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Foundations of Eurasianism – Dugin

Foundations of Eurasianism

By Alexander Dugin


Introductory Note: This page presents the combined republication of two separate articles by Alexander Dugin, titled “Milestones of Eurasianism” and “The Eurasian Idea.” They have been published together because we believe that these two together give a more complete view of Eurasianist theories and their philosophical roots. However, our audience should be aware that these two texts by themselves are not entirely satisfactory for understanding Eurasianism, and may lead to misunderstandings if read without reference to other key texts. We urge our audience to read the other articles by or about Alexander Dugin and also articles about the subject Eurasianism on this site for a more complete view of Eurasianist theory.  – Daniel Macek (Editor of the “New European Conservative”)


Milestones of Eurasism


Eurasism is an ideological and social-political current born within the environment of the first wave of Russian emigration, united by the concept of Russian culture as a non-European phenomenon, presenting–among the varied world cultures–an original combination of western and eastern features; as a consequence, the Russian culture belongs to both East and West, and at the same time cannot be reduced either to the former or to the latter.

The founders of Eurasism:

  • S. Trubetskoy(1890–1938)–philologist and linguist.
  • N. Savitsky (1895–1965)–geographer, economist.
  • V. Florovsky(1893–1979)–historian of culture, theologian and patriot.
  • V. Vernadsky(1877–1973)–historian and geopolitician.
  • N. Alekseev– jurist and politologist.
  • N. Ilin– historian of culture, literary scholar and theologian.

Eurasism’s main value consisted in ideas born out of the depth of the tradition of Russian history and statehood. Eurasism looked at the Russian culture not as to a simple component of the European civilization, as to an original civilization, summarizing the experience not only of the West as also–to the same extent–of the East. The Russian people, in this perspective, must not be placed neither among the European nor among the Asian peoples; it belongs to a fully original Eurasian ethnic community. Such originality of the Russian culture and statehood (showing at the same time European and Asian features) also defines the peculiar historical path of Russia, her national-state program, not coinciding with the Western-European tradition. 


Civilization concept

The Roman-German civilization has worked out its own system of principles and values, and promoted it to the rank of universal system. This Roman-German system has been imposed on the other peoples and cultures by force and ruse. The Western spiritual and material colonization of the rest of mankind is a negative phenomenon. Each people and culture has its own intrinsic right to evolve according to its own logic. Russia is an original civilization. She is called not only to counter the West, fully safeguarding its own road, but also to stand at the vanguard of the other peoples and countries on Earth defending their own freedom as civilizations. 

Criticism of the Roman-German civilization

The Western civilization built its own system on the basis of the secularisation of Western Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism), bringing to the fore such values like individualism, egoism, competition, technical progress, consumption, economic exploitation. The Roman-German civilization founds its right to globality not upon spiritual greatness, as upon rough material force. Even the spirituality and strength of the other peoples are evaluated only on the basis of its own image of the supremacy of rationalism and technical progress.

The space factor

There are no universal patterns of development. The plurality of landscapes on Earth produces a plurality of cultures, each one having its own cycles, internal criteria and logics. Geographical space has a huge (sometimes decisive) influence on peoples’ culture and national history. Every people, as long as it develops within some given geographical environment, elaborates its own national, ethical, juridical, linguistic, ritual, economic and political forms. The “place” where any people or state “development” happens predetermines to a great extent the path and sense of this “development”–up to the point when the two elements became one. It is impossible to separate history from spatial conditions, and the analysis of civilizations must proceed not only along the temporal axis (“before,” “after,” “development” or “non-development,” and so on) as also along the spatial axis (“east,” “west,” “steppe,” “mountains,” and so on). No single state or region has the right to pretend to be the standard for all the rest. Every people has its own pattern of development, its own “times,” its own “rationality,” and deserves to be understood and evaluated according to its own internal criteria.

The climate of Europe, the small extension of its spaces, the influence of its landscapes generated the peculiarity of the European civilization, where the influences of the wood (northern Europe) and of the coast (Mediterraneum) prevail. Different landscapes generated different kinds of civilizations: the boundless steppes generated the nomad empires (from the Scythians to the Turks), the loess lands the Chinese one, the mountain islands the Japanese one, the union of steppe and woods the Russian-Eurasian one. The mark of landscape lives in the whole history of each one of these civilizations, and cannot be either separated form them or suppressed.

State and nation

The first Russian slavophiles in the 19th century (Khomyakov, Aksakov, Kirevsky) insisted upon the uniqueness and originality of the Russian (Slav, Orthodox) civilization. This must be defended, preserved and strengthened against the West, on the one hand, and against liberal modernism (which also proceeds from the West), on the other. The slavophiles proclaimed the value of tradition, the greatness of the ancient times, the love for the Russian past, and warned against the inevitable dangers of progress and about the extraneousness of Russia to many aspects of the Western pattern.

From this school the eurasists inherited the positions of the latest slavophiles and further developed their theses in the sense of a positive evaluation of the Eastern influences.

The Muscovite Empire represents the highest development of the Russian statehood. The national idea achieves a new status; after Moscow’s refusal to recognize the Florentine Unia (arrest and proscription of the metropolitan Isidore) and the rapid decay, the Tsargrad Rus’ inherits the flag of the Orthodox empire. 

Political platform

Wealth and prosperity, a strong state and an efficient economy, a powerful army and the development of production must be the instruments for the achievement of high ideals. The sense of the state and of the nation can be conferred only through the existence of a “leading idea.” That political regime, which supposes the establishment of a “leading idea” as a supreme value, was called by the Eurasists as “ideocracy”–from the Greek “idea” and “kratos,” power. Russia is always thought of as the Sacred Rus’, as a power [derzhava] fulfilling its own peculiar historical mission. The Eurasist world-view must also be the national idea of the forthcoming Russia, its “leading idea.”

The Eurasist choice

Russia-Eurasia, being the expression of a steppe and woods empire of continental dimensions, requires her own pattern of leadership. This means, first of all, the ethics of collective responsibility, disinterest, reciprocal help, ascetism, will and tenaciousness. Only such qualities can allow keeping under control the wide and scarcely populated lands of the steppe-woodland Eurasian zone. The ruling class of Eurasia was formed on the basis of collectivism, asceticism, warlike virtue and rigid hierarchy.

Western democracy was formed in the particular conditions of ancient Athens and through the centuries-old history of insular England. Such democracy mirrors the peculiar features of the “local European development.” Such democracy does not represent a universal standard. Imitating the rules of the European “liberal-democracy” is senseless, impossible and dangerous for Russia-Eurasia. The participation of the Russian people to the political rule must be defined by a different term: “demotia,” from the Greek “demos,” people. Such participation does not reject hierarchy and must not be formalized into party-parliamentary structures. “Demotia” supposes a system of land council, district governments or national governments (in the case of peoples of small dimensions). It is developed on the basis of social self-government, of the “peasant” world. An example of “demotia” is the elective nature of church hierarchies on behalf of the parishioners in the Muscovite Rus’. 

The work of L. N. Gumilev as a development of the Eurasist thinking

Lev Nikolaevic Gumilev (1912–1992), son of the Russian poet N. Gumilev and of the poetess A. Akhmatova, was an ethnographer, historian and philosopher. He was profoundly influenced by the book of the Kalmuck Eurasist E. Khara-Vadan “Gengis-Khan as an army leader” and by the works of Savitsky. In its own works Gumilev developed the fundamental Eurasist theses. Towards the end of his life he used to call himself “the last of the Eurasists.” 

Basic elements of Gumilev’s theory

  • The theory of passionarity [passionarnost’] as a development of the Eurasist idealism;
  • The essence of which, in his own view, lays in the fact that every ethnos, as a natural formation, is subject to the influence of some “energetic drives,” born out of the cosmos and causing the “passionarity effect,” that is an extreme activity and intensity of life. In such conditions the ethnos undergoes a “genetic mutation,” which leads to the birth of the “passionaries”–individuals of a special temper and talent. And those become the creators of new ethnoi, cultures, and states;
  • Drawing the scientific attention upon the proto-history of the “nomad empires” of the East and the discovery of the colossal ethnic and cultural heritage of the autochthone ancient Asian peoples, which was wholly passed to the great culture of the ancient epoch, but afterwards fell into oblivion (Huns, Turks, Mongols, and so on);
  • The development of a turkophile attitude in the theory of “ethnic complementarity.”

An ethnos is in general any set of individuals, any “collective”: people, population, nation, tribe, family clan, based on a common historical destiny. “Our Great-Russian ancestors–wrote Gumilev–in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries easily and rather quickly mixed with the Volga, Don and Obi Tatars and with the Buriates, who assimilated the Russian culture. The same Great-Russian easily mixed with the Yakuts, absorbing their identity and gradually coming into friendly contact with Kazakhs and Kalmucks. Through marriage links they pacifically coexisted with the Mongols in Central Asia, as the Mongols themselves and the Turks between the 14th and 16th centuries were fused with the Russians in Central Russia.” Therefore the history of the Muscovite Rus’ cannot be understood without the framework of the ethnic contacts between Russians and Tatars and the history of the Eurasian continent.

The advent of Neo-Eurasism: historical and social context

The crisis of the Soviet paradigm

In the mid-1980s the Soviet society began to lose its connection and ability to adequately reflect upon the external environment and itself. The Soviet models of self-understanding were showing their cracks. The society had lost its sense of orientation. Everybody felt the need for change, yet this was but a confused feeling, as no-one could tell the way the change would come from. In that time a rather unconvincing divide began to form: “forces of progress” and “forces of reaction,” “reformers” and “conservators of the past,” “partisans of reforms” and “enemies of reforms.” 

Infatuation for the western models

In that situation the term “reform” became in itself a synonym of “liberal-democracy.” A hasty conclusion was inferred, from the objective fact of the crisis of the Soviet system, about the superiority of the western model and the necessity to copy it. At the theoretical level this was all but self-evident, since the “ideological map” offers a sharply more diversified system of choices than the primitive dualism: socialism vs. capitalism, Warsaw Pact vs. NATO. Yet it was just that primitive logic that prevailed: the “partisans of reform” became the unconditional apologists of the West, whose structure and logic they were ready to assimilate, while the “enemies of reform” proved to be the inertial preservers of the late Soviet system, whose structure and logic they grasped less and less. In such condition of lack of balance, the reformers/pro-westerners had on their side a potential of energy, novelty, expectations of change, creative drive, perspectives, while the “reactionaries” had nothing left but inertness, immobilism, the appeal to the customary and already-known. In just this psychological and aesthetic garb, liberal-democratic policy prevailed in the Russia of the 1990s, although nobody had been allowed to make a clear and conscious choice.

The collapse of the state unity

The result of “reforms” was the collapse of the Soviet state unity and the beginning of the fall of Russia as the heir of the USSR. The destruction of the Soviet system and “rationality” was not accompanied by the creation of a new system and a new rationality in conformity to national and historical conditions. There gradually prevailed a peculiar attitude toward Russia and her national history: the past, present and future of Russia began to be seen from the point of view of the West, to be evaluated as something stranger, transcending, alien (“this country” was the “reformers’” typical expression). That was not the Russian view of the West, as the Western view of Russia. No wonder that in such condition the adoption of the western schemes even in the “reformers’” theory was invoked not in order to create and strengthen the structure of the national state unity, but in order to destroy its remains. The destruction of the state was not a casual outcome of the “reforms”; as a matter of fact, it was among their strategic aims.

The birth of an anti-western (anti-liberal) opposition in the post-Soviet environment

In the course of the “reforms” and their “deepening,” the inadequacy of the simple reaction began to be clear to everyone. In that period (1989–90) began the formation of a “national-patriotic opposition,” in which there was the confluence of part of the “Soviet conservatives” (ready to a minimal level of reflection), groups of “reformers” disappointed with “reforms” or “having become conscious of their anti-state direction,” and groups of representatives of the patriotic movements, which had already formed during the perestroika and tried to shape the sentiment of “state power” [derzhava] in a non-communist (orthodox-monarchic, nationalist, etc.) context. With a severe delay, and despite the complete absence of external strategic, intellectual and material support, the conceptual model of post-Soviet patriotism began to vaguely take shape.


Neo-Eurasism arose in this framework as an ideological and political phenomenon, gradually turning into one of the main directions of the post-Soviet Russian patriotic self-consciousness. 

Stages of development of the Neo-Eurasist ideology

1st stage (1985–90)

  • Dugin’s seminars and lectures to various groups of the new-born conservative-patriotic movement. Criticism of the Soviet paradigm as lacking the spiritual and national qualitative element.
  • In 1989 first publications on the review Sovetskaya literatura[Soviet Literature]. Dugin’s books are issued in Italy (Continente Russia [Continent Russia], 1989) and in Spain (Rusia Misterio de Eurasia [Russia, Mystery of Eurasia], 1990).
  • In 1990 issue of René Guénon’s Crisis of the Modern Worldwith comments by Dugin, and of Dugin’s Puti Absoljuta [The Paths of the Absolute], with the exposition of the foundations of the traditionalist philosophy.

In these years Eurasism shows “right-wing conservative” features, close to historical traditionalism, with orthodox-monarchic, “ethnic-pochevennik” [i.e., linked to the ideas of soil and land] elements, sharply critical of “Left-wing” ideologies.

2nd stage (1991–93)

  • Begins the revision of anti-communism, typical of the first stage of Neo-Eurasism. Revaluation of the Soviet period in the spirit of “national-bolshevism” and “Left-wing Eurasism.”
  • Journey to Moscow of the main representatives of the “New Right” (Alain de Benoist, Robert Steuckers, Carlo Terracciano, Marco Battarra, Claudio Mutti and others).
  • Eurasism becomes popular among the patriotic opposition and the intellectuals. On the basis of terminological affinity, A. Sakharov already speaks about Eurasia, though only in a strictly geographic–instead of political and geopolitical–sense (and without ever making use of Eurasism in itself, like he was before a convinced atlantist); a group of “democrats” tries to start a project of “democratic Eurasism” (G. Popov, S. Stankevic, L. Ponomarev).
  • Lobov, O. Soskovets, S. Baburin also speak about their own Eurasism.
  • In 1992–93 is issued the first number of Elements: Eurasist Review. Lectures on geopolitics and the foundations of Eurasism in high schools and universities. Many translations, articles, seminars.

3rd stage (1994–98): theoretical development of the Neo-Eurasist orthodoxy

  • Issue of Dugin’s main works Misterii Evrazii[Mysteries of Eurasia] (1996),Konspirologija [Conspirology] (1994), Osnovy Geopolitiki [Foundations of geopolitics] (1996), Konservativnaja revoljutsija [The conservative revolution] (1994), Tampliery proletariata [Knight Templars of the Proletariat] (1997). Works of Trubetskoy, Vernadsky, Alekseev and Savitsky are issued by “Agraf” editions (1995–98).
  • Creation of the “Arctogaia” web-site (1996) – arctogaia.com.
  • Direct and indirect references to Eurasism appear in the programs of the KPFR (Communist Party], LDPR [Liberal-Democratic Party], NDR [New Democratic Russia] (that is left, right, and centre). Growing number of publications on Eurasist themes. Issue of many Eurasist digests.
  • Criticism of Eurasism from Russian nationalists, religious fundamentalists and orthodox communists, and also from the liberals.
  • Manifestations of an academic “weak” version of Eurasism (Prof. A. S. Panarin, V. Ya. Paschenko, F.Girenok and others) – with elements of the illuminist paradigm, denied by the Eurasist orthodoxy – then evolving towards more radically anti-western, anti-liberal and anti-gobalist positions.
  • Inauguration of a university dedicated to L. Gumilev in Astan [Kazakhstan].

4th stage (1998–2001)

  • Gradual de-identification of Neo-Eurasism vis-à-visthe collateral political-cultural and party manifestations; turning to the autonomous direction (“Arctogaia,” “New University,” “Irruption” [Vtorzhenie]) outside the opposition and the extreme Left and Right-wing movements.
  • Apology of staroobrjadchestvo[Old Rite].
  • Shift to centrist political positions, supporting Primakov as the new premier. Dugin becomes the adviser to the Duma speaker G. N. Seleznev.
  • Issue of the Eurasist booklet Nash put’[Our Path] (1998).
  • Issue of Evraziikoe Vtorzhenie[Eurasist Irruption] as a supplement to Zavtra. Growing distance from the opposition and shift closer to the government’s positions.
  • Theoretical researches, elaborations, issue of “The Russian Thing” [Russkaja vesch’] (2001), publications in Nezavisimaja GazetaMoskovskij Novosti, radio broadcasts about “Finis Mundi” on Radio 101, radio broadcasts on geopolitical subjects and Neo-Eurasism on Radio “Svobodnaja Rossija” (1998–2000).

5th stage (2001–2002)

  • Foundation of the Pan-Russian Political Social Movement EURASIA on “radical centre” positions; declaration of full support to the President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin (April 21, 2001).
  • The leader of the Centre of Spiritual Management of the Russian Muslims, sheik-ul-islam Talgat Tadjuddin, adheres to EURASIA.
  • Issue of the periodical Evraziizkoe obozrenie[Eurasist Review].
  • Appearance of Jewish Neo-Eurasism (A. Eskin, A. Shmulevic, V. Bukarsky).
  • Creation of the web-site of the Movement EURASIA: eurasia.com.ru
  • Conference on “Islamic Threat or Threat to Islam?.” Intervention by H. A. Noukhaev, Chechen theorist of “Islamic eurasism” (“Vedeno or Washington?,” Moscow, 2001].
  • Issue of books by E. Khara-Davan and Ya. Bromberg (2002).
  • Process of transformation of the Movement EURASIA into a party (2002).

Basic philosophical positions of Neo-Eurasism

At the theoretical level Neo-Eurasism consists of the revival of the classic principles of the movement in a qualitatively new historical phase, and of the transformation of such principles into the foundations of an ideological and political program and a world-view. The heritage of the classic eurasists was accepted as the fundamental world-view for the ideal (political) struggle in the post-Soviet period, as the spiritual-political platform of “total patriotism.”

The Neo-Eurasists took over the basic positions of classical Eurasism, chose them as a platform, as starting points, as the main theoretical bases and foundations for the future development and practical use. In the theoretical field, Neo-Eurasists consciously developed the main principles of classical Eurasism taking into account the wide philosophical, cultural and political framework of the ideas of the 20th century.

Each one of the main positions of the classical Eurasists (see the chapter on the “Foundations of classical Eurasism”) revived its own conceptual development.

Civilization concept

Criticism of the western bourgeois society from “Left-wing” (social) positions was superimposed to the criticism of the same society from “Right-wing” (civilizational) positions. The Eurasist idea about “rejecting the West” is reinforced by the rich weaponry of the “criticism of the West” by the same representatives of the West who disagree with the logic of its development (at least in the last centuries). The Eurasist came only gradually, since the end of the 1980s to the mid-1990s, to this idea of the fusion of the most different (and often politically contradictory) concepts denying the “normative” character of the Western civilization.

The “criticism of the Roman-German civilization” was thoroughly stressed, being based on the prioritary analysis of the Anglo-Saxon world, of the US. According to the spirit of the German Conservative Revolution and of the European “New Right,” the “Western world” was differentiated into an Atlantic component (the US and England) and into a continental European component (properly speaking, a Roman-German component). Continental Europe is seen here as a neutral phenomenon, liable to be integrated–on some given conditions–in the Eurasist project.

The spatial factor

Neo-Eurasism is moved by the idea of the complete revision of the history of philosophy according to spatial positions. Here we find its trait-d’union in the most varied models of the cyclical vision of history, from Danilevsky to Spengler, from Toynbee to Gumilev.

Such a principle finds its most pregnant expression in traditionalist philosophy, which denies the ideas of evolution and progress and founds this denial upon detailed metaphysical calculations. Hence the traditional theory of “cosmic cycles,” of the “multiple states of Being,” of “sacred geography,” and so on. The basic principles of the theory of cycles are illustrated in detail by the works of Guénon (and his followers G. Georgel, T. Burckhardt, M. Eliade, H. Corbin). A full rehabilitation has been given to the concept of “traditional society,” either knowing no history at all, or realizing it according to the rites and myths of the “eternal return.” The history of Russia is seen not simply as one of the many local developments, but as the vanguard of the spatial system (East) opposed to the “temporal” one (West). 

State and nation

Dialectics of national history

It is led up to its final, “dogmatical” formulation, including the historiosophic paradigm of “national-bolshevism” (N. Ustryalov) and its interpretation (M. Agursky). The pattern is as follows:

  • The Kiev period as the announcement of the forthcoming national mission (IX-XIII centuries);
  • Mongolian-Tatar invasion as a scud against the levelling European trends, the geopolitical and administrative push of the Horde is handed over to the Russians, division of the Russians between western and eastern Russians, differentiation among cultural kinds, formation of the Great-Russians on the basis of the “eastern Russians” under the Horde’s control (13th–15th centuries);
  • The Muscovite Empire as the climax of the national-religious mission of Rus’ (Third Rome) (15th–end of the 17th century);
  • Roman-German yoke (Romanov), collapse of national unity, separation between a pro-western elite and the national mass (end of the 17th-beginning of the 20th century);
  • Soviet period, revenge of the national mass, period of the “Soviet messianism,” re-establishment of the basic parameters of the main muscovite line (20th century);
  • Phase of troubles, that must end with a new Eurasist push (beginning of the 21st century).

Political platform

Neo-Eurasism owns the methodology of Vilfrido Pareto’s school, moves within the logic of the rehabilitation of “organic hierarchy,” gathers some Nietzschean motives, develops the doctrine of the “ontology of power,” of the Christian Orthodox concept of power as “kat’echon.” The idea of “elite” completes the constructions of the European traditionalists, authors of researches about the system of castes in the ancient society and of their ontology and sociology (R. Guénon, J. Evola, G. Dumézil, L. Dumont). Gumilev’s theory of “passionarity” lies at the roots of the concept of “new Eurasist elite.”

The thesis of “demotia is the continuation of the political theories of the “organic democracy” from J.-J. Rousseau to C. Schmitt, J. Freund, A. de Benoist and A. Mueller van der Bruck. Definition of the Eurasist concept of “democracy” (“demotia”) as the “participation of the people to its own destiny.”

The thesis of “ideocracy” gives a foundation to the call to the ideas of “conservative revolution” and “third way,” in the light of the experience of Soviet, Israeli and Islamic ideocracies, analyses the reason of their historical failure. The critical reflection upon the qualitative content of the 20th century ideocracy brings to the consequent criticism of the Soviet period (supremacy of quantitative concepts and secular theories, disproportionate weight of the classist conception).

The following elements contribute to the development of the ideas of the classical Eurasists:

The philosophy of traditionalism (Guénon, Evola, Burckhardt, Corbin), the idea of the radical decay of the “modern world,” profound teaching of the Tradition. The global concept of “modern world” (negative category) as the antithesis of the “world of Tradition” (positive category) gives the criticism of the Western civilization a basic metaphysic character, defining the eschatological, critical, fatal content of the fundamental (intellectual, technological, political and economic) processes having their origin in the West. The intuitions of the Russian conservatives, from the slavophiles to the classical Eurasists, are completed by a fundamental theoretical base. (see A. Dugin, Absoljutnaja Rodina [The Absolute Homeland], Moscow 1999; Konets Sveta[The End of the World], Moscow 1997; Julius Evola et le conservatisme russe, Rome 1997).

The investigation on the origins of sacredness (M. Eliade, C. G. Jung, C. Levi-Strauss), the representations of the archaic consciousness as the paradigmatic complex manifestation laying at the roots of culture. The reduction of the many-sided human thinking, of culture, to ancient psychic layers, where fragments of archaic initiatic rites, myths, originary sacral complexes are concentrated. Interpretation of the content of rational culture through the system of the ancient, pre-rational beliefs (A. Dugin, “The evolution of the paradigmatic foundations of science” [Evoljutsija paradigmal’nyh osnovanij nauki], Moscow 2002).

The search for the symbolic paradigms of the space-time matrix, which lays at the roots of rites, languages and symbols (H. Wirth, paleo-epigraphic investigations). This attempt to give a foundation to the linguistic (Svityc-Illic), epigraphic (runology), mythological, folkloric, ritual and different monuments allows to rebuild an original map of the “sacred concept of the world” common to all the ancient Eurasian peoples, the existence of common roots (see A. Dugin Giperborejskaja Teorija [Hyperborean Theory], Moscow 1993.

A reassessment of the development of geopolitical ideas in the West (Mackinder, Haushofer, Lohhausen, Spykman, Brzeszinski, Thiriart and others). Since Mackinder’s epoch, geopolitical science has sharply evolved. The role of geopolitical constants in 20th century history appeared so clear as to make geopolitics an autonomous discipline. Within the geopolitical framework, the concept itself of “Eurasism” and “Eurasia” acquired a new, wider meaning.

From some time onwards, Eurasism, in a geopolitical sense, began to indicate the continental configuration of a strategic (existing or potential) bloc, created around Russia or its enlarged base, and as an antagonist (either actively or passively) to the strategic initiatives of the opposed geopolitical pole–“Atlantism,” at the head of which at the mid-20th century the US came to replace England.

The philosophy and the political idea of the Russian classics of Eurasism in this situation have been considered as the most consequent and powerful expression (fulfilment) of Eurasism in its strategic and geopolitical meaning. Thanks to the development of geopolitical investigations (A. Dugin, Osnovye geopolitiki [Foundations of geopolitics], Moscow 1997) Neo-Eurasism becomes a methodologically evolved phenomenon. Especially remarkable is the meaning of the Land – Sea pair (according to Carl Schmitt), the projection of this pair upon a plurality of phenomena – from the history of religions to economics.

The search for a global alternative to globalism, as an ultra-modern phenomenon, summarizing everything that is evaluated by Eurasism (and Neo-Eurasism) as negative. Eurasism in a wider meaning becomes the conceptual platform of anti-globalism, or of the alternative globalism. “Eurasism” gathers all contemporary trends denying globalism any objective (let alone positive) content; it offers the anti-globalist intuition a new character of doctrinal generalization.

The assimilation of the social criticism of the “New Left” into a “conservative right-wing interpretation” (reflection upon the heritage of M. Foucault, G. Deleuze, A. Artaud, G. Debord). Assimilation of the critical thinking of the opponents of the bourgeois western system from the positions of anarchism, neo-marxism and so on. This conceptual pole represents a new stage of development of the “Left-wing” (national-bolshevik) tendencies existing also among the first Eurasists (Suvchinskij, Karsavin, Efron), and also a method for the mutual understanding with the “left” wing of anti-globalism.

“Third way” economics, “autarchy of the great spaces.” Application of heterodox economic models to the post-Soviet Russian reality. Application of F. List’s theory of the “custom unions.” Actualization of the theories of S. Gesell. F. Schumpeter, F. Leroux, new Eurasist reading of Keynes.


The Eurasian Idea


Changes in the Original Meaning of Eurasianism

Different terms lose their original meaning through their daily use over the course of many years. Such fundamental notions as socialism, capitalism, democracy, fascism, have changed profoundly. In fact, they have turned banal.

The terms “Eurasianism” and “Eurasia” also have some uncertainties because they are new, they belong to a new political language and intellectual context that is only being created today. The Eurasian Idea mirrors a very active dynamic process. Its meaning has become clearer throughout history but needs to be further developed.

Eurasianism as a Philosophical Struggle

The Eurasian Idea represents a fundamental revision of the political, ideological, ethnic, and religious history of mankind, and it offers a new system of classification and categories that will overcome standard clichés. The Eurasian theory went through two stages—a formative period of classical Eurasianism at the beginning of the 20th century by Russian emigrant intellectuals (Trubeckoy, Savickiy, Alekseev, Suvchinckiy, Iljin, Bromberg, Hara-Davan, et al.) followed by the historical works of Lev Gumilev and, finally, the constitution of neo-Eurasianism (second half of the 1980s to the present).

Towards Neo-Eurasianism

Classical Eurasian theory undoubtedly belongs to the past and can be correctly classified within the framework of the ideologies of the 20th century. Classical Eurasianism might have passed, but neo-Eurasianism has given it a second birth, a new sense, scale, and meaning. When the Eurasian Idea arose from its ashes, it became less obvious, but has since revealed its hidden potential. Through neo-Eurasianism, the entire Eurasian theory has received a new dimension. Today we cannot ignore the large historical period of neo-Eurasianism and must try to comprehend it in it modern context. Furthermore, we will describe the various aspects of this notion.

Eurasianism as a Global Trend; Globalization as the Main Body of Modern History

In the broad sense the Eurasian Idea and even the Eurasian concept do not strictly correspond to the geographical boundaries of the Eurasian continent. The Eurasian Idea is a global-scale strategy that acknowledges the objectivity of globalization and the termination of nation-states (Etats-Nations), but at the same time offers a different scenario of globalization, which entails no unipolar world or united global government. Instead, it offers several global zones (poles). The Eurasian Idea is an alternative or multipolar version of globalization, but globalization is the currently major fundamental world process that is deciding the main vector of modern history.

Paradigm of Globalization—Paradigm of Atlantism

Today’s nation-state is being transformed into a global state; we are facing the constitution of planetary governmental system within a single administrative-economic system. To believe that all nations, social classes, and economic models might suddenly begin to cooperate on the basis of this new planet-wide logic is wrong. Globalization is a one-dimensional, one victor phenomenon that tries to universalize the Western (Anglo-Saxon, American) point of view of how to best manage human history. It is (very often connected with suppression and violence) the unification of different social-political, ethnic religious, and national structures into one system. It is a Western European historical trend that has reached its peak through its domination of the USA.

Globalization is the imposing of the Atlantic paradigm. Globalization as Atlantism absolutely tries to avoid this definition. Proponents of globalization argue that when there will be no alternative to Atlantism that it will stop being Atlantism. The American political philosopher Francis Fukuyama writes about the “end of History,” which actually mean the end of geopolitical history and of the conflict between Atlantism and Eurasianism. This means a new architecture of a world system with no opposition and with only one pole—the pole of Atlantism. We may also refer to this as the New World Order. The model of opposition between the two poles (East-West, North-South) transforms to the center-outskirt model (center—West, “rich North”; outskirt—South). This variant of world architecture is completely at odds with the concept of Eurasianism.

Unipolar Globalization Has an Alternative

Today the New World Order is nothing more than a project, plan or trend. It is very serious, but it is not fatal. Adherents of globalization deny any alternative plan of the future, but today we are experiencing a large-scale phenomenon—contra-globalism, and the Eurasian Idea coordinates all opponents of unipolar globalization in a constructive way. Moreover, it offers the competing idea of multipolar globalization (or alter-globalization).

Eurasianism as Pluriversum

Eurasianism rejects the center-outskirt model of the world. Instead, the Eurasian Idea suggests that the planet consists of a constellation of autonomous living spaces partially open to each other. These areas are not nation-states but a coalition of states, reorganized into continental federations or “democratic empires” with a large degree of inner self-government. Each of these areas is multipolar, including a complicated system of ethnic, cultural, religious and administrative factors.

In this global sense, Eurasianism is open to everyone, regardless of one’s place of birth, residence, nationality and citizenship. Eurasianism provides an opportunity to choose a future different from the cliché of Atlantism and one value system for all mankind. Eurasianism does not merely seek the past or to preserve the current status quo, but strives for the future, acknowledging that the world’s current structure needs radical change, that nation-states and industrial society have exhausted all their resources. The Eurasian Idea does not see the creation of a world government on the basis of the liberal-democratic values as the one and only path for mankind. In its most basic sense, Eurasianism in the 21st century is defined as the adherence to alter-globalization, synonymous with a multipolar world.

Atlantism is not Universal

Eurasianism absolutely rejects the universalism of Atlantism and Americanism. The pattern of Western-Europe and America has many attractive features that can be adopted and praised, but as whole it is merely a cultural system that has the right to exist in its own historical context along with other civilizations and cultural systems.

The Eurasian Idea protects not only anti-Atlantic value systems, but the diversity of value structures. It is a kind of “poliversum” that provides living space for everyone, including the USA and Atlantism, along with other civilizations, because Eurasianism also defends the civilizations of Africa, both American continents, and the Pacific area parallel to the Eurasian Motherland.

The Eurasian Idea Promotes a Global Revolutionary Idea

The Eurasian Idea on a global scale is a global revolutionary concept, called upon to be a new platform for mutual understanding and cooperation for a large conglomerate of different powers: states, nations, cultures, and religions that reject the Atlantic version of globalization.

If we analyze the declaration and statements of various politicians, philosophers, and intellectuals we will see that the majority of them are adherents (sometimes unaware) of the Eurasian Idea.

If we think about all of those who disagree with the “end of history” our spirits will be raised and the failure of the American concept of strategic security for the 21st century connected with constituting the unipolar world, will be much more realistic.

Eurasianism is the sum of the natural, artificial, objective, and subjective obstacles on the path of unipolar globalization; it offers a constructive, positive opposition to globalism instead of a simple negation.

These obstacles, however, remain uncoordinated in the meantime, and proponents of Atlantism are able to manage them easily. Yet, if these obstacles can somehow be integrated into a united force, they will be integrated into something united and the likelihood of victory will become much more serious.

Eurasianism as the Old World (Continent)

The New World is part of the Second Old World or a more specific and narrow sense of the word Eurasianism applicable to what we call the Old World. The Notion of the Old World (traditionally regarding Europe) can be considered in a much wider context. It is multi-civilizational super space, inhabited by nations, states, cultures, ethnicities, and religions connected to each other historically and geographically by dialectic destiny. The Old World is an organic product of human history.

