guillaume Faye seeks to reapply the values of social organisation that have proven effective for most of human history to the new, “post-catastrophic” world. These values include: the transmission of ethnic, folk and spiritual traditions; separation of gender roles; the establishment of organic, hierarchically organised communities “from the family to the folk”; matching of duties to rights; the prestige of the warrior caste; and the definition of peoples as “communities of destiny” rather than as masses of unconnected individuals.

“To face the future, it will be more and more necessary to adopt an archaic mind-set … one capable of restoring the ancestral values that inform ‘orderly societies’.”

Archeofuturism is envisaged as a synthesis of revitalised ancestral values and a futuristic spirit of scientific and technological exploration in the service of European peoples:

“The essence of futurism is the planning of the future … the envisaging of civilisation … as a work in motion … . Politics here are understood … as the future transformation of the folk, driven by ambition, a spirit of independence, creativity and the will to power.”

Birth of the Eurosiberian Federation

In the last chapter of the book, entitled “A Day in the Life of Dimitri Leonidovitch Oblomov”, Faye offers us a fictional glimpse of life in the year 2073, as seen through the eyes of a high-ranking official of the Eurosiberian Federation. It includes the following timeline of events leading up to the “Great Catastrophe” of 2014-16, the ensuing chaos and eventual transformation of continental Europe.

1999-2014

Successive economic crises cause increasing poverty across Europe. Unchecked immigration leads to ethnic tensions, crime and a climate of insecurity in the cities.

2014

In the French national elections, the Front National (FN) receives 30% of votes, whilst the Popular Muslim Party (PPM) receives 26%. In response to Muslim predictions that France will be an Islamic state within ten years, FN issues a call for “Resistance, Reconquest and Liberation”. The PPM leader in the National Assembly is murdered: FN is blamed, but many suspect the Algerian Secret Service – its motive to spark a revolt of Muslims in France.

2014-16

“The Great Catastrophe.” Uprisings by armed ethnic gangs lead to unprecedented violence in French cities. Unrest spreads to Belgium, Holland, Britain and Germany. Widespread strikes lead to paralysis of the economy and shortages of food and water. Cities are ransacked, the police overwhelmed. Civil war breaks out and people flee the cities. War, epidemics and famine kill 40% of people in Western Europe. In parallel developments, nuclear war between India and Pakistan kills two million, and a vast swathe of the Amazon rainforest catches fire, causing ecological and climatic upheavals. The global economy collapses.

2017-18

Islamic republics of North Africa exploit the chaos in France by sending an invading army to occupy Provence. European armies are mobilized but are paralysed by lack of electricity and fuel. Pockets of resistance, or “baronies”, are established containing exclusively indigenous Europeans.

2018-25

Continuing famines and environmental disasters. Chaos spreads beyond Europe. India, China, Japan and Russia retain some semblance of order, whilst multi-ethnic nations implode. America is wracked by famines, epidemics and ethnic conflicts. The Muslim army in France conquers Lorraine and burns down Metz cathedral.

2025-28

“Reconquista.” The baronies seek help from the Russian Federation. A Russian army of one million is amassed, and crosses central Europe to the “Western Europe Occupation Zone”. Aided by forces from Scandinavia, the Baltic, Ukraine, Poland and Brittany, the Russians drive out the Islamic invaders. The decisive battle takes place in the ruins of Disneyland Paris. Remnants of the Muslim army and ethnic gangs are forcibly shipped to North Africa. Tens of millions of people of non-European origin are deported to Madascar.

2030-38

“The Second Renaissance.” Europe spontaneously regroups into autonomous ethno-cultural region-states including Bavaria, Wallonia, Wales, Scotland, Brittany, Normandy, Provence, Euzkadi and Galicia. Technological activity resumes and the economic system is partially restored. Russia merges with the Community of European States to form the Eurosiberian Federation, which comes to be known as the “Great Homeland”.