The Old World is often opposed to the New World, the American continent, discovered by Europeans and transformed into a platform for an artificial civilization, where European projects of modernism were created. It was built upon human-produced ideologies as a purified civilization of modernism.

The United States was the successful creation of the “perfect society,” formed by intellectuals from England, Ireland, and France, while the countries of South and Central America remained colonies of the Old World, and Germany and Eastern Europe were less influenced by this idea of a “perfect society.”

In the terms of Oswald Spengler, dualism between Old and New world can be brought to opposites: culture-civilization, organic-artificial, historical-clinical. 

The New World as Messiah

As a historical product of Western Europe during its evolution, the New World very early on realized its “messiah” destiny, where the liberal-democratic ideals of the Enlightenment were combined with the eschatological ideas of radical protestant sects. This was called the theory of Manifest Destiny, which became the new symbol of belief for generations of Americans. According to this theory, American civilization overtook all cultures and civilizations of the Old World and in its current universal form, it is obligatory for all nations of the planet.

With time, this theory directly confronted not only the cultures of the East and Asia, but came into conflict with Europe, which seemed to the Americans to be archaic and full of prejudice and antiquated traditions.

In turn, the New World turned away from the heritage of the Old World. Directly following World War II the New World became the indisputable leader in Europe itself with the “criteria of verity” of others. This inspired a corresponding wave of American dominance and at a parallel time the beginning of a movement that seeks geopolitical liberation from the brutal, transoceanic, strategic, economic and political control of the “elder Brother.”

Integration of the Eurasian Continent

In the 20th century, Europe became aware of its common identity, and step-by-step started to move towards the integration of all its nations into a common union, able to guarantee full sovereignty, security, and freedom to itself and all members.

The creation of the European Union became the most important event that helped Europe restore its status as a world power alongside the USA. This was the response of the Old World to the excessive challenge of the New World.

If we consider the alliance of the USA and Western Europe as the Atlantic vector of European development, European integration under the aegis of the continental countries (Germany, France) may be called European Eurasianism. This becomes more and more obvious if we take into consideration the theory of Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals (de Gaulle) or even to Vladivostok. In other words the integration of the Old World includes the vast territory of the Russian Federation.

Thus, Eurasianism in this context may be defined as a project of the strategic, geopolitical, and economic integration of the north of the Eurasian continent, considered the cradle of European history and the matrix of European nations.

Parallel with Turkey, Russia (both ancestors of the Europeans) is historically connected with the Turkic, Mongolian, and Caucasus nations. Russia gives the integration of Europe a Eurasian dimension in both the symbolic and geographic senses (identification of Eurasianism with continentalism).

During the last few centuries, the idea of European integration has been proposed by the revolutionary faction of European elites. In ancient times, similar attempts were made by Alexander the Great (integration of the Eurasian continent) and Genghis Khan (founder of history’s largest empire).

Eurasia as Three Great Living-Spaces, Integrated across the Meridian; Three Eurasian Belts (Meridian Zones)

The horizontal vector of integration is followed by a vertical, vector.

Eurasian plans for the future presume the division of the planet into four vertical geographical belts (meridian zones) from North to South.

Both American continents will form one common space oriented on and controlled by the USA within the framework of the Monroe Doctrine. This is the Atlantic meridian zone.

In addition to the above zone, three others are planned. They are the following:

  • Euro-Africa, with the European Union as its center.
  • Russian-Central Asian zone.
  • Pacific zone.

Within these zones, the regional division of labor and the creation of developmental areas and corridors of growth will take place.

Each of these belts (meridian zones) counterbalance each other and all of them together counterbalance the Atlantic meridian zone. In the future, these belts might be the foundation upon which to build a multipolar world: the number of poles will be more than two; however, the number will be much less than the number of current nation-states. The Eurasian model proposes that the number of poles must be four.

The Meridian zones of the Eurasian project consist of several “Great Spaces” or “democratic empires.” Each possesses relative freedom and independence but are strategically integrated into a corresponding meridian zone.

The Great Spaces correspond to the boundaries of civilizations and include several nation-states or unions of states.

The European Union and the Arab Great Space, which integrates North, Trans-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, for Euro-Africa.

The Russian-Central Asian zone is formed by three Great Spaces that sometimes overlap each other. The first is the Russian Federation along with several countries of the CIS—members of the Eurasian Union. Second is the Great Space of continental Islam (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan). The Asian countries of the CIS intersect this zone.

The third Great Space is Hindustan, which is a self-dependent civilization sector.

The Pacific meridian zone is determined by a condominium of two great spaces (China and Japan) and also includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Australia (some researchers connect Australia with the American Meridian zone). The geopolitical region is very mosaic and can be differentiated by many criteria.

The American meridian zone consists of the American-Canadian, Central and North American Great Spaces.

Importance of the Fourth Zone

The structure of the world based upon meridian zones is accepted by most American geopoliticians who seek the creation of a New World Order and unipolar globalization. However, a stumbling block is the existence of the Russian-Central Asian meridian space: the presence or absence of this belt radically changes the geopolitical picture of the world.

Atlantic futurologists divide the world into the three following zones:

  • American pole, with the European Union as its close-range periphery (Euro-Africa as an exemption) and
  • The Asian and Pacific regions as its long-range periphery.
  • Russia and Central Asia as fractional, but without it as an independent meridian zone, our world is unipolar.

This last meridian zone counterbalances American pressure and provides the European and Pacific zones ability to act like self-dependent civilization poles.

Real multipolar balance, freedom and the independence of meridian belts, Great Spaces, and nation-states depend upon the successful creation of a fourth zone. Moreover, it’s not enough to be one pole in a two-pole model of the world: the rapid progress of the USA can be counterbalanced only by the synergy of all three meridian zones. The Eurasian project proposes this four-zone project on a geopolitical strategic level.

Eurasianism as Russian-Central Asian Integration; Moscow-Tehran Axis; Fourth Meridian Zone – Russian-Asian Meridian Integration

The central issue of this process is the implementation of a Moscow-Tehran axis. The whole process of integration depends on the successful establishment of a strategic middle and long-term partnership with Iran. Iranian and Russian economic, military, and political potential together will increase the process of zone integration, making the zone irreversible and autonomous. The Moscow-Tehran axis will be the basis for further integration. Both Moscow and Iran are self-sufficient powers, able to create their own organizational strategic model of the region.

Eurasian plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan

The integration vector with Iran is vitally important for Russia to gain access to warm-water ports as well as for the political-religious reorganization of Central Asia (Asian countries of CIS, Afghanistan and Pakistan). Close cooperation with Iran presumes the transformation of the Afghani-Pakistani area into a free Islamic confederation, loyal both to Moscow and to Iran. The reason this is necessary is that the independent states of Afghanistan and Pakistan will be the continuing source of destabilization, that being neighboring countries. The geopolitical struggle will provide the ability to implement a new Central-Asian federation and transform this complicated region into one of cooperation and a prosperity area.

Moscow-Delhi Axis

Russian-Indian cooperation is the second most important meridian axis in integration on the Eurasian continent and the Eurasian collective security systems. Moscow will play an important role, decreasing the tensions between Delhi and Islamabad (Kashmir). The Eurasian plan for India, sponsored by Moscow, is the creation of a federation that will mirror the diversity of Indian security with its numerous ethnic and religious minorities, including Sikhs and Muslims.


The main regional partner in the integration process of Central Asia is Turkey. The Eurasian Idea is already becoming rather popular there today because of western trends interlaced with Eastern. Turkey acknowledges its civilization differences with the European Union, its regional goals and interests, the threat of globalization, and further loss of sovereignty.

It is strategically imperative for Turkey to establish a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation and Iran. Turkey will be able to maintain its traditions only within the framework of a multipolar world. Certain factions of Turkish society understand this situation—from politicians and socialists to religious and military elites. Thus, the Moscow-Ankara axis can become geopolitical reality despite a long-term period of mutual estrangement.


The Caucasus is the most problematic region to Eurasian integration because its mosaic of cultures and ethnicities easily leads to tensions between nations. This is one of the main weapons used by those who seek to stop integration processes across the Eurasian continent. The Caucasus is inhabited by nations belonging to different states and civilization areas. This region must be a polygon for testing different methods of cooperation between peoples, because what can succeed there can succeed across the Eurasian continent. The Eurasian solution to this problem lies not in the creation of ethnic-based states or assigning one nation strictly to one state, but in the development of a flexible federation on the basis of ethnic and cultural differences within the common strategic context of the meridian zone.

The result of this plan is a system of a half-axis between Moscow and the Caucasian centers (Moscow-Baku, Moscow-Yerevan, Moscow-Mahachkala, Moscow-Grozny, etc.) and between the Caucasian centers and Russia’s allies within the Eurasian project (Baku-Ankara, Erevan-Teheran, etc.).

Eurasian Plan for Central Asia

Central Asia must move toward integration into a united, strategic, and economic bloc with the Russian Federation within the framework of the Eurasian Union, the successor of the CIS. The main function of this specific area is the rapprochement of Russia with the countries of continental Islam (Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan). From the very beginning, the Central-Asia sector must have various vectors of integration. One plan will make the Russian federation the main partner (similarities of culture, economic and energy interests, a common security system). The alternate plan is to place the accent on ethnic and religious resemblance: Turkic, Iranian, and Islamic worlds.

Eurasian Integration of Post-Soviet Territories; Eurasian Union

A more specific meaning of Eurasianism, partially similar to the definitions of the Eurasian intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s is connected with the process of the local integration of post-Soviet territories. Different forms of similar integration can be seen in history: from the Huns and other (Mongol Turkic, Indo-European) nomad empires to the empire of Genghis Khan and his successors. More recent integration was led by the Russian Romanov Empire and, later, by the USSR. Today, the Eurasian Union is continuing these traditions of integration through an unquiet ideological model that takes into consideration democratic procedures; respects the rights of nations; and pays attention to the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic features of all union members.             Eurasianism is the philosophy of integration of the post-Soviet territory on democratic, non-violent, and voluntary basis without the domination of any one religious or ethnic group.

Astana, Dushanbe, and Bishkek as the Main Force of Integration

Different Asian republics of the CIS treat the process of post-Soviet integration unequally. The most active adherent to integration is Kazakhstan. The President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, is a staunch supporter of the Eurasian Idea. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan similarly support the process of integration, though their support is less tangible in comparison with Kazakhstan.

Tashkent and Ashabad

Uzbekistan and especially Turkmenistan oppose the integration process, trying again to gain the maximum positive results from their recently achieved national sovereignty. However, very soon, due to the increasing rate of globalization, both states will face a dilemma: to lose sovereignty and melt into a unified global world with its domination by American liberal values or to preserve cultural and religious identity in the context of the Eurasian Union. In our opinion, an unbiased comparison of these two options will lead to the second one, naturally sequential for both countries and their history.

Trans-Caucasian States

Armenia continues to gravitate towards the Eurasian Union and considers the Russian Federation an important supporter and conciliator that helps it to manage relations with its Muslim neighbors. It is notable that Tehran prefers to establish a partnership with ethnically close Armenia. This fact allows us to consider two half-axis—Moscow-Yerevan and Yerevan-Tehran—as positive prerequisites for integration.

Baku remains neutral, but its situation will drastically change with the continued movement of Ankara towards Eurasianism (it will immediately affect Azerbaijan). Analysis of the Azerbaijani cultural system shows that this state is closer to the Russian Federation and post-Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia than to religious Iran and even moderate Turkey.

Georgia is the key problem of the region. The mosaic character of the Georgian state is the cause of serious problems during the construction of a new national state that is strongly rejected by its ethnic minorities: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Adjaria, etc. Furthermore, the Georgian state does not have any strong partners is the region and is forced to seek a partnership with the USA and NATO to counterbalance Russian influence. Georgia is a major threat, able to sabotage the very process of Eurasian integration. The solution to this problem is found in the Orthodox culture of Georgia, with its Eurasian features and traditions.

Ukraine and Belarus—Slavic Countries of the CIS

It is enough to gain the support of Kazakhstan and Ukraine to succeed in the creation of the Eurasian Union. The Moscow-Astana-Kiev triangle is a frame able to guarantee the stability of the Eurasian Union, which is why negotiations with Kiev are urgent like never before. Russia and Ukraine have very much in common: culture, language, religious, and ethnic similarities. These aspects need to be highlighted because from the beginning of Ukraine’s recent sovereignty Russophobia and disintegration have been promoted. Many countries of the EU can positively influence the Ukrainian government, because they are interested in political harmony in Eastern Europe. The cooperation of Moscow and Kiev will demonstrate the pan-European attitudes of both Slavic countries.

The above-mentioned factors pertain to Belarus, where integration intentions are much more evident. However, the strategic and economic status of Belarus is less important to Moscow that those of Kiev and Astana. Moreover, the domination of a Moscow-Minsk axis will harm integration with Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which is why integration with Belarus must proceed fluently and without any sudden incidents—along with other vectors of the Eurasian integration process.

Eurasianism as Weltanschauung

The last definition of Eurasianism characterizes a specific Weltanschauung: a political philosophy combing tradition, modernity, and even elements of postmodernism. This philosophy has as its priority traditional society, acknowledges the imperative of technical and social modernization (without separating from traditional culture); and strives for the adaptation of its ideological program to post-industrial, informational society, which is called postmodernism. Postmodernism formally removes the counter positions of tradition and modernism, disenfranchising and making them equal. Eurasian postmodernism, on the contrary, promotes an alliance of tradition and modernism as a constructive, optimistic, energetic impulse towards creation and growth. Eurasian philosophy does not deny the realities discovered by the Enlightenment: religion, nation, empire, culture, etc. At the same time, the best achievements of modernism are used widely: technological and economic advances, social guarantees, freedom of labor. Extremes meet each other, melting into a unifying harmonic and original theory, inspiring fresh thinking and new solutions for the eternal problems people have faced throughout history.

Eurasianism is an Open Philosophy

Eurasianism is an open, non-dogmatic philosophy that can be enriched with new content: religion, sociological and ethnological discoveries, geopolitics, economics, national geography, culture, strategic and political research etc. Moreover, Eurasian philosophy offers original solutions in specific cultural and lingual contexts: Russian Eurasianism will not be the same as French, German, or Iranian versions. However, the main framework of the philosophy will remain invariable.

Principles of Eurasianism

The basic principles of Eurasianism are the following:

  • Differentialism, the pluralism of values systems versus the conventional obligatory domination of one ideology (American liberal-democracy first and foremost);
  • Tradition versus suppression of cultures, dogmas, and discoveries of traditional society;
  • Rights of nations versus the “gold billions” and neo-colonial hegemony of the “rich North”;
  • Ethnicities as values and subjects of history versus the depersonalisation of nations, imprisoned into artificial social constructions;
  • Social fairness and human solidarity versus exploitation and humiliation of man by man.



Dugin, Alexander. “Milestones of Eurasianism.” Ab Aeterno, No. 3, (June 2010). Retrieved from: < http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/12/milestones-of-eurasism/ >.

Dugin, Alexander. “The Eurasian Idea.” Ab Aeterno, No. 1, (November 2009). Retrieved from: < http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/11/the-eurasian-idea/ >.



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What is Wrong with Europe? – Dugin

What is wrong with Europe?

By Alexander Dugin

Edited by Daniel Macek


In order to understand correctly the nature of the present crisis we need to make short analysis of situation. I suggest three levels:

  • Ideologically,
  • Economically,
  • Geopolitically.

Liberal ideology is the source of problem

Ideologically the problem is liberalism as the unique and only ideology imposed on the Europe and the rest of humanity by the Anglo-Saxon world. Liberalism affirms only individual identity and prohibits any kind of collective or organic identity. So liberalism step by step refuses religion, nation and gender belongingness in order to set individual completely free from any kind of holism. Gender is the core political problem because the liberals insists on the optional nature of gender, a gender as individual choice (before the struggle was around religion as individual choice or nation as individual choice). The other crucial point is immigration. The liberalism refuses to acknowledge religious or cultural identities as well as the gender one: so the immigrant is not considered as the bearer of different identity but as one numerical atomic individual more. Thus liberalism destroys any collective identity. Logically liberalism destroys European identity (with so-called tolerance and human rights theories). Together with intensive destruction of sexual identity it accelerates the end of society as such. The end of Europe is granted by the very fact of acceptance the liberalism as mainstream ideology.

The last step in developing liberalism will be negate human identity as collective one. So welcome to trans-humanism. That is the liberal agenda for tomorrow.

Liberalism is nihilist ideology. It insists on liberty from any kind of collective identity but never suggests something positive. In the past competing wit the totalitarian ideologies – communism or fascism – the liberalism was concrete and attractive because it negated the concrete totalitarianism positing itself as alternative. It was a real alternative. But when the totalitarianisms were overcome, the nihilistic nature of liberalism was revealed. It can only negate. It cannot affirm anything. It is not the ideology of positive freedom, it is ideology of negative liberty. Yesterday it wasn’t so explicit. Now it is.

Liberalismhas turned totalitarian. You do not have  the liberty to be non-liberal. You must be liberal. You can choose to be left liberal or right liberal or centre liberal. You can be – in the extreme case – be far left liberal or far right liberal. But always liberal. If you are judged illiberal by liberals you are finished – labelled as extremist, terrorist and so on. The liberals can tolerate only tolerant people. If you are not tolerant (in liberal sense) you are intolerable.

What can we oppose to liberalism? In XX century there were two options: communism (socialism) and fascism. Both failed historically – politically, philosophically, military, economically. They exist now as simulacra. They are hyper marginal or are manipulated by liberalism: hence the liberal-communism of post-modernists, anarchists and trotskistes, or liberal-fascists serving the liberals to promote their cause exactly as Islamic fundamentalism is used as weapon of USA. So my idea is to oppose to liberalism (first political theory) not second political theory (Marxism), nor third (fascism), but the fourth. I have developed this idea in book The Fourth Political Theory, translated in many languages – in German as well. We need combat liberalism, refusing it and deconstructing it totally. At the same time we need to do so not in the name of the class (as in Marxism) or in the name of nation or race (as in fascism), but in the name of the organic unity of People, social justice and real democracy. Liberals interpret democracy as the rule of minorities. We need to restore the original meaning of the term: the democracy is the rule of the majority, of the organic majority, a majority sharing a common identity – that is the rule of the People as the historic and cultural unity.

Financial capitalism is a catastrophe

Economically the problem is in financial capitalism pretending to overcome the real sector of industry in favour of financial markets technology. Such capitalism is monopolistic and creates bubbles instead of the development of the economic infrastructure. Such economy is based on financial speculations (of the G. Soros type) and cherishes the illusion of infinite growth. That contradicts the reality check. The middle class is not growing anymore. The growth of the financial markets doesn’t correspond to the growth of the real sector. Putting all the attention to financial institutions, promoting the delocalization of the real sector to the Third World countries in the course of the globalization, is the way to the abyss. The first waves of the crisis have already passed, but new waves will be here soon. The economic collapse of the Southern European countries such as Greece, and in the near future Italy and Spain, is only the visible peak of the immense catastrophe. The European unity is based on the full acceptance of the financial capitalism logistic. Only Germany struggles now in order to keep the economy in touch with industrial realities, refusing embark on the train into the nothingness. That is the reason for anti-German hysterics in Europe and in USA. German economy is may be the last real economy, the rest is already virtual economy.

So we need to reconstruct Europe on an alternative economic basis.

The infinite growth is but a liberal illusion. The fall of the middle class is the severe reality. The way out of this is complete revision of the myths of the financial capitalism.

Atlanticism is wrong

Geopolitically, Europe is today an Atlanticist entity. The geopolitics imagined by the Englishman Sir H. Mackinder declares that there are two types of civilizations – the civilization of the Sea (Seapower) and the civilization of the Land (Landpower). They are constructed on opposite systems of values. Seapower is purely mercantile, modernist and materialist. The Landpower is traditionalist, spiritual and heroic. That dualism corresponds to the pair of Werner Sombart’s concept – Händlers (Traders) and Helden (Heroes). Modern European society is fully integrated in the Civilization of the Sea [Seapower]. That is manifested in the North-American strategic hegemony and in NATO.

This situation prevents Europe from becoming an independent geopolitical entity. More profoundly it perverts the geopolitical nature of Europe as a continental entity – a Landpower.

So there is a need to change the situation and to restore the Landpower strategy based on the real European sovereignty. Instead of Atlanticism, Europe needs to become a continental strategic power.

Europa and Russia

If we summarize the points, we can logically deduce where we are in European-Russia relations. The Present Russia is

  • Relatively hostile towards liberalism (more traditionalist and conservatively inclined);
  • Economically trying to free itself from the dictatorship of the World Bank and WMF;
  • Geopolitically continental and anti-Atlanticist.

That is the reason why Russia is under attack – in Ukraine, in Moscow, everywhere. The recent killing of the liberal Boris Nemstsov was a provocation that serves to demonize Russia more and more in the eyes of the West. The liberals, the global financial oligarchy and the Atlanticists (the USA and the financial elite) try to provoke hostility between Russia and Europe, as well as trying to save their shaking rule by promoting ethnic conflicts. The war in Ukraine is the first step in a series of ethnic conflicts on European soil. The global liberal elite plans the ethnic war not only in Ukraine or Russia, but in Germany, France, Eastern Europe and elsewhere. The liberal Empire tries to save their hegemony from falling apart by dividing us.

We need to resist in order to construct better Europe, the truly European Europe. And in such situation, Russia is the friend and the USA is the enemy. We have to work on a Russian-European alliance not because Europeans love Russia or Russians love Europeans. The reason is different; we need to be together in order to save each one of us before the danger that menaces everyone.

I wish you gathering all the best and I would like to add that I appreciate very much the impact of the Zuerst magazine led by the brave Manuel Ochsenreiter and its struggle for a better Germany promoting real European case.



Dugin, Alexander. “What is Wrong with Europe?” The Fourth Political Theory, August 2015. <http://www.4pt.su/en/content/what-wrong-europe >.


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You Say You Want a Revolution? – Solère

You Say You Want a Revolution?

Transcript of the Radix Podcast Interview with Fenek Solère by Richard Spencer


Introduction: Fenek Solere joins Richard Spencer to discuss his novel, The Partisan, the tradition of violent partisanship in Europe, the social conditions that incite and suppress revolution, and the evolution of the American and European Alternative Right.

RS: Well, Fenek Solere, welcome to the podcast, it’s a pleasure to have you on.

FS: It’s a delight, Richard, thank you for having me.

RS: Well let’s talk about your new novel, indeed, your debut novel, The Partisan and I think first, what we should do, is give a summary of it, a taste of what the novel’s about and what sparked you to write it?

FS: Yes, certainly. I started writing the novel four or five years ago. It was by observing what was going on in France at that time and particularly Paris. I was very strongly of the opinion that France, for a whole range of reasons, both historical and intellectual would be a touchstone, a litmus paper for what was going to be, if I can use the expression, the Clash of Civilizations, especially in Europe because of mass immigration and things of this nature. Essentially the novel is a forward view, it’s a vision of a future five to seven years hence, very unlike the one Michel Houellebecq predicts, which is one of submission. This is one of No Submission. The situation is that France is being submerged into a wider Eurabic state, including most of Southern Italy and there are very strong Islamic political, cultural and military influences reaching across the Mediterranean into Europe. Just like the very big migrations we already see but now with wider implications. So, as well as the current demographic dynamic, it is predicting what is occurring as defining Europe’s future and I set this against the theatre which is Paris and France in general.

RS: Talk a little bit more about why you chose France as the setting because as I was reading the novel that was a very distinct aspect of it. The bohemian life in France, certainly with regard to the main character, La Pertoleuse, is a very dominant feature. So why France? You are, we can tell by your accent, from Britain, right?

FS: Well France for me seemed a natural choice. It is a focal point for the New Right, the very start of the intellectual movement that blossomed into Identitarianism. I was very much aware of the work, writings and opinions of de Benoist and Guillaume Faye, and please remember I was writing at a time before Generation Identitaire broke onto the scene at Poitiers, so my text was in some ways pre-empting those brave and very symbolic actions. So the whole Metapolitics around the Gramscian notion of the war of position and how the New Right had been re-positioning itself informed The Partisan. I see it as a pivotal novel, so the stage-set of Paris and culture-rich France is quite good in that regard. I wanted that juxtaposition of the self-styled 68’ers intellectual Bohemian France coming face to face with the realities of the other, they have for so long eulogized. A very different culture, that of Islam and in the novel we see them beat against each other quite violently and viciously. So I think it’s about the War of Position, understanding the whole notion of France as representing Europe, a very identifiable Europe, with a large and extended back history and an identity worth preserving and celebrating.

RS: And it’s also a place of revolution and obviously there’s the French Revolution but that in a way is only the beginning. It’s perceived as a place of left wing revolution and right wing partisanship of a type we don’t see in the US, at least not in the form it’s taken at the time of Charles De Gaulle for example, or indeed other leaders of France. So I agree, France is the perfect setting for a novel of partisanship. Why don’t we, before we start talking about the philosophical issues you raise with your novel, talk about the three main characters, Sabine, who is of course La Petroleuse, Luc and the man Costello who is chasing them.

FS: Yes, indeed, I wanted to inject some film noir elements into the story. So Sabine is a very determined, very individual female, and deliberately so. I’m trying to challenge any sort of residual misogyny amongst the Alternative Right. She is a complex character, indeed, a rebellious character, a licentious character but ironically with both loose and strict morals. I think there’s a nice tension there. And she’s also a woman who knows her mind and a woman who has suffered and indeed suffers during the course of the novel. But she overcomes these obstacles, ultimately becoming a significant icon among the traditional forces of France, the alternative resistance. In fact, she emerges as a central figure for them, becoming their poster-girl, and that is emphasized at the opening of the story with her taking very direct action against those collaborating with the transition to the Eurabic state. So she’s an evolving character. She acquires knowledge during the course of the novel, arriving in Paris as a blank sheet of paper in on sense, and that’s where Luc comes in, the male love interest, because he is already steeped in these traditions. He’s precociously well read, familiar with Herman Hesse at the age of twelve or thirteen, before moving onto much more political material, which in the novel he makes available to Sabine and she becomes intellectually empowered. It is the growth of both these characters as the storyline unfolds which is quite important. It’s a part of the love interest, it is part of the human story and also an ideological gateway for the reader too, because they are taken through various stages of radical development, to the point where they are in total sympathy with the main protagonists.

RS: What was it like for you to come to these views? Was your experience like Sabine’s or very much different?

FS: My arrival at these ideas, or this way of thinking, was instinctive. I come from a small provincial town. There was a homogenous demographic, so my rebellion was against the socialist milieu that dominated the town. Those that used the platitudes of egalitarianism to hide their own nepotism, corruption and self-advancement. So I came to my opinions through a philosophical antagonism to the lie of what I witnessed with my own eyes, in what we describe in Britain as a Labour ‘rotten borough’. So that is how I came to be a nationalist and patriot, rather than through the more edgy racial dimension. The problems of multiculturalism were not something I was exposed to as a child.

RS: I think there’s a certain personality type that seek these ideas out even before we have them ourselves. When I was a college undergraduate I was not racially conscious in the sense of thinking about these things, as part of a world-view, I mean. I was racially unconscious like millions of other white people. I was seeking out the edgy ideas, the one’s that seemed to strike at the heart of the system and many of those were Marxism and Critical Theory for example, and also Nietzsche and German idealists thinkers, but I was actively trying to seek them out. I was asking myself, what is the problem deep at the heart of reality that bothers me and I think that was my journey. So I was racially unconscious and then obviously became racially conscious. But I don’t in a way think race is the most important thing. It is obviously an indispensable factor, an extremely important one, but I think there has to be a spirit behind that, that you want something more, you want a deeper, more intense experience, you seek danger, you seek a heightened world, something that is different to bourgeois reality. I think that is how I would kind of describe a person who may become a partisan. I’m not a partisan of course, I just type blogs and do podcasts.

FS: Yes, you are a cultural partisan. But I recognize what you are saying. For me it was the excitement, that edginess of being a teenager, acting out, saying and doing outrageous things to get noticed, but before long I was getting exposed to some really good reading material like Michael Walker’s The Scorpion, which in turn introduced me to Nietzsche and before long I was reading de Benoist, well not in the original French of course, but the English translations of parts of his work. Then it was Conservative Revolutionaries like Carl Schmitt, Ernst Junger, Martin Heidegger, Edgar Julius Jung, Ludwig Klages, Arthur Moeller Van den Bruck, Ernst Niekisch and Ernst von Salomon. That group even included Thomas Mann, author of The Magic Mountain, until he distanced himself from them in the 1920’s.

Over time I got the sense of the transnationalism of de Benoist’s thinking. So I was becoming familiar with people like Marco Tarchi, an Italian professor of political science at the University of Florence and creator of Nuova Destra along with former members of the Nouvelle Ecole like Robert Stuekers from Belgium, Marcel Ruter from Holland and the Croatian Dr. Tomislav Sunic and some of the great pieces he’s written, particularly Against Democracy & Equality (2008) and Homo Americanus (2007). At the moment I’m enjoying Alexander Dugin’s Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism (2015) and I know you are very familiar with his work and are very supportive of him, having published his Martin Heidegger: The Philosophy of Another Beginning (2014). So this has been a long journey, starting with that hormonal teenager I spoke of but then I think it grew in me and became far more consolidated, grounded not only in theory and philosophy but also in lived-experience.

But to go back to Costello, he is a modern day Inspector Javert from Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables (1862) and the whole idea of having a character like that was to have him ask himself questions. He’s on the edge all the time. He has a task to hunt La Petroleuse down. He’s a specialist, part M16 and part Special Air Services, but all the time he’s conflicted, reflecting on his own experiences in recent international conflicts but also from his family history. But I don’t want to give away too much of the plot…’

RS: Yes, you can tell because you put thoughts in his head and you can tell he’s not sure what he’s doing. He’s a sort of instrument of the state. I think, when he’s first introduced someone says, ‘Oh, we have this person from England, like who is it, James Bond. Oh, no, it’s even better! But he is a type of James Bond. He’s an instrument of the state and he isn’t sure what he’s doing and he becomes a kind of reluctant hunter and he’s obviously physically attracted to Sabine as well so it gets quite interesting.

FS: That was a plot-device. I wanted to challenge the reader and make it very clear this was not a simple case of the goodies versus baddies, black and white, the white hat and the black hat from the westerns, but there was an in-between. This novel is attempting to get to those people who are ‘in-between’ . Trying to excite and entice them into Sabine’s world and that sub-plot is part of that mechanism. I also think, if you look at the early phases of the novel, I deliberately refer back to the Algerian crisis, introducing the notion of the Organisation de l’armee secrete (OAS) and the experience of the French Pieds- Noirs and that was significant because I wanted the back-drop to be very clear. Once France had been in Algeria, Algerie-Francais, and now Algeria has come to France. And I think that is quite an important theme of the novel. What we are witnessing today is the transference of the battle ground from Oran to metropolitan France. And if you know anything about that particular period in history, you’ll be aware that something like 3,500 French Settlers were killed in July 1962 alone by rogue elements of the Algerian liberation Front (FLN) and local auxiliaries there. So the backdrop is one of extreme and very recent historical disaster and tragedy.

RS: Oh yes, it is like the late 60’s when France moved from being an Imperial power and then there was the crisis involving De Gaulle. Many people united to revive the old empire, keep it going, and it seems like when that turning was crossed, it’s like the empire comes home, the chickens come home to roost. I don’t think all racial clashes are driven from Imperialism but it is definitely an important aspect to it all.

FS: It is. And of course it humanizes the main Arabic character in The Partisan, because it gives him a justification for his very strong and very bitter feelings towards France and that drive for revenge. But not just for revenge’s sake. He has ideals himself. He has good intensions for his vested interest group and I think that emerges as the story unfolds. A bit-like the Resistance, and I deliberately used that specific word Resistance because I love that ‘spin’. I think in one sense it’s superficial and facile but it is also very important point to make at this moment in time because France is indeed being occupied. And we are the opposition to the mainstream which is going along with this process, the Great Replacement, that Renaud Camus speaks about.

RS: Oh, yes, we’re the New Left

FS: Exactly, I couldn’t agree more.

RS: No, I think that is absolutely true. One question that came up earlier when we were talking was how would you understand the psychology of this new type of European leader. And what I mean by that is, this new type of non-European leader, and he or she may be a Muslim or maybe not? But at the moment we still live under white hegemony effectively. Barak Obama may be a wild card but basically the heads of state are white men and women. And you can call them multiculturalists or white guilt mongers or whatever but they are basically mostly well-educated and upper crust. White people are trying to ride the tiger of multiculturalism, either way using it for their advantage. In some cases they are being elected by their constituencies, like this Miliband figure, the leader of the Labour Party in Britain. Maybe he’s the ultimate expression of theirs, but you can see this, even in as someone a boring as Angela Merkel. But there’s going to be a change and I don’t think Obama’s a representative of this, because I think Obama is a lot less radical than people think and a lot more mainstream, but at some point there is going to be a new kind of leader. It is not going to be the ‘squidgy’ liberal white person, it’s going to be an actual Asian, an actual Muslim and he’s going to be a PM or President of France and Britain. How do you describe that psychology ? Do you think this will be a tension between adopting the system, becoming part of the system, a tension between conquering the old imperial power and revenge. A tension between some kind of racial hand-outs to his people. How would you estimate the psychology of this new European leader who I think we will inevitably see in the next decade?

FS: I think you’re right, that is coming. I think it is going to be by means of a creeping gradualism and as you have indicated it is going to be very interesting how it is played out. There will be continued attempts at assimilation. The rise of the people you are predicting will be from within the system. They are going to beneficiaries of the system. They are going to milk the system for all it is worth, patronage, prestige and pay-cheques. They do not want to change the system outright, just yet. These will be highly educated individuals who will have their own immediate vested interests and those of their intimate family and group close to their hearts. So I think there will be a long transition phase only speeding up and becoming more perceptible when their control on the leavers of power are so far advanced that they can risk allowing any wild outbreaks of disorder or any really extreme behaviours to occur. So their plan is for us to have quite a slow poisonous death. Ed Miliband is certainly a very good example. A treacherous individual. I have met his brother David and I was even less impressed with him. And that was the man Ed beat to be the leader of the Labour Party. Hollande in France is the best example though. There we have the personification of utter banality. I’ve never seen anything like it. It was like there was a vacuum walking ahead of all those heads of state after the Charlie Hebdo massacre. He really is vapid, there is no substance at all. The interesting thing there though is because of his lack of charisma the door is left open for the resurgent Sarkozy challenge. And Sarkozy is a really dubious character, mired of course in corruption. And I think he’s the doorman for the new leader that you are describing because in my opinion, Sarkozy is not French. So Sarkozy really is like Thatcher was in the UK, a wolf in sheep’s clothing. I suggest you take a second look at so-called white hegemony and the white leadership of these countries. I think you need to look a little below the surface. You need to look at the backgrounds of some of these people, who underwrites their campaigns, who funds theses parties. Look at the technocrats and ministers who surround them. In my interview on the Wermod & Wermod website with Alex Kurtagic I very quickly listed a whole range of people who were not remotely British and who do not represent the best interests of the indigenous community but who dominate the important decision-making positions throughout the country. And not just recently but for the last 5 to 8 years and the last 2 or 3 regimes. France is exactly the same. So the door is already open, they are setting the stage for this transition and it is going to be gradual. It will be like Alex Kurtagic said in one of his speeches about The Collapse, It’s already started and it will go on for some time and in my opinion we won’t know of its completion until Robert Mugabe is installed in Buckingham Palace.

RS: What do you think are some of the forces that might improve partisanship and what are some of the ways the forces that might retard or suppress it? And what I mean by that partisanship, is as Carl Schmitt defined it. A violent action, someone taking on the authority of the state or against the state’s interest. So what do you think are some of the forces that might inspire actions like that and what might prevent it?

FS: I think some of those actions are already occurring in many ways and have occurred over a period of time. Let’s look at the Radical Left, easy examples are the Red Army Faction with characters like Gudrun Ensslin and Ulrike Meinhoff. There are movies made about them, they are glamorized in features like The Baader Meinhoff Complex, where you have chic actresses like Martina Gedek and Joana Wokalek representing really quite plain and quite moribund characters in some ways. Now, flick the switch, look at the right, you’ve got very attractive dynamic characters like Francesca Mambro , of the Italian Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR) and you’ve got Yevgenia Khasis in Russia going through a controversial re-trial for her involvement in a political assassination. See for yourself the very different approaches to both these situations and bringing it back to my novel The Partisan and the lead female figure I contend is all about inspiration, it’s all about people coming across a personal circumstance or feeling inspired by characters taking action and following them and conducting activities that will challenge the state. I cited the examples I did because I think they have been put through the movie mill of the left and been overlooked on the right, except that is for Mambro. She was represented in quite a negative way in a recent movie when it concentrated on one of the victims, a bystander who got tragically shot, and I do not want to diminish that, but it was an interesting comparison on how the left and right are represented. So certainly what we need is leadership, glamour, excitement. We also need the spark that creates those activities and we have seen it in the riots across Europe.

What is holding us back, the flip-side of your question, it is obvious to me, Aldous Huxley’s soma. We do have an awful lot of apathy and just in time pleasure that keeps us off the streets . And in many ways that is a good thing but what I would like to say Richard, is that clearly I’ m not advocating violence, that is not what this is about, this is a warning against violence but what I am saying is that violence is going to be inevitable unless we can stop this demographic juggernaut before it reaches the tipping-point. After that, the game is up, we will be living on the movie set of Apocalypse Now. So, for me, it goes back to leadership. Today, in the Western World we have the most stupid at best or the most treacherous self-serving leaders, there is no positive dynamic. The 68’ers and their philosophers have dissipated. The right has filled the gap but the right are being stifled as well. UKIP in Britain, Sarkozy in France, look at your own country, I cannot tell the difference between the Republicans and the Democrats anymore and if our friend Ms. Clinton gets elected to the highest office, that will be the greatest example of the most stifling influence in American politics. So there is a whole strain of soma running through society and we need something to light a fire.

RS: I agree, that soma is not just among political rightists, its among everyone. I was shocked by the fact that there weren’t serious riots occurring after the Trayvon Martin case and there weren’t violent riots after the Ferguson situation. There is still things going on there but they’ve died down. I was kind of thinking why isn’t this happening. It could be simple things like instead of rioting you can watch free streaming pornography on your government sponsored smartphone. Then there’s obesity, a product of our post-modern, post-industrial world and the availability of junk food. And you know it seems post-modern civilization might really go with a whimper and not a bang. It may be able to dull partisanship, but a riot, which is a different thing? But it might be able to dull those things too and absorb them into itself.

FS: Yes, it’s like T.S. Elliot said in The Hollow Men ‘Not with a bang but whimper’. I think that’s a deliberate policy of the system. You talk about obesity, but there’s mental obesity, mental retardation, we’re not exposed to the same texts or they are difficult to get to. The Left has dissipated. In many ways the Left is so mutated, it is not recognizable from when I was a boy. I think de Benoist said: ‘What’s left of the new Left, possibly the New Right?’ and I quite like the way he played that. I think it’s a cheeky way of doing it, it’s a challenging way and if you think of the synthesis the New Right developed, certainly in the 80’s, what you’ve got there is a very interesting challenge to the Left and de Benoist filled that space and I rather admire his tactic.

RS: I agree. I think the Left is a victim of its own success. I mean the Left is the establishment. You can’t claim to be challenging the system when you have an academic post, or you’re in charge of this literary theory of feminism Department at Harvard. And that is one way the system has absorbed political partisanship. I would say most partnership has come from the Left, or is it has historically and the system has been able to absorb that and I think that is an interesting thing and it may not exactly be by design but is certainly a way the system can maintain stability.

FS: I think that’s not necessarily expressed in the text of this novel but what the story does do is work towards the de-legitimization of those basic tenets of Judeo-Christian tradition that prevents us from defending ourselves and it takes on the de-humanizing quality of global capitalism where we become mere units of production, spending and buying. Of course it deals with questions of ethnic homogeneity, but it’s not the only dimension, despite the Arabic and Muslim versus the secular or Christian world, and there’s this feeling as well of being liberated. Liberated from the excesses of modernity. Which is what you were just talking about. For me, mitigating as many of the more negative features of modernity is central. I am by nature an optimist and I consider myself to be progressive and successful in terms of my career and profession. So it is not that modernity is holding me back or I’m threatened by it. I’ve mastered it but I feel the fulfillment that I want modernity to offer me is a mirage. So the sort of vanguard you are describing will start with a small cadre of the committed, people like yourself in the States, Generation Identitaire in France, The Immortals in Germany, National Action and Sigurd Legion in the United Kingdom. I’m being up-beat but I can see these elements developing into something bigger. Well, I would hope they develop and I think they can with the right leadership.

RS: Do you think this will develop on the vanguard right, of our type of right? You mentioned the lack of legitimate antagonism to the system offered by the Christian Tradition. It’s almost as if the Christian traditionalists does not want to undermine but indeed underpins the system and supports it. Do you see it that way? Is it going to be a vanguard revolt? It’s not going to be a mainstream middle-class who will rise up, it’s going to be people on the margins who are hated, who are a-social. There’s a great quote that you have, where Luc says something to Sabine, like, It’s the bohemian, it’s the vanguardist, it’s the a-social person who is truly sane. I think that’s where partisanship or some kind of riot or social revolution, of whatever form will come. Maybe it is violent or maybe non-violent but nevertheless, a revolution, which truly does change the world, changes society, in a way that Ghandi, Martin Luther King and more violent figures changed society. That will come from the vanguard on the fringe.

FS: Yes, and that is why this novel is written in the way it is. It is very much aimed at that vanguard. It does not believe as the author does not believe that the moribund right, the Christian American Right will generate something which is fresh and unique, and that is what is required at this moment. But there is an irony in what I have just said because if you use France as an example, and if you look back over the great thinkers and writers who have supported the Right, many came from strong catholic backgrounds. So it is quite interesting that de Maistre, De Bonald, and people like Drieux la Rochelle, Henry de Motherlant were very strong in their faith. However in the post-modern world we cannot rely on a Charles Martel emerging from the Christian Right. They have been co-opted. The catalyst for what we are seeking will indeed be ‘other’ and I think we’ve already seen some of that vanguard act in a non- violent but very demonstrative way. The take over the mosque in Poitiers by Generation Identitaire and the siege of the Socialist headquarters were fantastic visceral images conveying strong messages and those sort of ‘happenings’ , the 68 generation attitude, I can see beginning to mount. And if you look at the youth of Europe, increasingly they are moving in our direction. So the novel is all about attracting them. It’s deliberately written in an explosive exciting way, that’s to bring the audience to the theory, the philosophy, bring them to the books that will influence them. It’s the ‘attractor’, the same as the love story element. We are not going to get to these young people by handing out thousands of copies of Francis Parker Yockey’s Imperium. A great piece of thinking, a brilliantly articulated neo-Spenglerian piece, but we’re simply not going to get a vanguard out on the street with that. We need to turn people on as Kai Murros says, we need to switch people on. Look this is a debut novel, I’m learning the craft, Richard, this is a very early piece. An attempt to draw that audience to us through literature and there’s some very good pieces of literature out there already. So this is just one contribution.

RS: I quite like Alex Kurtagic’s Mister. It’s quite a long novel. You’ve got to really get into the world of his work. But it is funny and it’s a non-revolutionary in a way. Very different from yours. Though they are published by the same publishing company, their nice counter-parts but in a way the image of the bourgeois man who is very intelligent and recognizing what is going on but in Mister someone who doesn’t revolt. Someone who finds another way of coasting along, going with the flow, not challenging the zeitgeist. I think there may be another genre of literature arising out of this. The revolt and collapse at the end of history.

FS: And there’s some really good writers out there as well. You publish them through your National Policy Institute outlet and Arktos have got some great theoretical texts. I regularly read their books and I’ve been in e-mail exchange with John Morgan since right back to the time when he was running Integral Traditions about six or seven years ago. So I very much agree with you. Alex is a great guy. He makes some great speeches. I know you have shared a platform with him. He was a very deserving winner of the inaugural Jonathon Bowden Oratory Prize and we haven’t touched on Bowden in our conversation but I know you are a great admirer of his intellect and his oratory, as was I, and like you I was turned on by that. It really stimulated and fascinated me. He is/was a great weapon in our armory. Works like The Partisan are aimed at a younger, but not just a young, but a youthful audience. A different audience. It’s a gateway to theory as I previously said in my interview at Wermod & Wermod. It is very much a piece to bring people to our milieu, to excite them. It is the first of many I have to say. I’m being very creative at the moment and I’m very excited about what’s going on and what you are doing at Radix. I’ll try very hard to come to your next conference. I couldn’t come along to Budapest because of other commitments but I’d like to come along to the next. I know you’ve got some great speakers and a mystery speaker as well, so I’ll look forward to the opportunity of being exposed to such talented intellects.

RS: That would be great. I don’t want to give it away but let’s just say the mystery speaker just happens to be from Texas and he’s running for President. Oh, I’m just kidding, Ted Cruz…

FS: I don’t think he’ll be turning up…

RS: May be we should invite him? He might come. Maybe we can get an invitation through some dumb staffer who would book him. That would be hilarious…

FS: But the speakers you have got are phenomenal and the one person I haven’t paid tribute to but is a giant is of course Jared Taylor. I know you’ve come over to Europe and you’ve done The Traditional Britain Group meetings and I think that is really good because except for The Scorpion which is now inert and unfortunately Bowden’s passing we don’t have the same intellectual tradition that the French have, another reason why I set The Partisan in France.

RS: Well, I think that is changing. And I’m not saying that to seem arrogant, oh, no we’re not out to challenge de Benoist and Guillaume Faye. But I think that is changing because for so long the American Right was intellectually so dominated by the Buckleyite conservative movement and so you had people like Russell Kirk, who I am not a great admirer of to be honest, but he’s an interesting guy, but these guys just ignored Europe in general, despite Kirk’s protestations otherwise. But they also had no contact and no awareness of developments like the French New Right and so we were just, well impoverished. I can remember when I was first just starting to enter this world in 2002/2003 I would find some translations of de Benoist on an Australian website in HTML format…

FS: That sounds familiar…

RS: And that was the only way. And I would try to buy copies of Telos which is actually a very interesting Left Wing/Right Wing journal, just so, because you know these were a lot like Radix is now. But they would come out when they were ready but you would buy these just to get a little taste of what was going on in Europe. We were really struggling back then but I think if you are looking at what’s happening, whether it’s the stuff I’m involved with or John Morgan’s doing we’re finally moving in the right direction and we’re finally shaking things up, getting rid of that conservative paradigm and moving things on. And I think we’re at an interesting point where we’re not in competition with all these groups, we’re synthesizing things and I think it’s very exciting.

FS: I agree, I feel that excitement as well. I referred earlier to that transmission of the New Right, it’s now travelled, It’s in fact transcontinental, not just because of the global village but because there are great and admirable thinkers of the Right perspective at the moment, people like the Australian Kerry Bolton. Sam Francis, who you often refer to in your podcasts and in your writing provided some great thoughts and expositions. Then there was your own Alt-Right site too. So we are becoming less and less dependent upon what was big in 1979/80. These were really big stepping stones and now with the superb articles on Greg Johnson’s Counter Currents and his own book New Right/Old Right things are motoring. Greg’s text by the way is sitting on my shelf right next to your own Dugin book on Heidegger that I referred to earlier .

RS: Those two books are at war with each other, perhaps?

FS: But nice to have on the shelf and hopefully some of this will find its way into some literature I produce in the future and give it some gravitas. So, yes, you’re right, I feel that excitement and like I said in an e-mail I sent you some four years ago, where I said when you were really active on the Alternative Right website, ‘you’ve definitely hit your stride here’, we’ve certainly got something going. You’ve got a lovely piece on the website at the moment about those Russians visiting the States and I think that’s a really clever piece. I’ve spent a lot of time in Russia. I speak some Russian and I am familiar with our milieu there.

RS: Excellent, well Fenek, let’s just put a book mark in this conversation. This was a lot of fun and I hope you can come back. And I was definitely stimulated by reading The Partisan. I enjoyed it and I think if anyone is listening they should at the very least give your book a shot. I think they will definitely find a lot of food for thought there, so I definitely recommend it. And this was a lot of fun, so thanks for coming on and let’s do it again.

FS: That would be great Richard. Thank you, goodbye.



Solère, Fenek. “You Say You Want a Revolution?” Interview with Fenek Solère by Richard Spencer. Radix, 20 May 2015. < http://www.radixjournal.com/vanguard-radio/2015/5/20/you-say-you-want-a-revolution&gt;. Transcript provided for the New European Conservative by Fenek Solère personally.


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Interview with Fenek Solère – Kurtagic

Interview with Fenek Solère by Alex Kurtagic


Introductory Note: The following interview was personally recommend to us by Fenek Solère for republication on the “New European Conservative.” We have found its contents to be largely agreeable or at least interesting, but there are two particular matters we would like to comment on to clarify our own position or approach where it possibly differs from Solère’s. Firstly, regarding the problem of the Jews, we admit that there are a number of Jewish groups and leaders who have contributed to the current negative state of Western societies. However, we agree with Paul Gottfried that Jews as a whole people cannot be equated with these particular groups, and there are a variety of positions and factions among the Jews, some of which have nothing to do with the creation of multicultural, decadent societies. While criticism of the Jews can be legitimate, it is always important to keep open the possibility to Jews of creating groups which hold similar values to our own, and could also become allied to our own in the future.

Secondly, regarding Solère’s responses to some of Kurtagic’s questions about racial differences, immigration, and racial mixing, we would have approached these questions somewhat differently. Solère’s responses will, probably unintentionally, seem to imply to some readers that whites outdo all other races in any field and thus have higher capacities on the whole, which would also imply that they can generally create more superiour societies than non-whites. However, we should make it clear that in our view there are many non-white groups (the best examples being the Chinese, Japanese, and other East Asians) who clearly have equal capacities to whites and create societies which are just as high quality as white societies. Concerning the problems brought up in Kurtagic’s questions, the first fact that must be kept in mind is that capacities such as IQ level, athletic ability, etc. often differ across time periods, cultures, and social units, and they also vary among population groups within a single race as well. While it may be true that among some racial or ethnic populations a low or high IQ seems genetically ingrained, the previous facts are also true in many cases. Furthermore, a race always has the possibility of improving its population’s capacities without any mixture whatsoever from other groups, which is why the idea that interbreeding is necessary  to increase these factors in a given population is scientifically invalid. However, one must also keep in mind that what is important about racial and ethnic identity is the value of the identity itself, not any kind of superiour biological traits that may be possessed; even if it were possible to create a “more superiour breed” through mixture, it would be undesirable due to the loss of original identities. This is the perspective representative of Identitarianism. – Daniel Macek (Editor of the “New European Conservative”)


Alex Kurtagic: Almost every time I receive a communication from you, it has originated in an exotic location, and it seems you are more often in some far-flung place on the planet than Britain. Are you an adventurer, or do you have a very interesting job?

Fenek Solère: I am both an adventurer and an entrepreneur. Like an ever-increasing number of people attracted to our movement I have thrived in the modern world, in direct contradiction to the media portrayal of dissidents like ourselves as lonely bitter bachelors, sitting in their basements with no friends and no sexual outlet.

Over the course of my adult life I have lived and worked in London, France, St Petersburg, Kiev, San Francisco, Central Asia, and the Middle-East. I am not someone who can be castigated and mocked for being unsophisticated or parochial. My home is filled with art, books, and the numerous artifacts I have collected from all over the world.

Both in private and professional terms I have lived cheek by jowl with many other cultures and ethnicities and observed them up close and personal. Life experience informs my writing. My fiction is grounded in an in-depth study of history, culture and political theory.

The Partisan could be read as the act of a natural contrarian. Were you a willful and troublesome child who did Z when told to do A?

I was born into an aspirant working class family in a small provincial town. My father was an electrician and my mother was a cook. A typical boy, I recall playing in the woods, running in the shadow of the craggy castles that littered the landscape, living more like one of those characters from an Arthur Ransom story than a game-boy addict. Pretending to be a cowboy, never an Indian, building tree houses in the style of Robinson Crusoe, crafting bows and arrows like Robin Hood to defend our fortified encampments.

My bookshelves were crammed with Tolkien, C.S. Lewis and the Norse mythologies. There was no family pressure to ‘achieve’. Rather, an atmosphere of calm reassurance. The warm glow of security reflected in the open fire as I sat marching Napoleonic armies across the hearth-rug. I was relatively good at sport, representing my school and region at football, rugby, basketball, and cross- country. By the time I met my first girlfriend I was already well-past reading Ayn Rand’s Anthem. I remember catching sight of her at a school disco. She was a spike haired punk in clinging pink trousers, cutting a resplendent profile in the backwash of strobe lighting, as she threw a right arm salute. Her small fist punching the air when the opening chords of the Sex Pistols’ God Save the Queen, broke out across the hall.

Within weeks I became an activist. I recall my initiation started one balmy summer evening when a group of us torched a Trotskyite Militant newspaper stand in the centre of town. Not long after I was involved in an amateur style re-enactment of the climactic scene from The Dead Poets Society. A clear-skinned, fair-haired boy was made to stand up in front of the history class to defend his essay justifying Apartheid. He was asserting the South African Government had been right to imprison Mandela for terrorism and maintain ‘separation’ of the races. The teacher, a bespectacled 68’er, was going ballistic, screaming from behind an accusatory finger, threatening to have my friend removed from her class. ‘You can’t say that!’ she insisted, ‘What sort of person are you?’

Then, when he had finished, he looked in my direction and I knew it was my turn to stand and repeat the process. When I came to a close I had the honour to defer to the next boy, who had also been called to answer for transgressing the politically correct curricula. This open act of defiance was rapidly followed by a nationalist poster campaign on school noticeboards, which coming so quickly on the heels of the pro- Afrikaaner debacle and my own and my girlfriend’s names appearing in bold graffiti under a very large symbol closely associated with a controversial German political party of the middle nineteenth century, resulted in my expulsion.

The Partisan is set in France. Why France?

I chose France for its symbolism. When I began writing The Partisan in 2009 I saw a magnificent country threatened by the machinations of a malignant cosmopolitan interloper who had hijacked the race riots breaking out in 2005 in almost every French conurbation for personal political advantage. Then, that same devious individual, insisting on the benefits of miscegenation between the French and the alien hordes swamping the very boulevards where they had set fire to cars and attacked the native people. It seemed to encapsulate the whole political and demographic catastrophe I wanted to warn against in my debut novel. It was a country on the front-line. But also one with a very rich history of patriotic movements like the Front National and Right-wing intellectuals like Maurice Bardèche and the Nouvelle Droite’s Alain de Benoist and Guillaume Faye. In more recent times the emergence of fledgling organizations like Generation Identitaire , who my fictional protagonists predicted two or three years prior to their brilliant ‘Declaration of War’ video and the Poitiers Mosque protest, gives me a real sense that the battle lines are being drawn and that the next twelve months will prove me right; that yes indeed, the land of Rousseau and Rabelais will be the first battle ground of the European resurgence.

How does The Partisan differ from the various American novels treating the same topic?

The characters in The Partisan are much more three dimensional than those I have met and admired in other so-called Rightist fiction. It is not purely ‘vengeful’ entertainment. The text is more literary and is replete with reference points to other writers and political thinkers. This is quite deliberate. I want my fiction to excite, inspire, and motivate its audience to investigate the very deep intellectual roots of what is referred to as the New Right. I want The Partisan to be an access point for our youth into that culture and to become familiar with the ideas of its main proponents.

Almost everyone would agree that there is little to admire in many earlier incarnations of Rightist literature: it is too often badly written and its message is utterly superficial, in that it wallows in an angry revenge fantasy. Would you not agree that the biological worldview, such as the one that informs many of these novels, is necessarily an amoral worldview (which often becomes immoral), since nature is concerned only with what works in a practical sense, and doesn’t assign value to abstract principles the way humans do? Since Westerners assign such importance to such principles—indeed, Western political philosophy has always been underpinned by some system of ethics—how can anyone expect readers to feel comfortable defending the heroes in such fiction, even if they find the revolutionary fantasy privately satisfying?

It is true that such literature can sometimes lapse into simplistic comic book fantasy. Such deficiencies are to some extent why I wrote The Partisan. One of my key objectives was to fuse the action-orientated type novel with a more poetic but pessimistic futurology like that envisaged by Jean Raspail in The Camp of the Saints. The point being that certain types of material appeal to certain dispensations at different given points. Some of our movement’s earlier fiction may rightfully be described as amoral, but much that passes today for great classic literature was considered so in the past. Look at the homosexuality of Gide and the modernist works of Joyce. That is not to place all those writers sympathetic to our cause in this category of artists, clearly, only a very few like Ernst Jünger, Knut Hamsun, and Ezra Pound would qualify, but to indicate that the amoral/immoral argument shifts according to the fashion of the day. The biological imperative underpinning some of these texts does remain relevant, though we have many other facets to our ever-maturing world-view. Without Western people there will be no Western sense of principles or ethics, so in that regard I have a degree of sympathy for those ground-breaking writers, in that their heroes and heroines had at least a modicum of understanding that unless those values were defended they would cease to exist and all our fine ideals would disappear—mea culpa.

Where does your interest in the European New Right originate?

I read Michael O’Meara’s New Culture, New Right and discovered the French Nouvelle École (New School). From that point it was a natural progression to study Oswald Spengler, Julius Evola, Pino Rauti, founder of the Ordine Nuovo, Guido Giannettini and the ideology of the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei in Italy; the writings of Carl Schmitt and the Conservative Revolutionaries of the Weimar period; Imperium by the American renegade Francis Parker Yockey; works by the Belgian Jean Thiriart; alongside contemporary thinkers and commentators like Robert Steukers, Gilbert Sincyr, Tomislav Sunic, Franco Freda of Disintegration of the System fame, Alexander Dugin, Kevin McDonald, Greg Johnson, Jonathan Bowden, Troy Southgate, and Michael Walker, editor of The Scorpion.

What is wrong with letting people from anywhere settle in Europe, if they are hard-working, law-abiding, tax-paying and contribute to the economy?

Nothing, if that is indeed the case. I have met many Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Central Europeans who fulfill such criteria. Of course a small percentage do not but most integrate perfectly well and live successfully among us. Compare that to the facts and figures behind migration from Roma communities, African or predominantly Muslim countries. Welfare dependency, anti-social behavior, criminality, isolationism and the colonization of whole communities seems to characterize the experience. Religious insularity, high prison rates, mosques filled with semi-literate imams and would-be boy-Jihadis educated free in our schools, sexism, genital mutilation, witch-craft, TB, Typhus, Ebola, drug and people trafficking, child-sex grooming, and riots complete the picture. Ask the people of Malmö, the women of Oslo, those poor souls living in close proximity to the urban sensitive zones around Paris or certain parts of the north of England like Bradford and Rotherham what part of the ‘enrichment’ process they have enjoyed. Talk to the thousands of violated white girls who have benefited from the fast food, cheap narcotics, and Rap music industry these people generate in their slums and taxi about our green and pleasant land.

What I witness every day are economic migrants, in transit under the false flag of asylum, seeking a better life at our expense. It is like a plague of locusts landing on a field. Leeching all the goodness from our soil. Infesting our villages, cities and towns. This is not some kind of small minded ‘fear of the other’ it is an objective analysis based on rational judgment. People like myself do not fear ‘the other’ we invest time and find out about the ‘other’ with a natural and friendly curiosity. I have lived for three years in Muslim countries and found good and bad much the same as I would in Europe or America. But what I find amongst the ‘invasion force’ pressing in upon Europe appalls me. I have nothing but the utmost respect for the nationalist activists who have stood tall despite state sponsored persecution and shouted until they were hoarse that the ‘emperor’ of multiculturalism has no clothes.

So is it just a question of the practical effects of multiculturalism? Is there no principle behind it except a root-and-branch or technocratic approach to problem-solving? Does this not make the liberal approach superior, then, since it is driven by an ethical system, however imperfectly executed? Not superior in a technical sense, but certainly in a moral sense.

There is indeed a very deep sense of principle embedded within my earlier response. People and communities who have over generations worked and sacrificed for their own well-being in later life and indeed their kith & kin in the present should expect that having made those long-term commitments under moral and indeed contractual commitments to and with their governments that those obligations are honoured. People originating from societies who have failed or are unable to take that long-term view have no prior right upon such investments. And I challenge any authority or political party arguing otherwise to stand openly upon a platform declaring such an intent to pillage that hard earned inheritance and let the people who have genuinely and fulsomely entered into such an arrangement decide the matter.

Surely, diversity increases creativity, since you have more perspectives and approaches to any problem, and immigration from everywhere boosts economic growth. Are you against creativity and for a stagnant economy?

Despite the diversity you see in Hollywood films and on television, the world’s laboratories, board rooms and libraries are not filled with West Indians designing new software systems for intergalactic flight, Somalians building robots to work in arid conditions or ecologically aware Uzbeks setting up green companies to reduce carbon emissions. This is a myth, perpetuated by the few whose individual and cosmopolitan group interests it suits, flooding productive economies with low IQ ‘hands’ to drive down wages and increase short-term share-holder profits at the expense of the long term interests of their host community. The media is used to manipulate and shape our moral and social expectations. Identity is eroded by the notion of ‘global citizenship’. Water-cooler philosophy is dispensed by Kid-President you-tube videos. Economic and moral stagnation leading to inter-ethnic tension distracts us from the enemy’s goals, so openly declared by Barbara Lerner-Spectre Founding Director of the Paideia Institute in Sweden: I think there is a resurgence of anti-Semitism because at this point in time Europe has not yet learned how to be multicultural and I think we are going to be part of the throes of that transformation which must take place. Europe is not going to be a monolithic society that they once were in the last century. Jews are going to be to be at the centre of that. It’s a huge transformation to make. They are now going into a multicultural mode and Jews will be resented for our leading role but without that leading role and without that transformation Europe will not survive’.

This sounds like a conspiracy theory. Is not your answer a bit of an overstatement? Certainly, Jews in the diaspora on the whole have favoured social, political, and intellectual movements tending to make the societies in which they live safer for them. No surprise here, given their history. Yet, to the degree that they have supported or even led such movements, these have merely demanded a more thorough and complete application of principles already enshrined and, indeed, central to liberal political philosophy. And liberal political philosophy is wholly North-Western European and ‘Aryan’ in origin: John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Paine, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, David Hume, Immanuel Kant—all these are gentiles, mostly from Britain to boot.

Your point is well made and I take it in the spirit it is intended, however, please indulge me for one moment. The term ‘Conspiracy Theorist’ is often used to belittle and decry non-standard theoreticians. I accept there are a lot of cranks out there and people who have the potential to cause arm to others. Clearly, that is not my intent. Indeed, the very opposite is true. I am a historian and a political theorist. My opinions are not based on phantasms, a need to gain attention or dye my hair green and stand in a turquoise track suit next to David Icke. I have quoted above (and indeed elsewhere in relation to Nicholas Sarkozy, former President of France) one of hundreds of examples where some people of that particular diaspora have acted, in my opinion, against the interests of the European majority among whom they live. At this very moment I am simultaneously reading Ilan Pappe’s The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine and Simon Schama’s The Story of the Jews: Finding the Words 1000BC – 1492 AD [Sic. It loos as if HarperCollins doesn’t know that AD goes in front of the year. —Ed.]The former, a chilling account of the systematic way the founders of the early Jewish state went about their ethnic cleansing and murder of thousands upon thousands of Arabs in the late 1940’s, (activities some may argue analogous with recent events); the latter a shameless and sycophantic account of Jewish history that exonerates the Chosen from any sense of personal or group responsibility for the numerous expulsions they have suffered throughout the centuries. The media-savvy Schama, reveals himself to be less historian and more a propagandist as he explains why it is that everyone else is always to blame and his own tribe are always right, or indeed innocent, and the victims of mindless persecution. I would recommend everybody to read both texts. I found it advantageous to have also read the Talmud, Torah, and indeed the Koran, so I have a socio-economic, historical, and religious context for my opinions. I came to the work of Kevin McDonald late but recognize the behavior patterns he ascribes to his study group and I personally would prefer that the more over-zealous Zionists desisted from their activities so that your average Mr and Mrs Finkelstein could live in peace within the wider community. Unfortunately, that wider community now includes people with anti-semitic attitudes. This is regrettable but is a direct consequence of the strategy so eloquently explained by Spectre-Lerner above.

The fact that you can list the names of such great Anglo-Saxon, French, and German thinkers is a testimony to the progressive and open-hearted culture from which they originate. That the good intentions of such well-meaning people could be so perverted is in fact a measure of what Yockey describes as the culture distortion so prevalent today both in Europe and America. I have studied the American Constitution, The Framers who devised it, their backgrounds, ethnicity and intentions. Likewise, the real motivations of President Lincoln before, during, and after the American Civil War and I can assure you the abbreviated versions of history our schools and universities teach us and the voters are fed through the distorting lens of Orwellian ‘Truth Speak’ is a subject fit for serious review. I myself studied the whole historiography surrounding ‘Reconstruction’ after the American Civil War and it is most instructive on how aspects of history can and are used during different epochs to influence public opinion. From the books we read to the films we watch. Trust me, there is a pattern and it is no coincidence. From Spencer Tracy’s The Northwest Passage encouraging American entryism into the Second World War, to John Wayne’s Green Berets, trying to sustain moral during the Vietnam War, and 300, instilling anti-Islamic sentiment during the Iraq and Afghan wars. A whole book could be written on the movies bolstering anti-German sentiments and the falsehoods therein contained, but I will leave it there, my counter-point, I believe, equally well made.

Immigration is needed because white folk no longer want to do certain jobs, whereas the newcomers are keen to contribute and willing to work hard. If we were to send them all back—which is impossible, of course—the economy and the NHS would collapse.

These shibboleths need to be exposed for the nonsense they are. In the course of my career I have collaborated with thousands of sole-traders, SME’s, and multinational corporations. In my opinion there would be no collapse, rather, a rejuvenation of the economy, greatly boosted I suspect by the end of massive social security payments, that could be re-directed from these imported voting blocs and unproductive elements to invest in new start-ups and training programmes for people who need to update their skill-set in line with current economic trends. I would recommend the re-nationalization of utility companies in the UK, likewise the rail and postal service, at the price set by the ‘fixers’ when they were sold off. I would also withdraw all benefits from those who had entered the country illegally and their families and dependents. Similarly, non-ethnic British who had committed serious crimes prior to their immediate deportation back to their country of origin, accompanied of course by their dependents, but not the assets that had been accumulated by fraudulent means or due to the generosity of the British taxpayer. It may sound draconian to some but it makes good business sense. I would also argue to levy taxes on the money migrant workers send back to their families, thereby reducing the outflow of capital from its source of origin and open negotiations with countries in receipt of Foreign Aid or benefits to assist us in the task of humane repatriation of their nationals or peoples of compatible ethnic origin or similar religious persuasion. New targets need to be set for emigration, based on a wide range of criteria, but certainly with a view to returning the ethnic balance of countries like Britain to pre-1997 levels. And that would be the start not the end-point of the discussion.