2040-2073

A two-tier economy evolves: a “techno-scientific” economy for a small-city-based technological elite (approximately 20% of the population), focused on transport, computer science, genetics, energy and space exploration; and for the remainder of the population a low energy, low pollution Medieval-style economy based on neo-traditional agriculture and crafts.

Archeofuturism or neo-feudalism?

Dimitri Oblomov’s job in 2073 is to travel around the Federation resolving disagreements and conflicts between the regions. Unbound by cumbersome consultation processes, he is able to make quick, responsive decisions. As one of the urban elite, he has access to a transport system that is fast, efficient and non-polluting: jet aircraft and private cars have been replaced by high-speed airships, a modernised canal system and electromagnetic “planetrains” that whizz through airless tunnels at up to 20,000kph.

Meanwhile, above ground the neo-traditionalist communities use equally non-polluting forms of transport such as horse-drawn carts; and because the great majority of Eurosiberians live sustainable (if basic) pastoral lives within such communities, nature is everywhere recovering and flourishing. Moreover, the relative ethnic homogeneity of the regional communities has fostered a revival of traditional languages and dialects, of folk traditions and pagan cults that coexist with Christianity.

Relationships between the two strata of this imagined society, living parallel lives technologically centuries apart, are not described in detail. It is unclear, for instance, how membership of the two classes is decided, or whether movement between them is possible, though Faye seems to suggest (somewhat implausibly) that the sense of meaning and worth that comes from being part of a close-knit traditional community would mitigate any yearning for the cosseted, fast-paced lifestyle of the technological elite.

Eurosiberia is described as “an organic assembly of large and highly autonomous regions”, each of which controls its own linguistic, cultural and educational matters. All regions send representatives to the Federal Senate, which elects the Government. The Government’s authority is absolute, but regions are free to organise themselves in pretty much any way they choose – as hereditary monarchies, socialist republics, etc. – provided they don’t oppress their people, in which case they would risk expulsion from the Federation.

On the scientific front, advances in genetics and computer science have made possible “biotronic animals” – biological animal-robots – and “human chimeras” – pigmen, chimpanhumans and other man-animal hybrids, which are used mainly as organ banks. Medical advances have made possible an average lifespan of 105 years, though only for the elite – the pattern for rural, neo-archaic communities is high birthrate, high death rate. In Eurosiberia there seem to be few, if any, ethical constraints on science, and class-based differences in life quality are inbuilt.

Conclusion

Guillaume Faye’s analysis of the unsustainability of Western civilisation at the end of the Twentieth Century may convince many readers of the converging lines of impending disaster, and (even if his time scale is wrong) of the need to think about and prepare for life after the Great Catastrophe. His fictional portrait of post-catastrophic Europe may be taken as a warning or call to action, which I believe all Europeans should heed.

His portrayal of a Eurosiberian Federation of autonomous regions, extending “from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, across fourteen time zones” and constituting “the largest geopolitical unit on Earth” may not appeal to those of us already concerned with corruption and abuses of power in the EU, but perhaps it represents a bold and timely response to the growth of political, economic and religious power blocks in the far- and mid-East. As Faye says, “the future requires us to envisage the Earth as structured in vast, quasi-imperial units in mutual conflict or cooperation”.

This is a thought provoking book by one of the leading thinkers of the European nationalist movement, and it seems as relevant now as when it was written more than ten years ago. It throws into sharp relief the nature and urgency of the crises facing Europeans and offers us a way forward through Archeofuturism, an audacious synthesis of ancestral values and future science and technology, making, as Faye claims, “a radical break with contemporary values and morals”.

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Whale, George. “Archeofuturism: Guillaume Faye’s Vision for Europe”. Liberty GB, 4 September 2013. <http://libertygb.org.uk/v1/index.php/home/root/news-libertygb/6026-archeofuturism-guillaume-faye-s-vision-for-europe>.