With regard to the NHS, I have managed contracts with a wide range of people connected to this vast and worthy enterprise. Indeed, I have been involved with medical training for nurses, GPs, and surgeons. An immediate family member is a practicing junior doctor. The simple fact is that we are diverting resources to train people of non-British origin to these highly paid jobs, reinforcing cultural stereo-types among some of the high achieving Asians who think the profession is ‘theirs’ (the names Khan and Patel are currently the most common names for a medical doctor in the UK) whilst failing to act when they underperform or commit acts of negligence or perversion because we fear being branded ‘racist’. Additionally, we are providing health tourists with a first class service and denuding developing countries of their most highly skilled health professionals, which seems morally indefensible to me, especially if we are to be judged by the liberal and ethical standards we are supposed to be upholding. So, in short, I think we can materially benefit from a mass outflow of the post-’97 immigrants, up-skill the workforce with a view to advancing our technological infrastructure and preserve and improve fundamental services like the British NHS with a planned programme of awareness raising and aspiration building so that increasing numbers of whites want to move into these fields, as was the case in previous generations.

Polls recording the attitudes of indigenous Europeans towards non-European immigrants consistently show that this view is popular. But how do you justify it morally? That’s the first thing. The second is, What about the many families of non-European origin that, nevertheless, have been here for several generations and are all citizens, born and bred in Europe? Are we to start rounding them up and shipping them out? And, if so, what would determine an ‘ethnically compatible’ country? Many are of mixed origin too, which would further complicate the issue, not just practically, but morally as well.

Yes, indeed, it is a popular view and one that should have had a major impact on the results of several electoral cycles. In the UK alone, there have been orators like Enoch Powell predicting the current circumstance for decades. Many other far sighted people have followed him, in their own ways, in their own countries across the ‘developed world’. Why it has failed to mature into a vote winning electoral vehicle in the majority of those countries is a question worth asking? Where was the plebiscite agreeing to immigration in the first place? Why isn’t one held now across the EU or in its constituent states? These very facts undermine the claim we live in representative democracies. The current wave of concern in this area may bring Marine Le Pen to power in France but I have no doubt every judicial or technical reason will be found to make that difficult. We have an unresponsive state apparatus that is ‘owned’ and with every year the new imported peoples who they pander to in order to maintain their short-term positions grow in number. These newcomers have originated from somewhere outside Europe and that is where they should return. Where is a choice for them to make but they should not remain. On the subject of people of mixed race, we have a conundrum. I believe everyone should be free to choose their life-partner without the interference of law and statute. Love is a valuable commodity and should be appreciated in all the various forms it assumes. But look carefully at the spousal abuse rates, the single parent families, the divorce rates between people of different ethnicities. The evidence is overwhelming, if uncomfortable reading for the self-loathers like FEMEN who daub their bare breasts with statements like: ‘Immigrants fuck better’. Perhaps a picture of O.J. Simpson would be more appropriate?

What do you think drives FEMEN to engage in this type of activism?

My initial response to FEMEN was positive. I thought they were protesting against the sexual exploitation of Eastern European women. My sympathies were obvious. The long and well documented white-slaving indulged in by predominantly Turkish, Albanian, and Jewish gangsters, gathers pace year on year. It is simply incredible that such appalling human trafficking exists and that no direct intervention like sanctions on the countries that operate brothel gulag systems are enforced. I note a real double standard here when you think of the recent high profile campaign by Michelle Obama to ‘Bring back our girls’. However, I soon became disconcerted when FEMEN Founders like Sasha Shevchenko began pontificating on their Sextremist ideology. I found it to be a poisonous cocktail of anti-white male bigotry, a clichéd Leftist love of ‘the other’, and a vulgar circus for self-indulgent, self-loathing women invading churches, urinating in the street, and protesting against so-called fascists who would deport the perpetrators of organized crimes victimizing their gender, limit the freedom of communities practicing female genital mutilation, and stamp out the grooming and abuse of young girls. I might be wrong, but I don’t recall seeing FEMEN actively challenging Muslim paedophiles in the UK or across Europe. Have they made a statement about Rotherham?

The antics of Pussy Riot demean the very important work of genuine female activists such as those of the first wave of feminism like Hannah More, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Frances Willard. Women whose genuine motivations were highjacked by radical feminists like the Red Stockings Brigade of the 1960’s, themselves a mere projection of the Black Civil Rights Movement stirring up trouble across the gender divide. Look at the work of Germaine Greer, Shulamith Firestone, Carol Hanisch, Ellen Levine, and Anne Koedt. The very titles of their books—The Female Eunuch, Forbidden Discourse: The Silencing of Feminist Criticism of Gender, and The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm—betray their narcissistic belligerence, over-bearing sense of entitlement, political lesbianism, and economic and syncretic Marxist agenda. And it did not end there. Bell Hooks in her book Killing Rage went so far as to justify her feelings about longing to murder an anonymous white male, no doubt because he represented the ‘oppressive patriarchy’ all these types despise. Dworkin, Wolf, Paglia, and Steinhem all follow in the same path as de Beauvoir whose Second Sex features on all ‘politically correct’ liberal arts college reading lists. I would highly recommend an antidote to such corrosive prejudice. Try the work and thoughts of Erin Pizzey, an early campaigner against domestic violence, who incidentally has subsequently been forced to spend long periods in hiding after bomb threats from radical feminist extremists; Karen Straughan of Girl Writes What and Dr Tara Palmatier who are working hard to re-balance the debate. There is also an extensive literature refuting the theories of the celebrated women’s champions listed above: Christina Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism ? and The War against Boys; Suzanne Venker’s The Flipside of Feminism: what Conservative Women think—and men can’t say; and Ronnee Schreiber’s Righting Feminism: Conservative women and American Politics.

According to certain controversial literature on human biodiversity, South East Asians are the most intelligent population on Earth and blacks the most athletic. If we accept this as true, then, surely, it makes sense to accept immigration from anywhere, since we’ll benefit from Asian brains and West African muscle. We’d then be unbeatable both in the astrophysics laboratory and the Olympic stadium.

Let us for a minute accept such stereotyping. Should we not also insist that those self-same people accept their proven statistical predilection for corruption, rape, and violence? Would South East Asians not be able to construct free and stable societies, dominate academia, and the patent lists of inventions? Why are our West African brothers not able to master the rudiments of more complex sports like gymnastics that require the synchronization of mind and body? I have studied alongside South East Asians and their tendency is to regurgitate what they learn uncritically. I have myself beaten black athlete’s on the school running track. Take a look at the Olympic medal tables and you will see white people outperform all other races proportionally, when you consider that we represent less than 16% of the world’s population.

Surely, with better immigration criteria and controls we can keep out the criminals and attract the best talent from all over the world. And, surely, there is a role even for rote memorisation and brute force in our societies. These things are needed, and it’s down to employers to find the right individuals for the right jobs. Let’s assume for a moment that this is just a technical issue that can be cracked with excessive costs and within a reasonable timeframe. Would you still oppose immigration? And, if so, why?

I would oppose immigration instinctively not just on the scale currently being undertaken, but because I think Europe, America, and the Slavic countries neither require it or substantially benefit from it. The criminal aspect is merely a ‘touchstone’ issue. Out of control diversity is a millstone not an asset. Especially when the benefits of diversity are all pretty much one-way. We in the West are uniquely blessed, unlike other peoples with most of the requisite capabilities to meet the majority of our societal needs. There is no obligation to feed the world until our own needy and poor are brought up to a proper level of subsistence. There is an old adage that charity begins at home. Let us start there. I do not however believe in isolationism, which is counter-productive and prevents a genuine and worthwhile exchange between cultures on an equal and beneficial footing. That is not what we have now.

The Western world can point to a history of brute force and rote memorisation. I do not hold such skills in high regard unless the former is absolutely necessary and the latter is applicable and beneficial to those who have no other course of betterment. I have liaised with large numbers of Chambers of Commerce in the UK and France and employers have plenty of opportunities to create viable and profitable businesses. What is becoming increasingly apparent is the drive towards excessive profit and greed. Such materialism above and beyond physical and spiritual satiation is I believe a serious sign of moral decay. The numbers of culturally bereft nouveau-riche people swilling second-rate champagne in kidney-shaped jacuzzis sickens me. And believe me, I have met many of that sort from Dublin to Tomsk.

Isn’t nationalism just hate and fear? Most decent people think it is very narrow-minded and backward world-view. We are no longer in the 19th century, after all; this is the 21st century and we live in a globalized world. You, in fact benefit from this every day.

I see the New Right as an alternative modernist movement, building on the homogenous organic roots of traditionalism, rejecting the liberal and socialist platitudes of a utopian future populated by a coffee-coloured people. I participate, contribute and benefit from the technical effects of modernity. Indeed, it is people like myself that drive those technical knowledge based economies. But I utterly reject the racial and cultural side-effects as an unnecessary impediment. I long for a political framework which abolishes multiculturalism and privileging the ‘ethnic’ over the ‘indigenous’ not because the European needs ‘protection’ and cannot compete but because current governmental statutes deliberately discriminates in favour of ‘ethnics’ over the whites and the fact that these global parasites are a drain on our core business, the advancement of our nations and the European continent. A national community functions best when, as Italian, Sergio Salvi, in his book Patria e Matria (Fatherland and Motherland) wrote : ‘It can be tentatively defined as a human group living in a definitive territory, which differs from other groups in a number of characteristics. These can be linguistic, cultural, historical and socio-economic. It is such shared characteristics that makes the members of a group aware of their particular identity. Even when the differences are not so tangible, they still give rise to the group’s desire to organize autonomously in the fields of administration (i.e., the State), politics and culture’. For me positive not ‘petty’ nationalism is the instinctive outcome of love for family, community and place. It is a healthy and over-riding human emotion. It is limitless and according to the Nietzschean theory of eternal return, its time will inevitably come again.

But nationalism is an idea associated with the nation-state, a fairly recent creation, which is becoming increasingly irrelevant, is it not? And its adoption necessitated the suppression of regional identities to begin with. At the time of the French Revolution, for example, only 1 in 8 people living in France spoke fairly good French; only half spoke any; and even in Oïl language zones, it was usually only used in cities. The ‘national identity’, the ‘national religion’, the ‘national curriculum’—all of these are concepts associated with the nation-state. The tendency in world history has been to
go from lower levels of organisation to higher. Surely, you do not envision a return to the polis, or to the city-state (à la Geneva, as in Rousseau’s time), do you? What about the argument that hugely expensive undertakings, such as a space programme, would be far more difficult with a 1000 small regions with small economies, with 1000 currencies and 1000 languages, as opposed to with a large block like the EU, using one currency and adopting a lingua franca?

It is true that the nationalism of the last two hundred years is generally associated with the nation-state and if you are force-fed Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawn like I was at university you are getting that diaspora interpretation once again. Even a more conservative view like that of Elie Kedourie comes from the same gene pool. Historians of this type are pre-determined to view such communitarian societies as essentially reactionary in character. Thinkers from the Anglo-conservative sphere like Edmund Burke, Thomas Carlyle, Maurice Cowling, Michael Oakeshott, T.S. Eliot, Roger Scruton, and Phillip Blond are given scant attention. Likewise, John Calhoun, the Southern Agrarian School, Russell Kirk, Paul Gottried, and even Gregory Wolfe in America. De Benoist and Faye, whom I referenced earlier were largely ignored and remained only partially translated into English until Arktos Media redressed this unforgivable oversight in recent years. Consideration of the German Conservative Revolutionaries is basically forbidden unless it is to criticize them. People like Fichte, Herder, Schopenhauer, Stefan George, Ludwig Klages, Gottfried Benn, Ernst Niekisch, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Othmar Spann, Edgar Julius Jung, and the great Martin Heidegger, despite the latitude of their thought must be viewed through the politically correct lens. Even Carl Jung suffers in this regard, but then again, he did split from Freud and so according to their narrative can never be forgiven.

The significance and relevance of regionalism is in fact an issue I hint at in the text of The Partisan, where I try to balance the importance I attach to Breton, Provencal and other regional cultures to the unified fight-back against a common-enemy. I do envisage a Europe of a thousand flags under a federal entity. But you will appreciate my vision of such a European confederation would be unrecognizable from today’s EU. It would not be without dissension and dispute but it would be a debate between similar peoples of a generally shared milieu, informed and framed by some of the disprivileged thinkers I listed above. A discussion of this type is far more likely to advance in a positive direction than disputes between peoples of completely different cultures, races or susceptibilities.

In The Partisan, you seem to see the problems afflicting our societies cannot be solved through the mainstream political process. Yet, people—not only in France and in Britain, but in all the Western democracies—are given a chance to vote every four or five years , so the political establishment and the policies pursued by democratic governments simply reflect the will of the people. From this it seems obvious that your view is that of a disgruntled minority.

My first Masters degree is in Government & Politics. I fully understand the various forms of local, regional, national, and international governance structures that bind our hands. I have studied all aspects of representation, party funding and the ideologies and platforms of the supposedly competing mainstream parties. The charade of the democratic process and the pantomime of elections do not fool me or I think increasing numbers of other people. Our governments are bought and paid for by people running multi-national corporations and ‘banksters’ who do not have our best interests at heart. We may still be a disgruntled minority but a committed vanguard can lead a revolution. Did you see the street scenes on Maidan? I was there. All over Europe the Right is on the rise: in France, Austria, the Baltic States, Italy, Poland, and Hungary. Look at Casa Pound fighting the Reds on the streets of Rome, Blocco Studentesco and of course Golden Dawn in Greece. I was touched by the dignified way The Immortals conducted themselves during a torch lit parade through a small German town. Our creed is a vital and living force, not a passive celebration of former glories, or for that matter a family that lives in a lifeless, sterile museum. I have a certain respect for the sentiments expressed in the dedication to the preface of Derek Holland’s The Political Soldier II, Thoughts on Sacrifice & Struggle: ‘To the prayers of the Saints and the Blood of the Martyrs who redeemed the European Motherland in the Past. May we, the last loyal Sons of Tradition and Order, be worthy of their Example as the Final Conflict approaches.

This narrative, about a race-based revolution, would strike many as wishful thinking by a fringe minority. Most would find it impossible to justify morally, because it is ultimately selfish. The Randian view of selfishness as a virtue has had the most fertile soil grow on in a context of Classical liberalism favouring individual liberty and therefore laissez-faire capitalism, and yet, it remains a marginal view; it cannot stand the moral attacks from the egalitarians, who can present themselves as virtuous because egalitarianism is selfless, at least as they understand it, which is what counts in this realm. Moreover, the events in Ukraine are of an entirely different order, since fits the liberal narrative, which can temporarily justify Ukrainian nationalism as a struggle for freedom—freedom from another, larger, richer, more powerful nation; a well-defined opponent. There is no well-defined opponent in Europe, even within the narrative you reproduce—no one likes the bankers and politicians, but responsibility for even the worst trends is diffuse. Even Tony Blair, a proven liar and war criminal, is making a killing economically. GQ even named him philanthropist of the year, eliciting only the most supine and feeblest of complaints!

This is the exact opposite of wishful thinking. Who would want to deal with a civil war on their own soil ? Yugoslavia was a test-case. I am not advocating violence but warning against it. The Partisan is not wish fulfillment, rather a shrill cry of concern about what will occur unless positive steps are taken now. Merkel and Cameron bemoaning the failure of multiculturalism will not stave off internecine violence. Randian idealism remains a cult because it does not link the supposed virtue of selfishness with the natural philanthropism that people have felt and acted upon historically because they are inclined to support people of like character and type. It is true the banksters are an easy target but you are looking through a post 2007 perspective. Distributists like Chesterton and Belloc were saying this over 70 years ago. And they were right!

In relation to Ukraine. I first starting wearing Stepan Bandera t-shirts and drinking vodka with Ukrainian nationalist veterans in the cellars of Lviv 7 years ago. I am fully aware of how that genuine uprising was manipulated. I was holding a birthday party 200 meters from the spot where the secret police were shooting protestors in Kiev last March. I have two further manuscripts dealing directly with Russia and Ukraine completed and ready for publication.

I personally refused to meet Tony Blair despite being part of a British trade delegation set to greet the former Prime Minister to a certain Muslim country two years ago. GQ embarrasses itself and insults our intelligence with their phony polls and propaganda. Everyone knows what Blair and his type represent and advocate. Will he produce GQ’s analysis as part of his defense when he is finally brought before a court? I don’t know about you, but I would anticipate a cacophony of contemptuous laughter.

You seem to reject egalitarianism. But isn’t equality a good thing? And if you don’t, are you not saying that certain people are inferior and should be deprived of rights that everyone—and certainly the United Nations—regard as universal? How can you possibly defend that? Is it your view that women are inferior to men, that blacks are inferior to whites, and that you’d rather institutionalise privilege for some, and oppression for others, based on the qualities they are born with and therefore cannot do anything about?

Egalitarianism is a façade used by the liberals and socialists to push their proposition nation agenda. In pursuit of the Holy Grail of Equality they are more than willing to sacrifice any sense of human differentation, erasing the realities of race, gender intelligence and cultural competencies. It is not a matter of supremacy and inferiority, it is a matter of reality. I do not believe in a universal ‘lowest common denominator’. People and cultures are different and we should celebrate that very real diversity not hold it to a single standard. Cultures are at different points of development and are on different trajectories. I agree with Spengler when he said, ‘Each culture has its own new possibilities of self-expression which arise, ripen decay and never return. There is not one sculpture, one painting, one mathematics, one physics, but many, each in its deepest essence different from the others . . . ’ Does that sound like someone who wishes to impose his will on others or a person hell-bent on depriving other cultures of their right to sovereignty or self- determination? I think not. Look around the world, the caste system you allude to in your question and the slave/worker relationships it implies are far more prevalent and embedded in non-white cultures. I am reminded of an axiom quoted in the short lived Rising journal: ‘A Nationalism that seeks to subdue or extirpate another culture is, in fact, not a Nationalism but an Imperialism, which threatens not only its intended victim but also its own well-being, for its distorted view of itself, and of its relations with others, can only invite disaster’.

I would not have selected a woman to be the central character in my novel if I was even remotely sexist or believed the female gender was in any way inferior. Sabine, the heroine of the book, is the very personification of a modern, intelligent, powerful woman who makes her own decisions and lives with the consequences. It is my view that we need to be far more strategic in appealing to women in order to grow our movement. They offer us the chance of a real multi-skilling asset which would greatly enhance our operations and further refine our perspective, ideals and objectives.

The issue is also not about colour but character and capability. History informs us that large numbers of diverse people find it difficult to live in close proximity without conflict. In general, the under-achievement of many non-whites living in a white community leads to demoralization, dependency and frustration. These result in violent outpourings like: in the USA—Watts 65, Newark 67, Rodney King/LA 92, Cincinnati 2001, Ferguson 2014; in the UK—Bristol 1980, Toxteth 1981, Brixton 1981, Bradford, Burnley and Oldham 2001, London 2011; in France—Clichy-Sous-Bois, Seine-Saint-Denis, Dijon, Belfort 2005; in Italy—Rosarno in Calabria 2010; in Spain – Roquetas in Almeria 2008; in Sweden—Stockholm 2013.

I see no benefit in perpetuating such catastrophes when it is clear that peaceful co-existence and co-location is simply not possible. A race realist like myself would recommend a natural separation based on mutually agreed terms.

This argument has been made for decades, with a great deal of hard science to support it. And yet, that hasn’t made any difference. It is still rejected wholesale. We go back to the ethics of this idea: egalitarians may argue that even if equality does not exist, it is nevertheless a noble ideal, and that alone makes it worth pursuing, even if the ideal could never be achieved entirely. In short, the facts don’t really matter, because this is an ethical question, not an empirical one.

If the Convergence of Catastrophes Faye anticipates in his book is correct, and the money, food and power begins to run out, I predict it will not be noble ideals and ethics that characterize our behavior. When the tipping point is reached the fracturing of society will move rapidly on ethnic, religious and tribal lines. Like you yourself argued in one of your celebrated speaking engagements, The Collapse may not be instant, it may have already began and its ramifications may go unnoticed at first. I think it was Ezra Pound who claimed it is the artist’s antenna that first picks up the vibrations of such events. The Partisan is in some ways a literal confirmation of what my more sensitive predecessors already knew awaited us. It is the realization of the dark nightmare to come.

In that speech you refer to I also said that a collapse could well take so long that by the time it is recognised as such the consequences would have long ceased to be relevant, because those affected or warning about them would have already disappeared or were no longer powerful. I also mentioned that there is no guarantee that any collapse would have the desired outcome. The scenario you describe assumes that in a social breakdown scenario, everybody falls into line along ethnic or tribal lines. That seems likely with the non-European demographic in our part of the world, but simple everyday observation suggests Europeans, and particularly North-Western Europeans, will remain as divided as they are now, fractured along moral or morally justified ideological lines. Even the Far Right is notoriously fractuous, not only due to conflicting personalities, but also due to disagreements over ideology. The same has always been the case with the Far Left. Kevin MacDonald has pointed out that Western Europeans are low in ethnocentricity and tend to form moral communities. If that is true, then ancestry is an insufficient condition. So the question must be asked—if egalitarianism is the irritant and the stumbling block, should identitarians not be focusing on a moral critique of egalitarianism?

I would contend the collapse started around 1913 and is now well advanced. The collapse takes many forms and proceeds at a different pace along many separate fault lines. It can be identified and estimated by different social, economic, demograhic, and political indices. We recognize it at the point it affects us as individuals, or as citizens of a particular nation. Those who govern the western world are managing the decline rather than arresting it. Some I suspect are complicit in it, or are directly benefiting from the decline in some way, transferring assets and investments at favourable rates to BRIC countries, much like maggots feeding off dying flesh. There is simply no way of guaranteeing that the moral poison of egalitarianism will not have so retarded the European population that they are inhibited from protecting their own or acting in a way to promote their group’s interest. I suspect however, that when non-Europeans band together, set up exclusive organizational structures, possibly based on religious lines, commit outrageous crimes and begin ethnic-cleansing, the mantra of ‘One World, One People’ will ring very hollow. There is nothing like watching your mother, sister and daughter being raped, or your father, brother and son being eviscerated by machete wielding savages to focus the mind. A moral critique of egalitarianism is long overdue. But we should pull the mask off this expression egalitarianism and call it what it is today, the Frankfurt School strategy to undermine all aspects of the Western Superstructure.

So what if people with non-European ancestry eventually become majorities in Europe? Aren’t they just people, no better or worse than anyone else? Are we to judge them by the colour of their skin, rather than the contents of their character?

The character and nature of the future population of Europe most certainly does matter. Demographics is destiny and the central question of our age, is whether or not the civilized and educated nations of the world will continue to allow themselves to be overwhelmed by those incapable of self-improvement, other than by squatting in close proximity to the techno-industrial or welfare systems of more developed cultures with their begging bowls in hand, or will they close their borders. The behavior, values, and capabilities of a large percentage of the people of non-European ancestry who are coming to Europe at this time, like many of the Latinos fording the Rio Grande, do not stack up meritoriously under any serious degree of scrutiny. They stand condemned by any scientific or moral measurement by which you would chose to evaluate them. They threaten a new dark age, taking us back centuries. Forget customs and folkways for one moment, just look at the graphs on intelligence. IQ averages in the countries benefiting from immigration are plummeting. In what way can this be described as evolution? It represents the dilution of excellence and the low level ground war already underway throughout North America and Europe is a sure sign that things will get worse rather than better. Is Leicester or Birmingham to be the next Detroit?

Like Spengler I believe that the human species is divided into a variety of widely differing and contradictory cultures. My interpretation of nationalism carries with it the insistence of reciprocal respect. It is in essence Identitarian. What we strive for is national self- determination; sufficient living space for the preservation and development of our race, heritage and culture; a socio-economic and legal system that reflects the values of its creators; the nurturing of our art; and the continuance of our life-force into future millennia. I will not stoop to plea for this on the grounds of the Charter of Human Rights or because it can be argued that what is being done to the white indigenous populations of European nations is a form of genocide by stealth. Though you can make plausible arguments for both those scenarios. I do not ask permission to live or to survive in my own homeland. A territory that people of my lineage have inhabited for 10,000 years. I demand it and will join others in reaching for the rope to hang the traitors who opened the floodgates to the sewers of the third world and lock and load the guns when words prove insufficient to defend our homes.

What was your aim with The Partisan?

Continuing my earlier point about fiction providing a gateway to theory, I want to contribute to a vibrant cadre of New Right novelists. My desire is to re-enchant the present generation with the ideals that made Europe great in the past. We are all descendants of a great cultural and intellectual inheritance and we have to make that case time and time again. Standing on the shoulders of giants like Ernst Jünger, Ezra Pound, and Louis Ferdinand Céline, I believe there now exists the potential to develop a genre that both entertains and informs. Several recent works like your own Mister, Tito’s Perdue’s oeuvre, and Derek Turner’s Sea Changes provides the basis for a new school of storytellers, poets and singer-song-writers.

They say that those who forget the past are bound to repeat it. You have an advanced degree in history from an American university—in fact, with a major component in Black Studies. Could it be not be argued, therefore, that you of all people, should know better than to write novels like The Partisan?

On the contrary. My original Masters in Politics included a dissertation which was a critique of the Soviet system. The Black Studies component of my MA in History featured such luminaries as: Nat Turner, Frederick Douglas, W.E. Dubois, Marcus Garvey, Elijah Muhammad, Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, Angela Davis, Kathleen Cleaver, Bobby Seale, George Jackson, Jesse Jackson, Al Sharpton, Louis Farrakhan and Black Panthers like Stokely Carmichael and Huey P. Newton and their ilk.
I probably know more about Communism and so-called Black Civil Rights activists than those on the left. It is an advantage to know your opponents better than they know themselves. My studies helped me identify the linkages like that between the Zionist Kivie Kaplan, who was Martin Luther King’s ‘handler’ and the communist Party of America. It was a formula that was repeated in the former Weather Underground leaders Bernadine Dohrn and Bill Ayers involvement with the Obama Presidential candidacy. Similarly, the association between Joe Slovo and his slow-witted tool Mandela in the dismemberment of South Africa.
These simple key quotes define the reasons why I wrote The Partisan:

‘During the last Open Convention the debate was, was it or was it not the duty of any good revolutionary to kill all new born white babies. At the time it seemed like a relevant framing of an issue. The logic being that through no fault of their own these white kids are going to grow up to be a part of an oppressive racial establishment internationally, so really your duty is to kill new born white babies. And I remember one guy tentatively and apologetically suggesting that this was in contradiction to the humanitarian aims of the movement and he was booed down’ – Doug McAdam (Weather Underground)

Kill all white men, white women and their babies’ – New Black Panther Party activist Malik Zulu Shabbaz, infamous for accusations of attempting to intimidate voters at a Philadelphia polling booth in 2008.

Do you plan on getting another degree?

To quote Solzhehnitsyn : ‘without any censorship, in the West fashionable trends of thought and ideas are carefully separated from those which are not fashionable; nothing is forbidden, but what is not fashionable will hardly find its way into periodicals or books or be heard in colleges. Legally your researchers are free, but they are conditioned by the fashions of the day . . .’

One single anecdote illustrates this perfectly. Having graduated on a bright summer day under a warm Californian sun, I returned to a slate grey London, intending to commence a PhD on the historiography of the so-called European New Right. I was interviewed by an American Professor with a Jewish surname. He was wearing a tweed jacket and smiling suspiciously over an oversize bowtie. As I tried to explain my hypothesis, the would-be don twirled his pen, looking distractedly out the window.

‘Why are you interested in these people?’ he asked contemptuously, ‘they have no intellectual capital. Have you thought of an evaluation of the impact of his theological upbringing on Martin Luther King’s later Civil Rights activities?’ The door closed. So I pushed on another. Sitting down in front of my laptop, sometimes overlooking a village green in Kent, where my every key stroke echoed to the rhythm of leather on wood; and at other times walking around the Zenkov Cathedral in Almaty, staring up through the cloud formations gathering around the rim of the Zailiysky Alatau mountains, I began typing the opening lines of The Partisan. That is my PhD thesis and it is written from the heart, free of the shackles of political correctness.

I notice that, though The Partisan draws from the anti-liberal ideas of the European New Right, it also has references to the French Revolution, which represented a triumph of liberal political theory. You even have the revolutionaries sing certain verses from La Marseillaise. Is this not a somewhat idiosyncratic interpretation of history?

It is the paradox we live with. French identity and pride is inextricably linked with a familiar anthem like La Marseillaise. If fiction is to be grounded and credible it must reflect reality. I would argue that we should accept that the vast numbers required to make a movement will fix on certain icons, flags and songs as they come together. It is to be expected and it is expedient. It is the passion and emotive qualities of unifying symbolism that is important. The deconstruction of deeper ideological underpinnings can be dealt with once we have won back the streets.

The Partisan makes a clear case against the Islamisation of France, and, presumably by extension, of Europe. What is wrong is Islam having a presence in Europe? There are Muslims in Bosnia who are fully European and don’t behave at all like Abu Hamza and fellow Jihadists from Asia and North Africa or the Pakistani paedophile rings in the United Kingdom. Indeed, even the SS had a division of Bosnian Muslims.

A presence is one thing. An overwhelming presence is quite another. Whilst minarets overshadow rooftops from Barcelona to Geneva and Frankfurt to Bolton, Christian churches are being firebombed across the Muslim world and the followers of Jesus are given an option, convert or die. How long before the phony war of protest by Muslims in Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels turns into a full scale insurgency by ISIS trained zealots? There is much to admire in all faiths, cultures and identities. But we must acknowledge, they flourish best when they are rooted in their home soil and watered by the winds from their own mountain tops. Over the last half century the seeds of destruction have been scattered across our fields. It is time to take the scythe to the weeds strangling our crop.

What about David Cameron’s proposal of ‘muscular Britishness’?

There is so much one could say on this matter but I will try to keep my reply concise and free from vitriol. My recollection is that this expression was first used in a Daily Mail article on the Trojan Horse scandal, where Tory party policies relating to the freeing up of school governing bodies and head-teachers from so-called local authority bureaucracy and allowing more school independence had resulted in a myriad of predominantly Muslim schools imposing a sharia curricula, removing white governors and treating indigenous students, already a numerical minority as second class pupils. Well, I cannot say I am surprised, it reinforces what I alluded to earlier in relation to the mindset of certain burgeoning non-British communities. I contend such autonomy will be abused by these people time and time again. They simply cannot be constrained by the normal European or British notions of fair play, decency and appropriate behavior. These apologists for paedophilia and honour killings are animated by the dream of a jihadist take-over not assimilation. The fact that Cameron, along with his collaborators in the Liberal-democrats have actually overseen a growth in immigration, despite all their public statements and manifesto pledges to the contrary, calls into question both the British Prime Minister’s integrity and capability.

His fetid description of Britishness as being all about democracy, equality, and tolerance reveals a complete disengagement with the martial qualities that built an Empire from Scotland to the Falklands and Novia Scotia to Singapore. Listening to a rendition of Elgar’s Pomp and Circumstance, would suffice in correcting such confusion. These modernist ideals also fly in the face of historic reality like the Chartist March on Monmouth, where men were shot and killed for demanding political representation; the fact that for centuries only male property owners had the right to vote and a suffragette had to throw herself under the King’s horse to raise awareness that women wanted the same opportunity; and that the everyday experience of anyone expressing concern over the behavior of non-whites is immediately shouted down with the cat-call of that much over-used word ‘racist!’ The latter apparently being a case of blatant ‘intolerance’ regardless of the merit of their argument. Double standards abound. No tolerance for the intolerant. No platform for fascists ! Government ministers signing up as members of Unite Against Fascism. So it seems, equality and tolerance are in reality in short supply in David’s Little Britain.

As for democracy, equality and tolerance are as British as the Union Flag, football and fish and chips ? Well let us deconstruct David’s assertions in true Marxist dialectical terms, shall we? It strikes me that the very existence of the Union flag is called into question by the Scottish referendum. Something Mr Cameron agreed to but did not feel he could extend to the discussion on immigration? With regards to football, it was clear from the lethargic display by the English team at the last World Cup, that the game ‘the British’ invented has now developed well beyond their current competency levels. Football is most certainly not coming home to paraphrase the line from the Three Lions Song. And the clichéd reference to fish and chips, so typical of Oxbridge champagne swilling Tories trying to appear ‘down with the boys’, can be dismissed by the simple observation that the most popular meal in the UK is now curry.

Like John Major before him speaking of the English matron pedaling through the morning mist or Mrs Thatcher hinting about the people’s concern about being ‘swamped’ by immigrants in the 79 election, Cameron has no intention of enacting muscular Britishness, whatever that means? Look who funds the party he leads. Peel back the names to reveal his own family origins and those of his advisors. Indeed, those of his predecessors. Leon Brittan, Nigel Lawson, Keith Joseph, Malcolm Rifkind, Alex Carlisle, Michael Howard, Edwina Currie, John Bercow and Keith Joseph. Check the following list of Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Labour MP’s, Ministers and Peers of the realm (the following is only indicative, not comprehensive) : Sam Gyimah, Kwasi Kwarteng, Reham Chisti, Baroness Warsi, Priti Patel, Alok Sharma, Nadhim Zahami, Kishwer Falkner, Sandip Verma, Mohamed Sheikh, Nat Wei, Maurice Saatchi, Satyendra Prasanno Sinha, Lord Taylor of Warwick, Patricia Scotland, Navnit Dhozlakia, Herman Ouseley, Floella Benjamin, Meral Hussein-Ece, Zahida Manzour, Rumji Vergee, Doreen Lawrence, Paul Boateng, Lord Darzi, Bill Morris, Baron Bhattacharrya, Baron Chan, Amir Bhatia, Baron Adebowale, Baron Parekh, Baron Patel, Baroness Pashar, Nazir Ahmed, Baroness Uddin, Baron Ali, Keith Vaz, Valerie Vaz, Chuka Umunna, Yasmin Qureshi, Ed Milliband, and George Galloway. Now ask yourself are such people likely to enact muscular Britishness?

And before we settle back and think this is an isolated situation, please take a look at the political ‘movers and shakers’ in the United States and closer to home, in Europe itself. It is not hard to find the same egregious behaviour perpetrated in the same quarters by the same self-interested parties.

Why did you choose a female protagonist?

I wanted to create a positive role model for those young women sympathetic to our shared traditions and thinking about becoming active in the movement. The Left have to some extent mythologized in book and film form the likes of Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin. To my mind these were two emotionally bereft, politically shallow and nihilistic women. Sabine was created in direct opposition to these latter day martyrs of the German Autumn. I can foresee a time when some of our best exponents will be women. I long to stand beside them in the shadow of fluttering Spartan pennants on the field of Poitiers.

Is there hope for Europe beyond liberalism?

There most certainly is. First, we must acknowledge the significance of integral traditionalism to the life and continuity of the homogenous community. Then we need the energy and vital radicalism of revolutionary conservatism to simultaneously conserve and transform those parts of our culture that are (a) worthy of preservation and (b) in vital need of evolution or eradication.

Isn’t liberalism simply for individual liberty, freedom of expression, freedom of opportunity, and equality before the law? Are we do away with all those, and go back five hundred years—or, worse still, end up with an authoritarian police state?

The police state is already here and the prison walls are the laws imposed upon us by the equality gurus to uphold the liberal establishment. There is no real individual liberty. It is being systematically replaced by stifling conformism in both the private and public arenas. Freedom of opportunity and equality before the law increasingly only applies to non-whites. A two-tier justice system is enforced by the adoption of politically correct moral codes. Social ostracization and exclusion from the work force is practiced against dissenters. Orwell’s vision of a ruthless regime insisting on political orthodoxy is with us. We are all locked in room 101 with Winston Smith and the rats are coming.



Solère, Fenek. “Interview with Fenek Solère.” Interview by Alex Kurtagic. Wermod & Wermod Publishing Group, 31 October 2014. <http://www.wermodandwermod.com/newsitems/news311020140001.html >.


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Dostoevsky and the State – Lossky

Dostoevsky and the State

By Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky

Translated by Mark Hackard


Translator’s Note: As the author of a notable work on Fyodor Dostoevsky, philosopher Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky contributed an excellent analysis of Dostoevsky’s worldview. Here he examines Dostoevsky’s relation to the state in the context of Russian culture and Orthodox faith. While Dostoevsky highly valued the democratic ethos of the Russian people and wished to see their communal principles enacted more in political life, he was nonetheless a staunch monarchist and a critic of Enlightenment liberalism. Dostoevsky’s thoughts on foreign policy, meanwhile, might seem quite romantic to us, but they contain a powerful ideal: the image of a state in the service of God, the Church and the people.


As a great empire, Russia is an organism larger than the Russian people. However, the Russian people are the most important factor of the Russian Empire, and the basic features of the people’s spirit determine the character of its sovereignty to a significant degree. Therefore Dostoevsky’s thought on the attributes of Russia as a state are closely tied with the views he expounded on the Russian nation.

Dostoevsky was an opponent of limiting autocracy; he feared that the higher classes, the bourgeoisie and the educated would use political liberty to subordinate the simple folk to their interests and ideals. “Our constitution,” says Dostoevsky, “is mutual love of the Monarch toward the people and the people toward the Monarch.” (Letter to Maikov, No. 302) Civil liberties, freedom of conscience, freedom of thought and freedom to print were loved and defended by Dostoevsky in every period of his life. He valued rural and city self-government highly and considered them correspondent to the spirit of the Russian people. Preparing the novel Demons in his notebooks and thinking over the image of Stavrogin (initially under the name of “the prince”), Dostoevsky wrote and doubtlessly expressed during this his own thought: “If there is reform, self-government, then elucidate it clearly and firmly, not hesitating, but believing the in strength of the nation… The German principle, administration, wants to lay its hands on the native Russian form, self-government.” One of the characters elucidates further, keeping in view the thoughts of the “prince”: “It was curious that he could so deeply understand the essence of Rus when he explained it and thereby enflamed Shatov.”

Finding in the Russian people a “genuine democratic attitude,” Dostoevsky, without doubt, would have welcomed the establishment of political democracy in the form of a democratic monarchy, if, he hoped, the lower classes of the people could have genuinely enjoyed political freedom in the spirit of their ideals. In the last year of his life, when discussions of calling a Zemsky Sobor (Land Assembly) were circulating, he recommended to ask the “gray coats” about their needs and even spoke about the responsibility of ministers before the Zemsky Sobor.

The place of Russia in Europe and her foreign policy especially interested Dostoevsky. The notion that moral principles should guide only the behavior of private individuals, but not the state, roused him to indignation. Condemning the behavior of such diplomats as Metternich, Dostoevsky says: “A policy of honor and unselfishness is not only a higher, but also perhaps the most beneficial policy for a great nation, precisely because it is great.” (Diary of a Writer, 1876, Jul.-Aug.) Russia namely comports herself as a great nation. “Russia,” says Dostoevsky, “was never able to produce its own Metternichs and Disraelis, but rather the entire time of its European life it has lived not for itself, but for others, precisely for interests common to all mankind.” Her unselfishness often resembles the chivalrous nature of Don Quixote:

In Europe they scream of ‘Russian invasions’ and ‘Russian treachery,’ yet only to frighten their masses when needed, for the shouters themselves hardly believe any of it, nor have they ever believed it. On the contrary, they are now bothered and scared that in Russia’s image there is something upright, something too unselfish, honest and disdainful of usurpation and bribery. They have a presentiment that it’s impossible to buy her off and she won’t be lured into a mercenary or violent matter by any political advantage.” (1877, Feb.)

There has recently appeared a brochure titled, “Principles of Russia’s European Policy in the 19th and 20th Centuries,” by Professor E.V. Spektorsky. Therein Prof. Spektorsky, making use of a multitude of facts, attests that Russia was guided predominantly by a policy of principles while Western states conducted a policy of interests. “The principles of Russia’s European policy were the salvation of the lost, loyalty to treaties and allies, and a peace of solidarity.”

One can object that Russia under autocracy conducted an unmercenary policy not by the will of the people, but by the orders of her rulers, such as Alexander I, Nicholas I and Alexander II. With many facts it can be proven that this is incorrect, and that that unselfish policy did correspond to the spirit of the Russian people themselves. And so after the flooding of St. Petersburg on 7 November 1824, among the people there were rumors that the disaster was retribution for the sin of not rendering help to co-religionist Greeks who had revolted against the Turkish yoke. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the goal of which was the defense of Orthodox Slavs, was supported by a widespread sympathetic movement of the popular masses.

Peter’s reforms, despite the dangers and temporary deviations toward the loss of cultural identity, were highly valued by Dostoevsky, as they freed Russia from “isolation”; their consequence was the “measureless expansion of view” and such an introduction to Europe, thanks to which we apprehended

our universal purpose, our personality and role in humanity, and we could not but recognize that this role and purpose did not resemble those of other peoples, for there every national personality lives only in themselves and for themselves, while we shall now begin, when the time has arrived, namely with becoming servants to all for universal conciliation.

Entering into European life, Russia attains the possibility of “active application of our treasure, our Orthodoxy, to the service of humanity.” (Diary of a Writer, 1876, June) The first step on this path should be the resolution of the Eastern and Slavic questions, which in Dostoevsky’s understanding are rather approximate with each other. As a matter of fact, the significance of the Straits for the economic life of Russia and the defense of the Black Sea Coast is known to Dostoevsky, but it does not interest him. “The Golden Horn and Constantinople – all of this will be ours,” writes Dostoevsky, “but not for invasions and not for violence.” To demand Constantinople from Europe, Russia, thinks Dostoevsky, has “a moral right,” “as the marshal of Orthodoxy, its patroness and protector.” (Diary of a Writer, 1876, June, Dec.; 1877, March)

Gaining hold of Constantinople and freeing the Bulgarians and Serbs from the Turkish yoke, Russia, hoped Dostoevsky, would set a beginning to the “unity of the Slavs” “in the service of humanity.” (1876, June) He knew that Western Europe would oppose Pan-Slavism with all its power, fearing Russia’s strengthening. Even in Russia herself, in an article by Professor T.N. Granovsky, Dostoevsky came across the idea that Russia’s attention to the fate of the Southern Slavs was conditioned not by idealist motives, but the aspiration to expansion. Fighting against Granovsky’s idea, Dostoevsky backhandedly admits that he had the academic in mind when he sketched out the image of a Russian liberal in the form of Stepan Trofimovich Verkhovensky, mocking while at the same time loving and respecting him. In consolation to people who feared Russia’s strengthening, Dostoevsky said that for Russia herself the matter of liberating the Slavs will be a source of “only troubles and pain.” (1876, Jul.-Aug.)

Dostoevsky foresaw that “as it never was before, there will be for Russia no greater haters, enviers, slanderers and even overt enemies than all these Slavic tribes only as soon as Russia liberates them and Europe agrees to recognize them as liberated.” This would happen “not by the supposedly low ungrateful character of the Slavs, not at all – they have their character in this respect as all do – but because such things in the world cannot happen otherwise.”

Unfailingly they will begin from inside themselves, if not speaking it aloud, and announce to themselves and convince themselves that they do not owe Russia the least bit of gratitude, but rather that they barely escaped from Russia’s lust for power by concluding a peace through the intervention of the European concert.

“They will grovel before the European states,” and will say that “they are educated peoples capable of the highest European culture, while Russia is a barbarous country, a gloomy northern colossus not even of pure Slavic blood, an oppressor and antagonist of European civilization.” “These small lands will eternally quarrel amongst each other, eternally envy and intrigue against one another.” (1877, November) Therefore, “without Russia’s enormous unifying center, Slavic harmony is not to be, and without Russia the Slavs couldn’t survive; the Slavs would wholly disappear from the face of the earth, whatever the Serbian intelligentsia or various European, civilized Czechs might dream.” (ibid, February)

Despite all these tragic prophecies, Dostoevsky loves the Slavs and considers it Russia’s duty to selflessly fight for their freedom. “In the current war,” he says, “having freed the Slavic tribes, we shall not acquire not one strip of land from them (as Austria is dreaming for herself), but rather, we will be overseeing their mutual harmony and defend their liberty and independence, even against all of Europe. (ibid, April) He hopes that the freed Slavs, perhaps after their age-old strife, will finally come to understand Russia’s unselfishness and form a federated state with her, in which every member would receive “as much political freedom as possible.” Dostoevsky dreams that “such a union could finally someday be joined by even non-Orthodox European Slavs.” (1876, June)

When speaking on an all-Slavic federation, Dostoevsky obviously has in mind N.Y. Danilevsky’s work Russia and Europe. Danilevsky set out to prove that the united Slavs would bring a new form of culture into the historical process and achieve a new cultural-historical type to take the place of the Romano-German cultural-historical type. However, the distinction between Dostoevsky and the ideas of Danilevsky is great. According to Danilevsky, cultural-historical types are so unique that they are almost incapable of influencing one another, and it is impossible to produce a unified and universal human culture. Dostoevsky, to the contrary, does not depart from the ground of Christian universalism:

We first declared to the world that not through the repression of the character of foreign nationalities do we want to attain our own success. On the contrary, we see it only in the freest and most independent development of all other nations and in brotherly unity with them, complementing one another, fostering in ourselves their organic particularities and extending, from us to them, our branches for cultivation, communing with them in soul and spirit, learning and teaching until that time when humanity, having been fulfilled with the relations of peoples unto universal unity, like a great and magnificent tree will give shade to the happy earth.

Lovely are Dostoevsky’s dreams of universal brotherhood of peoples and the peaceful development of culture. Speaking on Russia, he constantly underlines her unselfishness and her unwillingness to undertake predatory seizures of other lands. He had well-founded proof in Danilevsky’s book Russia and Europe that Russia, founding a massive empire, never killed off established national cultures. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to close one’s eyes to the fact that Slavic and Russian messianism seduced Dostoevsky to the assertion that the capture of Constantinople by Russia would be morally justified. He omits from view that the protection of Orthodoxy and the defense of Russia’s economic and strategic interests could be achieved without taking Constantinople away from the Turks by way of a peace agreement with Turkey and other states.

We shall say in passing, by the way, a few words on Dostoevsky’s attitude toward war. Christianity, both in Orthodoxy and in Catholicism, considering war an evil, admits, however, that there are other even worse types of evil, and therefore permits war in the struggle with them – for example, for the salvation of a people perishing from the violence of a predatory conqueror. Dostoevsky also holds this opinion, though he is overly fascinated by the positive aspects of war. He says:

A long peace always breeds cruelty, cowardice and crude, flabby egoism and principally mental stagnation. During a long peace, only the exploiters of peoples grow fat.

Having accumulated enormous wealth, the exploiters engorge themselves and begin to seek out deviant pleasures; the division between the rich and the poor is amplified, and “faith in the brotherhood of man” is lost. From this condition of society arise wars with commercial ends, for example, over new markets; such wars “pervert and even ruin peoples.” Conversely, “war for a magnanimous objective, for the liberation of the oppressed, for an unmercenary and holy idea heals the soul, drives out shameful cowardice and idleness,” and strengthens with an “awareness of self-sacrifice,” a consciousness of duty fulfilled and the solidarity of all the nation. (1877, April, see also Letter No. 353)

A burning love for Russia did not stop Dostoevsky from seeing the shortcomings of her state and social structure. And so in Demons, he made a well-aimed satire of despotic ways of Governor Von Lembke, who, not listening to the workers’ representatives that came to complain about the fraud of their factory manager, took them for rioters and had several of them beaten. Also wonderfully expressed in the novel are the absurdity and illegality of the measures that the governor and his subordinate take in the fight against the revolutionaries. Any “administrative triumph” (in Stepan Trofimovich’s words) is revolting to Dostoevsky. Toward the end of his life, he wrote in his notebooks that our society was not conservative, as “everything was taken from it, right up to legitimate initiative.” “All the rights of the Russian are negative ones. Give him something positive and you will see that he’ll also be conservative.” “He’s not conservative because there’s nothing to conserve.”[i]


[i] Biography, Letters and Notes from the Notebooks of F. Dostoevsky, 1883. Pg. 357.


Lossky, Nikolai Onufriyevich. “Dostoevsky and the State.” The Soul of the East, 4 April 2014. <http://souloftheeast.org/2014/04/04/dostoevsky-and-the-state/ >.


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Organic Democracy – Tudor

Identity and Politics: Organic Democracy

(Excerpt from “The Philosophy of Identity”)

By Lucian Tudor


Translations: Ελληνικά

Identitarians distinguish between different forms of democracy, some of which can be said to be more validly democratic than others. Alain de Benoist has distinguished between three forms of democracy corresponding to the French Revolutionary motto “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.” The first, “liberal democracy,” is based on liberal, egalitarian, and individualist ideology; it is focused on the individual as a self-interested being, is inseparable from the individualist ideology of human rights, and is characterized by the principle of “one person, one vote.” The second form is “egalitarian democracy” or “popular democracy,” based on the principle of equality and manifested itself in the totalitarian regimes of the nationalist or socialist (particularly Marxist) type. The third form of democracy is based on the principle of fraternity and is known as “organic democracy,” which, as we shall see, is regarded by Identitarians as being the only true democracy.

Organic democracy is primarily defined not by fraternity as a “universal brotherhood” (which is impossible and is based on a false, egalitarian notion of humanity), but on fraternity in the sense of ethnic solidarity and a sense of collective meaning grounded in a shared heritage: “The only ‘families’ in which genuinely ‘fraternal’ relations may be entertained are cultures, peoples and nations. Fraternity, therefore, can serve as the basis for both solidarity and social justice, for both patriotism and democratic participation.”[54] Because true democracy is essentially non-totalitarian and is based on respecting the principle of liberty, it is also, in a sense, pluralistic, allowing the existence of groups representing differing opinions and ideas. However, as Benoist points out, this does not at all justify the notion of establishing a “pluralist” society in the ethnic sense (the liberal multiculturalists’ conclusion):

The way in which the political rights assigned as a guarantee to the opposition are commonly assimilated to the rights from which social minorities wish to benefit is itself problematic: for political categories cannot always be transposed on a social level. This may lead to a serious failure to distinguish between citizen minorities and non-citizen groups installed—whether temporarily or not—in the same land as the former. “Pluralism” may here be used as a rather specious argument to justify the establishment of a “multicultural” society that severely threatens national and folk identity, while stripping the notion of the people of its essential meaning.[55]

Alongside the foundation in ethnic community, organic democracy is also defined by participation: “Democracy is a people’s [Volkes] participation in its own destiny,” to reference Arthur Moeller van den Bruck’s words.[56] For that reason, a purely representative democracy is regarded as an incomplete democracy: only a participatory democracy in which the entire citizenry can take part in decision-making is a true democracy. Finally, addressing the anti-democratic arguments made by most Traditionalists, Benoist has also pointed out that democracy does not necessarily reject hierarchy. Political equality among citizens of a state does not mean regarding each of them as equal in any other sense, and organic democracy, at its essence, is perfectly reconcilable with the values of hierarchy, aristocracy, and authority, although in a unique manner differing from absolute monarchies.[57]

To support their advocacy of democracy and to counter the claim that democracy is a modern invention, a common theme in Identitarian and New Right works is the reference to ancient democracy, which has taken on participatory, representative, and various mixed forms. It is typical for Identitarians to reference examples of democracy specifically from Western European history, such as that of the ancient Germans or Greeks, although historical examples could also be found in many Eastern societies, even in entirely non-European societies (ancient Asiatic, Native American, etc.). Democracy clearly has a solid historical basis, for, to quote Benoist once more,

Democratic regimes or tendencies can be found throughout history. . . . Whether in Rome, in the Iliad, in Vedic India or among the Hittites, already at a very early date we find the existence of popular assemblies for both military and civil organisation. Moreover, in Indo-European society the King was generally elected.[58]

Alexander Dugin has also cited the history of organic democracy in Russian and “Eurasian” history, including the examples of the ancient Slavic Veche (equivalent to the Germanic Thing) and Orthodox priestly democracy.[59] Whatever the example, ancient democracy has almost always taken on organic forms based on respect for ethnic differences. Thus, Benoist rightly denounces liberal and egalitarian democracies as being only pseudo-democratic or entirely undemocratic:

Democracy means the power of the people, which is to say the power of an organic community that has historically developed in the context of one or more given political structures—for instance a city, nation, or empire. . . . Every political system which requires the disintegration or levelling of peoples in order to operate—or the erosion of individuals’ awareness of belonging to an organic folk community—is to be regarded as undemocratic.[60]


[54] Alain de Benoist, The Problem of Democracy (London: Arktos, 2011), 99.

[55] Ibid., 66.

[56] See Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Germany’s Third Empire (London: Arktos, 2012), 15.

[57] See Benoist, The Problem of Democracy, 17. See also the chapter “A Defence of Democracy” in this same work.

[58] Ibid., 14–15.

[59] See the chapter “Органическая демократия” in Alexander Dugin, Консервативная революция (Moscow: Арктогея, 1994). We have especially relied on the online version for this research, published at Арктогея, December 1, 2002 (http://www.arcto.ru/article/38; accessed September 1, 2014). We could add to these examples the democratic practices of many of the ancient peoples of the Baltic, including the Scythians, the Sarmatians, and the Dacians (in modern-day Romania); see Ion Grumeza, Dacia: Land of Transylvania, Cornerstone of Ancient Eastern Europe (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Books, 2009), 46, 129, 132.

[60] Benoist, The Problem of Democracy, 103.



Excerpt from: Tudor, Lucian. “The Philosophy of Identity: Ethnicity, Culture, and Race in Identitarian Thought.” The Occidental Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Fall 2014), pp. 106-108. This essay was also republished in Lucian Tudor’s book, From the German Conservative Revolution to the New Right: A Collection of Essays on Identitarian Philosophy (Santiago, Chile: Círculo de Investigaciones PanCriollistas, 2015).


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Democracy: Representative & Participatory – Benoist

Democracy: Representative & Participatory

By Alain de Benoist


Representative democracy — essentially liberal and bourgeois — is the most widespread political regime in the Western world today. Representatives are authorized by election to transform the popular will into acts of government. Thus we tend to think of “democracy and “representation almost as synonyms. The history of ideas, however, does not at all support this.

The great theorists of representation are Hobbes and Locke. For both, the people, in effect, contractually delegates its sovereignty to governments. For Hobbes, this delegation is total. But it by no means leads to democracy: on the contrary, it invests the monarch with absolute power (the “Leviathan”). For Locke delegation is conditional: the people agrees to give up its sovereignty only in exchange for guarantees concerning fundamental rights and individual freedoms. Popular sovereignty is not so much lost between elections as suspended, so long as the government respects the terms of the contract.

Rousseau, for his part, holds that democracy is incompatible with any representative regime. The people, for him, does not contract with the sovereign. The prince is only the executive of the people, which remains the sole holder of legislative power. He is not even invested with the power belonging to the general will; indeed, it is rather the people that governs through him. Rousseau’s argument is very simple: if the people is represented, then its representatives hold power, in which case it is no longer sovereign. The sovereign people is a “collective being” that can only be represented by itself. To renounce its sovereignty would be like renouncing its freedom, i.e., destroying itself. As soon as the people elect its representatives, “it is a slave, it is nothing” (On the Social Contract, III, 15). Freedom, as an inalienable right, implies its full exercise, otherwise there cannot be true political citizenship. Under these conditions, popular sovereignty can only be undivided and inalienable. Any representation thus constitutes an abdication.

If it is granted that democracy is the regime based on the sovereignty of the people, then one must accept Rousseau’s argument.

Democracy is the form of government that corresponds to the principle of the identity of the ruled and the ruler, i.e., the popular will and the law. This identity derives from the nominal equality of the citizens, i.e., from the fact that they are all equally members of the same political unity. To say that the people is sovereign, not essentially but by vocation, means that it is from the people that the public power and the laws proceed. The rulers can thus be only agents of execution, who must conform to the ends determined by the general will. The role of the representative must be reduced as much as possible, the representative mandate losing all legitimacy as soon as it relates to ends or projects not corresponding to the general will.

Exactly the opposite is the case today. In liberal democracies, primacy is given to representation, and more precisely to whomever incarnates representation, i.e., the representative. The representative, far from being merely an “agent” expressing the will of his voters, is the very incarnation of this will by the mere fact of being elected. Election justifies him acting no longer according to the will of those who elected him, but according to his own will—in other words, he regards himself as authorized by election to do whatever he judges best.

This system is the object of those criticisms that have always been raised against parliamentarism, criticisms that assume new urgency in current debates on the “democracy deficit” and the “crisis of representation.”

In the representative system, once the voter has delegated his political will to his representative by voting, power’s center of gravity inevitably resides in the representatives and the political parties that subsume them, and no longer in the people. The political class soon forms an oligarchy of professionals who defend their own interests (the “New Class”), in a general climate of confusion and unaccountability. Today, when decision-making power is increasingly allotted by nomination or co-optation rather than election, this oligarchy is further augmented by “experts,” senior officials, and technicians.

The rule of law, whose virtues liberal theorists regularly celebrate—despite all the ambiguities attached to this expression—seems unlikely to correct the situation. Consisting of an ensemble of procedures and formal legal rules, it is actually indifferent to the specific aims of politics. Values are excluded from its concern, thus leaving an open field for the confrontation of interests. Laws have authority solely because they are legal, i.e., in conformity with the constitution and the procedures provided for their adoption. Thus legitimacy is reduced to legality. This legalist-positivist conception of legitimacy encourages respect for institutions as such, as if they constituted ends in themselves, without the popular will being able to amend them and control their operation.

However, in democracy, the legitimacy of power does not depend solely on conformity to the law, or even conformity to the Constitution, but above all on conformity of governmental practices to the aims assigned by the general will. Thus the justice and the validity of the laws cannot lie entirely in the activity of the state or the legislation of the party in power. Likewise, the law’s legitimacy cannot be guaranteed by the mere existence of jurisdictional control: it is also necessary that the law be legitimate, that it answer to the citizens’ expectations, and that it serve the common good. Finally, one can speak of constitutional legitimacy only when the authority of the constituent power is recognized as always having the right to amend the laws’ form or contents. That is to say that the constituting power cannot be completely delegated or alienated, that it continues to exist and that its authority is higher than the Constitution and constitutional laws, even if these are based on it.

Obviously we can never completely escape representation, since the idea of a controlling majority encounters insurmountable difficulties in modern societies. Representation, which is never more than a makeshift, does not, however, exhaust the democratic principle. It can to a large extent be corrected by the implementation of participatory democracy, also called organic democracy or embodied democracy. Such a reorientation appears even more necessary today given the general evolution of society.

The crisis of institutional structures, the disappearance of the founding “grand narratives,” the growing disaffection of the electorate for conventional political parties, the revival of community life, the emergence of new social or political movements (ecological, regionalist, identitarian) whose common characteristic is less to defend negotiable interests than existential values—all these allow us to envision the possibility of recreating a fundamentally active citizenship.

The crisis of the nation state — due in particular to the globalization of economic life and the deployment of phenomena of planetary influence — causes for its part two modes of transcendence: at the top, through various attempts to recreate at the supranational level a coherence and efficiency in decision-making that would allow at least partial regulation of the globalization process; at the bottom, through the renewed importance of small political unities and local autonomies. These two tendencies — which not only do not oppose but actually complement and imply one another — offer a remedy for today’s democracy deficit.

But the political scene is still changing. On the right we are seeing the rupture of the old “hegemonic block” because capitalism can no longer maintain its alliance with the middle classes—due to its belated modernization, the evolution of production costs, and the transnationalization of capital accelerated by the crisis. At the same time that the middle classes feel disorientated if not threatened, the lower classes are increasingly disappointed by the governmental policies of a left that, after disavowing practically all its principles, tends to identify more and more with the interests of the upper middle class. In other words, the middle classes no longer feel represented by the parties of the right, while the popular elements feel abandoned and betrayed by the parties of the left.

Moreover, the effacement of old points of reference, the collapse of models, the disintegration of the great ideologies of modernity, the absolute power of a commercial system that (may) ensure the means of existence but not the meaning of life, raise finally the crucial question of the significance of man’s earthly existence, of the meaning of individual and collective life, in an age when the economy produces more and more goods and services with less and less labor, multiplying exclusions in a context already heavily marked by unemployment, precarious employment, fear of the future, insecurity, reactive aggressiveness, and tensions of all kinds.

All these factors call for an in-depth recasting of democratic practices that can take place only in terms of true participatory democracy. Indeed, in an increasingly “illegible” society, participatory democracy has the main advantage of eliminating or correcting the distortions caused by representation, ensuring greater conformity of the law to the general will, and founding a legitimacy without which institutional legality is mere show.

It is not possible to recreate such an active citizenship at the level of the great collective institutions (parties, trade unions, churches, armies, schools, etc.) for today they are all more or less in crisis and thus no longer able to perform their traditional functions of social integration and mediation. Nor can the control of power be the sole prerogative of political parties whose activity is too often reduced to clientelism. Today, participatory democracy can be only a grassroots democracy.

The purpose of grassroots democracy is not to generalize discussion to all realms of life, but rather — with the input of as many people as possible — to arrive at new decision-making procedures in conformity with the requirements of grassroots democracy and the aspirations of the citizens. This is not merely a matter of opposing “civil society” to the public sphere, which would amount to increasing private influence and giving up political initiative for obsolete forms of power. Rather, grassroots democracy works to make it possible for individuals to prove themselves as citizens, and not as members of the private sphere, while supporting as much as possible the multiplication and flourishing of new public spheres of initiative and responsibility.

The referendum procedure (which results either from government decision or popular initiative and which is either optional or obligatory) is only one form of direct democracy among others — one whose importance is perhaps overestimated. Let us stress once again that the real political principle of democracy is not that the majority decides, but that the people is sovereign. Voting per se is only a simple technical means of consulting and revealing opinion. This means that democracy is a political principle that should not be confused with the means it uses, any more than it is to be reduced to a purely arithmetic or quantitative idea. Citizenship is not exhausted by voting, but is present in all methods allowing one to give or refuse consent, to express refusal or approval. It is thus advisable to explore systematically all possible forms of active participation in public life, which are also forms of responsibility and personal autonomy, since public life conditions the daily existence of us all.

But participatory democracy is more than just political. It also has social import. By supporting relations of reciprocity, by allowing the re-creation of social bonds, it can help reconstitute today’s weakened organic solidarity, repairing a social fabric frayed by the rise of individualism, competition, and self-interest. Insofar as it produces elementary sociality, participatory democracy goes hand in hand with the rebirth of vibrant communities, the re-creation of solidarity in neighborhoods, districts, workplaces, etc.

This participatory conception of democracy is entirely opposed to the liberal legitimation of political apathy, which indirectly encourages abstention and leads to the reign of managers, experts, and technicians. Democracy, in the final analysis, rests less on the form of government per se than on people’s participation in public life, such that the maximum of democracy merges with the maximum of participation. To participate is to take part, to prove oneself as part of a unit or a whole, and to assume the active role that results from this membership. “Participation,” René Capitant says, “is the individual act of the citizen acting as a member of the popular collectivity.” One sees by this how much the concepts of membership, citizenship, and democracy are interdependent. Participation sanctions citizenship, which results from membership. Membership justifies citizenship, which allows participation.

Everyone knows the motto of the French republic: “Liberty, equality, fraternity.” If the liberal democracies have exploited the word “liberty,” if the former people’s democracies seized upon “equality,” then organic or participatory democracy, based on active citizenship and popular sovereignty, could well be the best way to respond to the imperative of fraternity.


Alain de Benoist, “Démocratie représentative et démocratie participative,” in Critiques—Théoriques (Lausanne, Switzerland: L’Age d’Homme, 2002), 426–30. The translator wishes to thank Alain de Benoist for permission to translate and publish this essay, and Michael O’Meara for checking and editing the translation.



De Benoist, Alain. “Democracy: Representative & Participatory.” The Occidental Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 2008), pp. 19-24. Text retrieved from: <http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/05/democracy-representative-and-participatory/ >.


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Re-Reading Rousseau – Benoist

Re-Reading Rousseau*

By Alain de Benoist

Translated by Greg Johnson


Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) is a rather curious case in the history of ideas. After two centuries, he is still the object of truly passionate opinions (you either love him or you hate him), and few authors have given rise to as many contradictory interpretations. He is commonly seen as an inspiration for the French Revolution, but also as an influence on German nationalism. He is seen as a convinced individualist, a social misfit, a gentle dreamer seeking self-dissolution—and as a fanatical logician devoted to Spartan discipline. He is seen as a rationalist, but also as the prophet of a morality and religion based solely on sentiment. He has been represented as the father of romanticism and one of the precursors of state socialism. Hippolyte Taine accused him of collectivism, Benjamin Constant of despotism. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, who blamed him for the “great deviation of 1793,”[1] saw him as a theorist and apologist of tyranny.

Rousseau is the bête noire of the French right, though they seldom read him. The liberals, for their part, blame him for the excesses of the Revolution of 1789 and claim he is the source of a “totalitarian” current leading straight to Karl Marx.[2] Indeed, for Rousseau, the social contract remains in large part still to be written: the limits of the possible have not yet been attained and the better society is still to come. The traditional right is more radical in its criticism, reproaching Rousseau for the very idea of the social contract and using the term “Rousseauism” to designate a “utopian” anthropology of undeniable malefi-cence. Rousseau is then presented as nothing more than the father of egalitarianism and the author of absurd theories of the “noble savage” and the “naturally good man.”

Typical of this mentality is Charles Maurras’ portrait of “poor Rousseau”:

Neither the spirit of the family, nor of the party, nor the political interests that would have moderated every other Genevan, was capable of tempering the mystic rage of this tub thumper, born in misfortune, scourged silly by an elderly spinster, and spoiled rotten by his first friends. Jack of all the trades, including the most disgusting, in turn lackey and minion, music master, parasite, kept man, he knew only one thing: his intellectual and moral bankruptcy. . . . Born sensitive and versatile, completely incapable of holding fast to the truth, his divergent arguments never harmonize with his whining. He is a criminal, a savage, and a madman, in about equal parts.[3]

Rousseau’s thought nevertheless exerted a considerable influence, which extends far beyond the intellectual or political context to which it is often restricted.[4] But this influence, even in Rousseau’s own time, seems to be located much more on the level of sensibility than of doctrine. Besides, his influence was based less on his texts than on often hostile interpretations and simplifications. Rousseau is an author who is often quoted but almost never read. Moreover, only his early works are commonly cited; his constitutional projects for Corsica and Poland are too often ignored, especially by his adversaries. Finally, it was only in the twentieth century that serious study of his work began and the unity of his thought was recognized.[5] In any case, all these controversies show that Rousseau’s thought does not lend itself to easy summation in neat formulas. Thus I propose that we re-read Rousseau, not to “rehabilitate” him—for he does not need it—but to go beyond the received view and discover an author who undoubtedly deserves better than the image often offered by his admirers as well as his enemies.