Note: Guillaume Faye’s Archeofuturism was originally published in French as L’Archéofuturisme: Techno-science et retour aux valeurs ancestrales (Paris: Editions de L’Aencre, 2011). It was also published in an Italian translation as Archeofuturismo (Milano: Società Editrice Barbarossa, 1999), in a Russian translation as Археофутуризм (Тамбов: Ex Nord Lux, 2011), and in a Spanish translation as El arqueofuturismo (Barcelona: Titania, 2008). Some parts of the book under review have also been published in the Spanish-language collection: Escritos por Europa (Barcelona: Titania, 2008).

 

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Review of O’Meara’s ‘New Culture, New Right’ – Stevens

Review of Michael O’Meara’s New Culture, New Right

By Brett Stevens

New Culture, New Right: Anti-Liberalism in Postmodern Europe
by Michael O’Meara
224 pages, 1st Books.

With New Culture, New Right, Michael O’Meara undertakes an exhaustive survey of the post-war conservative renewal. Every concept that will become a talking point is mentioned here, and analyzed without excessive self-interested criticism. The book is dense, detailed and technically accurate, which means it is not for everyone, but for any person seriously considering the New Right as an option, this is essential reading.

This fiery little volume, weighing in at just over 200 pages, has quickly become one my favorite go-to books about the New Right. It is academic (mostly) in style, but more importantly, it is a walk through history by way of its thinkers, point-by-point showing us the evolution of the ideas that are incorporated into the New Right. This is not propaganda or leisure reading; it’s a history of politics through philosophy.

Through a complete study of the different facets of the New Right and related movements, including the difference between its US, UK and European variants, O’Meara triangulates on a central point that is too often forgotten: this movement is a revolt against what liberalism has wreaked from 1789 to the present day, and its key struggle is finding an anti-liberal viewpoint that is also popularly selectable, and its greatest self-contradiction is its tendency to adopt liberal ideas.

Academics will recognize in this book the kind of political study through historical events that qualifies a great secondary source, meaning that after you’re done perusing the Churchill speeches and Stalin bodycounts, you turn to a book like this to figure out what it all meant.

If you want “The War Nerd” or Paul Krugman for educated adults, this is the source to which you will most likely turn; it is reminiscent of the detailed historical analyses of R. Palmer or Alexis de Toqueville, in that it traces history as a progression of ideas evolving in response to their environment.

Unlike the works of Guillaume Faye or Tomislav Sunic, this book does not take a particular position, but instead reports on the birth of the New Right and its ideas, including credible options and contrarian opinions. Through this method, an aggregate forms in the mind of the reader which shows not only the details of the New Right, but where it fits as a transition between periods of history.

O’Meara is superb in his concise insights into the underlying meanings of the terms we find bandied about, a process he creates by anchoring these terms to their structural significance in the construction of nations from political methods. Often in the course of a few sentences, he clarifies what has been vague for decades, and in doing so, smooths out a concrete foundation on which other ideas can build.

He writes in the chapter “Metapolitics”:

Like other politicians of the “corrupt, cosmopolitan oligarchy” (Le Pen), Gisgard d’Estaing assumed that economics was primary, where culture was a mere accounterment — sign, perhaps, of finesse — but nothing more consequential.

Benoist, by contrast, reversed the relationship. It is not the political economy that determines a society’s ideology (that is, the meaning-bearing way a people culturally understands itself), but ideology that dictates its politics. As postmodernists would emphasize, culture is not power per se, but its sheathe. How things are perceived, symbolized, and evolutioned influence how society’s agenda is set and how power is wield. If the anti-liberal forces were ever to regain control of the state, they would, Benoist concluded, first have to change the culture. (43)

This concept shows up in other books on the New Right, but never quite gets explained as being as pivotal as it is. O’Meara coaxes it from the limelight into its rightful place and shows how essential this difference between the New Right and other political factions is, and then launches into a short chapter that skillfully analyzes the symbols in use by the anti-liberal movement and explains their relevance to the overall theory of that movement.