Rousseau on Nature

Rousseau writes that “man is naturally good.” However, one reads at the beginning of Emile: “Everything that comes from the hands of the Author of things is good; everything degenerates in the hands of man.” What are we to think of a being who is alleged to be naturally good, but who causes everything he touches to “degenerate”? Moreover, in the formula “naturally good,” which word matters most? Does Rousseau want to say simply that man is good, and on top of that this kindness is natural for him, or does he want to say that it is as a natural being that man is good? The importance that Rousseau gives “nature” evidently suggests the second interpretation. But this term is also equivocal for him. The “back to nature” theme was all the rage in the eighteenth century. For Diderot, Guillaume Raynal, and so many others, it nourished all kinds of speculations about the “golden age,” the “primitive virtues,” etc.[6] Is this really the case with Rousseau? Moreover, such a watchword has very different meanings depending on one’s idea of “nature.” The Church, for example, always preached an “ethics according to nature,” whereas Nietzsche denounced “morality as anti-nature” (the title of the one of the chapters of Twilight of the Idols). In fact, one need only read Rousseau to realize that “natural” is used with two very different meanings. Sometimes “natural” refers to what is original, sometimes to what is authentic or essential. Very quickly, the second meaning took precedence.

When he evokes the “state of nature,” Rousseau proves to be much less utopian than many Enlightenment philosophers. At the beginning of his Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men,[7] he says explicitly that he never intended to depict an original state of humanity, because one can never know what it was, or even if the “state of nature” ever existed. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Rousseau does not turn towards a far distant past, which he reconstructed in his own fashion, any more than he believed it possible to learn something of human “nature” from so-called “savage” tribes. The state of nature for him is less a historical concept than a speculative and regulative idea allowing one to organize facts. It is a fiction he uses to explain the appearance of the phenomena he wishes to critique. The same applies to the idea of the “social contract” which he says belongs among “the hypothetical and conditional truths.” Today, one would say: a working hypothesis.

Rousseau opposes “natural man” and “civilized man.” But both of these categories are immediately subdivided: just as civilized man includes the bourgeois as well as the citizen (more on this below), the natural man includes the savage natural man and the natural man living in society. However, one wonders whether the first of these two “natural men” is truly a man. Rousseau describes him as a “stupid and limited being,” “bound by nature to instinct alone”: “limited to physical instinct alone, he is null, he is stupid” (Discourse on Inequality). This savage, guided only by “self-love,” is a recluse who lives in autarky. He is self-sufficient in the sense that he does not maintain individualized relations with anybody. He has neither morality, nor beliefs, nor reason, nor language. Such a being is thus in no way distinguishable from an animal. The savage natural man, subject to strict natural selection, is initially one living thing among others. By this, Rousseau thinks he is affirming the animal origin of man. It is a point of view rather different from that of his contemporaries.

Rousseau does not see the “state of nature” as the starting point of an ineluctable linear development. The state of nature described in the first part of the Discourse on Inequality is essentially static; in theory, man could have remained there eternally, perpetually enjoying the “happiness” connected to his animal embodiment. This savage man is by all evidence an imaginary being, a kind of ideal type that Rousseau needs in order to set up his other categories. For if the savage is not an actual man, he is nevertheless potentially one. He is solitary, but not asocial. He has the “social virtues potentially.”[8] For Rousseau, although sociality does not strictly speaking arise from nature, neither does it go against it. Man is social as soon as he is man, in the full sense of the term. It is thus no exaggeration to say, with Louis Dumont, that Rousseau, contrary to most interpretations of his thought, fully recognizes the social character of man, i.e., his membership in a concrete society as a condition of his humanity.

Natural Goodness and the Problem of Evil

It is, in short, necessary to place Rousseau in the context of his time. Rousseau’s theory of the “naturally good man” initially aimed at answering the classical question of theodicy, i.e., the problem raised by the existence of evil in a world supposedly freely created by a God who is both all-powerful and infinitely good. Apparently this problem can be solved in only two ways: either we exonerate God by explaining evil by the original sin, i.e., by man’s misuse of his freedom before his entry into history; or we exonerate man, and one is then obliged to doubt the goodness or the absolute power of God.

Rousseau’s position is more original. Against the Encyclopedists, Rousseau advocates the “justification of God.” Against the Church, he disputes the idea of original sin, which represents man as naturally bad. By affirming that evil comes neither from man nor from God, but from a third source, i.e., society, Rousseau by no means intends to plead in favor of an irresponsible individual who blames “society” for all his acts, which is the common meaning of “Rousseauist.” He intends, rather, to answer a fundamental theological problem, which immediately confronts any speculative reflection.

His critical conception of the social is equally original compared to the philosophy of his time. The idea of a distinction between civil society and the state was certainly common in the eighteenth century, when all philosophical reflection rested on the assumption that modern man first lives in a private social sphere, in opposition to the public sphere dominated by the state. The early liberal theorists articulated their criticism of institutions starting from the idea that there is a civil society that must be continuously defended against the encroachments of power. For Encyclopedists, civil society is thus a priori good in itself. What is bad is the political system, absolute monarchy, power which always tends to expand itself.

But Rousseau concludes the exact opposite. Absolutism, in his eyes, is only an epiphenomenon. For the Encyclopedists, it is the cause of social and political evil; for Rousseau it is only a consequence. These are two very different perspectives. The Encyclopedists, who reason in a purely mechanist manner, believe that it would suffice to limit power so that civil society could function “freely” in a more or less optimal way. Rousseau himself realized quite well that social reality is much more complex, and that one does not solve all problems by curbing the authority of the state or changing institutions.

Above all, it was the Church which, having recognized Rousseau as an adversary of the idea of original sin, worked to blame every excess on the “natural goodness” of man. In fact, for Rousseau, man in the state of nature is neither good nor bad, for the simple reason that there is no morality in him. In the state of nature, there is, “neither goodness in our hearts, nor morality in our actions.”[9] In addition, man is fully man only when he is “denatured,” i.e., when he ceases being a solitary and perfect whole to become part of the social whole. Rousseau, who often returns to this idea, writes that “good institutions are those that best denature man . . . so that each individual no longer believes he is one, but part of the whole.” His thought on this point is very clear. Rather than “good,” man is naturally innocent as long as his humanity is just virtual; he is neither good nor bad (or both good and bad) as soon as he fully attains his humanity.

In the second sense, which takes on a greater importance in Rousseau, “natural” means essential. Ultimately, for Rousseau “natural” man is not the original man, man without society, who bears an essence that he himself authenticates. The “nature” of man becomes at the same time what is specifically human in him. Consequently, the problem of human nature becomes an exclusively moral and philosophical problem. To know what is “natural” in man, one must undertake a reflection on his inner being, on the ideal type that corresponds best to the human phenomenon. I agree with Louis Dumont who writes: “The core of Rousseau’s message lies much more in moral and religious consciousness than in feeling for nature, as is sometimes is believed.”

Freedom, Perfectibility, History

What then is the “nature” of man? First and foremost, it is his freedom. Rousseau opens an important inquiry when he wonders whether man really belongs to “nature,” and not rather to freedom. His answer is that the two terms are integral to each other. And from this fundamental freedom, Rousseau immediately derives the concept of “perfectibility.” What distinguishes man from all the other living things is that he is perfectible: he has the capacity to change himself. Here Rousseau is not very far from the idea, presented in particular by Arnold Gehlen, of man as “open to the world,” not strictly determined, free to “denature” himself, i.e., to enculturate himself in his own fashion. Far from preaching the return to any state of nature, Rousseau defines real man as a being who never sticks to his state of origin, but unceasingly seeks to exceed himself and create new forms of existence. “The nature of man is to have no nature, but to be free” (Pierre Manent). That, of course, can be understood in various ways. But the fundamental idea remains: freedom initially consists in constructing oneself, which applies to individuals as well as to peoples.

In addition, for Rousseau freedom is neither a gift nor a passive state. From a dynamic point of view, it exists only insofar as one is ready to conquer it. Contrary to the philosophers of the Enlightenment, Rousseau does not intend to base the social bond on “sympathy” or self-interest. He does not expect society to guarantee well-being or “happiness,” but rather to provide man the conditions in which he can conquer his freedom. This is far from the presuppositions of the economists and utilitarians of his time and ours.

It is important to grasp fully that it is perfectibility that inserts man into history and makes him a historical being in the full sense of the word. Through this conception of man, Rousseau poses a philosophy of history far removed from modern historicism. Rousseau does not, like Hegel, see continuous progress in human development, an ever-intensifying rise of reason in history. The concept of perfectibility, for him, does not immediately answer the question of progress. On the contrary, Rousseau wonders why the history of human perfectibility is so often a history of evil. Contrary to liberal optimism, he believes neither in the intrinsic virtues of progress nor in a utopia that will necessarily come to pass. In a certain way, in his eyes, to become historical is neutral. Perfectibility is the source of errors and hopes, successes and failures. It is the cause of misfortune and all human “misery.” It is the source of the alienation of everything most authentic in him. But it can also help him get it back. In fact, according to the circumstances, it can lead to servitude or a better society.

Unlike many of his contemporaries, who were avid pastoralists, Rousseau did not believe it possible to return to an original state: “Human nature does not go backwards.” He did not dream of a Golden Age or wish to restore a lost paradise. His social contract is not, like Locke’s, an event of the past, but a part of the future that still remains to be founded. It is not to be reconstituted, but to be realized. Intended to rescue man from the corruptions of a degenerate society, it does not reveal the image of the self-sufficient individual, but calls for collective action. This is equivalent to moving from a history unconsciously suffered to one consciously engaged. Rousseau knew well that society was always much more the result of human action than human design. But his conclusions were the opposite of Hayek’s. Rousseau is resolutely “perspectivist.” Society has gone wrong precisely because hitherto it has developed without man’s knowledge—and this is why man must try to take control of it. Human existence is not inevitably inauthentic and “depraved.” It is not a question of seeking “happiness” or returning to the “state of nature,” but of taking the path of freedom. The idea that man is a good savage who has been corrupted by society seems, in this light, somewhat inadequate. Rather, according to Rousseau, man is a perfectible animal whose perfectibility resulted in self-alienation, but who can recover his authenticity without having to revert to a former state.

To work for the advent of a better society ultimately comes down to knowing how man can conform to his essence, how he can be himself. This preoccupation with “authenticity” explains Rousseau’s influence on the German Romantics and the Sturm und Drang generation, an influence, moreover, that would be expressed in two different forms according to whether one gave primacy to the feeling for nature or the requirements of morality. For Rousseau’s morality was not reduced to the prerogatives of feeling, to the “right of the heart” which likened Goethe’s Werther to Rousseau’s New Eloise. It is a more fundamental ethical imperative that already foreshadows Kant. Moreover, Kant worked out his moral theory in explicit reference to Rousseau, and it was really “between Kant and Rousseau” that the discourse of the young writers of the Sturm und Drang would be worked out.


Let us now consider the problem of equality. Here too, we tend to stick too closely to a formula: “All men are born equal and free” (On the Social Contract). Rousseau’s conception of equality is actually very complex. It has nothing to do, for example, with the embryonic communism of François-Noël Babeuf. Rousseau reduces the equality of nature to membership in the species—men are equal insofar as they belong to the same species (sub specie naturae)—and also to the metaphysical constitution of human nature: men are subject to a common finitude; we are all equally doomed to death.

Along with this equality of the human condition, there is a natural inequality that Rousseau does not deny for an instant. On the contrary, in the Discourse on Inequality, he explicitly mentions this “natural inequality,” “established by nature,” “which consists in the difference of ages, health, physical strength, and qualities of the mind, of the soul.”

Certainly, the social contract represents one moment when equality between men is perfectly realized. But Rousseau describes this equality as a “reciprocal commitment of all towards each.” This concept of reciprocity is rather close to the Aristotelian definition of justice, and steers the idea of equality towards that of proportion or right measure: to each his own.

In addition, on the social level, Rousseau unambiguously challenges what Montesquieu calls the spirit of “extreme equality.” In his eyes, the despotism of all is no better than the despotism of just one, and he rightly sees that extreme equality leads to the tyranny of all. In his projects for Corsica and Poland, he even recommends instituting a hierarchy of three nonhereditary classes, having distinct functions and privileges.

Thus Rousseau does not recommend the disappearance of social differences. He asks only that social inequalities agree with natural inequalities and do not involve unbearable domination. “With regard to equality,” he writes, “this word does not mean that the degrees of power and wealth are absolutely the same, but that, as for power, it is never comparable to violence and is never exerted but in virtue of rank and laws and, as for wealth, that no citizen is so rich he can buy another, and no one so poor that he has to sell himself” (Discourse on Inequality).

To use Isocrates’ famous distinction: Rousseau in the end tends more toward a “geometrical equality,” i.e., a distributive justice, than toward the arithmetic equality characteristic of modern egalitarianism. As Raymond Polin writes, “Rousseau always defended the other equality, the proportional and moderate form of equality that recognizes the legitimacy of moral and political distinctions and differences, provided that they harmonize with the inequalities established by nature.”[10]

Rousseau, in the same way, does not criticize property rights, but intends to firmly limit their abuse. “Property,” he affirms, “is the most sacred of all civil rights and more important, in certain regards, than even life.” In addition, property is “the true guarantor of the commitments of citizens,” because the law would be inapplicable if the people could not respond to how it applies to their goods. For this reason, Rousseau disputes Locke’s idea that one has a natural right to property based on work. Property, he says, is “a human convention and institution,” which means that the right to property is a social right. The state for Rousseau, unlike Diderot, is not a “dispenser of happiness.” It ought to intervene only when the inequalities of fortune reach such a point that they condemn certain categories of citizens to an economic dependence reducing them to the status of objects. Generally speaking, Rousseau is quite aware that there can be rights only where there are relations: rights are born with society. Human rights in the sense defined by liberal theorists, as eternal rights that man brings from his “state of nature,” leave Rousseau completely indifferent.

The importance Rousseau gives to broader society leads him to recognize that the central power in society resides in opinion. It is what fixes the position of men and the esteem they enjoy. It is what determines the social comparisons from which most inequalities result. (Here one can still see Rousseau’s originality: inequalities do not give rise to social comparisons, but social comparisons give rise to inequalities.) With these observations, Rousseau again expresses his anti-liberalism. Some take self-interest as axiomatic: society “necessarily entails that men hate one another to the extent that their interests conflict.” He perceived quite well that, in modern societies, the assignment of comparative values to men is above all based on the process by which things are priced. The value allotted to each individual aligns with exchange value. However, for Rousseau, the value of men is not reducible to a price. Thus he shows that, personal qualities being at the origin of inequalities and the phenomena of subordination that they involve, “wealth is the last thing they are reduced to in the end, because being most immediately useful for well-being and easiest to pass on, one easily makes use of it to buy everything else” (Discourse on Inequality).

Rousseau observes that this “competitive” inequality is found as much in Paris as in London, Naples, or Geneva. The power of money is integral to modernity, which installs the bourgeois in place of the citizen. Modern man lives neither for others nor for his fatherland, but only for the approval of an opinion that spontaneously models social value on monetary value, i.e., on money. Rousseau calls this attitude vanity (amour-propre) and sees it as a corruption of self-love (amour de soi). As Pierre Manent stresses:

Vanity is not self-love: it is even in some way the opposite. Vanity lives by comparison, it is the desire to be esteemed by others at as high a price as one esteems oneself, and it is condemned to be unsatisfied, since everyone has the same vanity and feels the same desire. Vanity knows that it cannot be satisfied, and it hates others for their vanity. It nourishes in the soul distaste for oneself and impotent hatred of others. The man of such a society lives only by the approval of the others, whom he hates.[11]

Thus envy and frustration seem to form the cursed pair of the modern spirit. One sees here the beginning of an analysis of resentment and mimetic competition that presages Nietzsche, Tocqueville, and René Girard all at once. Furthermore, the transformation of natural man into sociable man, into “man of man,” as described in the second part of On the Social Contract, attests to the importance of the role of vanity and resentment from the angle of preferences and comparisons. Comparison causes preferences, preferences generate individualized personal relations, the latter being mediated by the opinions of others, which is the origin of inequality. Describing this process, Rousseau reveals the connection between man’s domination of nature and his alienation from himself. The more man sets himself up as the master of a world reduced to objects, the more he is withdrawn from a relationship of mutual belonging with the world; the more he changes himself into an object, loses the meaning of his existence, and becomes a stranger to himself. The idea will be found in Heidegger. Rousseau notes finally that in the society produced by this evolution, “freedom” is nothing but illusion: when all members are slaves of opinion, the freedom of each is only the impotence of all. This is what justifies his strikingly formulated critique of the bourgeois spirit.[12]

Rousseau describes the bourgeois as a “double being,” divided, entirely subject to the dictates of opinion, and, for this reason, concerned entirely with appearances. Referring to the birth of the bourgeois, he writes in the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality: “To be and appear became two completely different things, and from this distinction came imposing splendor, deceptive trickery, and all the vices that follow in their train. . . . When everything is reduced to appearances, everything becomes false and deceptive.” This passage is important, because it shows what Rousseau really wanted. The bourgeois is defined less by his economic position than his psychic type, his mentality. The bourgeois is the very negation of everything authentic, of everything that connects man to his essential being. He is a false man, without consistency; a decadent who lives only for the opinion of others; a being characterized by lies, prudence, and calculation; by a servile spirit, debased morals, and tepid feelings: “He will be one of these men of today, a Frenchman, an Englishman, a bourgeois; he will be nothing.”[13]

Here the opposition to liberal authors is total. Whereas they criticize power but not wealth, Rousseau blames the rich much more than the powerful. Whereas the Encyclopedists sought above all to modify the institutional and political system, Rousseau realizes quite well that the problem raised by the absolute power of a social situation founded on envy, and in the final analysis on the power of money, is infinitely more complex. Rousseau is quite far from contrasting French absolutism to the liberal English regime so much admired by the Enlightenment. He sees that beyond their differences, the two systems are devoted to the rise of the same bourgeois type, i.e., of the type of man who aims always above all at his own self-interest.[14]

Finally, Rousseau does not believe for an instant that private life, left to itself, can make men happy, nor that the pursuit of selfish interest can, thanks to the “invisible hand,” end up benefiting all. In truth, he reviles selfishness: “When one wants to be happy only for himself, then there is no happiness for the fatherland.”[15] This is why he intends to fight against indifference towards the commonweal and wants to keep “in narrow boundaries this personal interest that isolates private individuals to such an extent that the state is weakened by their power and can expect nothing from their good will.”

Rousseau’s Critique of Progress

Nor does one find in Rousseau the optimistic confidence with which the Encyclopedists observed the rise and the progress of the sciences. Rousseau does not share the idea that there is a natural harmony between the requirements of society and those of positive science. Nor does he expect the diffusion of knowledge to roll back “superstitions.” In a famous text addressing the question Whether the progress of the sciences and the arts has contributed to the corruption or the purification of morals (1750),[16] he expresses his doubts about the emancipatory powers of science. Elsewhere, he recalls that “if reason illuminates us,” “passion leads us.”

It is probably in light of this critique of scientism that we should understand the importance he gives to feeling. For him conscience plays the same role that instinct does for the body: “Too often reason misleads us . . . but the conscience is never mistaken,” one reads in Emile (IV). This moral subjectivism, this idea that the personal conscience alone is able to determine good and evil (“all that I feel to be good is good, all that I feel to be bad is bad; the best of all casuists is the conscience”) earned Rousseau justified criticism. It should be seen, however, that if Rousseau gives such a place to the impulses of the conscience, if he defends feeling and passions, if he praises the “heart of nature” and the surging sensations it generates, he does so—against the spirit of the Encyclopedists, who conceive of society only in the form of a social mechanism—to establish the infirmity of reason and oppose to it the prerogatives of the heart—perhaps also to affirm the existence of a bond between man and the world at a time when incipient industrialization was turning the latter into a simple object of which human reason was to take possession.

To the figure of the modern bourgeois, Rousseau significantly opposes that of the citizen, of whom he finds the most perfect examples in antiquity. He writes:

When ancient history is read, one believes oneself transported into another universe and among other beings. What have the French, the English, the Russians, in common with the Romans and the Greeks? Almost nothing but their shapes . . . . They existed, however, and they were human like us. What prevents us from being men like them? Our prejudices, our base philosophy, and the passions of petty interest and selfishness in the hearts of all the foolish institutions that genius has ever dictated.[17]

The enthusiasm and the bitterness that inspire these lines are revealing. Rousseau is a passionate admirer of antiquity. He has an acute sense of heroism and loves great men. Did he not learn how to read with Plutarch’s Lives? It is in antiquity that he sought proof that there is a form of existence other than the bourgeois. It is his study of antiquity that sparked the idea of a society where distinctions rest on real virtues, not on wealth, birth, or even simple skill. It is in Rome and Sparta, in “noble Lacademonia,” that he sought the model citizen. Thus he does not at all share the criticisms Hobbes formulated of the ideal society of the ancients. And contra Montesquieu, who admired the ancient city, but reproached it for imposing an exhausting civic discipline on its members, he pleaded forcefully for a return to the public-spiritedness of free citizens.

He also used the ancient example when he based equality on liberty, and not liberty on equality. His conception of liberty is much nearer to what Benjamin Constant called the “liberty of the ancients” than that of the moderns, who understand liberty exclusively as the liberation of the individual ego and the independence of the subject. Liberty as Rousseau conceives it is inseparable from the idea of participation in the social order.

Rousseau on Democracy

Rousseau believes in direct democracy. Ideally, he says, this is the best regime, because the people always remain in control of the sovereign power. It guarantees every man total liberty and perfect autonomy, while ensuring that government conforms with the general interest. This leads to Rousseau’s fundamental criticism of the concept of representation. Contrary to the social contract of Hobbes or Locke, Rousseau excludes any delegation of sovereignty to rulers and requires that elected officials act according to the will of the voters rather than their own conscience.

In his system, the people do not sign a contract with the sovereign: their relations are governed exclusively by law. The prince is only the executive of the people, who retain sole title to legislative power. The prince does not represent the General Will; he is not its incarnation, but only its instrument; at most he is elected, commissioned, to express it. Indeed, remarks Rousseau, if the people are represented, then it is the representatives who have power, in which case the people are no longer sovereign. For Rousseau, popular sovereignty is inalienable. Any representation is thus equivalent to an abdication.

In this scheme, the sovereign holds executive power, but not legislative power. Rousseau calls “democratic government” the system in which the people would also hold executive power, a possibility that appears entirely utopian to him. This is why he writes: “If there were a people of gods, it would be governed democratically. A government so perfect does not agree with men. . . . True democracy never existed and never will.”[18] This remark, the subject of countless misconceptions,[19] must be interpreted correctly. Rousseau means only that the legislative power cannot merge with the executive power, because “it is against the natural order that the great number governs.”[20] The people cannot govern itself, but it can, on the other hand, legislate and then “appoint” its governors.

The rejection of any representative system entails the rejection of factions and parties. This is why Rousseau harshly critcizes the English constitution which, according to him, does not guarantee liberty so much as the privileges of the representatives: “The English people think themselves free; they are quite mistaken; they are free only during the election of members of Parliament; as soon as their representatives are elected, the people are slaves, they are nothing. In the brief moments of their liberty, the use they make of it merits its loss.”[21]

Whereas the philosophers of the Enlightenment wanted to limit the prerogatives of power and disputed the very notion of popular sovereignty, Rousseau instead made the latter the cornerstone of his entire political system. Calling sovereign the body politic which gave birth to the social contract, he deduced from this that, the General Will being one, the sovereignty resulting from it cannot be fragmented without losing all meaning. Thus Rousseau rejects any separation of powers, any attempt to divide sovereignty.

Rousseau also rejects the distinction between liberalism and despotism, because he thinks that by establishing citizenship, one can ensure political and social unity without falling into despotism. That said, he is rather indifferent to the form of government. He is not hostile, for example, to aristocratic government, which he says quite openly is the “best government.”[22] But that must be understood within his system. What is essential, for Rousseau, is that the people hold legislative power and never relinquish it. Once that is acquired, executive power can just as well have an aristocratic form. The power to govern does not merge with sovereignty.

In principle, the reasoning is completely sound. It is clear that to the degree it is human, democracy is truly realized only in direct form: a citizen who delegates his right to approve or reject a law to a representative, even one elected by him, thereby alienates his autonomy and uses his liberty only to relinquish it. But it is equally obvious, at least in theory, that only the rule of unanimity truly respects autonomy. It follows that true democracy requires, not just the assent of a majority, but the assent of all. On this point, one can of course be skeptical. Unanimity can perhaps be reached in very small cities or communities, with populations having common values and interests. On the other hand, the greater the population, the greater the risk of a diversity of irreconcilable opinions. Unless one falls into despotism, the ideal of unanimity then becomes an inaccessible dream. (Georges Sorel, of course, reproached Rousseau precisely for having imagined a democracy copied from the Genevan model.)

Rousseau does not dodge the problem. He is conscious of the fact that direct democracy requires conditions that are only seldom met. This is why he appears hardly inclined to propose universal solutions: his project for Corsica differs notably from the one he conceived for Poland. His tendency is rather to resort to the principle of authority: he thinks that the more subjects a government has, the stronger it must be.[23] He even thinks that, in a state of emergency, a Roman-style dictatorship (rei publicae servanda, “for the commonweal”) can be justified.

Holism and Individualism

Rousseau appears especially obsessed by the dangers of division. On the political plane, if he admires the ancient city, it is first of all for its unity. On the anthropological plane, he describes the bourgeois as a divided being. Moreover, he draws an interesting parallel between, on the one hand, the distinction between temporal and spiritual power, and, on the other, liberalism’s distinction between the citizen acting in the public sphere and the isolated individual pursuing his self-interest in the private sphere. Like Hobbes, he thinks that the conversion of Europe to Christianity could only entail a disastrous distinction between spiritual and temporal power, creating “a perpetual conflict of jurisdiction that made any good polity impossible in the Christian states.”[24] The conflict between the Christian and the citizen thus presages the conflict between the individual and society.

As a result, Rousseau sees what liberalism and absolutism—which the philosophy of the Enlightenment treats as polar opposites—really have in common: the importance attached to the individual—the difference being that absolutism believes in the rebellious nature of individuals and thus in the need to use force to make them obey, while liberalism professes in this respect a greater optimism. Rousseau criticizes the liberal idea that the social can be based on individualistic impulses and the autonomy of civil society. But at the same time, he reproached the French monarchy, to the extent that it reflected the influence of the bourgeoisie, for having dismantled the traditional corporations and professions, in order to transform them into entities made up only of individuals.[25]

Rousseau returns to the Aristotelian definition of the citizen: the citizen is he who participates in the sovereign authority. Thus citizenship is directly related to political life. The political sphere constitutes the essential medium for relationships between citizens; it is the place where they can find a unity apart from membership dictated by origin alone. In the city, the citizen depends only on the law, not on men. Contrary to the bourgeois, he shows from the beginning that this essential characteristic is not to be divided. It is a unity, and a good society has to preserve this unity. In the final analysis, society must allow each citizen to identify himself with the city of which he forms a part. The individual should be seen only as part of the body politic. One sees from this that Rousseau is completely alien to any scheme inspired by “class struggle.” He characterizes the well-ordered society by the harmonious integration of all its components. Society is first of all a community, a whole where each party is subordinated to all. Plato said: “Nothing is made for you, but you are made for the whole” (Laws, X). Rousseau advocates “the total alienation by each member of the community of all his rights to the whole community” (On the Social Contract).

Unlike Hobbes, who described society only in mechanistic terms, Rousseau sometimes even happens to compare the social body to a living organism. He is not, however, an organicist in the strict sense, because for him the solidarity between parties comes not just from organic cohesion or common origins, but in the political realities of the social contract and General Will. Referring to the social contract, Rousseau wrote: “This act of association produces a moral and collective body made up of as many members as the assembly has votes, deriving from this same act its unity, its common self, its life, and its will.”[26]

Thus in the end, Rousseau’s reasoning departs from individualistic premises to arrive at holist conclusions. Rousseau says that it is because man is free and originally one that he can be autonomous, and this model of individual autonomy must found the autonomy of society as a whole: “He who dares to undertake to institute a people must feel in a position to change, so to speak, human nature; to transform each individual, who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole, into part of a very great whole from which this individual receives to some extent his life and his being.”[27] Thus he uses a holist model, but a holism “built” on the model of the individual.

This passage from the individual level to the social status raises obvious difficulties. How can the citizen, the ideal figure of real humanity, constantly align his own interest with that of the city without making him fundamentally alienated from it? How can individual autonomy amalgamate with social autonomy without the latter, inevitably, restricting the former? Rousseau answers these questions by turning again to the social contract and the General Will. Implying a discontinuity between natural man and man in society, the social contract marks the true emergence of humanity in the strict sense. However, the social contract implies the General Will, which permits Rousseau to re-establish holism against the individualism that had previously sustained his discourse.

The General Will

What is the General Will? Rousseau sometimes gives the impression that he confuses the General Will with the will of all, i.e., with the simple addition of individual wills. But it is nothing of the kind. The General Will is based on the unanimous preference of those who instituted the body politic. It is the will of this body as an established whole. Its only acts are laws, and these are the acts that make it possible to put the general interest, the common good, above individual opinion and private interests. Rousseau, as we have seen, defines liberty as an autonomous ability to participate in society. From such a perspective, authentic liberty consists in the autonomous movement of the will that adheres to the law, and this is why it is realized to the highest degree in the General Will. Of course, “each individual as a man can have a specific will contrary or dissimilar to the General Will which he has as citizen. His private interest can tell him something completely different than the common interest.” The individual, Rousseau continues, should put nothing before the General Will. It is here that he makes a remark for which he is reproached so often:

When one proposes a law in the assembly of the people, what one asks them is not precisely if they approve or reject the proposal, but if it is in conformity or not with the General Will that is theirs. . . . Thus when a opinion contrary to mine prevails, that proves only that I had been mistaken, and that what I thought was the General Will was not in fact it.[28]

And as individual autonomy is supposed to have fused with social autonomy, Rousseau can affirm that while submitting to the General Will, individuals in the end submit only to themselves!

The question inevitably arises of whether the General Will is infallible. Rousseau answers it in a way that can make one smile: “The General Will is always right, but the judgment that guides it is not always enlightened.” That leads him to imagine the figure of the “Legislator,” a rather ambiguous character who would have the power to control the laws without possessing either “legislative right” or governmental office. Commentators, of course, have not failed to compare this “Legislator” to the providential “guides” of which modern totalitarianisms made great use.[29] It should not be forgotten, however, that in Rousseau the General Will is more a force of resistance than a force of command. Its essential goal is to express right, just as the government incarnates force, both being necessary to the operation of the state. Expressing the law, the General Will literally animates the social body, gives it “movement and will,” becoming thus the principle of its conservation. It is consequently “the sole form appropriate to the will as an ethical will in general, the sole institution that can bring about the passage from mere arbitrariness to law” (Cassirer).

The General Will thus escapes any reductionistic interpretation. Incarnating sovereignty, it transcends individual wills and has particular characteristics that one does not find in any of its components taken separately, exactly in the same way that the common interest transcends private interests. Rousseau, moreover, is emphatic that “what realizes the will is less the number of votes than the shared interest that unites them.” The theory of the General Will thus exceeds the idea of the majority that comes from universal suffrage. Centered around the concept of “common interest,” it implies the existence and maintenance of a collective identity. Whence the importance Rousseau attaches to the “character of a people,” to the “feeling of membership,” “shared habits,” etc. It is known that Rousseau puts the law above all, because in his eyes it alone can realize the justice that is the condition of freedom. And yet, above the law, he still places mores. “By reason alone,” he writes, “one cannot establish any natural law,”[30] while mores are what makes the “true constitution of states.”[31] When the laws grow old and fade away, it is mores that revive them. Customs and traditions thus constitute the natural adjuncts of political authority: “Nothing can replace mores for the maintenance of government.”

Thus the people is identified with the whole citizenry and opposed quite naturally to the masses (“the multitude”): whereas the multitude can always be controlled by a tyrant, the people no longer exists when the Republic is dissolved. Thus the General Will can be likened to Durkheim’s “collective conscience,” or even the “popular soul” (Volks-seele) dear to the Romantics, although the conditions of its formation are exclusively political. Indeed, there is little doubt that the General Will implicitly preexists its expression in a majority vote. It is, as Louis Dumont writes, “the emergence at the political level and in the language of democracy of the unity of a given society as it preexists in its members and is present in their thoughts and projects.”[32] To be legitimate, therefore, power must be exercised by a community that has first become conscious of itself. As Kant saw so well, the General Will is the act by which the people constitutes itself as a state and creates the conditions of an identity of will between the people and the sovereign: the society resulting from this act, says Rousseau, is one where “a unity of interest and will reigns between the people and their leaders.”

Furthermore, against the universalism of the Enlightenment which, with Diderot, advocates the “society of mankind,” Rousseau affirms that the General Will of a nation is specific to it, which leads him to challenge cosmopolitanism. The citizen, according to him, is first of all a patriot. In Emile, he writes:

Forced to fight nature or social institutions, it is necessary to choose between making a man or a citizen: because one cannot do both at the same time. . . . Every patriot is hard on strangers: they are only men; they are nothing in his eyes. This disadvantage is inevitable, but it is small. What is essential is to be good to the people with whom one lives. . . . Beware of those cosmopolitans who search far and wide in their books for duties that they scorn to observe where they are.[33]

In the Discourse on Inequality, he adds: “If I had been forced to choose the place of my birth, I would have chosen . . . a state . . . where this sweet habit of seeing and knowing one another turned love of the fatherland into love of the citizens rather than of the Earth.” Just as individual liberty corrupts itself when it falls under the domination of others or when it is alienated and becomes a stranger to itself, ceasing to belong to itself, the liberty of the nation is essential for him. Rousseau even goes so far as to make autarky one of the conditions of freedom: “The national condition most favorable to the happiness of individuals is not to need the help of any other people in order to live happily.”[34]

Economics versus Freedom

Montesquieu naïvely maintained that the expansion of trade in Europe would oblige states “to cure themselves of Machiavellianism.” Rousseau, who knew that the “state of nature” always persists between nations, did not believe for a moment that trade and economic exchange in general were conducive to peace.[35] Besides, he obviously did not like economics and scarcely wrote anything about it. When Mirabeau tried to make him read the Physiocrats, he balked. On his return from England in 1767, he denounced the idea of an autonomous economic sphere and developed a radical critique of Physiocratic ideas. His economic ideal is nothing at all like free trade: here too, he remains autarkical and even archaic. Rousseau wishes above all to reduce as much as possible the role of money in exchanges, and proposes to support agriculture against industry. A nation with prosperous agriculture, he says, is already on the path of self-sufficiency; in addition, its inhabitants, having kept contact with nature, have healthier mores than townspeople or workmen: “Trade produces wealth, but agriculture ensures freedom.”

This opposition between “wealth” and “liberty” is characteristic of Rousseau’s thought. Just as he defends the primacy of politics over economics, Rousseau—preoccupied with “morals” above all—upholds values contrary to those of the bourgeois or the merchant. He extols virtue, which is to be understood as “political virtue,” i.e., as good citizenship. To adapt his particular will to the General Will, to place the common interest above all else, to put themselves at the service of the fatherland, i.e., at the service of all free individuals who compose the people and of the laws they give themselves, this is what virtue is. An admirer of Sparta, Rousseau loved the frugal life, “simplicity in manner and ornament.” The thesis of Emile is that one should spare no effort, no pain, no suffering if one wants to educate the character and the will. Indeed, for Rousseau, the public authorities ought to be educators. In order to forge and maintain the will of the citizens, they should make money contemptible, discourage useless luxury, maintain “simple manners, healthy tastes, a martial spirit without ambition, form courageous and disinterested souls.” Above all, on all occasions, they must cultivate love of the fatherland, which merges with the love of liberties and laws. In opposition to Christianity which, he says, inspires “humanity rather than patriotism” and tends “to make men rather than citizens,” Rousseau proposes in his book on the government of Poland to educate citizens in the worship of the fatherland alone: “It is education that ought to imbue men’s souls with the force of the nation and direct their opinions and tastes such that they are patriotic by inclination, by passion, by need. A child, when opening his eyes, must see the fatherland and, until his death, should see nothing else.”[36] At the end of his life, he went so far as to envisage the formation of a national and civil religion inspired by antiquity, which was to be the highest degree of patriotic worship and civic education.

* * *

The commentators on Rousseau have stressed his contradictions, real or imagined, a thousand times. He himself says: “System of any kind is above me; I have none of it in my life and actions.”[37] A complex thinker heralding the whole modern agenda through the very critique he made of it, Rousseau never hesitated to correct himself when he thought it necessary. The closer he came to the end of its life, the more he seemed to realize that the objective he had chosen—to find a form of government that puts laws above man, without falling back into divine right monarchy—was the political equivalent of squaring the circle. His letter to Mirabeau of July 26th, 1767 even suggest that the form of government he proposed was to a great extent chimerical.

Many criticisms of Rousseau are superficial and erroneous, but others are sound. Maurras is obviously wrong to attach Rousseau to the liberal school. The model of society proposed in On the Social Contract, and more still in the later texts, is incontestably holist. The whole problem comes, as we already noted, from basing a holist model on individualistic premises. Rousseau remains individualistic in the very idea of the social contract: he believes, mistakenly, in the voluntary origin of politics; he believes that politics is about “commission.” To support the idea that the city is an artifice if man is not naturally a social being, he had to imagine a “natural” man whose existence, however, he was the first to regard as doubtful. The contradiction falls apart when he attempts to posit society as an enlarged projection of the individual. How can one compose a society that is one and independent of individuals who themselves prefer to be and remain one and independent? The social contract makes it impossible to solve this problem. It is necessary for men to be autonomous by nature if society is conceived in their image, but as soon as society exists, it is necessary that they cease being autonomous. Rousseau hopes “to find a form of association . . . by which each, uniting himself with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.”[38] This objective is unrealizable.

Rousseau’s main error is to believe that one can fuse the law and the constitution. He thinks it possible to found a constitution where the law alone is sovereign, so that there is no longer any reason to limit the sovereignty of such a constitution. The General Will would then have all rights: “Alienation being made without reserve, the union is as perfect as it can be and no associate has anything more to claim.” Consequently, one could not violate the law, since it would amount to contradicting oneself. And no law could be unjust, since one could not be unjust towards oneself. Disobedience consequently becomes impossible. But there is no more freedom when it is not possible to disobey. The simultaneous search for unanimity and undivided direct democracy is thus quite likely to lead to a new form of tyranny, a tyranny all the more frightening as the system, bathed in an eminently moral atmosphere, does not so much state what politics is as what it should be.

Although idealist and “virtuist” in many respects, Rousseau is nonetheless eminently realistic. He gleefully denounces the majority of “enlightened myths” supported by the philosophy of the Enlightenment and flatly opposes liberal optimism. His conception of man clarifies both his “animal” origins and the “world-openness” that enables him to realize his humanity within a social whole. His “final” holism is undeniable, and his definition of human authenticity deserves to be pondered. The Precursor of a certain modernity, he nevertheless embraces the ancient ideal and pleads for a people’s community against the bourgeois society growing before his eyes. His entire social philosophy is based ultimately on the primacy of politics, which is enough to make him one of the most original minds of his time. Consequently, his thought is much more “Machiavellian” than is generally supposed. His whole treatment of the conservation of a political order founded on sovereign authority and instituted by the General Will, with a sovereign personifying the order and identified with the will of all, inevitably evokes Machiavelli’s repubblica ordinata bene. His theory of political order thus seems quite foreign to the individualistic foundations of his theory of the social contract. This reveals his major contradiction: he borrows from republican political doctrines as well as the philosophy of natural right, which he misappropriates. This contradiction was indeed noted by Maurizio Viroli, who writes:

Whereas republican political doctrines are based on virtue and community, the political doctrines of natural right are based on self-interest and consider the function of the state to be the protection of the private interests. The former posits love for the fatherland and identification with the community as essential conditions for maintaining good political order and freedom. The latter speaks the language of interests and rational calculation. Rousseau uses both. But is it possible to be a republican and a “contractualist” at the same time?[39]

It is a pity that so complex an author is always over-simplified. We need to re-read Rousseau.



* Alain de Benoist, “Relire Rousseau,” in Critiques—Théoriques (Lausanne, Switzerland: L’Age d’Homme, 2002), 313–31. The translator wishes to thank Alain de Benoist for permission to translate and publish this essay, and for checking the translation. Thanks also to Michael O’Meara and F. Roger Devlin for checking the translation.

[1] The Terror—Ed.

[2] Cf. notably J. L. Talmon, Les origines de la démocratie totalitaire [The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy] (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1966), which presents Rousseau as a kind of Montagnard avant la lettre. Undoubtedly Marx would not have contradicted this point of view. Louis Dumont, however, showed that the Marxian reading of Rousseau rests on a remarkable series of misconceptions (cf. Homo æqualis: Genèse et épanouissement de l’idéologie économique [Homo aequalis: The Genesis and Development of Ecnomic Ideology] [Paris: Gallimard, 1977], 151–56). Dumont also thinks that “the totalitarian aspects of democratic movements result not from Rousseau’s theories but from the confrontation of the artificialist project of individualism with experience” (Essais sur l’individualisme. Une perspective anthropologique sur l’idéologie moderne [Paris: Seuil, 1983], 96; in English: Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986]). The accusation that Rousseau paved the way for the excesses of the Revolution is found in Nietzsche (cf. Human, All-Too-Human, I, §463). The thesis that Rousseau is a precursor of totalitarianism is contradicted by Raymond Polin, La politique de la solitude: Essai sur la philosophie politique de Jean-Jacques Rousseau [The Politics of Solitude: Essay on the Political Philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau] (Paris: Sirey, 1971) and Eric Weil, “Rousseau et sa politique” [“Rousseau and his Politics”], in Gérard Genette and Tzvetan Todorov, Pensée de Rousseau [Rousseau’s Thought] (Paris: Seuil-Points, 1984).

[3] Charles Maurras, Romantisme et révolution [Romanticism and Revolution] (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1922).

[4] In Germany, in particular, Rousseau did not just influence Kant in a decisive fashion (which is well-known). By way of romanticism, his influence was also felt by a whole series of theorists advocating the “return to nature” and some forms of social organicism, beginning with some völkisch authors. Maurras, who accused Rousseau of having imported “Germanic” ideas into France, was undoubtedly aware of it. In any case, the idea that Rousseau is nothing more than an author of “the left” (particularly widespread in France and the United States) can only appear quite summary to one who knows a bit about the complexity of the history of ideas in Europe. His intellectual legacy is undoubtedly more varied than is usually believed.

[5] Cf. Ernst Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans. Peter Gay (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963).

[6] Cf. André Delaporte, Bergers d’Arcadie: Le mythe de l’Âge d’Or dans la littérature française du XVIIIe siècle [Shepherds of Arcadia: The Myth of the Golden Age in the French Literature of the Eighteenth Century] (Puiseaux: Pardès, 1988).

[7] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 3, Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (Second Discourse), Polemics, and Political Economy, ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, trans. Judith R. Bush, Roger D. Masters, Christopher Kelly, and Terence Marshall (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1992).

[8] Emile, IV. In English: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, or On Education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979).

[9] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Geneva Manuscript (the first version of On the Social Contract), I, 2, in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 4, Social Contract, Discourse on the Virtue Most Necessary for a Hero, Political Fragments, and Geneva Manuscript, ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, trans. Judith R. Bush, Roger D. Masters, and Christopher Kelly (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1994).

[10] Polin, La politique de la solitude,133. Heinrich Meier writes: “The opinion—still widespread—that had the strongest historical influence, namely the idea that the Discourse on Inequality is above all a moral, not to say moralizing, treatise with the goal of promoting egalitarianism, blocks access to the central core of the enterprise, which is more broached than revealed by Rousseau in his book” (“The Discourse on the Origin and the Foundation of Inequality Among Men: On the Intention of Rousseau’s Most Philosophical Work,” Interpretation, Winter 1988–89, 212).

[11] Pierre Manent, Histoire intellectuelle du libéralisme: Dix leçons (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1987; 2nd ed, Paris: Hachette-Pluriel, 1988), 155; in English: An Intellectual History of Liberalism, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Chapter 6 is entitled “Rousseau, Critic of Liberalism.”

[12] Heinrich Meier, in his article on the Discourse on Inequality cited above, claims that Rousseau introduced his politico-anthropological use of the concept of the “bourgeois” in the first book of Emile.

[13] Emile, I.

[14] Rousseau even thought that France was much more bourgeois than England. According to him, the French monarchy had continuously supported the emergence of the bourgeois type, without ever giving rise to the citizen, whereas English history, at least in certain periods, made a place for the latter.

[15] “On Public Happiness,” Political Fragments, in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 4.

[16] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts, in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 2, Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts (First Discourse) and Polemics, ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, trans. Judith R. Bush, Roger D. Masters, and Christopher Kelly (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1992).

[17] Considerations on the Government of Poland and its Planned Reformation, ch. 2, in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 11, The Plan for Perpetual Peace, On the Government of Poland, and Other Writings on History and Politics, ed. Christopher Kelly, trans. Christopher Kelly and Judith R. Bush (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2005).

[18] On the Social Contract, III, 4, in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 4.

[19] Cf. for example Jean-Jacques Rouvier, Les grandes idées politiques, des origines à Jean-Jacques Rousseau [The Great Political Ideas, from the Origins to Jean-Jacques Rousseau] (Paris: Bordas, 1973), 342.

[20] On the Social Contract, III, 4.

[21] On the Social Contract, III, 15.

[22] On the Social Contract, III, 5.

[23] On the Social Contract, III, 1, 13, and 15.

[24] On the Social Contract, IV, 8.

[25] This process was accelerated by the Revolution.

[26] On the Social Contract, I, 6.

[27] On the Social Contract, II, 7.

[28] On the Social Contract, IV, 2.

[29] Cf. Talmon, Les origines de la démocratie totalitaire.

[30] Emile, IV.

[31] On the Social Contract, II, 12.

[32] Dumont, Essais sur l’individualisme, 100.

[33] Emile, I, 2.

[34] “On Public Happiness.”

[35] Rousseau, moreover, did not believe in the supreme value of peace. Citing the ancient ideal once more, he prefers freedom to peace, and states that freedom merits fighting battles to preserve it.

[36] Considerations on the Government of Poland, ch. 4.

[37] Letter to Mirabeau, March 1767.

[38] On the Social Contract, I, 6.

[39] Maurizio Viroli, La théorie de la société bien ordonnée chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 20 ; in English: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the “Well-Ordered Society,” trans. Derek Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).



De Benoist, Alain. “Re-Reading Rousseau.” The Occidental Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 7 (Fall 2008). Text retrieved from: <http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/06/re-reading-rousseau/ >.


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Ethnic & Racial Relations – Tudor

Ethnic & Racial Relations: Ethnic States, Separatism, & Mixing

By Lucian Tudor

Translations: Español (see note at the bottom of this page)

In our previous essay, “Race, Identity, Community,”[1] we discussed a number of subjects: most importantly, the varying levels and relations of ethnic and cultural groups, the matter of cultural communication, openness, and closure, the relationship between race and culture, the necessity of resisting miscegenation for the sake of ethno-cultural stability, the error of individualism and the value of social holism, and the importance of the sense of community to ethnic and racial identity.

In the present essay, we will not reiterate the major points which we made before, except those which are relevant to the matters discussed. The purpose of this essay is to serve as an extension of the previous one and to expand upon certain points which were not made sufficiently clear or covered properly, and it thus must be read in the context of the preceding essay. Here we aim to discuss the topic of social, cultural, and political relations between ethnic and racial groups, the problem and varieties of social and biological mixing, and the practices and forms of ethnic and racial separatism.

Identity and Interaction

Particularities and particular identities define human beings; contrary to egalitarian and universalist ideology, one cannot be truly human without a belonging to particular groups, including religious, political, cultural, and racial groups. Of course, belonging to a group and possessing a conscious identification with this belonging are two different things (just as we can say that there is a conscious and unconscious aspect to identity). History and observation show that ethnic, cultural, and racial identities come into being and are awakened by awareness of and interaction with other ethnic and racial groups. As Alain de Benoist wrote: “The group and the individual both need to be confronted by ‘significant others.’ Therefore, it is nonsense to believe that identity would be better preserved without this confrontation; actually, it is the opposite: confrontation makes identity possible. Other subjects make a subject become subject.” [2]

Thus, interaction with other types of human beings is an essential part of human existence, since they draw their very awareness of being who they are by this interaction. Furthermore, as we have already mentioned in our previous work (“Race, Identity, Community”), the various cultures (in terms of both smaller and larger groups) develop and are enriched not only by internal development, but also by interaction with and the exchange of products and ideas with other cultures or peoples. It is for these reasons that it is justified to assert that “the originality and the richness of the human heritages of this world are nourished by their differences and their deviations . . .” [3] as Pierre Krebs stated, similarly to many other New Right authors.

Of course, recognizing the value of diversity and differences, and appreciating these differences in other peoples and learning from them, does not mean that all peoples of the world can or should be appreciated equally. It is, of course, perfectly natural that one people will find certain foreign peoples to be unattractive in some cases, and will distance themselves from them. This is why, although diversity is valuable, the present egalitarian and multiculturalist propaganda that all cultures and ethnic groups must be appreciated and accepted equally, is simply wrong and absurd. No healthy people show equal liking for all others, although it is possible to respect all foreign peoples even if one does not treasure them all. It is, for example, completely natural that a European may be repulsed by the culture of an African tribe but simultaneously feel admiration for East Asian culture, while still according to each people a certain level of respect.

It is also a fact of life that without barriers, without a certain level of separation from other peoples, and without a specific territory on which to live as a distinct and relatively homogeneous people, an ethnic or a racial group would disappear through mixture or assimilation into other groups. The extreme modern liberal-globalist propaganda advocating complete openness and mixing between cultures and peoples, using as its justification historical examples of cultural exchanges, is fallacious because normal cultural dialogue and interaction never involved complete openness but always a limited form of interaction.

Total openness and mixing eliminates identities because peoples do not merely change through such processes, but lose who they are or merge with another people entirely. To quote Benoist, “it is the diversity of the human race which creates its richness, just as it is diversity which makes communication possible and gives it value. Diversity of peoples and cultures exist, however, only because, in the past, these various peoples and cultures were relatively isolated from one another.”[4] Culture transforms over time due to internal creativity and development as well as through communication with other cultures, but contact with other cultures must always be limited and imperfect, otherwise the very integrity of a culture is undermined. Therefore, “Identity is not what never changes, but, on the contrary, it is what allows one to constantly change without giving up who one is.”[5]

The Problem of Mixing

It needs to be recognized that mixing, both the social form (so-called “integration”) as well as the biological form (miscegenation), is a complicated human problem. Mixing has occurred all throughout history in a variety of forms and circumstances, as a result of different forms of close interaction between different ethnic and racial groups. The questions of why mixtures occur and whether this is a normal and acceptable phenomenon therefore naturally present themselves, and they must be answered with the proper level of sophistication in order for us to defeat our opponents.

First, it needs to be recognized that mixture between two different peoples belonging to the same race is a distinct matter from mixture between two different races, and involves different principles and circumstances. Ethnicities belonging to the same racial type share the same biological and spiritual background, which serves as a larger foundation for identity which connects them. In cases where two or more ethnic groups of the same racial type no longer live separately and choose to mix socially (from which intermarriage inevitably follows), it is oftentimes because these groups – within a particular time and conditions – have become closely connected culturally and spiritually or because they no longer feel their distinctions to be significant.

This phenomenon cannot be regarded as abnormal and wrong any more than when two racially related ethnic groups choose to separate instead of mix, because both occurrences are rather frequent in history and do not normally have negative effects to identity (even if identity undergoes some change in this). For example, many European ethnic groups (the English, the French, the Balkan peoples, etc.) are the result of an inter-European mixture that occurred centuries ago, although they also have a right to separate. Thus, within a race, separation and mixing can both be regarded as normal phenomena, depending on the circumstances and the nature of the ethnic groups in question.

On the other hand, between different races, mixing can be argued to be an abnormal phenomenon because the relations and effects are different; the state of normality is to desire racial separation. Contrary to the assertions of many egalitarian multiculturalist (“multiculturalism” here signifying the belief and practice of ethnic mixing) propagandists, racial identity and the concept of race is not a modern phenomenon, for, as Benoist pointed out, “the idea of race is almost as old as humanity itself.”[6] So it is clear that recognizing the importance of race and practicing racial separatism does in fact have a historical and even a universal basis; human beings were never in a condition where they completely lacked racial feelings and mixed freely.

The reasons for racial mixing (social and, following that, biological) throughout history are complex and differ based on the circumstances in question. In some cases, it was due to a powerful, militant people conquering another people and forcefully reproducing with the women of the conquered in order to secure their conquest through breeding. In other cases, as some authors have argued, it is due to the decadence of a people who have lost certain spiritual qualities, their sense of differentiation, and their racial identity, and have as a result chosen to mix with other peoples, even those racially different (these other peoples may be immigrants or conquered peoples who formerly lived separated). Of course, where mixing occurs willingly, both sides have surrendered their unique identity.[7] There may be other causes, and in a sense racial miscegenation is inevitable because it is always bound to occur at certain times and places where different races come into contact (even if only to a small extent).

However, it is always important to recognize and reassert that despite its occurrence throughout history, for whatever reasons or causes, race-mixing is not a rule. It is actually rather abnormal, and that it occurs all throughout history does not invalidate this fact. Because the identity, basic anthropological and psychological features, and character of ethnic groups and cultures are influenced by racial type, and because of the spiritual and sociological dimension of race, race-mixing means a deep and profound change completely transforming a family or, when it occurs on a larger scale, a people. This idea cannot be associated with biological reductionism, which we must reject as fallacious; even though culture, society, and cultural identity cannot be reduced to race, and race is only one factor among many which affects them, racial background is still undoubtedly an important factor.

Thus, since preserving their racial type means maintaining who they are, their identity as a folk, peoples are thus historically compelled to resist race-mixing and to separate from other races. It is not only for the sake of their survival that they are so compelled, but also because of the primal impulse to live with their own people in their communities. As Krebs pointed out, “modern ethology clearly established the innate tendency of man to identify with individuals who resemble him . . .”[8] There is, furthermore, also the fact that, as Evola pointed out, “blood and ethnic purity are factors that are valued in traditional civilizations too,” which means that the maintaining physical racial type is a practice which holds a meta-historical value.[9]

We should note that, of course, a people which goes through minor amounts of race-mixing does not lose its identity or its belonging to its original racial type. For example, the Eastern Slavic peoples and Southern Europeans peoples who have endured some level of miscegenation historically still belong to the White-European race, both in terms of their general anthropological-physical type as well as their racial and ethnic identity. Race is defined not by a strict purity, but by the possession of a general physical form (the general anthropological features associated with a race), the general spiritual form associated with it, and the cultural style and identity which is sociologically linked with race.[10]

It also needs to be mentioned here that resisting race-mixing is not necessarily a “racist” phenomenon (which means racial supremacism), because placing value on racial differences and practicing racial separatism can and has taken on non-racist forms. It is clear that it is extremely naïve and erroneous to associate all forms of racial separatism with racism and inter-racial hostility.[11] As Guillaume Faye once wrote:

In effect, just as it is normal and legitimate for the Arab, the Black African, the Japanese to desire to remain themselves, to recognize that an African is necessarily a black man or an Asian a yellow man, it is legitimate, natural and necessary to recognize the right of the European to reject multiracialism and to affirm himself as white man. To link this position with racism is an inadmissible bluster. The real racists are, on the contrary, those who organize in Europe the establishment of a multiracial society.[12]

Practices of Separatism

Evidently, racial and ethnic separatism has taken on a variety of forms throughout history. One commonly recognized form is the creation of a class or caste system, separating people into different castes based on their racial background (or, in a typical analogous system, based on ethnic or cultural background). The class structure of racial separation, which is usually the result of conquest, can be seen in numerous cases throughout history, including in Classical civilization, in certain ancient Near Eastern civilizations, in India, and in many parts of Central and South America after European colonization. The most negative feature of this practice is obviously that it involved “racism” and subjugation, although it also had the positive effect of preserving the racial types which have formed, even after miscegenation (the new, mixed racial types; mulattoes and mestizos), due to the fact that it discouraged race-mixing by class separation.[13]

Another form of separatism is what is commonly recognized as ethnic “nationalism,” which has its primary basis in ethno-cultural identity, although it is oftentimes accompanied by racial identity where inter-racial contact exists. Nationalism is defined, in the most simple terms, as the belief that ethnic groups or nationalities (in the cultural sense) are the key category of human beings and that they should live under their own independent states. It implies complete and total separation of ethnic groups into separate nations. Nationalism is oftentimes associated with ethnic chauvinism, inter-ethnic hostility, imperialism, and irredentism, although it is important to remember that there have been certain select forms of nationalism throughout history that were not at all chauvinistic and imperialistic, so it is erroneous to assume that it always takes on these negative features.

However, “nationalism” is a problematic term because it has been defined in different and sometimes contradictory ways. In one, very generic sense, nationalism means simply the desire of a people to live separately from others, under its own state and by rule of leaders of its own ethnic background; in essence, a basic ethnic separatism and desire for independence. In this sense, nationalism is a very ancient idea and practice, since all across history one can find cases where a people of one particular ethnic background desired to be independent from the rule of another different people and fought for this independence. This is not, however, the way nationalism is always defined, and aside from the fact that it is sometimes defined as being necessarily chauvinistic, it is also often defined in a certain manner that makes it particularly an early modern phenomenon.

Many New Right as well as Traditionalist authors have defined nationalism as a form of state in which the “nation” is politically or culturally absolutised, at the expense of smaller local or regional cultural differences, and regarding other nations as completely foreign and of lesser value. This form of “nationalism” is exemplified by the Jacobin nation-state and form of sovereignty (since the French Revolution was a key force in initiating the rise of this state form), and is identified by the elimination of sub-ethnic differences within its borders and the regard for differences with other peoples or nationalities as absolute. Naturally, this form of nationalism has the consequence of creating hostility and conflict between nations because of these ideological and political features.[14]

From the “Radical Traditionalist” perspective, exemplified by Evola’s thought, nationalism is an anomaly, a deviation from valid state forms. It is regarded as negative, firstly, because this form of traditionalism considers ethnicity and nationality as secondary qualities in human beings; although they have some level of importance, they are not valid as primary features around which to organize states and leadership, which should be based solely upon the values of elitism, aristocracy, and spiritual authority. Nationalism also contradicts the practice of the Empire – the imperial state, which is not necessarily imperialistic – since nationalism means the absolutisation of the “nation,” whereas the traditional empire is organized as a supra-national federalistic union with a central spiritual authority.[15] According to Evola,

The scheme of an empire in a true and organic sense (which must clearly be distinguished from every imperialism, a phenomenon that should be regarded as a deplorable extension of nationalism) . . . safeguarded the principles of both unity and multiplicity. In this world, individual States have the character of partial organic units, gravitating around . . . a principle of unity, authority, and sovereignty of a different nature from that which is proper to each particular State . . . due to its super-ordained nature, would be such as to leave wide room for nationalities according to their natural and historical individuality.[16]

In the imperial state, which Evola asserts is the true traditional model of the state, ethnic or national groups are thus separated federally; different peoples live under the same state and serve the same ultimate monarchical authority, but they live in separate parts of the kingdom or empire. To quote one his key works: “the Middle Ages [and also certain ancient civilizations] knew nationalities but not nationalisms. Nationality is a natural factor that encompasses a certain group of common elementary characteristics that are retained both in the hierarchical differentiation and in the hierarchical participation, which they do not oppose.”[17]

Identitarian Separatism

The European New Right and the Identitarian Movement, the latter being closely related to and derived from the New Right,[18] also advocates the practice of federalism, although their thinkers have some disagreements with the claims of “Radical Traditionalists” concerning certain essential principles. The “New Rightist” concept of federalism involves the vision of a federation (or better, confederation, which more clearly expresses this decentralized type of federalism) which is based upon the principles of subsidiarity, of granting autonomy to its regions, and of local and regional political structures holding the power that is due to them, while the central authority rules primarily when decisions affecting the whole state must be made. This form of state and sovereignty “implies plurality, autonomy, and the interlacing of levels of power and authority.”[19] Subsidiarity and allowing decisions to be made at lower levels are also features of the Radical Traditionalist concept of the federalist state, but in contrast they assert the importance of the ultimate authority of the sovereign (the central ruler) far more.

Aside from supporting a partly different conception of sovereignty and authority from Radical Traditionalists, Identitarians and New Rightists also support the practice of a participatory and organic form of democracy as the ideal state form (which, it must be noted, is still compatible with respect for authority and hierarchy). This idea does indeed have a historical basis, for, as Benoist pointed out, “governments with democratic tendencies have appeared throughout history . . . . Whether in Rome, in the Iliad, in Vedic India or among the Hittites, already at a very early date we find the existence of popular assemblies for both military and civil organisation. Moreover, in Indo-European society the King was generally elected . . .”[20]

Furthermore, New Rightists and Identitarians strongly assert the value of ethnic, cultural, and racial differences and identities, and therefore, according to this conception, organic democracy coincides with the recognition of and respect for ethnic differences.[21] Because organic democracy, meaning true democracy, is based off of respect for ethnic differences, Benoist rightly asserts that:

Democracy means the power of the people, which is to say the power of an organic community that has historically developed in the context of one or more given political structures – for instance a city, nation, or empire . . . Every political system which requires the disintegration or levelling of peoples in order to operate – or the erosion of individuals’ awareness of belonging to an organic folk community – is to be regarded as undemocratic.[22]

The New Right advocates the idea of respecting the identities of smaller, local, and regional ethnic or sub-ethnic groups as well as recognizing the importance of larger ethnic and cultural relations and unities. Thus, for example, to be a Breton, a Frenchman, and a White European[23] all have importance, and each level of identity and belonging has value in a hierarchical relationship. Ethno-cultural groups of all levels and types have the right to live with freedom and separately from others in different states and territories. The New Right acknowledges that there are cases where complete state separation for a people is appropriate (akin to the simpler, generic idea of “nationalism”), but there are also cases where the federalist state system in which each people has its own autonomous region in which to live is more practical or desirable.[24]

Arguably, the New Right or Identitarian vision is not only the most desirable, but also the most realistic in the modern world because it offers the most balanced solution to the current problems and ethnic-racial chaos. In a world where democratic feelings have become permanent among most peoples it offers an organic participatory democracy to replace the corrupt liberal democracies presently dominant. Where there are countries composed of multiple ethnicities which are not in a position to divide themselves entirely (complete nationalism) it offers the idea of a federation of autonomous regions. Finally, in a world where ethnic and racial groups are threatened to be disintegrated by “multiculturalist integration” and mixing it offers a peaceful and fair solution of territorial separation, the creation of unmixed ethnic communities, and cooperation between the different races and peoples of the world to achieve this vision.


[1] Lucian Tudor, “Race, Identity, Community,” 6 August 2013, Counter-Currents Publishing, http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/08/race-identity-community.

[2] Alain de Benoist, “On Identity,” Telos, Vol. 2004, No. 128 (Summer 2004), p. 39.

[3] Pierre Krebs, Fighting for the Essence (London: Arktos, 2012), p. 89.

[4] Alain de Benoist, “What is Racism?” Telos, Vol. 1999, No. 114 (Winter 1999), p. 46-47. This work is available online here: http://www.alaindebenoist.com/pdf/what_is_racism.pdf

[5] Benoist, “On Identity,” p. 41.

[6] Alain de Benoist, “What is Racism?” p. 36. It is worth mentioning here that there are certain mainstream historians who have admitted and studied the history of racial feelings since ancient times (in Western and Middle Eastern civilizations, specifically). Among their works include Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) and Miriam Eliav-Feldon, Benjamin Isaac, & Joseph Ziegler, eds., The Origins of Racism in the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Despite the egalitarian bias and hostility to racialism these authors may reveal in their works, these still have research value for us because of the historical facts they provide.

[7] See for example the chapters “Life and Death of Civilizations” and “The Decline of Superior Races” in Julius Evola, Revolt Against the Modern World (Rochester: Inner Traditions, 1995) and Krebs, Fighting for the Essence, pp. 23 ff. & 79 ff.

[8] Ibid., p. 25.

[9] Evola, Revolt Against the Modern World, p. 57. On this matter, see also the chapter “The Beauty and the Beast: Race and Racism in Europe” in Tomislav Sunic, Postmortem Report: Cultural Examinations from Postmodernity (Shamley Green, UK: The Paligenesis Project, 2010).

[10] A number of Right-wing authors have already written much more on this matter. For the White Nationalist perspective in particular, see especially Ted Sallis, “Racial Purity, Ethnic Genetic Interests, & the Cobb Case,” 18 November 2013, Counter-Currents Publishing, http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/11/racial-purity-ethnic-genetic-interests-the-cobb-case. For the New Right perspective, see for example: the entries “Miscegenation” and “Race, Racism, Anti-Racism” in Guillaume Faye, Why We Fight: Manifesto of the European Resistance (London: Arktos, 2011), pp. 194 ff. & 227 ff.; Benoist’s commentaries in his “What is Racism?”; Tomislav Sunic, “Ethnic Identity versus White Identity: Differences between the U.S. and Europe,” The Occidental Quarterly, Vol.12, No.4 (Winter 2012/13), available online here: http://www.tomsunic.com/?p=444.; The articles in Sebastian J. Lorenz, ed., Elementos: Revista de Metapolítica para una Civilización Europea, No. 47, “Elogio de la Diferencia, Diferencialism versus Racismo,” (28 May 2013), http://urkultur-imperium-europa.blogspot.com/2013/05/elementos-n-47-elogio-de-la-diferencia.html

[11] See the citations of Faye, Benoist, Sunic, and Lorenz in the previous note (# 10).