One unique factor of this book is that it integrates the writings of European philosophers and political philosophers beyond Nietzsche, Evola and a handful of right-wing thinkers; it is a broad-spectrum survey that attempts to incorporate the learning of the path and show the New Right as one of its culminating options, the other being a Fukuyama-styled globalist, multicultural, consumerist liberal democracy.

Approaching the topic from the philosophical perspective enables this book to go deeper into the topic than politics will allow, finding the relevance of symbols apart from their use as slogans or responses to the immediate political situation, and instead showing us the evolution of ideas over time as producing the current conflict out of the necessity of moving past an obstructed past.

By doing so, O’Meara takes us past a reactionary longing for nationalism and instead shows us a conflict between civilization types: (a) the civilization led by its economy and (b) the civilization grounded in the organic, biocultural and tradition. Here he explores the issue of nationalism in its most lucid form to date:

As argued in all the above chapters, the single most consequential force assailing these significations, and hence compromising the integrity of European being, is liberalism, which conceives of man in the way modern science conceives of inert matter. On the basis of its simplistic reductions, the European is rendered into a quantitative abstraction, undifferentiated from the rest of humanity.

So reduced, he is subject to laws that isolate and decontextualize him, limit his motivation to material self-interest, relate him to other individuals through faceless contractual arrangements, and, most damagingly, lock him into a mono-directional temporality at at odds with his world-open nature. Then, as the instrumentalist dictates of this condition override deeply rooted meanings, life is made barren and new anxieties arise to haunt it.

With postmodernity, this process attains nihilistic proportion, as historically formed peoples are transformed into consumerist tribes and identity is reduced to an array of vacuous lifestyle choices that threatens to extinguish the last vestiges of their ancient heritage. By severing Europeans from all that makes them a distinct people, liberalism has created the worst possible world for them.

As Jose Ortega y Gasset describes it: “Europeans do not know how to live unless they are engaged in some great enterprise. When this is lacking, they grow petty and feeble and their souls disintegrate.” (208-9)

The author intelligently summarizes not just what points are relevant to the New Right, but why not in the context of political dogma, but in the question of the philosophy of the individuals that make up a society and thus make that a pleasant or miserable place to be.

Not all is perfection. For a start, this book needs an editor to go through and find the spelling mistakes and typos that mar several chapters. Further, sometimes O’Meara speaks too much in the language of his specific audience at the expense of the wider academic field; among the right, “negro basketball player” and “‘anti-racist’ organizations (most dominated by Zionists)” may be considered sensible, but for him to use those terms in such a vividly factual book seems to me wrong not on a moral level, but an informational one; he simply hasn’t explained, nor revealed the history for this verbiage or why it is relevant. Ideally, O’Meara will expand on this volume with an explanation of where Zionists, who are like right-wing anti-liberal Jewish nationalists, and descriptive terms for the African races fit into this picture. Clearly he can do it and would reveal a good deal about how we should visualize our relationship to those groups.

O’Meara sensibly summarizes the views of the New Right, then tacks on a final chapter where he covers honest critics — not those who hope to refute, but those who hope through pointed questioning to force evolution — of the New Right, and injects some of his own thinking through questions as well. This allows the reader to make up his or her own mind, and because the buildup of ideas has been so diligent, requires relatively few words to make itself clear.

If Guillaume Faye’s Archeofuturism is the call to arms for the New Right, and writings by Sunic, Benoist, Evola and Guenon its cornerstones, New Culture, New Right is its textbook — clear writing for those who wish to understand this movement on a structural level as it emerges from history. For many of us, it has become a favorite reference because it traces these ideas to their roots and in doing so, makes them come alive.

 

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Stevens, Brett. “New Culture, New Right, by Michael O’Meara.” Amerika.org, 15 June 2011. <http://www.amerika.org/books/new-culture-new-right-by-michael-omeara/ >.

Note: A second edition of O’Meara’s New Culture, New Right has been recently published in 2013 by Arktos (London). See: <http://www.arktos.com/our-authors/michael-o-meara/michael-o-meara-new-culture-new-right-second-edition.html >.

 

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