[12] Guillaume Faye, “La Sociedad Multirracial,” 13 Jul y 2007, Guillaume Faye Archive, http://guillaumefayearchive.wordpress.com/2007/07/13/la-sociedad-multirracial. Note that this article was republished in print in Escritos por Europa (Barcelona: Titania, 2008).

[13] On the matter of historical examples, see our previous citations of Isaac’s The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity and The Origins of Racism in the West. Dealing with the racial basis for the Indian caste system, see for example the preface to Arvind Sharma, Classical Hindu Thought: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), and Alain Daniélou, India: A Civilization of Differences: The Ancient Tradition of Universal Tolerance (Rochester: Inner Traditions, 2003), the latter arguing that the caste system is not truly “racist” but a natural racial ordering. On the race-based case/class systems in Central and South America, one classic mainstream resource is Magnus Mörner, Race Mixture in the History of Latin America (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967). There are, of course, numerous other academic resources on this subject matter.

[14] See Alain de Benoist, “Nationalism: Phenomenology & Critique,” 16 May 2012, Counter-Currents Publishing, http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/05/nationalism-phenomenology-and-critique; Michael O’Meara, New Culture, New Right: Anti-Liberalism in Postmodern Europe, 2nd edition (London: Arktos, 2013), pp. 228 ff.; Edgar Julius Jung, “People, Race, Reich,” in Europa: German Conservative Foreign Policy 1870–1940, ed. & trans. by Alexander Jacob (Lanham, MD, USA: University Press of America, 2002); the overview of Evola’s position in the chapter “Nations, Nationalism, Empire and Europe” in Paul Furlong, Social and Political Thought of Julius Evola (Abingdon & New York: Routledge, 2011).

[15] See Alain de Benoist, “The Idea of Empire,” Telos, Vol. 1993, No. 98-99 (December 1993), pp. 81-98, available online here: http://www.gornahoor.net/library/IdeaOfEmpire.pdf.

[16] Julius Evola, Men Among the Ruins: Postwar Reflections of a Radical Traditionalist (Rochester: Inner Traditions, 2002), p. 277.

[17] Evola, Revolt Against the Modern World, pp. 338-39.

[18] Identitarianism is founded upon the ideas of New Right intellectuals such Alain de Benoist, Guillaume Faye, Tomislav Sunic, Pierre Krebs, Dominique Venner, and Pierre Vial, who themselves are sometimes designated as “Identitarian.” However, we should also note that some of the basic ideas of the Identitarian Movement can be found in We Are Generation Identity (London: Arktos, 2013), although by itself this brief manifesto may be insufficient.

[19] Alain de Benoist, “What is Sovereignty?” Telos, vol. 1999, no. 116 (Summer 1999), p. 114. This work is available online here: http://www.alaindebenoist.com/pdf/what_is_sovereignty.pdf . See also Benoist, “The First Federalist: Johannes Althusius,” Telos, vol. 200, no. 118 (Winter 2000), pp. 25-58, and the articles in Sebastian J. Lorenz, ed., Elementos: Revista de Metapolítica para una Civilización Europea, No. 37, “Federalismo Poliárquico Neoalthusiano,” (28 November 2012), http://urkultur-imperium-europa.blogspot.com/2012/11/elementos-n-37-federalismo-poliarquico.html.

[20] Alain de Benoist, The Problem of Democracy (London: Arktos Media, 2011), pp. 14-15. We should note that this book is one of the most essential resources on the matter of democracy, for the idea of an organic and ethnic-based participatory democracy and for defending the idea of democracy as a political system.

[21] See Chapter I. “The Ancients and the Moderns” in Ibid.

[22] Benoist, Problem of Democracy, p. 103.

[23] When we refer to the broader, more encompassing cultural identity of Europeans, it is better to refer to a general “European” culture rather than to “Indo-European” culture because not all White European peoples are entirely Indo-European, and there clearly are and have been non-Indo-European peoples in Europe who are of the same racial and general cultural type as Indo-European peoples (well-known modern examples including the Finns, Hungarians, Estonians, Livonians, and Basques, although there were also numerous white pre-Indo-European peoples in ancient times who had disappeared through mixture with Indo-Europeans).

[24] Along with our previous citations of Benoist’s essays on sovereignty, empire, and federalism, see also Faye’s entries “Empire, Imperial Federation” and “Democracy, Democratism, Organic Democracy” in Why We Fight, pp. 130-32 and 111-14.



Tudor, Lucian. “Ethnic & Racial Relations: Ethnic States, Separatism, & Mixing.” Counter-Currents Publishing, 20 March 2014. <http://www.counter-currents.com/2014/03/ethnic-and-racial-relations/ >.

Note: We have also republished on our website Lucian Tudor’s “Race, Identity, Community.” On the matters discussed in the above essay, see also a more complete exposition in Lucian Tudor, “The Philosophy of Identity: Ethnicity, Culture, and Race in Identitarian Thought,” The Occidental Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Fall 2014), pp. 83-112.

Translation note: This essay by Tudor has also been translated into Spanish as “Relaciones Etnicas y Raciales: estados etnicos, separatismo y mezcla” (published online 18 April 2014 by Fuerza Nacional Identitaria). We have also made this translated file available on our site here: Relaciones Etnicas y Raciales


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La Nueva Derecha Europea en Español (The European New Right in Spanish)

La Nueva Derecha Europea en Español

(The European New Right in Spanish)

Note in English: Due to the fact that the Spanish is one of the most important languages (along with French, Italian, and German) in which many key works of the European New Right have been published, we have created this page to bring attention to some of the more significant Spanish-language resources on the European New Right which are available on the Internet and which we have chosen to republish on our website. These include certain selected issues of Sebastian J. Lorenz’s online journal Elementos which we have deemed to be the most important, along with Alain de Benoist’s and Charles Champetier’s “Manifesto of the New Right” (Spanish version).

Aquí vamos a poner en conocimiento de los recursos más importantes en el idioma español para el pensamiento de la Nueva Derecha Europea. El recurso más importante es la revista de Sebastián J. Lorenz: Elementos: Revista de Metapolítica para una Civilización Europea, que se ha anunciado y publicado en línea en su sitio web: <http://elementosdemetapolitica.blogspot.com.es/ >. Hemos seleccionado y publicado en nuestra página web lo que hemos considerado que son los números más esenciales de esta revista en lo que respecta a las ideas de la Nueva Derecha. En el espacio a continuación vamos a enumerar y enlace en el espacio por debajo de estos números de Elementos y sus contenidos, junto con el manifiesto de Alain de Benoist y Charles Champetier.

Aquí también queremos mencionar los libros más importantes de la Nueva Derecha en español que están disponibles en formato impreso: Alain de Benoist, ¿Es un Problema la Democracia? (Barcelona: Nueva República, 2013); Benoist, La Nueva Derecha: Una respuesta clara, profunda e inteligente (Barcelona : Planeta, 1982); Alain de Benoist, Guillaume Faye, & Carlos Pinedo Cestafe, Las Ideas de la “Nueva Derecha”: Una respuesta al colonialismo cultural (Barcelona: Nuevo Arte Thor, 1986); Guillaume Faye, Pierre Freson, & Robert Steuckers, Pequeño Léxico del Partisano Europeo (Molins de Rei, Barcelona: Nueva República, 2012); Tomislav Sunic, Homo Americanus: Hijo de la Era Postmoderna (Barcelona: Ediciones Nueva Republica, 2008); Dominique Venner, Europa y su Destino: De ayer a mañana (Barcelona: Áltera, 2010); Rodrigo Agulló, Disidencia Perfecta: La Nueva Derecha y la batalla de las ideas (Barcelona & Madrid: Altera, 2011); Jesús J. Sebastián Lorente (ed.), Alain de Benoist: Elogio de la disidencia (Tarragona: Ediciones Fides, 2015).


Manifiesto: La Nueva Derecha del año 2000 por Alain de Benoist y Charles Champetier

(Nota: Este libro también fue publicado en forma impresa como: Manifiesto para un renacimiento europeo [Mollet del Vallès, Barcelona: GRECE, 2000])


ELEMENTOS Nº 15 – “Moeller van den Bruck: Conservadurismo Revolucionario”  (publicado 1 Junio 2011)


Arthur Moeller van den Bruck y la Nouvelle Droite, por Sebastian J. Lorenz

Moeller van den Bruck: un rebelde conservador, por Luca Leonello Rimbotti

Moeller van den Bruck: ¿un “precursor póstumo”?, por Denis Goedel

Moeller y Dostoievski, por Robert Steuckers

Moeller y la Kulturpessimismus de Weimar, por Ferran Gallego

Moeller y los Jungkonservativen, por Erik Norling

Moeller y Spengler, por Ernesto Milá

Moeller y la Konservative Revolution, por Keith Bullivant

Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, por Alain de Benoist


ELEMENTOS Nº 16 – “Un Diálogo Contra la Modernidad: Julius Evola y Alain de Benoist”  (publicado 9 Junio 2011)


Julius Evola, por Alain de Benoist

Posmodernidad y antimodernidad: Alain de Benoist y Julius Evola, por Marcos Ghio

Julius Evola, reaccionario radical y metafísico comprometido. Análisis crítico del pensamiento político de Julius Evola, por Alain de Benoist

Evola y la crítica de la modernidad, por Luisa Bonesio

La recepción internacional de Rebelión contra el mundo moderno, por Giovanni Monastra

Rebelión contra el mundo moderno, por Julius Evola


ELEMENTOS Nº 24 – “Europeismo Identitario”  (publicado 25 Mayo 2012)


Hacia el reencuentro de Europa: Lo que piensa la Nueva Derecha, por Diego L. Sanromán

Europa a la búsqueda de su identidad, por Isidro J. Palacios

La cuestión europea: Bases ideológicas de la Nueva Derecha, por Carlos Pinedo Cestafe

Europa: la memoria del futuro, por Alain de Benoist

Una cierta idea de Europa. El debate sobre la construcción europea, por Rodrigo Agulló

La memoria en herencia: Europa y su destino, por Dominique Venner

Siglo XXI: Europa, un árbol en la tempestad, por Guillaume Faye

La identidad europea, por Enrique Ravello

Europa: no es herencia sino misión futura, por Giorgio Locchi

El proyecto de la Gran Europa, por Alexander Dugin

¿Unión Europea o Gran Espacio?, por J. Molina


ELEMENTOS Nº 26 – “Economía Orgánica. Una Alternativa a la Economía de Mercado” (publicado 11 Junio 2012)


Salir de la Economía, por Rodrigo Agulló

La Economía no es el Destino, por Guillaume Faye

La Economía Orgánica en la Nueva Derecha, por Carlos Pinedo

Adam Müller: la Economía Orgánica como vivienca romántica, por Luis Fernando Torres

Friedrich List: Sistema Nacional de Economía Política, ¿proteccionismo?, por Arturo C. Meyer, Carlos Gómez y Jurgen Schuldt

Crear la Economía Orgánica, por A.L. Arrigoni

El principio de reciprocidad en los cambios, por Alberto Buela

¿Homo oeconomicus o idiota moral?, por Ramón Alcoberro

Por una Economía Mundial de dos velocidades, por Guillaume Faye

La Economía Local contra la Economía Global, por Edward Goldsmith

Dictadura de la economía y sociedad mercantilista, por Stefano Vaj

Crisis económica: aproximación a un modelo económico alternativo, por Juan P. Viñuela

La crítica de la Economía de Mercado de Karl Polanyi, por Arturo Lahera Sánchez

Por la independencia económica europea, por Guillaume Faye

¿Decrecimiento o barbarie?, por Serge Latouche

Decrecimiento: hacia un nuevo paradigma económico, por Luis Picazo Casariego

La Economía del Bien Común: un modelo económico alternativo, por Christian Felber

Charles Champetier: por una subversión de la lógica economicista, por Diego L. Sanromán


ELEMENTOS Nº 28 – “Contra el Liberalismo: El Principal Enemigo” (publicado 29 junio 2012)


El liberalismo, enemigo principal, por Alain de Benoist y Charles Champetier

El liberalismo en las ideas de la “Nueva Derecha”, por Carlos Pinedo Cestafe

Liberalismo, por Francis Parker Yockey

Frente al Peligro de la Hegemonía Liberal, por Marco Tarchi

La esencia del neoliberalismo, por Pierre Bourdieu

El error del liberalismo, por Alain de Benoist

Liberalismo y Democracia: Paradojas y Rompecabezas, por Joseph Margolis

El liberalismo y las identidades, por Eduardo Arroyo

Dinámica histórica del Liberalismo: del mercado total al Estado total, por Tomislav Sunic

Neoliberalismo: la lucha de todos contra todos, por Pierre Bourdieu

La impostura liberal, por Adriano Scianca

Una crítica liberal del liberalismo, por Adrián Fernández Martín

Leo Strauss y su crítica al liberalismo, por Alberto Buela

Charles Taylor: una crítica comunitaria al liberalismo político, por Carlos Donoso Pacheco

El liberalismo norteamericano y sus críticos: Rawls, Taylor, Sandel, Walzer, por Chantal Mouffe

La crítica comunitaria a la moral liberal, por Renato Cristi


ELEMENTOS Nº 31 – “Armin Mohler y la “Konservative Revolution” Alemana” (publicado 12 Agosto 2012)


El movimiento de la Revolución Conservadora, por Robert Steuckers

La herencia del movimiento de la “Revolución Conservadora” en Europa, por Ian B. Warren

La Revolución Conservadora, por Keith Bullivant

La crisis de la democracia en Weimar:Oposición ideológica de la Revolución

Conservadora,por José Ramón Díez Espinosa

La Revolución Conservadora en Alemania, por Marqués de Valdeiglesias

Ideas para Europa: la Revolución Conservadora, por Luca Leonello Rimbotti

Revolución Conservadora y nacionalsocialismo, por Andrea Virga

Evola y la Revolución Conservadora, por Giano Accame

La Konservative Revolution como doctrina de la decadencia de Alemania, por Miguel Ángel Simón

La influencia de Armin Mohler sobre la cosmovision de la Nueva Derecha, por Robert Steuckers

De la «Konservative Revolution» a la «Nouvelle Droite»: ¿apropiación o rehabilitación?, por Sebastian J. Lorenz

La Revolución Conservadora y la cuestión de las minorías nacionales, por Xoxé M. Núzez Seixas

El sinsentido de la Revolución Conservadora Historia de la idea, nacionalismo y habitus, por Henning Eichberg

Índice de los autores de la «Konservative Revolution”, según Armin Mohler


ELEMENTOS Nº 32 – “Imperio: Orden Especial y Espiritual” (publicado 11 septiembre 2012)


La idea de Imperio, por Alain de Benoist

Translatio Imperii: del Imperio a la Unión, por Peter Sloterdijk

¿Hacia un modelo neoimperialista? Gran espacio e Imperio en Carl Schmitt, por Alessandro Campi

¿Europa imperial?, por Rodrigo Agulló

Imperialismo pagano, por Julius Evola

El concepto de Imperio en el Derecho internacional, por Carl Schmitt

Nación e Imperio, por Giorgio Locchi

El Imperium a la luz de la Tradición, por Eduard Alcántara

Imperio sin Imperator, por Celso Sánchez Capdequí

Imperio: Constitución y Autoridad imperial, por Michael Hardt y Antonio Negri

La teoría posmoderna del Imperio, por Alan Rush

El Imperium espiritual de Europa: de Ortega a Sloterdijk, por Sebastian J. Lorenz


ELEMENTOS N° 37 – “Federalismo Poliárquico Neoalthusiano” (publicado 28 Noviembre 2012)


El primer federalista. Johannes Althusius, por Alain de Benoist

Carl Schmitt y el Federalismo, por Luis María Bandieri

Nacionalismo, Democracia y Federalismo, por Ramón Máiz

Europa federal y el principio de subsidiariedad, por Rodrigo Agulló

España, ¿federación o autodeterminación?, por Sebastian J. Lorenz

Plurinacionalidad, Federalismo y Derecho de Autodeterminación, por Jaime Pastor

El federalismo pluralista. Del federalismo nacional al federalismo plurinacional, por Miquel Caminal

Federalismo plurinacional, por Ramón Máiz

Estado federal y Confederación de Estados, por Max Sercq

De la Confederación a la Federación. Reflexiones sobre la finalidad de la integración europea, por Joschka Fischer

Federalismo versus Imperialismo, por Juan Beneyto

Europa. De imperio a federación, por Josep M. Colomer

Entrevistas imaginarias con el Presidente de Europa y el Jefe del Gobierno europeo


ELEMENTOS Nº 39 – “Una Crítica Metapolítica de la Democracia: De Carl Schmitt a Alain de Benoist, Vol. I” (publicado 23 Enero 2013)


Democracia, el problema

Democracia representativa y democracia participativa, por Alain de Benoist

La crítica de la democracia, por Felipe Giménez Pérez

La democracia: Un análisis a partir de los críticos, por Eva Garrell Zulueta

La crítica decisionista de Carl Schmitt a la democracia liberal, por Antonella Attili

Rectificación metapolítica de la democracia, por Primo Siena

La crítica de Nietzsche a la Democracia  en Humano, demasiado humano, por Diego Felipe Paredes

Teoría democrática: Joseph Schumpeter y la síntesis moderna, por Godofredo Vidal de la Rosa

La crisis de la Democracia, por Marcel Gauchet

Democracia morbosa. Variaciones sobre un tema de Ortega, por Ignacio Sánchez Cámara

La democracia capitalista como forma extrema del totalitarismo. Entrevista con Philip Allot, por Irene Hernández Velasco

Sobre Nietzsche contra la democracia, de Nicolás González Varela, por Salvador López Arnal

La Democracia como Nematología. Sobre El fundamentalismo democrático, de Gustavo Bueno, por Íñigo Ongay de Felipe


ELEMENTOS Nº 40 – “Antonio Gramsci y el Poder Cultural. Por un Gramscismo de Derecha” (publicado 11 Febrero 2013)


El gramscismo de derecha, por Marcos Ghio

Antonio Gramsci, marxista independiente, por Alain de Benoist

La estrategia metapolítica de la Nueva Derecha, por Carlos Pinedo

Un gramcismo de derechas. La Nueva derecha y la batalla de las ideas, por Rodrigo Agulló

El Poder Cultural, por Alain de Benoist

Gramsci, la revolución cultural y la estrategia para Occidente, por Ricardo Miguel Flore

El concepto de hegemonia en Gramsci, por Luciano Grupp

Gramsci y la sociología del conocimiento,por Salvador Orlando Alfaro

Antonio Gramsci: orientaciones, por Daniel Campione

Cómo Ganar la Guerra de las Ideas: Lecciones de la Derecha Gramsciana Neoliberal, por Susan George


ELEMENTOS Nº 41 – “Una Crítica Metapolítica de la Democracia: De Carl Schmitt a Alain de Benoist, Vol. II” (publicado 18 Febrero 2013)


Democracia antigua y “Democracia” moderna, por Alain de Benoist

¿Es eterna la democracia liberal? Algunas opiniones al respecto,por Pedro Carlos González Cuevas

La democracia según la Escuela de Frankfurt y Carl Schmitt: ¿Opuestos y complementarios?, por Emmanuel Brugaletta

Carl Schmitt y René Capitant. Parlamentarismo y Democracia, por Xavier Marchand

La democracia federalista, por Sergio Fernández Riquelme

Tres modelos de democracia. Sobre el concepto de una política deliberativa, por Jürgen Habermas

Carl Schmitt y la paradoja de la democracia liberal, por Chantal Mouffe

Elitismo y Democracia: de Pareto a Schumpeter, por Mercedes Carreras

Democracia como sistema, democracia como ideología, por Pelayo García Sierra

Filósofos para una nueva democracia, por Braulio García Jaén

¿Hacia un nueva democracia? Habermas y Schmitt, por Ellen Kennedy

El invierno de la democracia, por Guy Hermet

Los enemigos de la democracia: la dictadura neoliberal, por Eduardo Álvarez Puga

Democracia sin demócratas, de Marcos Roitman, por Josep Pradas


ELEMENTOS N° 43 – “La Causa de los Pueblos: Etnicidad e Identidad” (publicado 18 Marzo 2013)


La causa de los pueblos, por Isidro Juan Palacios

El etnocidio contra los pueblos: Mecánica y consecuencias del neo-colonialismo cultural, por José Javier Esparza

Etnopluralismo: las ideas de la Nueva Derecha, por Carlos Pinedo

El Arraigo por Alain de Benoist

La Europa de las etnias: nuestro único futuro posible, por Olegario de las Eras

La cuestión étnica: Aproximación a los conceptos de grupo étnico, identidad étnica, etnicidad y relaciones interétnicas, por Maria Cristina Bari

Visiones de la etnicidad, por Manuel Ángel Río Ruiz

Sobre la identidad de los pueblos, por Luis Villoro

La etnicidad y sus formas: aproximación a un modelo complejo de la pertenencia étnica, por Eduardo Terrén

El problema del etnocentrismo en el debate antropológico entre Clifford Geertz, Richard Rorty y Lévi-Strauss, por Rafael Aguilera Portales

La negación de la realidad étnica, por Guillaume Faye

Etnicidad y nacionalismo, por Isidoro Moreno Navarro

Etnicidad sin garantías: contribuciones de Stuart Hall, por Eduardo Restrepo

Etnia y etnicidad: dos categorías en construcción, por Carlos Ramiro Bravo Molina


ELEMENTOS N° 47 – “Elogio de la Diferencia. Diferencialismo versus Racismo” (publicado 28 Mayo 2013)


Identidad y diferencia, por Alain de Benoist

Sobre racismo y antirracismo. Entrevista a Alain de Benoist, por Peter Krause

Diferencialismo contra racismo. Sobre los orígenes modernos del racismo, por Gilbert Destrées

El racismo. Génesis y desarrollo de una ideología de la Modernidad, por Carlos Caballero Jurado

Hacia un concepto convencional de raza, por Sebastian J. Lorenz

Nihilismo Racial, por Richard McCulloch

El antirracismo como religión de Estado, por Guillaume Faye

Un asunto tenebroso: el problema del racismo en la Nueva Derecha, por Diego Luis Sanromán

El racismo como ideología política. El discurso anti-inmigración de la Nueva Derecha, por José Luis Solana Ruiz

Sobre viejos y nuevos racismos. Las ideas de la Nueva Derecha, por Rodrigo Agulló


ELEMENTOS Nº 54 – “La Falsa Ideología de los Derechos Humanos” (publicado 30 Agosto 2013)


Más allá de los Derechos Humanos. Defender las Libertades, por Alain de Benoist

Reflexiones en torno a los Derechos Humanos, por Charles Champetier

El Derecho de los Hombres, por Guillaume Faye

Derechos Humanos: una ideología para la mundialización, por Rodrigo Agulló

En torno a la Doctrina de los Derechos Humanos, por Erwin Robertson

¿Derechos del hombre?, por Adriano Scianca

¿Son universales los Derechos Humanos?, por François Julien

Los Derechos Humanos  como derechos de propiedad, por Murray Rothbard

La religión de los Derechos Humanos, por Guillaume Faye

Derechos comunes y Derechos personales en Ortega y Gasset, por Alejandro de Haro Honrubia

Derechos Humanos: disyuntiva de nuestro tiempo, por Alberto Buela


ELEMENTOS Nº 61 – “La Condición Femenina. ¿Feminismo o Feminidad?” (publicado 28 Noviembre 2013)


Visión ontológico-teológica de lo masculino y lo femenino, por Leonardo Boff

El ser oculto de la cultura femenina en la obra de Georg Simmel, por Josetxo Beriain

El feminismo de la diferencia, por Marta Colorado López, Liliana Arango Palacio, Sofía Fernández Fuente

La condición femenina, por Alain de Benoist

La mujer objeto de la dominación masculina, por Pierre Bourdieu

Feminidad versus Feminismo, por Cesáreo Marítimo

Afirmando las diferencias. El feminismo de Nietzsche, por Elvira Burgos Díaz

La mujer como madre y la mujer como amante, por Julius Evola

El “recelo feminista” a proposito del ensayo La dominacion masculina de

Pierre Bourdieu, por Yuliuva Hernández García

Friedrich Nietzsche y Sigmund Freud: una subversión feminista, por Eva Parrondo Coppel

Hombres y mujeres. Un análisis desde la teoría de la polaridad, por Raúl Martínez Ibars

Identidad femenina y humanización del mundo, por Rodrigo Guerra
Simmel y la cultura femenina, por Raquel Osborne

La nueva feminidad, Entrevista a Annalinde Nightwind

El hombre no es un enemigo a batir, Entrevista con Elisabeth Badinter


ELEMENTOS Nº 64 – “El Eterno Retorno de Mircea Eliade”  (publicado 20 Marzo 2014)


Bibliografía comentada de Mircea Eliade, por José Antonio Hernández García

Antropología y religión en el pensamiento de Mircea Eliade, por Pedro Gómez García

Mircea Eliade y el ideal del hombre universal, por Ioan Petru Culianu

Mircea Eliade y la Revolución Conservadora en Rumanía, por Claudio Mutti

Paisaje espiritual de Mircea Eliade, por Sergio Fritz Roa

Ingenieros de almas. Cioran, Elíade y la Guardia de Hierro, por Luis de León Barga

La experiencia de lo sagrado según Mircea Eliade, por François Chirpaz

Muerte y religión en Mircea Eliade, por Margarita Ossorio Menéndez

El paradigma del mito-ontológico de Mircea Eliade y su significación metodológica, por Nataly Nikonovich

Eliade y la antropología, por José Antonio González Alcantud

Mircea Eliade: hombre histórico, hombre mítico, por Hugo Basile

Mircea Eliade: un parsifal extraviado, por Enrico Montarani

Las huellas de la ideología en el pensamiento antropológico. El caso de

Mircea Eliade, por Pedro Jesús Pérez Zafrilla

Mircea Eliade, el novelista, por Constantin Sorin Catrinescu


ELEMENTOS Nº 70 – “Alexander Dugin y la Cuarta Teoría Política: La Nueva Derecha Rusa Eurasiática” (publicado 29 Mayo 2014)


Alexander Dugin: la Nueva Derecha rusa, entre el Neo-Eurasianismo y la Cuarta Teoría Política, por Jesús J. Sebastián

Más allá del liberalismo: hacia la Cuarta Teoría Política, por Alexander Dugin

Necesidad de la Cuarta Teoría Política, por Leonid Savin

La Cuarta Teoría Política y la “Otra Europa”, por Natella Speranskaya

El Liberalismo y la Guerra Rusia-Occidente, por Alexander Dugin

Alexander Dugin, o cuando la metafísica y la política se unen, por Sergio Fritz

La Cuarta Teoría Política, entrevista a Natella Speranskaya, por Claudio Mutti

El quinto estado: una réplica a Alexander Dugin, por Marcos Ghio

La Tercera Teoría Política. Una crítica a la Cuarta Teoría Política, por Michael O’Meara

La gran guerra de los continentes. Geopolítica y fuerzas ocultas de la historia, por Alexander Dugin

La globalización para bien de los pueblos. Perspectivas de la nueva teoría política, por Leonid Savin

Alianza Global Revolucionaria, entrevista a Natella Speranskaya

Contribución a la teoría actual de la protesta radical, por Geidar Dzhemal

El proyecto de la Gran Europa. Un esbozo geopolítico para un futuro mundo multipolar, por Alexander Dugin

Rusia, clave de bóveda del sistema multipolar, por Tiberio Graziani

La dinámica ideológica en Rusia y los cambios del curso de su política exterior, por Alexander Dugin

Un Estado étnico para Rusia. El fracaso del proyecto multicultural, por Vladimir Putin

Reportaje sobre Dugin (revista alemana Zuerst!), por Manuel Ochsenreiter

Dugin: de la Unión Nacional-Bolchevique al Partido Euroasiático, por Xavier Casals Meseguer


ELEMENTOS Nº 79 – “Contra Occidente: Salir del Sistema Occidental” (publicado 29 Agosto 2014)


Occidente debe ser olvidado, por Alain de Benoist

Occidente como decadencia, por Carlos Pinedo

¿Existe todavía el mundo occidental?, por Immanuel Wallerstein

¿Qué es Occidente?, por Juan Pablo Vitali

Romper con la civilización occidental, por Guillaume Faye

Sobre Nietzsche y el masoquismo occidental, por Carlos Javier Blanco Martín

Hispanoamérica contra Occidente, por Alberto Buela

El paradigma occidental, por H.C.F. Mansilla

El decadentismo occidental, por Jesús J. Sebastián

Critica del sistema occidental, por Guillaume Faye

¿El ascenso de Occidente?, por Immanuel Wallerstein

René Guénon, ¿profeta del fin de Occidente?, por Antonio Martínez

Más allá de Oriente y Occidente, por María Teresa Román López

Civilización y hegemonía de Occidente, por Jaime Parra

Apogeo y decadencia de Occidente, por Mario Vargas Llosa
Europa vs. Occidente, por Claudi Finzi

Occidente contra Occidente. Brecha intelectual francesa, por José Andrés Fernández Leost

Civilización e Ideología occidentales, por Guillaume Faye

Occidente como destino. Una lectura weberiana, por Jacobo Muñoz


ELEMENTOS Nº 82 – “El Debate sobre el Paganismo de la Nueva Derecha (Vol. 1)” (publicado 11 Octubre 2014)


¿Cómo se puede ser pagano? (I), por Alain de Benoist

La cuestión religiosa y la Nueva Derecha, por José Javier Esparza

¿Qué aliento sagrado puede salvarnos? Carta abierta a José Javier Esparza, por Javier Ruiz Portella

La tentación pagana, por Thomas Molnar

Paganismo, la nueva religión europea, por Guillaume Faye

¿Qué religión para Europa? La polémica del neopaganismo, por Rodrigo Agulló

La Derecha pagana, por Tomislav Sunic

Monoteísmo versus Politeísmo, por Alain de Benoist

El paganismo: religión de la vida terrenal, por José Vicente Pascual

La religión en las sociedades occidentales, por Alain de Benoist

El paganismo de Hamsun y Lawrence, por Robert Steuckers

El eclipse de lo sagrado, ¿o el sagrado eclipse?, por Paul Gottfried

La reacción contra la modernidad y la secularización del cristianismo, por Adolfo Galeano Ofm

El Paganismo como concepción del Mundo, por Ramón Bau

Contra Dawkins: qué esconden sus preferencias por el politeísmo, por Javier del Arco

Politeísmo versus monoteísmo: el desarrollo de la crítica a la religión cristiana en la obra de Friedrich Nietzsche, por Herbert Fre

El origen de la Navidad. Las raíces paganas de una fiesta cristiana, por Alfredo Martorell


ELEMENTOS Nº 83 – “El Debate sobre el Paganismo de la Nueva Derecha (Vol. 2)” (publicado 11 Octubre 2014)


¿Cómo se puede ser pagano? (II), por Alain de Benoist

Lo sagrado en la cultura europea, por Carlos Martínez-Cava

Marx, Moisés y los Paganos en la Ciudad Secular, por Tomislav Sunic

Dioses y titanes: entrevista con Guillaume Faye sobre el paganismo, por Christopher Gérard

¿Es preciso ser cristiano? La Derecha tradicional, por José Javier Esparza

La religión de Europa, por Alain de Benoist

¿Qué religión para Europa?, por Diego L. Sanromán

Entre el paganismo y la derecha radical, por Stéphane François

Europa: pagana y cristiana, por Juan Pablo Vitali

Humanismo profano y neopaganismo moderno, por Arnaud Imatz

Del politeísmo al monoteísmo: los riesgos de los fundamentalismos, por Juan Antonio Estrada

El Frente Nacional de Marine Le Pen y la derecha pagana, por Fernando José Vaquero Oroquieta

La cuestión del paganismo. Entrevista a Alain de Benoist, por Charles Champetier

Paganismo y nihilismo, por Daniel Aragón Ortiz

El neopaganismo pessoano, por Antonio López Martín

El nuevo paganismo ¿triunfo del ilusionismo?, por José Miguel Odero

Paganismo y Cristianismo, por Eduard Alcántara


ELEMENTOS Nº 84 – Julien Freund: Lo Político en Esencia (publicado 31 Octubre 2014)


Julien Freund: una introducción, por Juan Carlos Corbetta

Julien Freund, un politique para nuestro tiempo, por Jerónimo Molina

Julien Freund y la impolítica, por Alain de Benoist

Evocación de Julien Freund, por Günter Maschke

Julien Freund, por Dalmacio Negro Pavón

Conflicto, política y polemología en el pensamiento de Julien Freund, por Jerónimo Molina

Julien Freund, analista político: contextos y perspectivas de interpretación, por Juan C. Valderrama Abenza

Lo público y la libertad en el pensamiento de Julien Freund, por Cristián Rojas González

El realismo político. A propósito de La esencia de lo político, de Julien Freund, por Felipe Giménez Pérez

Julien Freund. Del Realismo Político al Maquiavelismo, por Jerónimo Molina

Situación polémica y terceros en Schmitt y Freund, por Jorge Giraldo Ramírez

Orden y situación política en Julien Freund, por Juan C. Valderrama Abenza

Las nociones de mando y obediencia en la teoría política de Julien Freund, por Jerónimo Molina

Julien  Freund: la paz como medio de la política, por José Romero Serrano

Julien Freund: entre liberalismo y conservadurismo, por Sébastien de la Touanne


Otros Ensayos:

“Alain de Benoist y su crítica del capitalismo” por Carlos Javier Blanco Martín

“La Nueva Derecha Criolla” por Francisco Albanese


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